Effects of an anti-tank division on the Eastern Front

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Deleted member 1487

The snag is that you can't ignore the influence of Stalin or Hitler on Soviet and Nazi operational planning. It doesn't matter to an objective analysis of events on the Eastern Front why German operational planning sucked, the outcome is it did. Maybe in an ideal world where the old Great General Staff ran the military, Germany could produce plans capable of beating the USSR. Then again, that Germany wouldn't be Nazi Germany and it probably wouldn't have attacked the Soviet Union in the first place. Moreover, wasn't the Schiefflen Plan one that broke down on logistics? So who knows, or can know, how a traditional German military-run campaign would have gone?
:confused:

Taking on three powers, two of which can outproduce you and third match you, is a definite Strategic NO-NO. It explains adequately why Germany lost the war. But operations planners have to deal with this reality and Nazi German ones couldn't. The evidence is that Nazi Germany couldn't or wouldn't match its plans to resources. Being by far the best at the tactical level of land warfare wasn't enough.
;)

The reality is that war is not a technocratic exercise divorced from wider issues. Saying that OKH would have made a better job of running the campaigns on the Eastern Front without Hitler may be true but it is unprovable. And Halder's plans for Barbarossa don't fill me with confidence.
:rolleyes:
Which is why its silly to say the Soviets or Germans were good or bad at something, because you cannot divorce it from the context and take one piece of it and make pronouncements. OKH/OKW could have done things a lot differently from 1942 on in the East and changed how that campaign was fought and played out, but by that point it was rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. The thing was due to Hitler the German military was constantly called on to do what it did not have the resources to achieve realistically, but due to Hitler's magical thinking and the purged military's adherence to orders, no matter how crazy they did it against their better judgement. The German military could have fought the war in the East significantly better divorced from Hitler's interference, which is why I'm saying that saying their operational skill was terrible is not fair, but the situation being what it was they went along with orders and suffered as a result.

As to having an AT division, it would seem it was really only useful as a parking lot/logistics management for extra AT units to be distributed by army command as needed; perhaps that would be useful to have those extra units if available in that configuration, but I don't think we can say for sure without extensive study of operational engagements and wargaming that option.

Clearly it wasn't going to have a strategic effect on the war, but it could have been an interesting option given the situation, moreso than the artillery division, which IMHO really only made sense for offensive operations, which was not an option after Kursk in the East. It might have been an interesting experiment in a constricted battle zone like Narwa, Smolensk, or Normandy, but did not make sense in Ukraine in 1943-44.
 

Deleted member 1487

Actually looking into some of the battles in late 1943-early 1944 I'm thinking the artillery division might have had significant use for AG-Center or North, even though the division wasn't combat ready until after the Battle of Smolensk. It might have have significant effect in some of the fighting around bridgeheads in Belarus or at very least around Leningrad in early 1944. It sounds like the Germans placed it in a bad area for its abilities. Thoughts?
 
The Germans wanted something more mobilie hence the independent assault gun battalions Something like the Soviet Anti Tank Brigades probably didnot fit the bill.
 
Agree to differ on what matters?

Which is why its silly to say the Soviets or Germans were good or bad at something, because you cannot divorce it from the context and take one piece of it and make pronouncements. OKH/OKW could have done things a lot differently from 1942 on in the East and changed how that campaign was fought and played out, but by that point it was rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. The thing was due to Hitler the German military was constantly called on to do what it did not have the resources to achieve realistically, but due to Hitler's magical thinking and the purged military's adherence to orders, no matter how crazy they did it against their better judgement. The German military could have fought the war in the East significantly better divorced from Hitler's interference, which is why I'm saying that saying their operational skill was terrible is not fair, but the situation being what it was they went along with orders and suffered as a result.
Hmm, we probably differ on perspective here. I don't really care how good the German Generals might have been at running the campaigns left to themselves, that's one for wargaming. IMHO there simply was a significant difference in the quality of operational level command from late-1942 onwards. Hitler or the Generals, I don't really care.
As to having an AT division, it would seem it was really only useful as a parking lot/logistics management for extra AT units to be distributed by army command as needed; perhaps that would be useful to have those extra units if available in that configuration, but I don't think we can say for sure without extensive study of operational engagements and wargaming that option.

Clearly it wasn't going to have a strategic effect on the war, but it could have been an interesting option given the situation, moreso than the artillery division, which IMHO really only made sense for offensive operations, which was not an option after Kursk in the East. It might have been an interesting experiment in a constricted battle zone like Narwa, Smolensk, or Normandy, but did not make sense in Ukraine in 1943-44.
I think we can agree on this.
:)

Ironically, the A-Tk division might make more sense in late 1942 as a unit(s) that could have supported the Allied Armies on 6th Army's flanks. The German apathy towards ensuring these troops were adequately equipped and trained is odd. I'm not sure it can be blamed on Hitler either but ....that's anther issue.
:eek:
 
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Any source for this? Seems unlikely to me but....

Sudoplatov. I've seen his book quoted in Stalin's Secret War (Robert W. Stephan). I've also seen this claim mentioned elsewhere in passing in context that this claim is taken seriously and as a possibility even if it's unproven
 
... an AT division might have been something useful, especially if it made use of the heaps of captured Soviet weapons that were still useful, getting around Germany's production problems and need to focus on AAA.

... The equipment could come from the captured Soviet stocks and supplied with their ammo; all the Germans would need is trucks, which apparently they had enough for to have the 18th artillery division IOTL.
I am not at all able to say whether a specialised anti-tank division might have made sense.
I have the opinion, however, that it would not have made sense to equip it (even partly) with captured Soviet equipment, especially not in 1943 (or later).

By 1943 the Wehrmacht's opportunities for capturing Soviet equipment, spare parts or ammunition are rare to non-existent. A large portion of the equipment that has been captured in 1941 and 1942 has lost its usefulness due to lack of spare parts and ammunition, on top of that portion that has been destroyed by enemy action and by wear and tear. So the pool of captured equipment is already small and it is getting smaller.

It may still make sense to use locally what captured equipment there is - after all using a tank, gun or whatever for a limited period might be more useful than not using it at all.

But going to the trouble of raising a new large unit especially for this equipment is very probably not worthwhile, especially not if this division is intended as a 'fire brigade' - an elite unit that can be shifted to points of actual or potential Soviet breakthroughs. If you want a unit that is worth using valuable transport capacities (which a 'fire brigade' by definition must) then you better take care that this unit gets as much fighting power from the transport space it uses - and this is clearly not the case with captured equipment for which spare parts and ammunition are a problem.
 
For the most part they were quite good at operations, but Hitler monopolized strategy and interfered in operations, fatally compromising everything.

Uh... the actual historical record says quite differently. Hitler actually rarely interfered with operations until mid-1941. Even the planning for Barbarossa was left almost entirely to OKH. And when he did interfere in that time period, up until 1942, Hitler actually showed considerably better operational sense then the German High Command in several critical instances. The two that stand out are with France and Barbarossa. In the former case, OKH and OKW wanted to stick with the original plan but Hitler forced them to accept Manstein's Sichelschnitt, which was wildly more successful then the original plan would have been. In the latter case, he overruled OKH who wanted to keep going for Moscow in September 1941, which was logistically and militarily impossible, and decided to divert to Kiev instead. Operation Citadel was also almost entirely OKH's plan and led to a disaster for the Germans that could have been even worse had Hitler not cancelled it when he did.

Even the fact that Hitler monopolized strategy is a mark against the German high command because they let him monopolize strategic thinking. The last German senior military leader to seriously challenge Hitler on strategy was Ludwig Beck who, in 1938, resigned over the matter hoping that it would provoke the rest of the German military leadership to follow him. Not a single one of them did. Furthermore, once you accept Hitler's basic premise, (and this is the critical point... unless one takes the time to consider and understand how Hitler viewed the world, his strategic choices simply could never make sense) that Germany had to constantly expand and become powerful at the expense of the other nations around it, his strategic decisions in the 1939-1941 period are for the most part remarkably rational.

Of course in mid-1942, when the failure of Operation Blau became apparent, Hitler's decision making in all manners took a sharp turn for the worst. Probably his last good major decision, as I observed earlier, was the cancellation of Operation Citadel but at that point it hardly really mattered.
 
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I think the Germans wanted formtions that were tactically mobile. Anti tank guns, by their nature cannot fit the bill. And a divisional size formation, probably modelled on the idea of the Soviet Anti Tank brigades would likely have been at the expense of divisional/corps level anti tank weapons. And there is the question of whether an anti tank division could have been deployd quickly enough to where it was actually needed. I just don't see a formation of this nature being a viable one for the Germans.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think the Germans wanted formtions that were tactically mobile. Anti tank guns, by their nature cannot fit the bill. And a divisional size formation, probably modelled on the idea of the Soviet Anti Tank brigades would likely have been at the expense of divisional/corps level anti tank weapons. And there is the question of whether an anti tank division could have been deployd quickly enough to where it was actually needed. I just don't see a formation of this nature being a viable one for the Germans.
Its funny I was reading interviews with Hermann Balck last night and he said this is exactly what the Germans needed, a formation of towed AT guns that could be massed against a breakthrough, blunt it, and allow for panzers to counter attack.
 

Deleted member 1487

Uh... the actual historical record says quite differently. Hitler actually rarely interfered with operations until mid-1941. Even the planning for Barbarossa was left almost entirely to OKH. And when he did interfere in that time period, up until 1942, Hitler actually showed considerably better operational sense then the German High Command in several critical instances. The two that stand out are with France and Barbarossa. In the former case, OKH and OKW wanted to stick with the original plan but Hitler forced them to accept Manstein's Sichelschnitt, which was wildly more successful then the original plan would have been. In the latter case, he overruled OKH who wanted to keep going for Moscow in September 1941, which was logistically and militarily impossible, and decided to divert to Kiev instead. Operation Citadel was also almost entirely OKH's plan and led to a disaster for the Germans that could have been even worse had Hitler not cancelled it when he did.

Even the fact that Hitler monopolized strategy is a mark against the German high command because they let him monopolize strategic thinking. The last German senior military leader to seriously challenge Hitler on strategy was Ludwig Beck who, in 1938, resigned over the matter hoping that it would provoke the rest of the German military leadership to follow him. Not a single one of them did. Furthermore, once you accept Hitler's basic premise, (and this is the critical point... unless one takes the time to consider and understand how Hitler viewed the world, his strategic choices simply could never make sense) that Germany had to constantly expand and become powerful at the expense of the other nations around it, his strategic decisions in the 1939-1941 period are for the most part remarkably rational.

Of course in mid-1942, when the failure of Operation Blau became apparent, Hitler's decision making in all manners took a sharp turn for the worst. Probably his last good major decision, as I observed earlier, was the cancellation of Operation Citadel but at that point it hardly really mattered.

I was referring to the post-1941 period when Hitler purged the officer corps and basically started to assume increasing command over the military. The military didn't let Hitler do things, they followed the command structure and Hitler placed himself legally in charge of it by purging it. Just as Stalin did; the problem of dictatorships is they can do what they want and individuals can do nothing about it on their own. I don't think we can pin Citadel on the German military too much because they were effectively ordered into the operation by Hitler's strategy and demand for it, despite advising him against it; once they had to play by his rules and arbitrary demands they were allowed 'freedom' to plan. AFAIK the only major figure demanding that the operation continue on the southern flank was Manstein. He was Johnny on the spot and wasn't at all thinking about wider strategic matters (a good little Ludendorff knock off), smelled blood and wanted to continue the bloodletting his forces were involved in. Of course his opinion was informed by the horrible intelligence they were getting that the Soviets lacked deep reserves and couldn't attack as they did soon after; we cannot condemn their military opinions (but obviously we can for all their other failings and actions) based on faulty intelligence, because we have hindsight they didn't have access to.

But remember too that Manstein and Guderian didn't even want to fight Kursk in the first place, they wanted to hold off and fight mobile battles in retreat, Hitler forces them to fight an attritional battle, which they realized was a losing proposition and which ultimately wore down their armor badly before the mobile battles started after Citadel. I'm still curious what would have happened had the Germans opted out of Kursk and had their AFV strength intact for the mobile battles of 1943 in Ukraine.
 
I was referring to the post-1941 period when Hitler purged the officer corps and basically started to assume increasing command over the military.

True enough.

The military didn't let Hitler do things, they followed the command structure and Hitler placed himself legally in charge of it by purging it.
In 1938-1940? Hell yes they did. Megargee, in "Inside Hitler's High Command" quotes von Beck as wanting to wait until 1942 or 1943 at the earliest for any action against Austria or Czechoslovakia, and even then he was vehemently opposed to any course of action that would lead to a general European war, in which he saw no way for Germany to win. While he was certainly not philosophically opposed to using military force to pressure Czechoslovakia, he felt it had to be done in a manner that did not antagonize France or Britain. What Beck wanted was fundamentally very different from what Hitler wanted - Beck wanted a powerful military as a lever to help lean on Germany's neighbours; Hitler wanted a powerful military to wage a war to remake the world. Beck's views on this matter were quite clear, detailed in an increasingly dense barrage of memos he fired off over the course of 1938 as Hitler's intentions became clear.

Most of the rest of the German generals lacked any clear strategic vision for what Germany should do with military force. They just dumbly followed whoever won that minor power struggle... which was Hitler, ultimately. Of course they, like Beck, wanted to wait until '42 or '43 to begin the war. But Hitler's decision to wage a genocidal war in 1939-1941 came at the point where Germany had the greatest chance of winning it, something he identified yet surprisingly few others in the German military establishment did (and of those who did, they drew the opposite conclusion from Hitler - that war should be avoided - since they weren't amoral megalomaniacs). Part of Hitler's disdain in those years for so many around him was due to the fact that very often he was right, when so many others who surrounded him were wrong.

I don't think we can pin Citadel on the German military too much because they were effectively ordered into the operation by Hitler's strategy and demand for it, despite advising him against it;
Not true. Hitler was pretty much out of ideas by the Spring of '43 and basically placed himself out of the loop. It's pretty clear that Hitler had serious reservations about Citadel himself ("Whenever I think about this attack, my stomach turns over") but he let himself be talked into it by OKH. It would be interesting to speculate how he would have reacted if the OKH staff had decided to agree with Manstein or Guderian and recommended a defensive approach.

But remember too that Manstein and Guderian didn't even want to fight Kursk in the first place, they wanted to hold off and fight mobile battles in retreat, Hitler forces them to fight an attritional battle, which they realized was a losing proposition and which ultimately wore down their armor badly before the mobile battles started after Citadel.
It's true that Manstein and Guderian had serious reservations about the idea but neither were part of OKH, who were the ones who planned and advocated for Citadel.

I'm still curious what would have happened had the Germans opted out of Kursk and had their AFV strength intact for the mobile battles of 1943 in Ukraine.
The Soviets were repeatedly and consistently able to beat the Germans in mobile battles throughout mid-late 1943. Indeed, even in Citadel itself the fact they were executing large strategic counter-offensives that German forces could not withstand proved an important part in it's cancellation. The combination of the fact that the terrible German strategic intelligence leaves them unable to predict when and where the Soviets will launch their attack, that German infantry could no longer hold off Soviet attacks by themselves, that the German Panzer forces had to be concentrated to repel Soviet offensives, and that the Soviets could execute more offensives either in sequence or parallel then the Germans could respond. They might have slowed the Soviet advance slightly... but that would be off-set by the fact that the Soviets could go on the offensive earlier.

we cannot condemn their military opinions (but obviously we can for all their other failings and actions) based on faulty intelligence,
That the Germans had faulty intelligence can in fact be blamed upon them (although not upon Manstein specifically). Intelligence gathering, like many other military matters, is based on adequate of resource allocation and organization. The Soviets and WAllies allocated adequate resources and organization to intelligence gathering, the Germans (and the Japanese and Italians, for that matter) did not. The deficient attention towards intelligence gathering is a key reason why German defensive operations in the 1943-45 were such failures.

Manstein, of course, after the war wrote bemoaning the lack of a coherent strategic planning group. But going to war then complaining about the lack of an overall strategy rather encapsulates the problem with WW2 Germany. If they'd had a competent strategic planning group prior to the war, the most likely answer would have been "don't bloody do it, we'll lose". In fact... it was!

"In order to make our position clear to historians in the future and to keep the reputation of the High Command clean, I wish, as Chief of the General Staff, to make it a matter of record that I have refused to approve any kind of National Socialist adventure. A final German victory is impossible."
-Resignation letter of General Ludwig von Beck, 1938
 
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Let's not forget that "when in doubt, attack!" has been part of Prussian (and hence German) way of waging war since 17th century. Which is why there were officers who were all for going on attack in 1945 (see Ardennes and Budapest). Some general ight have expressed doubts about particular offensive but there were others who were in favour.
 

Deleted member 1487

The Soviets were repeatedly and consistently able to beat the Germans in mobile battles throughout mid-late 1943. Indeed, even in Citadel itself the fact they were executing large strategic counter-offensives that German forces could not withstand proved an important part in it's cancellation. The combination of the fact that the terrible German strategic intelligence leaves them unable to predict when and where the Soviets will launch their attack, that German infantry could no longer hold off Soviet attacks by themselves, that the German Panzer forces had to be concentrated to repel Soviet offensives, and that the Soviets could execute more offensives either in sequence or parallel then the Germans could respond. They might have slowed the Soviet advance slightly... but that would be off-set by the fact that the Soviets could go on the offensive earlier.

That the Germans had faulty intelligence can in fact be blamed upon them (although not upon Manstein). Intelligence gathering, like many other military matters, is based on adequate of resource allocation and organization. The Soviets and WAllies allocated adequate resources and organization to intelligence gathering, the Germans (and the Japanese and Italians, for that matter) did not. The deficient attention towards intelligence gathering is a key reason why German defensive operations in the 1943-45 were such failures...

What about the legendary Maskirovka? Frankly the Germans couldn't get worthwhile intelligence with what they had available.

Soviet ability to win was a function of superior intelligence due to all the civilians behind the lines, not to mention partisan operatives, plus the massive numerical superiority the Soviets enjoyed and superior transport that was not interdicted by partisans; in fact a major part of Germany's woes in 1943-44 was the partisan problem affecting their supply lines. It was a big part of Soviet strategy before Kursk to hurt the German ability to build up.
 
What about the legendary Maskirovka?

Counter-intelligence comes part-and-parcel with intelligence. ;)

Frankly the Germans couldn't get worthwhile intelligence with what they had available.

Soviet ability to win was a function of superior intelligence due to all the civilians behind the lines, not to mention partisan operatives, plus the massive numerical superiority the Soviets enjoyed and superior transport that was not interdicted by partisans;
And all this does is prove my point: the Soviets used adequate amounts of time, effort, and resources to invest in identifying, exploiting, cultivating, supporting, organizing, and coordinating such assets while the Germans did not. The result was that the Soviets had good intelligence and a means to interdict German supply lines while the Germans had nothing.
 

Deleted member 1487

Counter-intelligence comes part-and-parcel with intelligence. ;)

And all this does is prove my point: the Soviets used adequate amounts of time, effort, and resources to invest in identifying, exploiting, cultivating, supporting, organizing, and coordinating such assets while the Germans did not. The result was that the Soviets had good intelligence and a means to interdict German supply lines while the Germans had nothing.

Right, which doesn't mean the Soviets were the greatest eva at operations, it had one front to focus on, on its turf, where they could maximize their logistics and special ops advantage (which they lacked and had problems without outside their 1939 borders), which the Germans were badly outnumbered. That's the entire point here; Soviet operational success was a function of singular attention and overwhelming resources rather than pure skill/ability. They got very good at their system by 1944-45, no one can deny that, but it wasn't the skills of their commanders or their system which was world beating, it was their vast advantages over their foe that enabled them to win and overcome their tactical inferiority.
 
Right, which doesn't mean the Soviets were the greatest eva at operations, which the Germans were badly outnumbered.

The things we are talking about are very much fundamental parts of operations. That the Soviets were able to apply them to their operations was a direct function of their superiority in operational art over the Germans.

(which they lacked and had problems without outside their 1939 borders),
Uh... no they didn't. At least not in 1944-45. Soviet intelligence gathering continued to produce accurate pictures of German dispositions in front of them all the way until the end of the war, even if partisans were substituted by deep-infilration reconnaissance teams. Logistics became a issue at certain points, but their excellent operational planning and problem solving allowed them to appropriately apply their resources in overcoming them. In 1939-1941 they were issues, but then that was before the Soviets had developed adequate levels of skill to apply their resources in overcoming them.

That's the entire point here; Soviet operational success was a function of singular attention and overwhelming resources rather than pure skill/ability. They got very good at their system by 1944-45, no one can deny that, but it wasn't the skills of their commanders or their system which was world beating, it was their vast advantages over their foe that enabled them to win and overcome their tactical inferiority.
If the Soviets skills had not been so good, then all of these resource advantages would have meant little-to-nothing. Skill is a necessary perquisite for the appropriate accumulation and application of superior resources. Otherwise, those resource advantages mean precisely zilch.

The Iran-Iraq War is a very good example of this. Comparing to the two halves of the Winter War also illustrates it nicely.
 
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