StephenColbert27
Banned
Plus the mobility of the Stuart makes it rather difficult for infantry to get close enough for them to do what has been described.
Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon
- Thread starter galveston bay
- Start date
edited The Battle of Agoo Beachhead a bit
a more detailed analysis of what went right and wrong there will be posted this weekend
a more detailed analysis of what went right and wrong there will be posted this weekend
it really depends on the terrain... in close (jungle) terrain, the M3 Stuart could indeed be swarmed and destroyed by Japanese infantry. It happened frequently in the Solomons and New Guinea according to "Touched With Fire" by Eric Bergerud. Also the Japanese have two anti tank battalions deployed with 47 mm guns.
As an added comment on American Armored forces in the P.I. the 26th Cavalry. Had a 6 vehicle M-2 White Armored Scout Car section as part of Regimental Hq.http://www.philippine-scouts.org/the-scouts/regiments-units-bases/26th-cavalry-regiment-ps.html
Agreed. Especially as close-cooperation between tanks and their supporting infantry may not happen - no training and heat of battle...
The American Defeat at the Apoo Beachhead: Learning to fight
Learning to fight: analysis of the Battle of the Apoo Beachhead
The heavy fighting at the beachhead cost the 11th PA, 12th PS and 23rd PS Divisions between a third to half of their infantry strength. Japanese losses were similar and in some cases, such as a battalion of the 47th Regiment of the 48th Infantry Division that loss approached 80%. But the fierce fighting failed in the end to hurl the Japanese back.
The Japanese had several important advantages. The first was their landing site. The Americans were set up to attack a landing at the center of the Gulf from three sides, with the armored / cavalry force to provide the final push to to the beaches. However the Japanese landing on the eastern side of the Gulf, with a river between them and three of the four American formations, and immediately engaged the 12th Infantry Division (PS) splitting it almost in two, forcing it to react to events instead of launching a counterattack when the Japanese where most vulnerable. In addition the Japanese beachhead was only 8 kilometers from thick jungle in an area with only one road. Thus the American force had to attack across a river and through jungle, and particularly in the jungle, communications breakdowns, inexperience, some poor leadership at the junior level and even battalion level and inability to coordinate the counterattack properly led to failure. The American force was forced to attack and thus be defeated in detail, and the final effort simply added more casualties.
Other problems were the Japanese were simply better armed, managed to get more firepower into the fight, had more skill with their mortars, machine guns (and many more of both) and managed to finally get nearly 3 brigades of heavy guns ashore that overpowered the American artillery. American tanks found that the Japanese tanks were vulnerable (indeed losing 15 M3 Stuart tanks, mostly to anti-tank guns against Japanese losses of 36 tanks, mostly to American artillery, heavy machine guns and a a brief company sized tank battle between the Japanese 7th Tank Regiment and the US 194th Tank Battalion).
But the counterattack failed. Although potentially the Americans and Filipinos still could have pushed the Japanese back into the sea, it would have wrecked all four of the combat formations of the I Corps to do it while the Japanese attack from northern Luzon and from Lamon Bay threatened its northern flank and rear. The attack also used up staggering amounts of artillery ammunition, nearly all that had not yet been moved to Bataan, and Eisenhower decided in the end that there was simply too high a risk of destroying the cream of his army that he can never replace with Japanese naval and air domination already in effect.
But the heavy damage to the 48th Infantry Division and the fact that it too is forced to use up nearly all of the supplies it landed with buys Wainwright the time to break off the action.
The heavy fighting at the beachhead cost the 11th PA, 12th PS and 23rd PS Divisions between a third to half of their infantry strength. Japanese losses were similar and in some cases, such as a battalion of the 47th Regiment of the 48th Infantry Division that loss approached 80%. But the fierce fighting failed in the end to hurl the Japanese back.
The Japanese had several important advantages. The first was their landing site. The Americans were set up to attack a landing at the center of the Gulf from three sides, with the armored / cavalry force to provide the final push to to the beaches. However the Japanese landing on the eastern side of the Gulf, with a river between them and three of the four American formations, and immediately engaged the 12th Infantry Division (PS) splitting it almost in two, forcing it to react to events instead of launching a counterattack when the Japanese where most vulnerable. In addition the Japanese beachhead was only 8 kilometers from thick jungle in an area with only one road. Thus the American force had to attack across a river and through jungle, and particularly in the jungle, communications breakdowns, inexperience, some poor leadership at the junior level and even battalion level and inability to coordinate the counterattack properly led to failure. The American force was forced to attack and thus be defeated in detail, and the final effort simply added more casualties.
Other problems were the Japanese were simply better armed, managed to get more firepower into the fight, had more skill with their mortars, machine guns (and many more of both) and managed to finally get nearly 3 brigades of heavy guns ashore that overpowered the American artillery. American tanks found that the Japanese tanks were vulnerable (indeed losing 15 M3 Stuart tanks, mostly to anti-tank guns against Japanese losses of 36 tanks, mostly to American artillery, heavy machine guns and a a brief company sized tank battle between the Japanese 7th Tank Regiment and the US 194th Tank Battalion).
But the counterattack failed. Although potentially the Americans and Filipinos still could have pushed the Japanese back into the sea, it would have wrecked all four of the combat formations of the I Corps to do it while the Japanese attack from northern Luzon and from Lamon Bay threatened its northern flank and rear. The attack also used up staggering amounts of artillery ammunition, nearly all that had not yet been moved to Bataan, and Eisenhower decided in the end that there was simply too high a risk of destroying the cream of his army that he can never replace with Japanese naval and air domination already in effect.
But the heavy damage to the 48th Infantry Division and the fact that it too is forced to use up nearly all of the supplies it landed with buys Wainwright the time to break off the action.
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authors note: Only American units and Japanese units in direct contact are being shown
screen captures from "Operational Art of War III" Luzon 1941-42 scenario (heavily modified and edited for the story)
screen captures from "Operational Art of War III" Luzon 1941-42 scenario (heavily modified and edited for the story)
Thanks for the map and counters. They do help to put things into perspective for the battle and how it was playing out. I also enjoyed reading how the tactics based on the events went and how lessons could be learned for later encounters with the Japanese. That is if they can be communicated and trained for.
Think what sets GB's timelines apart from even Johnboy and Calbear, no disrespect to them whatsoever mind, is the wargaming outcomes to support the writing.
Of course, a wargame is still only as valid as its inputs; and that requires some human evaluation...
But if we get any consensus out of these various Pacific War timelines, it is this: It really takes very little in terms of a pre-war point of departure to generate markedly better results from the Allies. It really was just about leadership, not some technological breakthrough, vastly more resources, or a very early departure. And by leadership, you don't even need military geniuses, just reasonably competent ones. The Pacific War we got up through the spring of '42 really was a huge Japan-wank, and so much of it was because of terrible, blundering Allied leadership - some of it in Washington and London, but especially by MacArthur and Percival.
The Americans are still going to lose the Philippines. But Galveston putting Parsons/Ike in charge, and the decisions that followed, is going to push back the final defeat to well into the summer, and seriously tear up Japanese timetables. Honestly, even replacing MacArthur with Ike on December 1, 1941 could produce markedly better results.
you can safely assume that Eisenhower is going to be ordered out, after all this is Eisenhower in the Pacific Part 1
Driftless
Donor
GB will tell the tale in good time...
Still, our author has had the US commanders better prepare locations down the archipelago as well as better preparation of the main bastion on Bataan. The fight could drag out for longer than in history and spread down the line. With the fight on northern Luzon taking longer and costing the Japanese more resources, their historic successes in the DEI and Malaya are going to be delayed and perhaps jeopardized? So, there may be more retreat paths compared to history.
Ike doesn't have MacArthur's cachet at this point, but Marshall appreciates his full value; and it's hard to think that he can't talk FDR into ordering him out to preserve him for future use.
I'm curious how many times you'll have Eisenhower visiting Bataan, while it's still feasible (or how quickly he moves his command to Corregidor in the first place, for that matter). Somehow I have the feeling he won't get the sobriquet "Dugout Ike."
The problem is, the Japanese really can't delay the DEI very much; it's the whole reason they launched the Southern Operation! They're running out of oil stocks. And there's the danger that every day they delay, the Dutch and British might sabotage the facilities. Yamamoto will do everything possible to keep that from happening.
But everything else would be up for grabs. Operations into New Guinea, Rabaul, the Solomons, even Burma could be endangered. There is only so much shipping to go around even if the IJA can be talked into diverting more forces from the Kwangtung Army.