Japan eventually loses from financial collapse and sustaining heavy casualties while attempting to overwhelm Russian positions which forces it to accept defeat alongside whatever terms the Russians have - how does this effect Japan later on?
An important question is however how Russia wins. This far mostly everyone goes with the Russian army carries the day. However a naval russian victory is a much more dangerous prospect. It could lead to the invasion of Japan. I dont think that would happen - Brittain would not allow it and basically no one would like an outcome like that so I expect a meditation at the moment that Japan island are in danger.
The Germans considered the Russians in Manchuria to be a pre-existing condition, but I suspect the mischief preventing an Anglo-German understanding was meta-gaming by Holstein and Salisbury. Diplomatic relations between Wilhelmine Germany and Britain prior to the Anglo-Japanese alliance resembled a tragic rom-com.Search in google for Yangtze Agreement, it was signed in the october of 1900. For the full text: British Documents on the Origins of the War, volume II., document No. 17. according to my notes.
The gist is that it was a huge failure on the part of Germany and Brittain both. If you read the documents leading up to the treaty the germans clearly state that they have no intention of going in to conflict with Russia for Manchuria however the final text of the document has nothing of this in it and speaks of the Open Door and upholding chinese territorial integrity and has nothing to exclude Manchuria. Combine this with a change in the british government and the new foreign minister knows only the text. And when he decides to go forth in regards of China to protest the continuing russian occupation of Manchuria he wants to enlist the germans for a joint protest based on this documents however the germans refuse even to do this.
The quality of Russian decision making declined as Sergei Witte's influence waned and the hawks increasingly dominated Russian foreign policy, but like much of Europe, overt racism was always firmly entrenched in Russian society."The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War" is a book filled with good PODs.
In my TL I started from a bit earlier POD, but ultimately the fate of this conflict boils down to Russian court politics. I was personally surprised how determinedly the concilatory faction of Japanese statesmen really tried to reach an agreement with Russia, and how clumsy and erratic the Russian diplomacy towards Japan was.
From a TL perspective, you could plausibly have Japanese capital ships hit more mines, the Russian capital ships hit fewer mines and Makarov surviving, but without those handwaves, I agree the optimal use of Russian naval assets would be a fleet in being performing the occasional raid.Was there any realistic chance for the Russian navy to win outright? I know they could have performed better, but I didn't think the Far East fleet was strong enough to do more that act as a fleet-in-being or as a raiding fleet...
Agreed. I doubt even the Korean peninsular would be worth the Russian effort.And whatever happens, I don't really see the Russians invading Japan. What does Russia gain from it? On the other hand, it has much to lose by invading Japan, since even if they had a cake walk, the logistics chain would be very expensive and taking Japan just seems like it would upset too many people.
Agree. If the Russians were victorious, the smart move would be to "gift" the Korean peninsular to Japan and reach a discreet understanding in respect of harvesting China.As far as Britain trying to keep Russia out of China, them side-lining Japan to do so could end up pushing Japan into Russia's arms, which would be very ironic to see. It depends on the Russians being able to see that their interests were compatible with Japan's though - in OTL, there was a Russo-Japanese rapprochement after the Russo-Japanese war (which would have been very interesting to see evolve had Russia not gone Red). Without Japan beating respect into the Russians, they may continue to be too arrogant to recognize the opportunity if Britain jilts Japan.
Actually, an outcome of the 1905 revolution was Okhrana subsequently successfully infiltrated most of the known revolutionary organisations to the extent some cells were actually lead by Okhrana operatives. Another interesting potential outcome: the 1905 revolution was a dress rehearsal for the 1917 revolution, one of the reasons why the Russian Civil War ended in a Bolshevik victory is because the various groups who were dissatisfied with the Tsar's rule had plenty of people who remembered their mistakes in 1905 and didn't repeat them next time around.
Actually, an outcome of the 1905 revolution was Okhrana subsequently successfully infiltrated most of the known revolutionary organisations to the extent some cells were actually lead by Okhrana operatives.
The Germans considered the Russians in Manchuria to be a pre-existing condition, but I suspect the mischief preventing an Anglo-German understanding was meta-gaming by Holstein and Salisbury. Diplomatic relations between Wilhelmine Germany and Britain prior to the Anglo-Japanese alliance resembled a tragic rom-com.
Im not sure about that. If you see the record of the relations of the two countries in the period:
1. The Boer wars was a big hit - Germany foreign office handled that very poorly IMO
2. The Boxer rebellion: another german bundle with Wilhems hun speach and his insistence upon Germany leading the expedition
3. The Yangtse agreement started as a positive
4. The death of Queen Victoria. Wilhelms conduct here did improve the relations for once.
5. German failure to support the british was a big mistake again on their part. I think they should have supported the british while making clear in private to them that they wont go to war over the matter and letting the british take a leading role. A joint protest might have succeeded in persuading the russians to leave - thus terminating one of the main reasons of russo-japanese war and the british-japanese alliance - and Russia was already an ally of france so alienating them is not that big of a problem. This way they didnt honour an agreement and showed the british that they cant be relied upon. Thats a huge mistake when you are already facing a russo-french alliance.
6. The venezuelan affair. Here they acted together but german conduct and agressivnes made a bad impression and left a bad after taste.
Essentially you have highlighted the Germans were routinely guilty of bad table manners, while the British were busy pocketing the silverware...All in all in 3 years the germans showed that they are unreliable especially if their interest are not directly at stake and that even if they help (Boxer rebellion, Venezuela) it would have been probably better if they didnt. I think these fact and especially the first part played a great role in paving the road to the franco-british entente.
By way of background, Anglo-German angst in respect of Southern Africa was initially derived by the failed attempt by the British in 1895-96 to incite a revolt in the independent Boer Republic of Transval. Germany/Wilhelm sent a congratulatory telegram to the President of the Republic of Transval on the successful defense of the State. The German sentiment was loosely consistent with continental europe, but was met with indignation in Britain, which had traditionally viewed Prussia/Germany as the British friend on the continent. The British Foreign Office subsequently threatened to blockade the German coast and thereby cripple the German economy if Germany intervened in the conflict in Transvaal, arguably setting off the subsequent Anglo-German naval rivalry.
I think the above is less about bad German behaviour and more about British exceptionalism.
What exactly did the Germans do wrong when the British subsequently went on to conquor the Boer Republics and their resources in the Second Boer War?
There is no way to sugar coat the Kaiser's speech, which was of potus proportions. I was not aware of Wilhelm's insistance the expedition be lead by Germany, which I understand was actually lead by Britain. I daresay this illustrated the Kaiser could behave like a twat, but I struggle to see how this offended or undermined British interests in a significant way.
I understand this agreement was negotiated by the Salisbury's predessor and Salisbury was scheptical as to the merit of the agreement. If you look at the respective mindsets of Holstein and Salibury, it is not surprising the British did not get something for nothing.
The German delusion the British had no choice but to reach an accomodation with Germany (essentially because no-one on the continent liked or trusted the British), resulted in the tentative British approaches being rejected by Germany. That was the missed opportunity to change paths.
Yeah nah. No one expected the Russians to leave Manchuria unless they felt like it. If things escalated, there would be no doubting which nation would be carrying the burden of a continental war (hint Germany) and if the Russians withdrew from Machuria, there would no doubt which nation would continue to dominate the international trade of China (hint Britain).
However, notwithstanding the above, I do believe the Germans should have slashed the price of German friendship following the death of Wilhelm's Grandmother.
I have not done much reading on this matter for a couple of decades, but my understanding was the Germans generally following the British lead, indeed the German involvment was dependent on the British doing so. I understand the incident you are referring to was acknowledged as inadvertant by the British and tainted US-German (mildly) rather than Anglo-German relations.
Essentially you have highlighted the Germans were routinely guilty of bad table manners, while the British were busy pocketing the silverware...
The Anglo-German disconnect was substantially due to interpersonal differences, rather than some logical geo-political reasons - IMHO