Effects of Operation Ichi-Go failing/not being launched?

[Vinization]

Operation Ichi-Go was a massive Japanese offensive in China, one whose objective was to create a land connection between the occupied territories of Indochina in the south and northern China/Manchuria in the north. While it was a success for the IJA on paper, in reality it was an extremely costly victory, one which overstretched their army even further and also thinned out their defenses against the Soviets in Manchuria.

However, while ultimately meaningless to the development of WWII at large, Ichi-Go had a major effect in China itself: the Chinese Nationalist army not only lost a great deal of territory, but it also suffered absolutely horrendous casualties (from 6 to 700.000 men), a loss that would definitely be felt in the last stages of the Chinese Civil War.

So WI the Japanese were defeated or didn't bother launching the offensive in the first place? Would Chiang Kai-shek be have a better chance to defeat Mao in 1945-49? Would the Soviets have a (slightly) harder time taking Manchuria, perhaps enabling the US to grab all of Korea?​

 

[CalBear]

Operation Ichi-Go was a massive Japanese offensive in China, one whose objective was to create a land connection between the occupied territories of Indochina in the south and northern China/Manchuria in the north. While it was a success for the IJA on paper, in reality it was an extremely costly victory, one which overstretched their army even further and also thinned out their defenses against the Soviets in Manchuria.

However, while ultimately meaningless to the development of WWII at large, Ichi-Go had a major effect in China itself: the Chinese Nationalist army not only lost a great deal of territory, but it also suffered absolutely horrendous casualties (from 6 to 700.000 men), a loss that would definitely be felt in the last stages of the Chinese Civil War.

So WI the Japanese were defeated or didn't bother launching the offensive in the first place? Would Chiang Kai-shek be have a better chance to defeat Mao in 1945-49? Would the Soviets have a (slightly) harder time taking Manchuria, perhaps enabling the US to grab all of Korea?​

The U.S. and USSR had agreed on the stop line on the Korean Peninsula as a temporaty measure. The U.S. was much less interested in any stop line than the Soviets. The U.S. assumed (stop me if you've heard this one) that there would be free and fair elections to decide the political leadership of the country after the Japanese were defeated and their occupation troops were repatriated..

The Japanese were a light infantry force with a rather pitiful tank force in support that suffered from enormous shortages of, well, everything that was generally supposed to be supplied from the Home Islands (e.g. about 40% of the total IJAAF strength in Manchuria was grounded due to lack of parts) . If you leave the IJA literally everything that was used in Ichi-Go the Japanese will still be outnumbered in personnel around 2:1, still outnumbered ~2.5-1 in armor and artillery (not even counting the nearly 2,000 Katyusha batteries, a system that the IJA had no useful counter against), with these number actually be far worse than they appear since the Soviet equiment is vastly superior across the Board,

The IJAAF had been gutted on the Mainland with its operational single engine fighter strength reduced to 60 Ki-27, 70 Ki-43, 40 Ki-44, and 40 Ki-84with 45 Ki-45 twin engine heavy fighters with much of its strength and nearly all of its top tier of pilots having been diverted to the Home Island to oppose the anticipated invasion. Bomber numbers were similar, and of similar quality.. The Soviets threw better than 3,400 combat aircraft at the IJAAF in Manchuria with only the Ki-84 really been a good match for the YaK-9 (although a Ki-44 in the hands a really good pilot would have also presented a formidable challenge). Perhaps the best demonstration of just how weak the IJAAF was in Manchuria is that the Soviets encountered almost no air opposition with their relatively light losses being due to ground fire and operational accidents.

It is also use to remember that the IJA forces in Manchuria & China were being drawn down to the extent possible to reinforce the defenses on Kyushu, it is unlikely that, regardless of Ichi-Go that the Kwantung Army would have exceed its ~700K ration strength on August 9, 1945.

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[Admiral Bloonbeard]

Operation Ichi-Go was a massive Japanese offensive in China, one whose objective was to create a land connection between the occupied territories of Indochina in the south and northern China/Manchuria in the north. While it was a success for the IJA on paper, in reality it was an extremely costly victory, one which overstretched their army even further and also thinned out their defenses against the Soviets in Manchuria.

However, while ultimately meaningless to the development of WWII at large, Ichi-Go had a major effect in China itself: the Chinese Nationalist army not only lost a great deal of territory, but it also suffered absolutely horrendous casualties (from 6 to 700.000 men), a loss that would definitely be felt in the last stages of the Chinese Civil War.

So WI the Japanese were defeated or didn't bother launching the offensive in the first place? Would Chiang Kai-shek be have a better chance to defeat Mao in 1945-49? Would the Soviets have a (slightly) harder time taking Manchuria, perhaps enabling the US to grab all of Korea?​

I think this might have Japan not surrender in 1945. Remember how the Japanese were really close to not surrendering. Now, those troops that were used in Ichi Go OTL can be used to defend Japan.

 

[CalBear]

I think this might have Japan not surrender in 1945. Remember how the Japanese were really close to not surrendering. Now, those troops that were used in Ichi Go OTL can be used to defend Japan.

The actual difference in troops, i.e. restoration of the KIA/MIA/permanently disabled WIA would be under 40,000 men.

In the greater scheme of things that number isn't going to make a difference in thew Japanese decision process. They have still taken two Special Weapons, with (according to their own expets, at least one, perhaps two, more in the offing) and their great hope, that Stalin, of all people, would broker a deal between Japan and the WAllies has vanished as three Soviet Fronts have started to roll up the entire Kwantung Army.

 

[Vinization]

Alright, so what about the Chinese Civil War? Would more troops of higher quality and a Southern China that is less devastated be enough for Chiang to be less reliant on the warlords, enact a few popular reforms, and deal with the communists?​

 

[BobTheBarbarian]

There is a massive difference between "Ichi-Go not being launched" and "all forces for Ichi-Go being transported to Manchuria in 1945."

Most units that took part in Ichi-Go in 1944 were part of the China Expeditionary Army, not the Kwantung Army, so mass transfers to the latter would have gutted the former. On the other hand, some divisions in China received moderate artillery reinforcements before the start of the offensive. These would have been useful in Manchuria, but probably would have gone to the Home Islands if they weren't sent there after Ichi-Go in OTL.

The main problems for the Japanese in Manchuria were threefold:

1.) Lack of equipment - Soviet figures about the Kwantung Army having 1,155 tanks, 5,000+ guns, 1800+ aircraft are complete fabrications. Some divisions were totally without heavy artillery and off the top of my head there were only 60 serviceable combat aircraft in the entire country.

2.) Lack of ammunition - The Kwantung Army only had 13 kaisenbun (ammunition for 13 divisions for 3-4 months) to support a force structure of 24 divisions. During the week or so of all-out combat 2 to 2.5 kaisenbun were used up. This is compared to the 48 kaisenbun it was allocated in late 1941 and the ~205 "required by the scope of operations" in 1945.

3.) Poor training - most new divisions were staffed with local conscripts, the old, the young, or the infirm. They were formed during what the Japanese literally called "uprooting mobilizations." In terms of competence and combat ability they were not comparable to the old units.

Unless these problems were rectified, the Japanese could only hope to delay the Soviets in Manchuria, and even then only for a few months.

Alright, so what about the Chinese Civil War? Would more troops of higher quality and a Southern China that is less devastated be enough for Chiang to be less reliant on the warlords, enact a few popular reforms, and deal with the communists?​

Mao credited the Japanese beating up the KMT as the main reason why the Communists won the Chinese Civil War. Ichi-Go in particular is more of a reach, but at the time it was feared the Japanese offensive might topple Chiang's government. They weren't aiming for Chongqing though, but for Vietnam.

 

[theg*ddam*hoi2fan]

If the KMT have the troops that they lost in Ichi-Go, definitely the odds improve for them in the civil war...how much I’m not sure though.

 

[snerfuplz]

I am not entirely sure that had Chiang kept the troops he would have prevailed in the Civil War. Most KMT units could not conduct offensive operations and during Ichi-Go most units offered at best token resistance

 

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

The actual difference in troops, i.e. restoration of the KIA/MIA/permanently disabled WIA would be under 40,000 men.

In the greater scheme of things that number isn't going to make a difference in thew Japanese decision process. They have still taken two Special Weapons, with (according to their own expets, at least one, perhaps two, more in the offing) and their great hope, that Stalin, of all people, would broker a deal between Japan and the WAllies has vanished as three Soviet Fronts have started to roll up the entire Kwantung Army.

There were attempts by the army to keep the war going even after the nukes

 

[CalBear]

There were attempts by the army to keep the war going even after the nukes

There were, by field grade officers. Why would they be any more (or less) successful if there were 50,000 additional personnel scattered across Kyushu?

 

[Vinization]

I am not entirely sure that had Chiang kept the troops he would have prevailed in the Civil War. Most KMT units could not conduct offensive operations and during Ichi-Go most units offered at best token resistance

Well, Chiang's prestige took a big hit, and I read a few posts here that the best KMT divisions were actually in Burma, divisions he wanted to be returned to China in preparation for the incoming Japanese offensive, but Stilwell prevented that.​