Effects on imperialism in Africa with a different Germany?

For, jeez, about a decade now I've been working on an alternate history project. Some tiny few of you may remember snippets of it, either here or even back on SHWI. While its POD is towards the end of the War of the Rebellion, a major divergence some years later is Germany.

In particular, I'd love to get input on how the imperial divvying-up of Africa would proceed with this different Germany. In broads strokes the differences are as follows:
* A much less cordial relationship with Austria(-Hungary) after taking a bit of territory (and other humiliations) after the Seven Weeks' War.
* No Wilhelm I and no Bismark after German unification, instead a government by Friedrich and a more liberal constitution and (presumably) National Liberal dominance. (Yes, I am aware of the arguments for Friedrich not being the Great Liberal Hope; but the reasons for the political situation are not dependent on him to the extent that would matter).
* Friedrich still smokes himself to ruin in despair over his son (combined with the stress of government), his son is by then quite anti-colony.


So how does the carving-up of Africa (and, to a lesser extent, the south west Pacific, the other German sphere) develop with (through ~1888) a pro-colony but Anglophilic Germany, and after that an anticolonial one? Consider also this will involve no (or a different) Berlin Conference.


I hope I am not impertinent in pinging @Jonathan Edelstein and @carlton_bach in particular, whose efforts cover this era and subject (and whose works I adore).
 

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At the very least, without a Berlin conference you almost certainly prevent the Congo Free state from coming into existence, which in and of itself has massive repercussions. The International Congo association wouldn't get much clout otherwise, and unlike any other state in Europe he lacks the military capacity to enforce his claims.
 
Part of the problem really comes into the fact that a lot of the situation in 1885 OTL was determined decades before that. Does Britain have the cape? Have the Boers headed inland, did Shaka Zulu (or somebody similar) still cause something along the lines of the Mfecane or was that avoided (which means that the Sotho/Tswana population densities in the Transvaal and Eastern Free State are going to be massively higher than OTL making establishment of a Boer state much harder).

Those three points alone are pretty fundamental to answering just what's likely to be going on in the area south of the Zambezi.
 
I think you're trying to give me a headache... anyway, as you've probably guessed, this is complicated. No way do I have the time, unfportunately, to address it in detail, but I'll try and throw up a few points:

European alliances will be different. With hostile Austria, Germany is free to develop cordial relations with Russia. Being on good terms witzh Russia and Britain simultaneously wioll be hard, but not impossible in the days of splendid isolation. France, though, will never be isolated. It will immediately latch onto Austria-Hungary as an ally. This is going to have implications for Balkan policy and for the degree to which Britain and Germany can watch French expansion into Northern Africa with equanimity. How it plays out will be up to you. I would envision France and Austria as guardians of the Ottoman empire against Russia, with Germany on Russia's side and Britain on France's. Lots of politics, lots of horse-trading, especially with France putting chips on Germany's side of the continent. Potentially opportunities for Berlin to extract more valuable concessions in Africa, assuming it wants to.

German politics will be utterly unrecognisable. The NatLibs are basically Bismarck's creation and liable to fall apart unless supported by any successor government. Do we assume the war of 1870/71 went as IOTL despite the changed relations with Austria? If so, you'll still have strengthened conservatives and militarists. The liberals are still into factionalism. Colonialism might become a uniting cause for them even more than it was IOTL.

Colonies were not popular in Germany. Despite a vast propaganda machine funded by bourgeois interest groups, they never caught the imagination or garnered support the way the army or social insurance did. With a pro-colonial emperor relying on the cartel parties. that propaganda would still happen. Without either, it might not, in which case Germany might decide to largely forgo colonial expansion. THis would aliewnate bourgeois liberal parties, but it is absolutely feasible. Most conservatives didn't care and most SPD voters were opposed. Zentrum was at best divided.

If Germany's new government decides it wants to pursue colonial expansion, it could easily end up with bigger slices of the pie. That would also mean alienating other states, though. IMO it depends on how the new government actually pans out (contrary to popular perception, the Kaiserreich was far from stable or united and Bismarck's greatest achievement was less the victories that allowed it than the compromise that held it together). I assume we are talking about a more or less 'democratic' franchise? That would produice more left-liberal and left influence as well as more political Catholicism as an element of a Southern identity. It could play out either way - colonies and trade as a unifying element to identify with the Empire, or as a bargaining chip getting divided and neglected between the parties. The imperial will matters less that one would think in this. Certainly, colonial ventures would be seen as a northern, protestant thing, perhaps a sop to the Hanseatic cities and the Ruhr industrialists.

Another question is what happens with the protected territories and treaty ports that German states and companies had already carved out? I could see the imperial government going for a system of chartered companiews to govern them through, backed by German power but private in nature. The British had similar things. It failed IOTL and likely will ITTL, but I would not underestimate the stubbornness of a government invested in defending an established bad idea.

This could also lead to greater German presence in the Pacific. ITTL Germany mostly focused on Africa, but masny of the Hanseatic companies had invested in Melanesia and around the South Pacific, too. THis could produce more tensions with the USA, of all people. Or Japan, if Germany decides that Formosa looks good before the Sino-Japanese war. This is possible, though I suspect unlikely, given how unimportant the area was considered and how little prestige could be gained.

Anticolonial beliefs in the future Wilhelm II will not matter very much if the colonies already exist. National prestige demands they be defended and developed.

As to the situation in Africa and the reaction of the British government, I'll leave that for more knowledgeable people to comment on.
 
@Soverihn yes that's very much on my mind, but I'm not at all sure what solution the international community would turn to, since it was seen to be quite a plum.

@Alex Richards With a POD in 1864, I'm not thinking a change in British colonial policy or events in the British sphere for some time...

@carlton_bach Apologies for the headache. :D

I should mention, I think, a bit more in broad strokes the European and in particular German background. I freely admit it is not the most rigorously plausible, but at the same time I am trying to not be implausible while still having a bit of a hand on the scales for a desired outcome (in particular, a milieu I enjoy exploring). The main conceit is a Wilhelm II who rebels to the left, rather than right, of his father, absent the influences of his grandfather and Bismark and their circle, and a conservative movement that, despite its strengthening by the unification wars, discredits itself soon after the Empire's formation. A path I came up with was, in response to a more liberal constitution for the German Empire (or even Empire of Germany*), and fears of a continuing erosion of conservative norms--and in particular, blame being foisted on Freidrich's wife and her malicious English influence--conservatives stage an "intervention" (I-can't-believe-it's-not-a-coup) to free Friedrich from said influence long enough for his Prussian good sense to prevail. It fails miserably, of course, and leads to Prince Wilhelm going missing, and then into hiding, for a week or so with the poorer sort, leaving a lasting impact on the impressionable young man. As you can see, a good bit of hand on the scales, but hopefully only on the outer end of the bell curve of plausibility, and from that (or from some other series of events) I hope to be rather more plausible.

*IOTL, as I understand it, the argument for German Empire and, in particular, for the office being German Emperor rather than Emperor of Germany, was threefold: first, it was to avoid tension with Austria; second, to avoid tension with the constituent states of the Reich; third, to avoid stirring up a more popular pan-Germanism that would be injurious to good conservative rule and to relations with Austria and the states. A question here is, given that (1) is not a concern and (3) is quite likely not as well, given the players involved at least on the Prussian side, is (2) enough to maintain the distinction between Nation and State when drawing up the constitution? Given, as you say, the tension and compromise involved OTL simply within the Reich, probably?

So, yes, a stronger left-liberal (and right-liberal, at least vs. conservative) influence on the early years of the Reich, although not an overwhelming one. A strong reason for my thinking it a pro-colonial government is as you say in an attempt to unite the fractious liberals, always rather too enamored of the joy of sects. Further, given the Manchesterish bent of (let us presume) the government, chartered companies strikes me as a very plausible route, with their inherent dangers and inefficiencies. I do, however, think that--for similar reasons to the Belgian government stepping in--Wilhelm II will feel compelled to (assuming he cannot be rid of them, that's at least anti-*this*-colonialism).

However, in regards to political Catholicism--that betrays another area of my ignorance, for I had thought that the struggle against political (and educational) Catholicism would if anything be fiercer, given that some of the strong support for that came from the left-liberals.

Regarding the basic constitution of the Reich, my thinking is that after Friedrich's death, given what new Kaiser they must suffer, even (or especially) the conservatives would support more power to the Reichstag vis-a-vis the Kaiser and the imperial bureaucracy. This might even be true before his death, since even without cartel backing they would have considerable support in the Reichstag and see that route as a way to check further crumbling of traditional Germany.

In terms of foreign relations, I agree entirely on a Franco-Austrian alliance; in fact, my thinking is that the alliance system will end up close to that of the Seven Years' War, with the addition of Italy and Japan on the Anglo-German side. My thinking here is this: After a slightly shorter and less brutal Franco-Prussian war (in particular, a lower incidence of francs-tireurs) Friedrich will attempt as best as possible rapprochement with France (eventually ending in failure, but not before appearing to have promise), including a smaller cession in Alsace-Lorraine and less ruinous treaty. Relations with Britain and Russia remain broadly cordial. With Austria hostile, much more effort is spent on Italy, both industrial investment and military missions.
Relations with Russia deteriorate through an Oriental Crisis (I am not sure if there even would be a Russo-Turkish war; if there is, it's not implausible it's a Turkish victory. Either way Germany is liable to back Russia even less than OTL. A further wildcard is if Alexander II is assassinated earlier...) before plunging to the depths on the accession of blustery, bellicose Wilhelm II (that part of his personality I do not think likely to change...), with him placing Germany, at least verbally, firmly on the side of Progress and against Reaction. An Austro-Russian alliance is not the most plausible of things, but if France could manage an Anglo-Russian one, I presume it can manage this, particularly with a worrying Germany in their midst. The Straits, though...

I do think this all ends in tear^H^H^H^H a Great War, of course, although as likely as not over Trieste or Warsaw or Strassburg as the Balkans (speaking of, a different or no Russo-Turkish war and that's also going to be unrecognizable).
 
Piggybacking here but there was a Polish man who attained an audience with the king of Austria to start an Austrian colony before the French in Madagascar. Got no money for it though.

What we would need to change to get the funds and with such limited understanding of colonial enterprise much less African contact in general how terribly would it fail or like barely succeed in the malarial coastlines?
 
@Alex Richards With a POD in 1864, I'm not thinking a change in British colonial policy or events in the British sphere for some time...

Honestly, the only thing this guarantees is that the mid-19th Century situation is in place.

You see at this point London, flush from the success of Canada, was in the mood to create a Confederation of the colonies in Southern Africa, but it had been rejected by the Home Office in 1858. However Lord Carnarvon in particular was quite adamant about going about it and sent Henry Bartle-Frere and Theophilus Shipman to South Africa during his second tenure as Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1877.

You see at this point in time basically everybody was opposed to confederation. The Cape had a relatively liberal constitution and felt that confederation with the Boers would threaten the rights of their Black Citizens, as well as lead to conflict, Natal was concerned about war with the neighbours, and everyone else was independent- the Orange Free State was enjoying quite good relations with the British and had broken with the ZAR in part because of this, and attempts at treaty relationships were in existence with the Xhosa and Zulus.

Bartle-Frere, with Carnarvon's backing, completely destroyed all of this- revoking the Natal constitution when they objected, overthrowing the government of the Cape Colony, pouncing on a relatively minor border issue to launch the conquest of the Xhosa States, and managing to trigger both the Zulu and 1st Boer War.

Have Carnarvon permanently break with Disraeli over the Reform Act, or have somebody like the Viscount Monck appointed High Commissioner to try and persuade the colonies to confederate and you could completely change the entire situation in South Africa.
 
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