Eisenhower in the Pacific: Part 1 The Shoestring Warriors of Luzon

While the idea of lending Admiral Hart a transport aircraft sounds good, remember he had both PBY's and J2F'so available. Our TL, Hart used a PBY, to fly to Singapore to meet Admiral Philips.J2F'so, we're amphibious, aso were PBYs 4'So And Later models.

he needs every PBY he has for scouting at this point, while the R4D (DC3) is designed for the role
 
Wouldn't the increase of US and Filipino forces make the Japanese adjust accordingly compared to otl?

if you look closely at the OTL ground forces order of battle, it is substantially larger numbers but with the same amount of equipment. The aircraft numbers are slightly larger in TTL but not decisively so. As it is the Japanese have their own much larger and very powerful force of aircraft. The Japanese would not consider the Philippine Coast Guard a major obstacle
 
Dear All,

Okay this is news to me: Firstly the brainless farting of the PC-Gov; compounded by equal brainless farting of the US-Gov; then the Congressional mandated excise tax post-bellum usage ---- And now I discover that

"mining was controlled by the Army".
Speechless

Imagines clusterf*uck

as I mentioned at the beginning, MacArthur has the responsibility for failures in the Philippines because he was in command, but the fault of those failures are not just his fault.

I think a lot of the dithering by the two governments are in part because of the unrealistic defense plan that the General put into place however. A more realistic defense plan, along with assurances by the US government that the smaller targets would be supported, would have done a lot to calm Quezon down and by extension Roosevelt too.
 
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...nearly 80% of the mortar ammunition for the 3 inch mortars that provide the bulk of company and battalion firepower for the Philippine Army are duds. An urgent message is sent to the United States for immediate resupply, while every available ordinance sergeant in the Far East is put to work looking for solutions that can be done locally.
Was there any specific reason for this, such as design, quality control, age, storage, or some combination of factors?
 
Was there any specific reason for this, such as design, quality control, age, storage, or some combination of factors?
Probably either the fuse on the top of the mortar round or the ignition charge that arms the round, from the looks of it.

Maybe age and storage maybe have something to do with it.
 
MINING
The reason the Army was in charge of laying defensive minefields was that they were manning the Coastal Artillery. Minefields (defensive) are only good if they are covered by artillery. The mines keep enemy ships from approaching too closely to shore, the guns keep the enemy ships from sweeping the mines. These were not only simple contact mines, but in fact a rather sophisticated system of electrical command mines, ie, they enemy ship doesn't have to hit it, if it gets close enough (and the Army knows EXACTLY where each mine is) they simply hit the switch. They even had their own ships for this, Army Mine Planters. A good first stop for learning about it all is this one: http://cdsg.org/

FAULTY MORTAR ROUNDS

Age and poor storage were the culprits in the number of duds. Ammo stored in the tropics has a MUCH higher incidence of failure, due to excessive heat, moisture etc etc. Additionally, most of the ammo was for the old WWI issue Stokes mortars, ergo, made in WWI or very shortly thereafter. Realistically it should have been fired off for training years before. Ammo however, is expensive so it is often reworked and reissued. (Perhaps I'll write a short something up on that sometime, although since it isn't fiction, wouldn't fall within the purview of the board, and I don't know if the necessary OP's are available online)
 
Was there any specific reason for this, such as design, quality control, age, storage, or some combination of factors?

This was sadly historical... age and probably issues with their storage but it could have been production quality. I have not been able to find the specific answer but it was not noticed in OTL until troops entered combat. No one checked it seems.
 

Driftless

Donor
MINING
The reason the Army was in charge of laying defensive minefields was that they were manning the Coastal Artillery.
(snip)
(Perhaps I'll write a short something up on that sometime, although since it isn't fiction, wouldn't fall within the purview of the board, and I don't know if the necessary OP's are available online)

A couple of years ago, someone (Saphroneph?) started a thread on basics of logistics, with numerous contributors - so there's a precedent out there for informational lines. I found the thread to be both interesting and useful.
 

I would suggest two excellent books that discuss it

"How to Make War" by James Dunnigan (4 different editions available discussing warfare late 80s- 2010s). Dunnigan is the founder of Simulations Publicans Inc, also known as SPI, which was one of the original (along with Avalon Hill) table top wargame companies. He discusses logistics, along with nearly every other aspect of modern warfare in those books

https://www.amazon.com/How-Make-War-Fourth-Comprehensive/dp/006009012X

Dunnigan also did an excellent guide to the Pacific War

https://www.amazon.com/Victory-Sea-World-War-Pacific/dp/0688149472
Victory at Sea discusses logistics in the Pacific War thoroughly, and it also has a wonderful guide to the various harbors and islands in the Pacific area and why they mattered from the standpoint of usefulness as bases


for a historical look, few have done better than Creveld in his work

https://www.amazon.com/Supplying-War-Logistics-Wallenstein-Patton/dp/0521546575
sadly it does not look at the Pacific War at any length, and Creveld does not seem to look at it in his other works either, but if you want to know about World War II in Europe, he is a good place to go

all three are my go to sources before checking elsewhere
 
The details of logistics vary in time and place, land campaign versus naval, but the basics are always the same.
 
How long could a P-40 remain in combat over Luzon from Cebu where this timeline's AVG is currently training?

it is roughly 300 air miles Panay or Cebu to Clark Field or Manila, so if they land at fields in Luzon it is just doable although their time in the air is still pretty limited. (Combat range for a P40B is about 730 miles, but figure they lose about a third of that if they are in combat and drop tanks are not available)
 
The fact that there are well developed fields in the Southern PI means that some of the aircraft have a place to go when Clark and Nichols are out of action. This will allow some support to Bataan and the harbor forts for a while. This is yet another small (or not so small) thing that will end up taking the Japanese longer to accomplish their mission in the PI and costing them more in not just time but also materiel they are short on and troops needed elsewhere.
 
War Warning: the USAAFFE prepares for war
The Far East Air Force Prepares for War November 27, 1941
On November 27, 1941 a war warning is sent to Admiral Hart by Admiral Stark, and to General Krueger by General Marshall.


"This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicate an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines (printed in ink, "Thai") or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform district and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department x Spenavo inform British x Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage"

A secondary message is sent by Roosevelt directing his Pacific commanders ensure that Japan makes the first overt act.

General Krueger directs General Frank to take measures to preserve his force and fight an air campaign, while ground forces commanders are directed to move their forces to their wartime positions. All forces are ordered to draw live ammunition. The Asiatic Fleet is already on the move but begins armed scouting missions with its Catalinas assisted by B18s and B10s of the Philippine Army Air Force, which are subordinated to control of PatWing 10 based on the example set by Admiral Richardson and General Harmon in Hawaii. Meanwhile most of the submarines are ordered to sea with live ammunition as soon as they can be fueled and armed.

General Krueger (at Eisenhower's urging) now sends a request to Marshall requesting that the American Volunteer Group be returned to USAAF service, with Navy and Marine Corps pilots and personnel, along with sufficient aircraft for them to form a squadron be detached to Naval Service with the Asiatic Fleet. This causes a stir in Washington but Marshall successfully argues that more official help for the Chinese can sent another way, while Stimson argues that sending the AVG at this point would prevent any last minutes peace efforts by Roosevelt, who is still, as late as December 6, attempting to persuade the Japanese to step away from the brink.

Orders reach Chennault and the AVG on December 3, recalling Claire Chennault to active duty as Brigadier General, commander V Fighter Command and Deputy commander, USAAFE. The USAAF personnel are assigned to the newly formed 74th and 75th Pursuit squadrons of the 23rd Pursuit Group. The Asiatic Fleet is given a squadron of 24 P40s from the AVG, along with the Marine Corps and Navy pilots and ground crews which are formed into Marine Corps Fighter Squadron (VMF) 112 (provisional). Hart is very pleased, although Chennault is less so and the pilots, who were hoping for the bonuses and high pay from the Chinese even less so. This transition is still underway at their training facility at Cebu when the war begins. A total of 87 pilots and 300 ground crew thus find themselves transferred back to Naval Service, or the Army or in the case of the civilians, called into active duty in the USAAF. A few civilians who do not meet Army or Navy requirements (including one who flew with the Republicans in Spain) are given jobs with the Philippine Army Air Service at the same pay they would have received in the AVG.

Meanwhile, the Far East Air Force spreads out to its dispersal bases beginning on November 30. Operational aircraft are sent to the dispersal bases, while aircraft requiring repair or extensive maintenance remain assigned to their primary bases. However, engineers begin hurried efforts to complete revetments at all airfields, as well as digging air raid shelters and trenches. Indeed a mechanical ditch digger at Clark Field is working from dawn to dusk every day.

The efforts over the last few years to expand the number of airfields now pays off. There are enough bases and room at them for all of the operational aircraft to deploy while the dispersal of spares, fuel and ammunition over the last year means that the depot at Nichols Field is no longer the sole location of those vital parts. The only problem is that oxygen is still in short supply, with only sufficient for a few sorties for each aircraft, while none is available at all at Del Monte, so the bombers that are supposed to be arriving there will forced to bring their own. General Frank orders a shuttle of DC3 flights from Clark to Singapore as the British have far better facilities for producing oxygen there. Beechcraft will shuttle oxygen to Del Monte and Cebu as well as spares and personnel.


Far East Air Force Dawn December 8, 1941

23rd Fighter Group (Visayans and Mindanao) (Colonel George takes command December 6)
Iliolo Field (Panay) VMF121 (Lieutenant Newkirk, USN) 24 P40B plus 6 spares (moved on December 6) (there are 30 Marine and Navy pilots, plus 100 ground personnel)(authors note: the majority of the Flying Tiger Aces were Marine and Navy pilots, this is a squadron of elite highly aggressive pilots based on their historical record)
Cebu Maclan Field (Cebu) 74th Pursuit Squadron, 18 P40B plus 8 spares (Smith)
75th Pursuit Squadron 20 P40B, 6 DC2 (preparing to move to Luzon) (Shilling)
(the Army pilots do not have the same record of success as the Navy and Marine pilots above but they are still a very highly skilled group historically)
Delmonte Field (Mindanao) 6th Pursuit Squadron (PAAF) (Captain Villamor, PAAF), 18 CW21 interceptors plus 3 spares

also present, 3 RB17C, 4 Beechcraft, 3 DC3, 6 PT17 (the B17s are flying long range scouting missions in the direction of the Japanese held Palau Islands, the DC3s are flying transport missions to Australia while the Beechcraft are airlift Mindanao to Luzon. The PT17s are a detachment of light attack and liaison aircraft)
there is sufficient room on the field to handle the 19th Bomb Group (30 B17s) which are still en route before their final destination of Clark Field
2 seaplane tenders are at Panay and 12 PBY Catalina's are to disperse there once the war starts, adding to the 8 float planes (USN and PCG) already present

Luzon
the 24th Fighter Group, 4th Composite Group, and PAAF 1st and 2nd Groups remain at Luzon
General Chennault arrives on December 6 to meet with General Frank (and protest the orders eliminating the AVG)
the 24th Pursuit Group (30 P40B, 23 P40E with 17th and 3rd Pursuit squadrons) as well as the 7th PAAF Pursuit squadron (14 P26). Due to parts shortages, only 24 of the P40B and 18 of the P40E are operational on December 8. The 17th is organized into 3 flights of 8 aircraft each, deployed at Nichols, Del Carmen and Cabantuan Fields. The 3rd is organized into 2 flights of 8 each (plus 1 spare) at Clark and Rosales Fields. All of the Filipino P26s are at Neilson Field to provide point defense for the city of Manila and Cavite naval yard.

The 27th Bombardment Group (Light) with the 16th, 17th and 91st Bombardment Squadrons has 54 A24 Banshee (the Army version of the SBD Dauntless). Of these only 36 are operational due to parts shortages and the fact that a number of critical parts did not arrive with the crates the aircraft were shipped in. Enough parts have been rushed to the Philippines to get 36 airworthy, and then they are assigned to the 16th Squadron (at Bataan) along with 4 PAAF T6 advanced trainers (as observation aircraft), and 17th Squadron (at Iba Field, also with 4 PAAF T6 trainers). The remaining aircraft and the 39th Squadron are at Nichols Field attempting to get their aircraft operational.

The PAAF transports and trainers are scattered about in 4 plane detachments except for a squadron of PT17s (which are still conducting training) at all of the various airfields, with the B18s and B10s at Clark Field (and the other 3 RB17C) and the primary training squadron still at Zablan Field.

However, only Clark Field and Nielson Field have significant anti aircraft protection (a regiment each of PA antiaircraft guns, with 12 3 inch guns and 32 37 mm guns), the remaining fields have only a company of machine gunners with .50 caliber machine guns each. The antiaircraft units that will defend those airfields have not yet left the United States and will not before the war starts.

The Navy PBYs are stationed at Subic Bay as of the morning of December 8, conducting long range scouting missions in the direction of French Indochina, Formosa and the points in between, the area considered the most likely avenue of approach by a Japanese fleet. The PAAF B18s and B10s are conducting missions to the east of Luzon, while the RB17s are rotating with the rest of their squadron out of Del Monte.

 
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authors note:
The War Warning is the actual historical text

The actual USAAFFE had 18 P40B, 54 P40E, 18 P35, plus 14 PAAC P26, along with 29 B17D and 6 B17C, plus a couple of dozen obsolete observation aircraft. The PAAC had a couple of dozen PT17s, plus a few B18s and B10s, nearly all of which were destroyed on the opening day.

Historically half of the B17s and a third of the P40s and P35s were wiped out on day 1, and by the end of the first week only 22 P40s and a handful of the P35s survived, while about a squadron's worth of B17s were sent south to Australia (as the rest had already been lost).

Thus is the history of the air campaign

TTL USAAFFE has not that many more P40s, only a handful of B17s, but a group of A24s. But.... they have a larger PAAF to assist, and an air transport force that they did not have in OTL.

They still face roughly 104 A6M Zeroes, 144 Nell and Betty medium bombers, plus the Japanese Army bombers and fighters (still Nates for the fighters) and a few carrier aircraft from the Japanese fleet light carriers supporting the invasion.

fear not, Chennault will eventually end up in China

The Navy and Marine Corps fliers were an elite group... Tex Hill, Pappy Boyington to name but two, and indeed most of the highest scorers were from the Navy and Marine Corps

VMF 112 is a real squadron form in March 1942 (fought at Henderson Field as its first engagement). This will be the only Marine Corps squadron to ever have P40s but you have to admit it will be a colorful one

Here is there OTL roster...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Flying_Tigers_pilots
 
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Sounds like the Tigers are being treated better than they were OTL during the initial attempts to recall them to active service. That was a mess...
 
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