Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon

At this time I think the best option would be to start planning for the inevitable guerilla war against the Japanese. Reading all the suggestions/ideas about resupply by submarine and air has given me this idea:
1. Start identifying volunteer officers/NCOs to stay behind and
Organize a guerilla force. Preferably American officers with good working relationships with their Philippine counterparts.
2. Have the Navy start on recon missions for covert landing sites. Start updating maps.
3. Have an Air officer start doing the planning on flying back and forth from Australia to Mindanao under all kinds of conditions.
4. Most important start working on effective communications system. Make sure those stay behind teams have good radios and operators. Start working on establishing codes.
 
They did have these hatches for loading Torpedoes

Yes they did! Remember that the Mk 14 torpedo was 21 inches in diameter. The loading hatch was only 24 inches in diameter. That dictated what could be loaded and unloaded.

During my service in submarines, I participated in numerous stores loads prior to getting under way. They were an all hands evolution, even the officers and Chiefs helped. Cases of food were opened and canned food, loaves of bread, frozen meat, etc. were all passed down the hatches one by one. The most ridiculous event was loading toilet paper. They came in cases of 48 rolls and the cases were too big to fit down the hatches. So one Sailor would be topside with the open case and one Sailor down below at the bottom of the hatch. Several more Sailors would be positioned in a line running aft to the crew's head and the storage locker. The guy topside would open a case, drop a roll down to the guy at the bottom of the ladder, then he would throw it, football style, aft to the next guy and then to the next until the last Sailor would stash it in the locker.

I bring this all up to illustrate the difficulties in loading/unloading supplies and stores on a submarine. Yes, it can be done, but it is very inefficient and time consuming.
 
Final Defense Line as of January 30 1942 (Map)
Final Defense Line as of January 30 1942.jpg
 
The Final Defense Line
Fall back to the Final Defense Line January 27 – 29
Eisenhower and Wainwright decide after the heavy losses suffered at 1st Bataan that it is time to fall back to the prepared Final Defense Line, which the engineers of the USAFE have been preparing since November 1941. With the Japanese reeling and still falling back to reorganize, now is the perfect opportunity. Once again the cavalry troopers of the 26th and 112th Cavalry take up positions as the rear guard, supported by the 101st Infantry Brigade, all veterans of the phased retreat to Bataan. The rest of the USAFE is pulled back to the Bagac-Pilar Line over the course of the next two days.

Needing fresh troops, and running low on American infantry for the 31st and 65th Infantry regiment, Eisenhower orders the 91st Infantry Brigade (with its two regiments, the 91st and 92nd PA Infantry) which have been training at Corregidor since November 1941 broken up as replacements, while the 16th Naval District moves both of the American regiments (down to 40% strength) to Corregidor to replace them. Both American regiments are reorganized as single battalions, and excess personnel are either assigned to the 6th Cavalry or assigned to special group that Eisenhower intends to evacuate from the Philippines. Also sent over is the 1st Engineer Regiment (Philippine Army) which together with the 2 American battalions provides Corregidor with an infantry defense force of 3,500 US and Filipino troops. This also reduces the total garrison of Corregidor to 14,000 men (and 67 Filipino and American women nurses).

The engineers are again culled for manpower to serve as infantry replacements as well, which along with the disbanded 91st Brigade provides 12,000 replacements in all which is enough to make good all Filipino losses to date. As losses to date number 10,000, including those lost to attrition (and only about 3,000 are likely to return), this infusion of manpower is more than welcome and indeed allows combat units to send a large number of the more shaken and emotionally exhausted men to the rear for duties in service and combat support units. The Cavalry pulls back on January 30, and again goes into reserve. Homma meanwhile cautiously probes forward but as his combat units are badly mauled, he is unwilling to push just yet. He is unsurprised to find yet another American fortified line waiting for him 15-20 kilometers behind the initial American line.



Luzon Force (General Ord on February 1, 1942)
Bataan Force (Wainwright) (103,000 men)
I Corps (King) (42,000 men)
1st Philippine Infantry Division (1st PA, 2nd PA, 3rd PA)(11,000 men)
51st Philippine Infantry Division (51st PA, 52nd PA, 45th PS) (11,000 men)
12th Infantry Division (57th PS, 13th PA, 92nd PA,) (11,000 men)
Corps HQ and artillery (9,000 men)
II Corps (Parker) (42,000 men)
21st Infantry Division (21st PA, 25th PA, 26th PA) (11,000 men)
11th Infantry Division (11th PA, 12th PA, 43rd PS) (11,000 men)
23rd Infantry Division (47th PS, 53rd PA, 91st PA) (11,000 men)
Corps HQ and artillery 9,000 men)
Reserve (Lim) (19,000 men)
101st Infantry (PA) (attached 192nd Tank Battalion (US), 3rd Coast Artillery (mobile AA)(PA) (3,000 men)
6th Cavalry Brigade w 26th Cavalry (PS), 112th Cavalry (US NG), 194th Tank Battalion, (1,500 men)
Bataan Engineer Group (PA)(3,000 men)
USMC 1st Separate Battalion
4th Coast Artillery (PA)(AA)(2,000 men)
Bataan HQ, support and artillery reserve (9,500 men)
Manila Bay Defenses (General Moore)
Fort Mills (Corregidor), Fort Drum, Fort Hughes, Fort Frank (14,000 men) includes coast defense troops and the infantry garrison of 31st US, 65th US, and 1st Engineer Brigade (PA)


US Army Visayen Force (Ord)
General Ord is sent by air to take command of all US Army forces outside of Bataan, including stay behind forces that are now being created and placed into position through out the islands, including from behind Japanese lines in Luzon, by boat and light transport aircraft. The least effective men of the IV Corps are left to man the IV Corps, 31st and 41st Infantry Divisions (which now fall to a strength of 2,500 men each) with muster roles altered to reflect those units suffering heavy attrition from disease and desertion. This allows Ord to send 20,000 men into the hills throughout the islands with orders to lay low until contact is restored with USAFE in Australia at a future date. The remaining 4,000 men at Cebu and Mindanao are prepared for evacuation by ship and aircraft. Eisenhower wants to evacuate them to act as cadre as a future Philippine Scouts for when the Philippines are liberated in the future.

Meanwhile Homma is forced to ask the Imperial General Staff for 30,000 replacements, not only for those lost at 1st Bataan but the significant losses suffered from the landing to present.
 
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Yes they did! Remember that the Mk 14 torpedo was 21 inches in diameter. The loading hatch was only 24 inches in diameter. That dictated what could be loaded and unloaded.

During my service in submarines, I participated in numerous stores loads prior to getting under way. They were an all hands evolution, even the officers and Chiefs helped. Cases of food were opened and canned food, loaves of bread, frozen meat, etc. were all passed down the hatches one by one. The most ridiculous event was loading toilet paper. They came in cases of 48 rolls and the cases were too big to fit down the hatches. So one Sailor would be topside with the open case and one Sailor down below at the bottom of the hatch. Several more Sailors would be positioned in a line running aft to the crew's head and the storage locker. The guy topside would open a case, drop a roll down to the guy at the bottom of the ladder, then he would throw it, football style, aft to the next guy and then to the next until the last Sailor would stash it in the locker.

I bring this all up to illustrate the difficulties in loading/unloading supplies and stores on a submarine. Yes, it can be done, but it is very inefficient and time consuming.

Thats for a modern USN SSN?

I would have figured they'd have figured out some way to make resupply easier and quicker then manhandling individual items through a 24 inch hatch.

How long did it usually take to bring on all the beans and TP?
 
Interesting, I presume the stay-behinds will have some sort of communications equipment with them? Homma having to ask for 30,000 replacements, even the shipping required to move them could screw up the Japanese plans...
 
Well with TTL evacuation and redeployment of so many TRAINED men, it will help make the resistance that much more deadly for Japan. Hopefully they were able to take weapons, ammunition, radios, and other much needed supplies to keep them effective in the field. Perhaps other submarine missions, even after Bataan falls, will keep bringing weapons to make life miserable for Japanese garrisons.

A little plastic explosives and limpet mines can go a long way. :evilsmile:
 
Interesting, I presume the stay-behinds will have some sort of communications equipment with them? Homma having to ask for 30,000 replacements, even the shipping required to move them could screw up the Japanese plans...

those replacements won't be arriving all at once

historically the Japanese had to bring in a lot of replacements to rebuild their units after the Battle of the Points and the Battle of the Pockets, plus of course Malaria attrition (which was very high)
 
The problem for Homma will be the tension between his desire to have most if not all of the replacements in place and the push from higher ups to act right away. With the Japanese living in the field with less infrastructure than the defenders their attrition from disease will be worse than that of the US/PI troops. Inadequate medical support will make this worse - he will be fighting a battle of losing men to battle and disease and needing more numbers, and reinforcements arriving at a rate that may, at best, keep his numbers level and no increase.
 
The problem for Homma will be the tension between his desire to have most if not all of the replacements in place and the push from higher ups to act right away. With the Japanese living in the field with less infrastructure than the defenders their attrition from disease will be worse than that of the US/PI troops. Inadequate medical support will make this worse - he will be fighting a battle of losing men to battle and disease and needing more numbers, and reinforcements arriving at a rate that may, at best, keep his numbers level and no increase.
Plus I reckon he's got the beginning of guerilla movements behind those lines.
 
Given the situation of the Philippines in the process of being independent, is it possible and/or meaningful for the Commonwealth of the Philippines government to surrender?

Speaking of the Philippines, with a significantly longer time to conquer the Philippines, and likely a shorter amount of time before the Americans return, could this completely butterfly away the Second Philippine Republic?
 
Given the situation of the Philippines in the process of being independent, is it possible and/or meaningful for the Commonwealth of the Philippines government to surrender?
Depends, US has been fighting damn hard with their own troops at that.

Surrender might not be advisable until they are beaten. Because if they manage to drive the invaders back into the sea (Yes, I know it's impossible, but they don't know that), well, people might find themselves up against walls with blindfolds and cigarettes.
 
Tubular supply containers as used by the British airborne forces would be suitable for loading into a submarines via the torpedo hatch. Maybe an urgent request to the UK for the design maybe made.
 
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