Effects of More Soviet Influence in the Middle East?

One of the great victories of the US in the Cold War was their out-manoeuvring of both the British and Soviets for position of pre-eminent power in the Middle East. Combined with American economic and banking power, good diplomacy helped ensure that the US had (and still has) a privileged position in the oil market at a time when oil became THE most important energy source for human civilization.

Undoubtedly, this further strengthened the already much stronger American economy and easy access to the US banking system allowed Western Europe and Japan to grow their economies by switching out coal power for more efficient oil and gas power. At the end of the Cold War, the US was mostly an oil-based economy and the Soviets lagged behind in still gaining most of their energy from coal.

So I am curious what happens if the superior American diplomatic/influence position is somehow swapped with a superior Soviet diplomatic/influence position - i.e. that most of the major powers and oil producers in the Middle East are Soviet allies, not American allies.

The US would retain its starting advantage in economics, trade and banking.

So maybe Stalin plays a more cautious game in the Middle East. Instead of trying to break up Iran and punish Turkey for breaking their treaties during WW2, Stalin chooses to respect the sovereignty of these states. Perhaps allowing Stalin to retain the good relations the Soviets had with Turkey from before WW2, and take advantage of Anglo-Iranian friction. Similarly, after WW2, relations with Saudi Arabia declined (perhaps due to the Soviet alignment with Arab nationalism, but I'm not sure) - so if possible in TTL we would avoid that.

I also suspect that good relations with Israel would be important in retaining good relations with the major oil producers in the region, since Israeli military power and the leverage over Israel that the US gained by becoming their main supporter also made the US a vital power for Isreal's neighbours to gain the goodwill of. So ideally, we would want Stalin to die early, and leave it to another Soviet leader to start the Cold War. Avoiding Stalin's anti-Jewish policies in the last years of his life would greatly improve Soviet-Israeli relations and meaningful attempts to move to a less autocratic system would greatly improve relations with the Israeli left (which was dominated by democratic leftists).

So let's say that by the mid-50s, the Soviets have strong relations with Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran while Turkey is a friendly neutral. Saudi Arabia has started to develop her oil reserves with Soviet technicians and machinery imports rather than US ones and Iran is pushing Britain out and the new national oil company is similarly importing Soviet expertise and machinery. The Iranian Tudeh party, of course, is under strict instructions from Moscow that the revolution in Iran must wait until Mosaddegh have modernized the country enough to have a real proletariat, and in the meantime they should support the development of national consciousness. Let's further assume that the US and Britain try to overthrow Mosaddegh, but in TTL, a more supportive Tudeh party and a more respectful (to Iran) Soviet foreign policy means that Mosaddegh defeats the coup.

Let's further assume that while the Soviets gain further allies in the region, and sometimes lose them, the core allies mentioned above remain solid friends of the Soviets through the Cold War.

So what are the effects?

Does this mean the Soviets will have access to plentiful and cheap oil? I could see that the Soviets might end up inside TTL's equivalent of OPEC and maybe an OPEC-type group starts earlier. And Soviet advisers and machinery having such a role in building up Iran and Saudi Arabia's oil industries likely means Soviet extraction technology is a bit better in TTL and also the Soviets have a lucrative export market for industrial machinery that they didn't have in OTL. I can't see oil being priced in roubles though - likely it would be priced in either £s or $s, so the Soviets would still need hard currencies to import much oil.

Certainly if the Soviets can do well enough with pushing ahead their extraction technology and in pushing up the quality of their oil-sector manufactures, they might have the economic strength to import significant amounts of oil from the Middle East. But neither of those things are assured. It could be that countries like France, or even the US and Britain, end up reducing the Soviet market share in oil machinery and services.

Potentially, it may be possible that a more oil-powered Soviet Union and a less oil-powered (due to higher world oil prices) West might mean that the Soviets can continue the Cold War for longer.

Since the only plausible path I can see for the Soviets to do better in the Middle East involves them being much nicer, I'd imagine that generally the Middle East is a happier region in TTL - especially Iran. However, since the Soviets have less ability to support Israel, I'd imagine that country is less secure and prosperous in TTL. On the flip side, an Israel that was a Soviet ally likely means a much better situation for the Jewish population of the Soviet Union, doubly so since maintaining good relations with Israel requires avoiding Stalin being as much of a jerk as he was OTL. So overall, maybe Israel still gains?

So... What about the rest of you folks? How do you think the Soviets could maintain more influence in the Middle East and what kind of impact do you think Soviet pre-eminence would have? Does anyone see a path where the Soviets can get the edge by being more competent jerks than they were OTL?

And do people agree or disagree with my feeling that the oil producers of the Middle East were important enough that their alignment could decide the fate of the world?

fasquardon
 
While I wait for others to chip in, it's worth going into the other side of this.

Just because most major actors in the Middle East are Soviet aligned doesn't necessarily mean the Soviets have a great advantage here. The US was along with Austro-Hungary and Venezuela one of the first major oil producers, and unlike the other two, had the means to really push the innovation of oil extraction technology - so it has formidable advantages in the oil sector that are going to mean that even countries allied to the Soviet Union may be dominated by American technology in their oil fields. Add to that, the US also has a powerful financial sector and a large demand for oil, making USD loans and selling to the US market attractive. Do strong US cards mean that Soviet influence, even in the best case, is kept very light?

Further, with a PoD in the immediate post WW2 period, it's easy to imagine the Soviets making better initial moves, only for the US to overtake the Soviets in the 60s, 70s or even 80s as greater American advantages pull away more and more allies from the Soviet side, much as Egypt tilted towards the US in time as it became clear that friendship with the US just plain paid better and gave Egypt better back-channels to Israel.

So can the Soviets win here?

fasquardon
 
Maybe renewable energy would become more popular earlier.

Technology just wasn't there for Solar or Wind Turbines, and for storage batteries, you pretty much have Lead/Acid, NiCad won't be economical till the '70s, and the Silver based batteries never will be economical.
 
The main three reasons the US did well in the Middle East was

a. World leader exploration and extraction technology
b. Known for low interference in local governments, and seen as interested only in making money
c. Not British, who did the big screw jobs on the Arabs after WWI
 
This article by Yuri Barmin for aljazeera offers an interesting perspektive:

https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/moscow-lost-riyadh-1938-171014113525997.html

I just quote a short excerpt from an very in depth analysis. I think somewhere in the whole story there are one or two interesting PODs that could be explored.

How Moscow lost Riyadh in 1938
Russian-Saudi relations could be very different today, if Stalin hadn't killed the Soviet ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

(...)It is a little-known fact that Riyadh and Moscow used to enjoy remarkably warm relations in the 1920s and 30s. The Soviet Union was, in fact, a diplomatic pioneer in Saudi Arabia: It was the first state to recognise Abdulaziz Al Saud (King Salman's father) as the King of the Hijaz and the Sultan of Nejd in February 1926.

The Soviet charm offensive in the Arabian Peninsula in the 1920s was the culmination of numerous attempts by Moscow to gain a foothold in the region prior to that. As early as 1900, Russian imperial military vessels started frequenting the Gulf and making port calls in Kuwait among other destinations. (...)

But it wasn't until after the Bolshevik revolution that Moscow decided to seriously focus on the Gulf. Just like the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union saw the value of diplomatic presence in the region as a way to stand up to Britain. Apart from pursuing relations with the House of Al Saud, the Soviet Union looked at the Kingdom of Hejaz whose ruler Sharif Hussein controlled Mecca and Medina as a way to reach out to the entire Muslim world. Being at odds with London, Hussein was on the lookout for strong foreign allies, which is why his representative in Rome engaged in talks with the Soviets.

Extensive diplomatic communication between Georgy Chicherin, the Soviet People's commissar for foreign affairs, and Soviet diplomats reveals just how important his vision of the Arabian Peninsula and its role in the Muslim world was. Advocating the appointment of a Soviet Muslim as envoy to Hejaz, Chicherin noted in his memo to Joseph Stalin that "Getting into Mecca is of crucial importance to us because it would increase our influence in Arabia and beyond." He recognised that the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the Hajj, was a perfect opportunity to reach out to thousands of Muslims from the British and French colonies and flare up anti-colonial sentiment.

In August 1924, Soviet Consul General Karim Khakimov, a Soviet Muslim of Tatar descent, arrived in Jeddah. Soon after Khakimov's arrival in Jeddah, Abdulaziz launched his campaign to take over Hejaz, which left newly arrived Soviet diplomats with a dilemma of whom to side with.

chvJnc2.jpg

Karim Khakimov and Emir Faisal in Moscow in 1932 [Wikipedia]

Diplomatic dispatches from the Soviet commissar for foreign affairs ordered Khakimov to position himself as an ally of all Arabs without openly showing a preference for either side. "If Ibn Saud pursues a policy of uniting the Arabs, this will be in our interests, and we will also have to try to get closer to him, as we did with respect to Hussein, who tried to unite Arabia," Chicherin wrote to Khakimov. The Soviet Union saw the unification of Arabs as the first step towards empowering Muslims in the region and undermining British rule over them.

By December 1924, Abdelaziz took Mecca and Khakimov was convinced that the time was right for him to try to introduce himself to Ibn Saud. In April 1925, when Jeddah was under siege, he was allowed to perform Umrah, a pilgrimage to Mecca, where Ibn Saud was based, thus getting a chance to meet him - something that no Western non-Muslim diplomat had been allowed to do. Khakimov's letters to Moscow reveal that his meeting with Abdulaziz went exceptionally well and that even his idea of Soviet mediation between Hejaz and Nejd was perceived positively by Ibn Saud.

By the end of 1925, Ibn Saud controlled Jeddah, and in February 1926 he declared himself King of Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd. As soon as the Soviet mission learned the news, Khakimov did what ultimately earned him the respect and friendship of Ibn Saud. On February 16, Karim Khakimov drove his personal car mounted with a Soviet flag through gunfire from Jeddah to Ibn Saud's residence in the desert to hand over a formal note recognising his status as the king. The Soviet Union was the first state to recognise his new title. Abdulaziz responded with a letter thanking the Soviet Union for its neutrality during the war with Hussein and expressed readiness for "relations with the government of the USSR and its citizens".

Soviet-Saudi relations improved further when the Pan-Islamic Congress of Mecca was called in June 1926, whose objective was to resolve the dispute over Mecca and Medina. At the time, Ibn Saud's control over these holy sights had many opponents among Islamic notables, which is why it was paramount for the king to earn recognition at the congress.
Realising this, the Soviet Union did what contradicted the fundamentals of its atheistic ideology: it sent six Soviet Islamic scholars to take part in the congress. Moscow with its 30 million Soviet Muslims threw its weight behind King Abdulaziz, providing the votes for him to be elected the president of the congress. What is more, as a result of Khakimov's efforts, a Soviet delegate was elected the vice-president of the conference. Having established full diplomatic relations with King Abdulaziz, the Soviet Union dispatched, in 1928, a new head of mission to the kingdom, Nazir Bey Turyakulov.

London's key concern about the Soviet influence in Jeddah was that it was spreading Communist propaganda among Muslims during the Hajj. Indeed, this was one of the ideas that Moscow had for its diplomats in Jeddah, but in reality, the Soviet mission had a hard time reaching out to both locals and pilgrims.

Faced with a lot of resistance, Soviet diplomats decided to focus on the creation of trade links between Soviet Black Sea ports and Hejaz. Khakimov managed to convince King Abdulaziz to lift restrictions against Soviet goods that existed in the kingdom due to London's lobbying. In 1929-1930, Soviet goods poured into the kingdom from the port city of Odessa. The biggest achievement of Soviet diplomats in Jeddah was entering the kerosene and benzine market that was almost entirely dominated by the British. The Soviet Union also sent a group of medics to the kingdom to take care of pilgrims during the Hajj.(....)
 
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if Stalin hadn't killed the Soviet ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Plus the many mosques that were closed, re-purposed and outright destroyed in the SSRs from the mid '20s onward-- was no State Secret. One of the first targeted famines was against the Muslim Tatars in the early '20s, with some survivors helpfully transferred to Siberia with Russians moved in to take their place.
Reform Muslims, the Jadids, were purged after Lenin's death, as they suddenly were reclassed as bourgeoisie agents thru out the New SSRs( the various 'stans) made from Turkestan. Most Madrasa and Maktabs closed.
 
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