Effects of an Earlier Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on Russia?

[fasquardon]

So the discussion here got me thinking about what effect an earlier treaty of Brest-Litovsk would have on Russia and the Russian civil war.

So let's assume that more of the Bolsheviks are convinced by Lenin's insistence that they must sign peace NOW, and the first German proposal is accepted. Peace is signed in December of 1917 and Russia loses congress Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Riga.

Does this strengthen the Bolsheviks? And if so, by how much?

Does an earlier peace mean the Russian army will have more time to re-organize and recover? Will a stronger army help the Whites or the Bolsheviks at this point?

This will mean the Bolsheviks aren't pushed out of Latvia, so the region remains a Bolshevik heartland. In the circumstances, independence looks unlikely, but with Riga under German occupation, I wouldn't count the Latvian independence movement out just yet. Especially if the German army recognises quickly that they'll not be able to colonize the area (this is the German army though, so I expect they'll be suppressing the local nationalists until it's too late).

Estonian independence is likewise less likely. Do the local nationalists even try for independence in these circumstances?

Do the Bolsheviks still recognize Finnish independence in January? (My bet is yes.) And do they intervene more in the Finnish civil war? (Again, I would bet yes, but the Bolsheviks may not do much more than they did OTL - Finland just isn't that high on the list of priorities for them.)

In this scenario, peace has been signed before the Germans have invaded Russian Ukraine. That's going to really change how the Ukrainian war of independence goes - likely in the favor of the Bolsheviks, since the Bolshevik regime in Kharkiv won't be forced to cede all their gains in Ukraine to the Germans. In this scenario, do the Germans still try to help Ukrainian independence? Or do they turn every spare effort to the West?

Also, OTL's Brest-Litovsk let the Germans intervene in the Caucasus (where they particularly helped Georgia). With an earlier treaty that recognizes the Caucasus as Russian territory, the battles between the Caucasian nations will be rather different, and possibly (due to weaker nationalist armies) easier for the Bolsheviks to reclaim for Russia.

Do the White Russians gain anything from an earlier Brest-Litovsk?

And assuming that the earlier treaty does allow the Bolsheviks to wrap up the civil war in Russia faster, and further assuming that the earlier treaty lets Germany fight on for a bit longer (so peace in the West is in the first 4 months of 1919) but due to Hindenburg and Ludendorf remaining firmly in control the Germans don't try anything really clever. What happens in German-occupied Eastern Europe and the crumbling Hapsburg empire?

Might Bela Kun still try to set up a Hungarian Soviet? And do the Russian Bolsheviks help them if they can? (I'm not sure if they would, but maybe?)

Will the Bolsheviks try to "liberate" Courland and Lithuania (my bet is yes, given the more important position of Latvia in this Bolshevik Russia and the importance of Riga)?

Do the Poles and the Bolsheviks end up at war in TTL? (IMO it depends if the Russians have won/are clearly winning in Belarusia and the Ukraine - if they are Poland likely doesn't make a land grab east and the Bolsheviks don't invade Poland.)

Do the Bolsheviks end up fighting the West Ukrainian People's Republic? (My bet is that the Poles invade and conquer West Ukraine before the Bolsheviks really intervene, but it may depend on how fast the Bolsheviks can consolidate in Russia.)

And might a Bolshevik Russia that consolidated faster intervene more in the Ottoman Empire? (In OTL they supported the Turkish Nationalists with weapons.)

And if the Latvian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks are more important and aren't pushed out of their respective power bases ITTL, might we see a more de-centralized Soviet Union emerging in the 1920s?

fasquardon

 

[fasquardon]

No thoughts on this?

fasquardon

 

[CaliGuy]

Please allow me to give this my best shot:

So the discussion here got me thinking about what effect an earlier treaty of Brest-Litovsk would have on Russia and the Russian civil war.

So let's assume that more of the Bolsheviks are convinced by Lenin's insistence that they must sign peace NOW, and the first German proposal is accepted. Peace is signed in December of 1917 and Russia loses congress Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Riga.

Does this strengthen the Bolsheviks? And if so, by how much?

Yes, it strengthens them by giving them more time to rearm as well as more territory and resources under their control.

Does an earlier peace mean the Russian army will have more time to re-organize and recover? Will a stronger army help the Whites or the Bolsheviks at this point?

Yes.

As for your second sentence here, it would help the Bolsheviks.

This will mean the Bolsheviks aren't pushed out of Latvia, so the region remains a Bolshevik heartland. In the circumstances, independence looks unlikely, but with Riga under German occupation, I wouldn't count the Latvian independence movement out just yet. Especially if the German army recognises quickly that they'll not be able to colonize the area (this is the German army though, so I expect they'll be suppressing the local nationalists until it's too late).

Agreed with this.

Estonian independence is likewise less likely. Do the local nationalists even try for independence in these circumstances?

I think that Estonians would still attempt to become independent if they realize just how bad the Bolsheviks are; however, their odds of success might be somewhat smaller in this TL.

Do the Bolsheviks still recognize Finnish independence in January? (My bet is yes.) And do they intervene more in the Finnish civil war? (Again, I would bet yes, but the Bolsheviks may not do much more than they did OTL - Finland just isn't that high on the list of priorities for them.)

I completely agree with you on both of these questions.

In this scenario, peace has been signed before the Germans have invaded Russian Ukraine. That's going to really change how the Ukrainian war of independence goes - likely in the favor of the Bolsheviks, since the Bolshevik regime in Kharkiv won't be forced to cede all their gains in Ukraine to the Germans. In this scenario, do the Germans still try to help Ukrainian independence? Or do they turn every spare effort to the West?

I suppose that it really depends on just how much the Germans are starving in this TL; more German starvation would probably mean a greater chance that the Germans still invade Ukraine.

Also, OTL's Brest-Litovsk let the Germans intervene in the Caucasus (where they particularly helped Georgia). With an earlier treaty that recognizes the Caucasus as Russian territory, the battles between the Caucasian nations will be rather different, and possibly (due to weaker nationalist armies) easier for the Bolsheviks to reclaim for Russia.

Agreed.

Do the White Russians gain anything from an earlier Brest-Litovsk?

No, I don't think so; heck, if anything, a less harsh B-L peace might result in less support for the Whites since the Bolsheviks wouldn't seem that much like German agents (in comparison to our TL, that is).

And assuming that the earlier treaty does allow the Bolsheviks to wrap up the civil war in Russia faster, and further assuming that the earlier treaty lets Germany fight on for a bit longer (so peace in the West is in the first 4 months of 1919) but due to Hindenburg and Ludendorf remaining firmly in control the Germans don't try anything really clever. What happens in German-occupied Eastern Europe and the crumbling Hapsburg empire?

First of all, I am unsure that this results in a longer WWI for Germany; after all, the extra German forces might simply end up being cannon fodder in Germany's Michael/Spring Offensive.

As for what happens in Central and Eastern Europe, there would be a power vacuum and a power struggle between various nationalist forces--similar to our TL, in fact.

Might Bela Kun still try to set up a Hungarian Soviet?

Yes.

And do the Russian Bolsheviks help them if they can? (I'm not sure if they would, but maybe?)

They would if they are able to establish a land corridor between their territory and Hungary; however, the Poles might be in their way.

Will the Bolsheviks try to "liberate" Courland and Lithuania (my bet is yes, given the more important position of Latvia in this Bolshevik Russia and the importance of Riga)?

Yes and Yes.

Do the Poles and the Bolsheviks end up at war in TTL? (IMO it depends if the Russians have won/are clearly winning in Belarusia and the Ukraine - if they are Poland likely doesn't make a land grab east and the Bolsheviks don't invade Poland.)

To be honest, I think that the Bolsheviks will invade Poland either way in an attempt to spread the revolution.

Do the Bolsheviks end up fighting the West Ukrainian People's Republic? (My bet is that the Poles invade and conquer West Ukraine before the Bolsheviks really intervene, but it may depend on how fast the Bolsheviks can consolidate in Russia.)

Agreed with this. However, Poland and Russia might still end up fighting for Galicia afterwards.

And might a Bolshevik Russia that consolidated faster intervene more in the Ottoman Empire? (In OTL they supported the Turkish Nationalists with weapons.)

Probably Yes; however, it probably wouldn't be a high priority for them.

And if the Latvian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks are more important and aren't pushed out of their respective power bases ITTL, might we see a more de-centralized Soviet Union emerging in the 1920s?

fasquardon

Honestly, I doubt it; after all, the Bolsheviks' support for national self-determination appears to have been merely rhetorical when they were strong and powerful.

 

[Forbiddenparadise64]

Given the previous answer, I agree that the Baltic states and Caucasus would have a harder time getting independence, that Kars remains Russian, and that there's a slightly greater chance of red victory in Finland, though like with regular Finnish Civil War scenarios, it'd still be hard. And almost certainly a civil war that ends earlier than otl. It's also easy to imagine that a more intact and/or territorially larger USSR may be able to do more against Poland. The result is more red power in this scenario.

 

[Don Draper]

So the discussion here got me thinking about what effect an earlier treaty of Brest-Litovsk would have on Russia and the Russian civil war.

So let's assume that more of the Bolsheviks are convinced by Lenin's insistence that they must sign peace NOW, and the first German proposal is accepted. Peace is signed in December of 1917 and Russia loses congress Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Riga.

A good POD for this is that Trotsky doesn't pursue his "no war, no peace" line and sides with Lenin against Bukharin and his Left Communist group that opposed any negotiations. That would give Lenin the votes to carry immediate peace on the Central Committee (OTL he had seven votes, Bukharin four and Trotsky four).

Does an earlier peace mean the Russian army will have more time to re-organize and recover? Will a stronger army help the Whites or the Bolsheviks at this point?

I think it would mostly be a positive for the Bolsheviks, though a knock off effect of this POD (at least the way I imagine it) would be that Trotsky likely stays on as Commissar of Foreign Affairs (he resigned over Brest-Litovsk OTL) instead of being Comissar of War, which could delay the Bolshevik realization that they need former Tsarist officers (the previous War Commissar, Podvoisky, was opposed to them and resigned over it). I think they would understand the need for it in pretty short order though anyway though, Lenin pushed for it as well, he'd probably make sure whoever replaced Podvoisky was on board with that. Trotsky aka Mr. Permanent Revolution remaining at Foreign Affairs would be... interesting compared to the relatively mild Chicherin who came after him.

This will mean the Bolsheviks aren't pushed out of Latvia, so the region remains a Bolshevik heartland. In the circumstances, independence looks unlikely, but with Riga under German occupation, I wouldn't count the Latvian independence movement out just yet. Especially if the German army recognises quickly that they'll not be able to colonize the area (this is the German army though, so I expect they'll be suppressing the local nationalists until it's too late). Estonian independence is likewise less likely. Do the local nationalists even try for independence in these circumstances?

OTL the Latvian Bolsheviks made some major mistakes that alienated a lot of the peasantry (nationalizing all land in a very ham-fisted manner), so Latvia might still go independent. Estonia (which was also a Bolshevik stronghold- Tallinn actually fell before Petrograd OTL) would most likely stay Red though, and with that base and them being in stronger shape overall they could well take Latvia back anyway and hold it by force until the NEP calms things down.

Do the Bolsheviks still recognize Finnish independence in January? (My bet is yes.) And do they intervene more in the Finnish civil war? (Again, I would bet yes, but the Bolsheviks may not do much more than they did OTL - Finland just isn't that high on the list of priorities for them.)

Yes they would still recognize independence and would intervene more (they had several thousand troops in Finland OTL that they pulled out because of the German February offensive). More important than troops though would be better training and discipline for the Finnish Red Guards- once the Bolsheviks allow tsarist officers a few of those might be more valuable than a few thousand more soldiers. The really decisive question though is do the Germans intervene if TTL Brest-Litovsk doesn't recognize Finland as being in their sphere of influence?

Also, OTL's Brest-Litovsk let the Germans intervene in the Caucasus (where they particularly helped Georgia). With an earlier treaty that recognizes the Caucasus as Russian territory, the battles between the Caucasian nations will be rather different, and possibly (due to weaker nationalist armies) easier for the Bolsheviks to reclaim for Russia.

Agreed, also a better Bolshevik performance in the Caucasus could butterfly the massacre of the Baku Commissars, most notably among them Stepan Shaumian aka "the Caucasian Lenin," which
could have some interesting side effects for Soviet politics later on.

Do the White Russians gain anything from an earlier Brest-Litovsk?

I don't think so, as was said above an earlier, less costly peace only weakens the Whites.

Will the Bolsheviks try to "liberate" Courland and Lithuania (my bet is yes, given the more important position of Latvia in this Bolshevik Russia and the importance of Riga)?

Yes (though as I said earlier they might actually need to take the rest of Latvia back first). I say they get Latvia/Courland but Lithuania stays independent.

Do the Poles and the Bolsheviks end up at war in TTL? (IMO it depends if the Russians have won/are clearly winning in Belarusia and the Ukraine - if they are Poland likely doesn't make a land grab east and the Bolsheviks don't invade Poland.)

I think they still would- the Bolsheviks would want to try and export the revolution there I think.

Might Bela Kun still try to set up a Hungarian Soviet?

Yes but I think it would still fail- I don't see how much the Bolsheviks would be able to help him given they need to get through Poland to do so and I don't see them doing that.

And if the Latvian and Ukrainian Bolsheviks are more important and aren't pushed out of their respective power bases ITTL, might we see a more de-centralized Soviet Union emerging in the 1920s?

I don't think so- OTL was about as decentralized as the USSR could realistically get (and in practice local leaders in the early years actually had quite a bit more de facto autonomy than they did on paper, J. Arch Getty has talked about this I believe).

An earlier peace and an easier Bolshevik victory in the Civil War, respectively, would also have major effects on internal Soviet politics:

- First of all, even with a less harsh Brest-Litovsk the SRs would still walk out of the coalition government (since it isn't as onerous though some might decide to stay, but a good number would still walk out), leading to a similar conflict between the two of them playing out earlier- but I think that the weaker breakaway SR faction would be more easily neutralized by the Bolsheviks.

- This possibly butterflies Fanya Kaplan's assasination attempt on Lenin, which could buy him several more years of life (not more than ten at the most though he had a whole host of other health issues).

- Sverdlov could also end up surviving the Civil War as his visit to Oryol where he got sick is butterflied. I always saw a surviving Sverdlov as the most likely alternate successor to Lenin (before he died he basically was performing the critical party organizing role that Stalin would later on).

- With a less ruinous Civil War (though still with plenty of ruin from WWI) we could see a shorter NEP, with collectivization beginning in 1925 or 1926 instead of 1928.

 

[fasquardon]

A good POD for this is that Trotsky doesn't pursue his "no war, no peace" line and sides with Lenin against Bukharin and his Left Communist group that opposed any negotiations. That would give Lenin the votes to carry immediate peace on the Central Committee (OTL he had seven votes, Bukharin four and Trotsky four).

I think it would mostly be a positive for the Bolsheviks, though a knock off effect of this POD (at least the way I imagine it) would be that Trotsky likely stays on as Commissar of Foreign Affairs (he resigned over Brest-Litovsk OTL) instead of being Comissar of War, which could delay the Bolshevik realization that they need former Tsarist officers (the previous War Commissar, Podvoisky, was opposed to them and resigned over it). I think they would understand the need for it in pretty short order though anyway though, Lenin pushed for it as well, he'd probably make sure whoever replaced Podvoisky was on board with that. Trotsky aka Mr. Permanent Revolution remaining at Foreign Affairs would be... interesting compared to the relatively mild Chicherin who came after him.

That is very interesting. Never being commissar for war could help Trotsky's political career quite a bit (since the other politburo members wouldn't be worried about him launching a bonapartist coup). He'd still be arrogant and abrasive with his close colleagues, so I don't see him being likely to get the top job, but he could be an important player for much longer.

I also wonder what his influence on the power structure of the state would be in this scenario. Trotsky in otl seems to have been popular among the army and the soviets (that is, the democratic councils that were sidelined as Bolshevism evolved), in this scenario he'd never get popular with the army, so may become more focused on the soviets.

As for his influence on foreign affairs... I do wonder if he'd last long in the position. If he does, I wonder how much things would change if Chicherin wasn't in the top job (he was Trotsky's deputy, so Chicherin is likely to still have a large impact on Soviet foreign affairs). Perhaps the relationship with Germany wouldn't be so close? (Chicherin seems to be the main driving force behind the Soviet-German cooperation in the 20s.) I doubt the German-Soviet alignment would be much delayed or diverted. Chicherin is still there, still respected (just not as senior) and the incentives for both states would be little changed. Still it's an interesting idea.

Perhaps a bigger butterfly is what happens to the actual progress of the civil war without Trotsky managing the red army. He seems to have been fairly key to making the red army as effective as it was. Could Podvoisky have been as effective? Or would the Bolsheviks face setbacks they didn't in otl due to less capable organization of the army?

If this were the case, I wonder if Stalin might end up being tasked with the job to organize the red army? It would be amusing to see Stalin's ambitions stymied due to the Bolshevik fears of bonapartism hijacking their revolution.

And whoever is war commissar, can the Bolsheviks avoid War Communism? War Communism was a very damaging to the Soviet people, to Soviet foreign relations and to the Bolshevik party itself (though it was less of a disaster than losing the civil war would have been).

OTL the Latvian Bolsheviks made some major mistakes that alienated a lot of the peasantry (nationalizing all land in a very ham-fisted manner), so Latvia might still go independent. Estonia (which was also a Bolshevik stronghold- Tallinn actually fell before Petrograd OTL) would most likely stay Red though, and with that base and them being in stronger shape overall they could well take Latvia back anyway and hold it by force until the NEP calms things down.

Interesting.

Yes they would still recognize independence and would intervene more (they had several thousand troops in Finland OTL that they pulled out because of the German February offensive). More important than troops though would be better training and discipline for the Finnish Red Guards- once the Bolsheviks allow tsarist officers a few of those might be more valuable than a few thousand more soldiers. The really decisive question though is do the Germans intervene if TTL Brest-Litovsk doesn't recognize Finland as being in their sphere of influence?

Hm, so the Finnish reds may have a very good chance in this scenario. Finland instead of Mongolia as the second Communist country in the world?

Agreed, also a better Bolshevik performance in the Caucasus could butterfly the massacre of the Baku Commissars, most notably among them Stepan Shaumian aka "the Caucasian Lenin," which
could have some interesting side effects for Soviet politics later on.

No Turkish advance on Baku could certainly have helped the situation in Baku.

That does raise an interesting question though:

Does anyone know what the original Brest-Litovsk proposals was to gave to the Ottomans? In OTL's treaty the Ottomans gained Erdehan, Kars, and Batum.

Yes (though as I said earlier they might actually need to take the rest of Latvia back first). I say they get Latvia/Courland but Lithuania stays independent.

Hm. I wonder if Lithuania would feel more pressed to have better relations with Poland in a situation where they share a long border with the Soviets. Or would Soviet-Lithuanian relations be closer since until Germany builds a real army, they have a much more stark choice between either the Soviets or the Poles.

Considering that the Soviets may go into a Polish-Soviet war with considerable advantages over OTL, it may be there is no independent Poland, but rather a Red satellite state. (Or perhaps an SSR, but I suspect the Bolsheviks would not go that route, since it would be a provocative move diplomatically.) That probably doesn't bode well for Lithuania. Though it's interesting to speculate what would happen if the Bolsheviks sign a treaty with Lithuania, subsequently conquer Poland and do not immediately throw away their treaty with Lithuania. Sounds like a good setting for a spy thriller to me...

I don't think so, as was said above an earlier, less costly peace only weakens the Whites.

Reading more about the treaty of B-L, it seems that it rather roused many Russian nationalists to the White cause. I suspect that far fewer nationalists if Russia only lost Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Riga, Erdehan, Kars, and Batum - none of those are particularly Russian or even East Slavic parts of the former Empire. So the Whites may be MUCH weaker.

Yes but I think it would still fail- I don't see how much the Bolsheviks would be able to help him given they need to get through Poland to do so and I don't see them doing that.

In this scenario, Poland very likely would extend less to the east. More likely I think is that the Soviets border Slovakia directly (IMO most likely), or a Ukrainian nationalist regime would be over the Carpathians. Tantalizingly close. So far as I am aware, the Bolsheviks didn't think much of Kun and his regime, but they may intervene some in the name of fraternal solidarity.

- With a less ruinous Civil War (though still with plenty of ruin from WWI) we could see a shorter NEP, with collectivization beginning in 1925 or 1926 instead of 1928.

That could have huge impacts. In OTL, the hight of Collectivization coincided with a low point in international grain prices (due to the great depression), and to a series of bad harvests. An earlier Collectivization is very likely to have substantially less of a death toll. That in turn will mean the party does not suffer the reputation hit it did in OTL, which mean that Stalin (or whoever is in charge) won't have so many reasons to be paranoid (we may never know the true answer in our lifetimes, if ever, but certainly from what I read there was widespread fear throughout the Party, not only in Stalin's mind, that Collectivization had so badly upset people that there was a real threat of either a military coup or an uprising of the people that might string loyal party members from stout tree branches), which in turn may mean no purges as we know them (though if Stalin is in charge, it's hard to not see his murders escalating).

Needless to say, a much less severe Collectivization and less severe purges each have huge positive effects on the Soviet Union in and of themselves.

...

I wonder if the Soviets would try to claim Bessarabia back from Romania early in this scenario?

fasquardon

 

[Don Draper]

That is very interesting. Never being commissar for war could help Trotsky's political career quite a bit (since the other politburo members wouldn't be worried about him launching a bonapartist coup). He'd still be arrogant and abrasive with his close colleagues, so I don't see him being likely to get the top job, but he could be an important player for much longer.

I also wonder what his influence on the power structure of the state would be in this scenario. Trotsky in otl seems to have been popular among the army and the soviets (that is, the democratic councils that were sidelined as Bolshevism evolved), in this scenario he'd never get popular with the army, so may become more focused on the soviets.

As for his influence on foreign affairs... I do wonder if he'd last long in the position. If he does, I wonder how much things would change if Chicherin wasn't in the top job (he was Trotsky's deputy, so Chicherin is likely to still have a large impact on Soviet foreign affairs). Perhaps the relationship with Germany wouldn't be so close? (Chicherin seems to be the main driving force behind the Soviet-German cooperation in the 20s.) I doubt the German-Soviet alignment would be much delayed or diverted. Chicherin is still there, still respected (just not as senior) and the incentives for both states would be little changed. Still it's an interesting idea.

I'm not sure that Trotsky was really that popular with "the Soviets" outside of the Petrograd one (which he was elected chairman of in both 1905 and 1917). I just finished reading the first volume of Stephen Kotkin's Stalin biography, and Kotkin (who goes very in depth on the 20s power struggle) doesn't mention that at all.

I agree about German-Soviet alignment, it just makes too much sense for both parties to cooperate given their circumstances.

Perhaps a bigger butterfly is what happens to the actual progress of the civil war without Trotsky managing the red army. He seems to have been fairly key to making the red army as effective as it was. Could Podvoisky have been as effective? Or would the Bolsheviks face setbacks they didn't in otl due to less capable organization of the army?

If this were the case, I wonder if Stalin might end up being tasked with the job to organize the red army? It would be amusing to see Stalin's ambitions stymied due to the Bolshevik fears of bonapartism hijacking their revolution.

Podvoisky was opposed to using tsarist officers so he'd be pretty terrible, but I think even without Trotsky the rest of the leadership would quickly come to a consensus that they were needed, and Podvoisky would be forced to resign as he was OTL. And yeah that'd be pretty ironic to see Stalin (a likely alternate candidate for War Commissar) viewed with suspicion like that, though Trotsky's abrasive, domineering personality did no favors to him there.

And whoever is war commissar, can the Bolsheviks avoid War Communism? War Communism was a very damaging to the Soviet people, to Soviet foreign relations and to the Bolshevik party itself (though it was less of a disaster than losing the civil war would have been).

I would say that with the Whites weakened, War Communism would be less harsh, but it would still be there.

Does anyone know what the original Brest-Litovsk proposals was to gave to the Ottomans? In OTL's treaty the Ottomans gained Erdehan, Kars, and Batum

I don't unfortunately.

Hm. I wonder if Lithuania would feel more pressed to have better relations with Poland in a situation where they share a long border with the Soviets. Or would Soviet-Lithuanian relations be closer since until Germany builds a real army, they have a much more stark choice between either the Soviets or the Poles.

The former I imagine.

In this scenario, Poland very likely would extend less to the east. More likely I think is that the Soviets border Slovakia directly (IMO most likely), or a Ukrainian nationalist regime would be over the Carpathians. Tantalizingly close. So far as I am aware, the Bolsheviks didn't think much of Kun and his regime, but they may intervene some in the name of fraternal solidarity.

Yeah Kun ignored the advice from the Bolsheviks to give land directly to the peasants (he nationalized it instead). Molotov called him "unstable." I think he was pretty much screwed no matter what.

That could have huge impacts. In OTL, the hight of Collectivization coincided with a low point in international grain prices (due to the great depression), and to a series of bad harvests. An earlier Collectivization is very likely to have substantially less of a death toll. That in turn will mean the party does not suffer the reputation hit it did in OTL, which mean that Stalin (or whoever is in charge) won't have so many reasons to be paranoid (we may never know the true answer in our lifetimes, if ever, but certainly from what I read there was widespread fear throughout the Party, not only in Stalin's mind, that Collectivization had so badly upset people that there was a real threat of either a military coup or an uprising of the people that might string loyal party members from stout tree branches), which in turn may mean no purges as we know them (though if Stalin is in charge, it's hard to not see his murders escalating).

I do think that the conditions in this scenario does lead to there being much less of a siege mentality among the Bolsheviks as we've outlined, what with a less harsh Civil War, a more geographically secure USSR what with them controlling two of the Baltic states and possibly a Red buffer state in Finland, and collectivization going better.

This lends itself to a less paranoid leadership and yes, less purging (at least not in the sense that we think of the purges- Lenin expelled something like a third of Party members right after the Civil War and called that a "purge," but didn't kill them), even IMO if Stalin himself still becomes the leader he wouldn't be the same under these circumstances (in Kotkin's book he mentions that until 1928 Stalin would walk the streets of Moscow with just a single bodyguard, hardly paranoid behavior).

However, in the long run this opens itself up to an even greater danger for the Soviet Union potentially. With the construction of socialism seemingly going more smoothly and an international left that (due to no Great Purge) is less divided on the USSR, the leadership of the other Great Powers are going to see it as an even greater threat and perhaps focus on setting aside their differences to remove the Red menace...

 

[fasquardon]

I do think that the conditions in this scenario does lead to there being much less of a siege mentality among the Bolsheviks as we've outlined, what with a less harsh Civil War, a more geographically secure USSR what with them controlling two of the Baltic states and possibly a Red buffer state in Finland, and collectivization going better.

This lends itself to a less paranoid leadership and yes, less purging (at least not in the sense that we think of the purges- Lenin expelled something like a third of Party members right after the Civil War and called that a "purge," but didn't kill them), even IMO if Stalin himself still becomes the leader he wouldn't be the same under these circumstances (in Kotkin's book he mentions that until 1928 Stalin would walk the streets of Moscow with just a single bodyguard, hardly paranoid behavior).

However, in the long run this opens itself up to an even greater danger for the Soviet Union potentially. With the construction of socialism seemingly going more smoothly and an international left that (due to no Great Purge) is less divided on the USSR, the leadership of the other Great Powers are going to see it as an even greater threat and perhaps focus on setting aside their differences to remove the Red menace...

Kotkin's picture of Stalin reminds me of intentional community leaders I've read about who were apparently admirable people in the normal world, but once they had complete power in their Christian village/hippie commune/whatever they turned into paranoid monsters. Stalin seems to have had a stronger urge to collect more power the more power he had and to have gotten more paranoid the more power he had... And had the brains and work ethic to get what he wanted.

As such, Stalin might escalate more slowly if he faces different situations and accumulated power more slowly, but if he's the top man, I think given enough time we'd eventually get something that looked like the purges of the late 30s...

I think the Soviets controlling Finland, the Baltic states and Poland wouldn't make any waves on the international scene. The British certainly expected the Baltics and Poland to be re-absorbed by Russia eventually, and I can't see anyone else being particularly upset at the Soviets re-occupying all of Russia's pre-war territory.

A less brutal civil war and less brutal purges could greatly improve the Soviet foreign relations. The brutality of both really horrified the people in power in the West.

On the flip side, if the Bolsheviks do conquer Poland in this scenario, if they then try to invade Germany, I can see things going badly wrong for them.

fasquardon

 

[fasquardon]

Thinking about a Soviet intervention on the side of the Hungarian Communists, it occurs to me that since the Rumcherod won't be forced to withdraw and dissolve itself so that the Germans can occupy the Ukraine, the Soviets may still be in a live shooting war with the Romanians when the Hungarians revolt against Trianon. The Hungarians and Soviets might end up working together against especially Romania (and perhaps also Czechoslovakia?)

And I do wonder what the German reaction would be to two out of the 5 major treaties ending WW1 being overthrown almost as soon as the ink is dry...

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[DrakonFin]

I think the Soviets controlling Finland, the Baltic states and Poland wouldn't make any waves on the international scene. The British certainly expected the Baltics and Poland to be re-absorbed by Russia eventually, and I can't see anyone else being particularly upset at the Soviets re-occupying all of Russia's pre-war territory.

A less brutal civil war and less brutal purges could greatly improve the Soviet foreign relations. The brutality of both really horrified the people in power in the West.

On the flip side, if the Bolsheviks do conquer Poland in this scenario, if they then try to invade Germany, I can see things going badly wrong for them.

I think that even these gains for the Bolsheviks, Finland, the Baltics and Poland, would make for a significantly worse Red Scare in Western Europe in the 20s. The USSR would be acting more aggressively than IOTL, on the heels of its success in this area, and this success might well pre-empt the doctrine of "Socialism in One Country" which was in big part based on the failures of the European revolutions outside Russia itself. ITTL, by 1920 the Bolsheviks would have been victorious pretty much everywhere they have pushed, especially if they manage to make the Hungarian Red regime stick as well. Many of the Bolshevik leaders would feel invincible and that could translate into serious overreach in various ways.

We also have to remember that Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland would mean a significant influx of refugees into Western Europe. Finns and Baltic people fleeing to Sweden and Poles fleeing to the German areas and the Czech and Slovak lands would be cases in point. These people would bring along stories of Red atrocities against their friends and neighbours, perhaps sometimes exaggarated but often very real as well. I can see some rather important knock-on effects and butterflies rising from this state of affairs alone in the Nordic are and Central Europe in the 20s and 30s, even if we would not see actual *Soviet attacks into these areas, or significant *Soviet efforts to foment more local rebellions here.

So, IMO there definitely would be waves on the international scene due to the Bolshevik success ITTL, more so than IOTL.

 

[fasquardon]

ITTL, by 1920 the Bolsheviks would have been victorious pretty much everywhere they have pushed, especially if they manage to make the Hungarian Red regime stick as well. Many of the Bolshevik leaders would feel invincible and that could translate into serious overreach in various ways.

This is true.

The USSR would be acting more aggressively than IOTL, on the heels of its success in this area, and this success might well pre-empt the doctrine of "Socialism in One Country" which was in big part based on the failures of the European revolutions outside Russia itself.

I'm not so sure. Stalin's ideology is better summed up as "socialism here first", i.e. that the Socialists needed to build up a strong Russia in order to free the workers elsewhere. There's still going to be a logic to that if a more successful Bolshevik revolution still only manages to spread the revolution by the bayonets of the Red Army.

We also have to remember that Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland would mean a significant influx of refugees into Western Europe

I grant that Finland would produce and exodus. But would the others produce that many refugees? Things had already gotten pretty awful in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as WW1 was fought on top of them. Did many of those who hadn't fled already have the resources to escape?

The USSR would be acting more aggressively than IOTL

An intervention in the Hungarian mess would definitely be more aggressive than OTL, so I can see that provoking a reaction. Otherwise it's all contained within the borders of the Russian Empire though (and it's all fights the Bolsheviks got into in OTL). I am very dubious that more success in these areas would produce a significantly different reaction than OTL.

I wonder just how serious an intervention in Hungary could get though... I can't see the Western powers intervening more than they did in OTL, but I do wonder if the league of nations might develop into an anti-communist alliance or if a kind of psuedo-NATO could form.

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