I vaguely recall reading of a few air missions as well that delivered mortar bombs and .50 cal ammo. Perhaps a few pan am calliper flights were made.
Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon
- Thread starter galveston bay
- Start date
As of early March the Japanese control Davao (Mindanao) and most of the Dutch East Indies, so the airlift is over and only submarines can risk it
IIRC the planes flew in empty to conserve fuel, then flew out with wounded and personnel whose knowledge was wanted back in the States or people like codebreakers who couldn't be allowed to fall into enemy hands.
There were blockade running attempts to bring in food but the Japanese stopped or sank most of the vessels involved. Eventually the plan had to be scrapped...
There were blockade running attempts to bring in food but the Japanese stopped or sank most of the vessels involved. Eventually the plan had to be scrapped...
ITTL there was an extensive airlift until early February which was redirected to Singapore for 2 weeks, then back to Panay/Cebu until the Japanese hit Darwin at which point that airlift was redirected to Java. No surface ships have attempted to run the blockade since mid January ITTL. There are a number of submarines operating out of Allied held Rabaul that have begun carrying in a trickle of supplies and evacuating a trickle of personnel. More on that later.
In OTL there was an effort made, but none of the surface ships made it past Panay, while the airlift was a occasional run by PBY or Beechcraft (flown by Pappy Gunn) or submarine (a handful of trips)
I wonder how useful the Narwhal and Argonaut would be in running supplies in to Bataan? If I remember correctly each sub could carry well over a ton or more and cover the distance from Australia or Pearl to the army on the peninsula.
they are on their way but not available until June 1942
https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...arriors-of-luzon.409504/page-51#post-14672217
for now the Navy is relying on 8 fleet submarines from the Asiatic Fleet
Battle of Balanga Bagac Line (Day 1)
Good Friday (April 3) The main attack
The Japanese hit I Corps with the entire strength of the 4th Infantry Division, reinforced with 62nd Infantry Brigade, thus have 5 regiments of infantry backed by 150 tanks, 2 regiments of engineers, 6 battalions of light artillery (75 mm), plus 2 anti-aircraft battalions firing as direct support. At 0500 hours, the Japanese open fire with their medium and heavy artillery (105 and 155 mm) a total of 200 guns plus another 24 heavier guns (5.9 inch, 210 mm and 240 mm). Supporting this are strikes by 100 light bombers which combined with the fire of over 300 light, medium, heavy and super heavy guns, starts numerous fires in the dry grass and trees. The bombardment and air strikes continue from 0500 until 1100 Hours, and wreck communications telephone lines, knock out many mortars and machine guns and inflict serious casualties and is the heaviest artillery attack of the campaign thus far. American and Filipino artillery are ordered to withhold their fire unless the enemy is in direct line of sight to save ammunition.
Japanese light artillery in action
This attack hits the 1st and 51st Infantry Division, each which has all of their battalions (18 total) deployed on the front line that is 20 kilometers long. Each battalion is deployed in triangular perimeter, holding a front 1,000 meters across, with 2 companies forward and 1 at the apex in the rear, and with their few machine guns in reserve as a provisional heavy weapons company usually under the leadership of an American NCO. Most battalions have 1-2 American officers and 2-3 American NCOs as advisers at this point, mainly handling communications and the heavy weapons. All positions are wired in, with troops living in 2 and 4 man fighting positions with overhead cover (logs) and with what camouflage can be afforded based on whether they are in the jungle or in the coastal plain (which consists of rice paddies and marsh). A few bunkers are in the interior position for support elements, the command post, and aid station. Just after dark, each battalion is given a half battery of 3 75 mm guns (with only a few shells each) to provide something to fight tanks with. This pretty much strips both divisions of their divisional artillery aside from a battery of 105 mm guns each, but the deployment of the Corps and Army artillery reserve provides general support for both divisions.
In reserve is provisional emergency battalions consisting of support personnel from the division support troops to defend the hospital, artillery battery positions, divisional command post, maintenance and repair facilities, the division kitchen and the like. The 12th Division is corps reserve, and 2 of its regiments are moved up the night of April 2 to form a back stop with the 13th Infantry (PA) assigned to the 1st Division as its reserve, and the 92nd Infantry (PA) assigned the 51st Division as its reserve. Both of these regiments are soon fighting Japanese infiltrators which cut off the front line as the Japanese penetrate gaps between the battalions during the hours of darkness. The 12th Division keeps its 57th Infantry (PS), as takes command of the reserve force of the 6th Cavalry Brigade (US/PS), 101st Infantry Brigade (PA), 2 US tank battalions, a motorized AAA regiment (PA), and an engineer group (regimental strength, PA).
The Japanese commit half of their infantry battalions (6 total) toward the infiltration effort, and fierce fighting results between the reserve regiments of the two defending divisions and the Japanese well before the artillery barrage begins. This also means that forward battalions cannot be reinforced or resupplied and they cannot retreat without literally fighting their way out. Japanese scouts are also able to identify accurately the exact positions of each of the battalions holding the front line and send word back to their artillery and assault formations.
At 0900 hours, as General Lim, commander of I Corps, is considering committing his reserves to clear Japanese infiltrators when the Japanese open up with their artillery and begin the first of 300 bombing sorties over I Corps that day. Japanese 75 and 105 mm guns open up on forward positions with direct and indirect fire, while heavier guns (155 mm and larger) along with the bombers concentrate on an area bombardment hitting identified rear area positions, trails and roads, water crossings and artillery positions that are known. This bombardment continues for hours, only relenting after 1500 hours, and starting numerous fires, wrecking those communications wires that had not already been cut by infiltrators, and preventing Lim from committing his reserves. Direct fire also inflicts serious casualties on the men holding the forward company positions and keeps the defenders heads down while Japanese engineers clear gaps in the wire for the infantry assault that is about to begin.
As the last shells hit American positions, the Japanese launch diversionary attacks with the 62nd Brigade (3 battalions supported by 50 tanks and 1 engineer regiment) against the 51st Division, with company sized attacks against all but one battalion (1/45 PS) which is hit by a battalion sized attack with 30 tanks in support. The 1/45 is at the extreme right, with only a tentative link with the 3/3 PA of the 1st Division to its right. The Filipino battalion has only 204 men holding its front line positions as the 900 Japanese engineers and riflemen, supported by knee mortars, machine guns, tanks, and direct fire from 75 mm field guns and heavier mortars overwhelms them in 5 hours of savage fighting. Only 2 of the 75 mm guns defending the position survive the artillery attacks, and they manage to knock out 6 Japanese tanks before being destroyed. Major Alcantera, commander of the 1/45, leads a desperate breakout with surviving support personnel and the remaining infantry company, but in the darkness blunder into Japanese infiltrators which causes the breakout attempt to stall and the remaining Filipinos and the last American adviser are overwhelmed by Japanese from the front and rear during the night.
The 3/3 PA suffers a similar fate at the hands of a battalion assault group made up of the 1/37th Infantry with similar tank, engineer and artillery support.
The first day of fighting has cost the Japanese 3,000 casualties, the Filipinos have lost 2,500 casualties, including the complete destruction of 2 infantry battalions. Japanese infantry and engineer battalions are at 75% strength, tank losses amount to 30 tanks destroyed or broken down and out of the fight, and there is a 2,200 meter gap in the Filipino defense line.
General Siechi, the commander of the 20th Army, orders the 38th Infantry Division to move up to take advantage of the breech in the defense at 0500 hours.
The Japanese hit I Corps with the entire strength of the 4th Infantry Division, reinforced with 62nd Infantry Brigade, thus have 5 regiments of infantry backed by 150 tanks, 2 regiments of engineers, 6 battalions of light artillery (75 mm), plus 2 anti-aircraft battalions firing as direct support. At 0500 hours, the Japanese open fire with their medium and heavy artillery (105 and 155 mm) a total of 200 guns plus another 24 heavier guns (5.9 inch, 210 mm and 240 mm). Supporting this are strikes by 100 light bombers which combined with the fire of over 300 light, medium, heavy and super heavy guns, starts numerous fires in the dry grass and trees. The bombardment and air strikes continue from 0500 until 1100 Hours, and wreck communications telephone lines, knock out many mortars and machine guns and inflict serious casualties and is the heaviest artillery attack of the campaign thus far. American and Filipino artillery are ordered to withhold their fire unless the enemy is in direct line of sight to save ammunition.
Japanese light artillery in action
This attack hits the 1st and 51st Infantry Division, each which has all of their battalions (18 total) deployed on the front line that is 20 kilometers long. Each battalion is deployed in triangular perimeter, holding a front 1,000 meters across, with 2 companies forward and 1 at the apex in the rear, and with their few machine guns in reserve as a provisional heavy weapons company usually under the leadership of an American NCO. Most battalions have 1-2 American officers and 2-3 American NCOs as advisers at this point, mainly handling communications and the heavy weapons. All positions are wired in, with troops living in 2 and 4 man fighting positions with overhead cover (logs) and with what camouflage can be afforded based on whether they are in the jungle or in the coastal plain (which consists of rice paddies and marsh). A few bunkers are in the interior position for support elements, the command post, and aid station. Just after dark, each battalion is given a half battery of 3 75 mm guns (with only a few shells each) to provide something to fight tanks with. This pretty much strips both divisions of their divisional artillery aside from a battery of 105 mm guns each, but the deployment of the Corps and Army artillery reserve provides general support for both divisions.
In reserve is provisional emergency battalions consisting of support personnel from the division support troops to defend the hospital, artillery battery positions, divisional command post, maintenance and repair facilities, the division kitchen and the like. The 12th Division is corps reserve, and 2 of its regiments are moved up the night of April 2 to form a back stop with the 13th Infantry (PA) assigned to the 1st Division as its reserve, and the 92nd Infantry (PA) assigned the 51st Division as its reserve. Both of these regiments are soon fighting Japanese infiltrators which cut off the front line as the Japanese penetrate gaps between the battalions during the hours of darkness. The 12th Division keeps its 57th Infantry (PS), as takes command of the reserve force of the 6th Cavalry Brigade (US/PS), 101st Infantry Brigade (PA), 2 US tank battalions, a motorized AAA regiment (PA), and an engineer group (regimental strength, PA).
The Japanese commit half of their infantry battalions (6 total) toward the infiltration effort, and fierce fighting results between the reserve regiments of the two defending divisions and the Japanese well before the artillery barrage begins. This also means that forward battalions cannot be reinforced or resupplied and they cannot retreat without literally fighting their way out. Japanese scouts are also able to identify accurately the exact positions of each of the battalions holding the front line and send word back to their artillery and assault formations.
At 0900 hours, as General Lim, commander of I Corps, is considering committing his reserves to clear Japanese infiltrators when the Japanese open up with their artillery and begin the first of 300 bombing sorties over I Corps that day. Japanese 75 and 105 mm guns open up on forward positions with direct and indirect fire, while heavier guns (155 mm and larger) along with the bombers concentrate on an area bombardment hitting identified rear area positions, trails and roads, water crossings and artillery positions that are known. This bombardment continues for hours, only relenting after 1500 hours, and starting numerous fires, wrecking those communications wires that had not already been cut by infiltrators, and preventing Lim from committing his reserves. Direct fire also inflicts serious casualties on the men holding the forward company positions and keeps the defenders heads down while Japanese engineers clear gaps in the wire for the infantry assault that is about to begin.
As the last shells hit American positions, the Japanese launch diversionary attacks with the 62nd Brigade (3 battalions supported by 50 tanks and 1 engineer regiment) against the 51st Division, with company sized attacks against all but one battalion (1/45 PS) which is hit by a battalion sized attack with 30 tanks in support. The 1/45 is at the extreme right, with only a tentative link with the 3/3 PA of the 1st Division to its right. The Filipino battalion has only 204 men holding its front line positions as the 900 Japanese engineers and riflemen, supported by knee mortars, machine guns, tanks, and direct fire from 75 mm field guns and heavier mortars overwhelms them in 5 hours of savage fighting. Only 2 of the 75 mm guns defending the position survive the artillery attacks, and they manage to knock out 6 Japanese tanks before being destroyed. Major Alcantera, commander of the 1/45, leads a desperate breakout with surviving support personnel and the remaining infantry company, but in the darkness blunder into Japanese infiltrators which causes the breakout attempt to stall and the remaining Filipinos and the last American adviser are overwhelmed by Japanese from the front and rear during the night.
The 3/3 PA suffers a similar fate at the hands of a battalion assault group made up of the 1/37th Infantry with similar tank, engineer and artillery support.
The first day of fighting has cost the Japanese 3,000 casualties, the Filipinos have lost 2,500 casualties, including the complete destruction of 2 infantry battalions. Japanese infantry and engineer battalions are at 75% strength, tank losses amount to 30 tanks destroyed or broken down and out of the fight, and there is a 2,200 meter gap in the Filipino defense line.
General Siechi, the commander of the 20th Army, orders the 38th Infantry Division to move up to take advantage of the breech in the defense at 0500 hours.
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map of Good Friday Offensive
Red solid line is the depth of the Japanese initial penetration April 3
Dotted line is the depth of infiltration
authors notes: I hope the map makes sense
OTL the Japanese blasted right through the forward lines held by American and Filipino forces and continued to advance with little difficulty until the surrender on April 9. They are having more difficulty here but concentration of force has its advantages. The shortage of artillery ammunition, limited number of field radios and other communications equipment and shortage of automatic weapons is making the difference in favor of the Japanese, but the far superior level of training, physical fitness, and thus determination by the defenders ITTL is also affecting the situation.
But there is a powerful reserve that has a lot of firepower moving up for the American/Filipino force
OTL the Japanese blasted right through the forward lines held by American and Filipino forces and continued to advance with little difficulty until the surrender on April 9. They are having more difficulty here but concentration of force has its advantages. The shortage of artillery ammunition, limited number of field radios and other communications equipment and shortage of automatic weapons is making the difference in favor of the Japanese, but the far superior level of training, physical fitness, and thus determination by the defenders ITTL is also affecting the situation.
But there is a powerful reserve that has a lot of firepower moving up for the American/Filipino force
That is all for this weekend... took a while to figure out how all this would occur. Infantry combat is complicated.
Barry Bull
Donor
With so many more casualities, the more successful Doolittle Raid and the crazy derail of timetables, it would be interesting to see the domestic reaction in Japan home islands and the buttlefiles it caused in the strategic deliberations in the Imperial General Headquarters. Having suffered so many losses in the conquest of the Pacific with the Allies much more active and in better position than OTL, what would Japaneses do differently in TTL. Or would they?
there is also the problem of the outer perimeter not yet having been secured... the Allies still hold the Solomons, Bismarks, most of Papau and the Japanese have not yet moved on the Gilbert Islands (with the first attempt being derailed by the Marshal Islands Raid in "Flattops and Flyboys") and they haven't done anything about the Aleutians yet either.
A powerful Allied presence at Rabaul is particularly a problem, as it directly threatens the western portion of the Mandates and outflanks the eastern Mandates (Marshal Islands)
So expect to see some action there
Barry Bull
Donor
I understand this is a war TL first and foremost, but it would really be interesting if some time can be devoted to described the respective home fronts in Japan and USA.
Also, I see you are a fellow TOAW III player, how about a friendly round of game?
IMHO I don't think there will be much difference in morale on either home front. OTL the general morale in the USA was "we are completely pissed off and will stomp Japan", the loses in the PI and various Pacific Islands including Wake did not really depress the USA, here there have been fewer losses and some success but nothing seen by the public as "big". In Japan, because of the control of information as well as the militarization of Japan in the decades before the war, morale was maintained OTL at least until the daily appearance of B-29s over Japan. Since the public did not know the timetable for the advances, the fact that the victories japan has had are behind schedule does not matter they are still victories.
No Clipper flights.. The clippers had become a vital national war resource. Connecting the West Coast with Hawaii, and Australia, with high value individuals, and cargo(radar parts).
Dunno why, but the last map made me think of the Pusan Perimeter...
I'm afraid that, when the defensive line brokes, there would be no more withdrawal positions.
I'm afraid that, when the defensive line brokes, there would be no more withdrawal positions.
I read Clay Blair's "The Forgotten War" again recently and there are a number of battalion and regimental commanders in the early stages of Korea who were at Bataan. They definitely had concerns about that.