Effects of an HW Bush Administration Iraq War?

Although I know that Bush Sr. has spoken out extensively as to why his administration did not push for a full-on invasion and occupation of Iraq as did his son (He wrote an op-ed on this in 1998), I recall there were several members of his cabinet who were disappointed over his decision not to push for a more protracted Iraq War. What are some possible effects politically, economically and socially of the HW Bush administration initiating a much larger invasion/war?
 
At the time, '91, the coalition had a mandate to recapture Kuwait, not takeover Iraq. Going to Baghdad and holding it would've caused a lot of friction between the US and other states, including some in NATO.
Domestically it would've also caused problems, as occupying Iraq would've required keeping larger forces there longer than in the OTL. In addition it would've meant constant strife as was experienced beginning in 2003.
Assuming the US tried to democratize Iraq, the resulting Shiite rule would've meant Iraq (or its central/southern parts) gravitating toward Iran sooner than in the OTL. Basically it would've been the same scenario as in 2003 onward over a decade earlier.
 

bguy

Donor
At the time, '91, the coalition had a mandate to recapture Kuwait, not takeover Iraq. Going to Baghdad and holding it would've caused a lot of friction between the US and other states, including some in NATO.
Domestically it would've also caused problems, as occupying Iraq would've required keeping larger forces there longer than in the OTL. In addition it would've meant constant strife as was experienced beginning in 2003.
Assuming the US tried to democratize Iraq, the resulting Shiite rule would've meant Iraq (or its central/southern parts) gravitating toward Iran sooner than in the OTL. Basically it would've been the same scenario as in 2003 onward over a decade earlier.

Would it have been the same scenario as 2003 though? The U.S. in 1991 had a much larger army in theater than it did in 2003 and more coalition partners, so there would be a lot more troops to maintain security in Iraq which will make the occupation much more effective. The U.S. in 1991 also hadn't betrayed the Iraqi Shia population yet by encouraging them to rise up against Saddam and then doing nothing as he slaughtered them, so relations with the Shia population would probably be warmer than they were by 2003. Furthermore, Iran was weaker in 1991 (having just come off of the Iran-Iraq War) than it was in 2003, and al-Qaeda was only just getting started, so neither of those entities had the same capability to interfere in Iraq in 1991 as they did by 2003. And the moral case for the occupation would be much clearer in 1991 since it would be based on removing a war-mongering dictator from power rather than being based on faulty intelligence, which should make it easier to sustain public support for the occupation.
 
Would it have been the same scenario as 2003 though? The U.S. in 1991 had a much larger army in theater than it did in 2003 and more coalition partners, so there would be a lot more troops to maintain security in Iraq which will make the occupation much more effective.

But considering that the mandate was just to oust Saddam from Kuwait, would other coalition partners, and the US public, have gone along? The people were for the war but expected a quick campaign followed by an early return of the troops home, not a lengthy occupation.

The U.S. in 1991 also hadn't betrayed the Iraqi Shia population yet by encouraging them to rise up against Saddam and then doing nothing as he slaughtered them, so relations with the Shia population would probably be warmer than they were by 2003.

They were never the main source of resistance anyway. It was the sunnis especially ex-baathists.

Furthermore, Iran was weaker in 1991 (having just come off of the Iran-Iraq War) than it was in 2003,

Again, not the key source of resistance anyway. Iran may have been weaker in '91 but the sunnis, prior to sanctions taking such a toll, may have been stronger.

and al-Qaeda was only just getting started, so neither of those entities had the same capability to interfere in Iraq in 1991 as they did by 2003.

Ex-baathists would've organized resistance soon enough.

And the moral case for the occupation would be much clearer in 1991 since it would be based on removing a war-mongering dictator from power rather than being based on faulty intelligence, which should make it easier to sustain public support for the occupation.

On the other hand, people in government at the time weren't enthusiastic about assuming responsibility for governing Iraq, as if they instinctively realized what jr later didn't. Neocon influence was greater by 2002 than it had been a dozen years earlier.
 

bguy

Donor
But considering that the mandate was just to oust Saddam from Kuwait, would other coalition partners, and the US public, have gone along? The people were for the war but expected a quick campaign followed by an early return of the troops home, not a lengthy occupation.

We probably would lose some Coalition members, but even if say Egypt, Syria, and France refuse to commit forces to occupy Iraq, Coalition forces would still be much larger in 1991 than it was in 2003 simply because the U.S. contingent is so much bigger.

They were never the main source of resistance anyway. It was the sunnis especially ex-baathists.

Maybe, but the better relations the U.S. has with the Shia population, the more political capital the U.S. has to convince/pressure a Shia dominated government to make conciliatory gestures to the Sunni (and the less troops the Coalition has to station in Shia majority areas, which frees up more troops for the Sunni parts of the country.)

Again, not the key source of resistance anyway. Iran may have been weaker in '91 but the sunnis, prior to sanctions taking such a toll, may have been stronger.

That cuts both ways though. No decade of sanctions means Iraq's infrastructure is in much better shape in 1991 than it was in 2003. Better infrastructure makes it a lot easier to keep the lights on, the hospitals open, and the people fed which is important for giving legitimacy to any post-Saddam government.

Ex-baathists would've organized resistance soon enough.

Absolutely, but they would be facing a much larger U.S. military than they faced in 2003. (Plus all the Shia and Kurdish rebels that were killed in the failed 1991 uprising IOTL.)
 
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