Effects of a failed Sealion

You have failed to prove how this is to be the case. Or more to the point: failed to prove how this is to be the case in Hitler's mind. Hitler's priority is achieving his ideological goals as quickly as possible, as he was quite afraid of dying before they were since he believed that his successors would not have the where-with-all to properly follow the course, not defeating his enemies one at a time.

I must have missed the part where Hitler transferred his army east in June 1940 and then launched the invasion of Russia in September 1940.

I think Hitler's original plan was to win the war in the west first, then use that victory to carve a German empire in Russia second. It was the fall of France with Britain refusing to give up that was the joker in the deck - the surrender of Paris so quickly was totally unexpected, the decision of Britain to continue on perhaps even more so. The reason why the final decision between Sealion and Barbarossa took so long to resolve (July-December 1940) was because the decision was based solely on which move was most likely to win the war, not which would carve an empire in the east.

it's because he thinks it has a chance at knocking the British out without upsetting his plans to invade the Soviet Union afterwards.
No, this is exactly backwards. The question in Hitler's mind was whether it was too dangerous to attack Russia next, with an undefeated Anglo-American combination to his rear, or whether it was too dangerous to leave an intact Russia in his rear while pursuing an extended war in the west. Must Britain be defeated before a war in Russia, or must Russia be defeated before the Americans weighed in?


Of course not, because Hitler knew he could not entertain a concrete plan of attack against the USSR (as opposed to fantasies) until the French had been dealt with. The British could be dealt with once kicked off the continent (assuming that alone didn't bring them to terms) when convenient.

The decision for the Z-Plan in 1939 was to defeat the Anglo-French first, then war with Russia later. The Z-Plan was superceeded soon, but its order of wars was not overturned. In June 1940 the question arose whether the original strategic priority held with the French out and the British in, or whether the order could reverse. The peril of Sealion to the British is strategic - that the decision would be the original order of wars would be adhered to, and no war with Russia contemplated until Britain was defeated.
 
Last edited:

Saphroneth

Banned
Is it not possible that Hitler's original plan as of early 1940 was to force a quick decision in the West (i.e. French and British cessation of hostilities) to concentrate on Russia, and that his actions in threatening Sealion in late 1940 were because of the hope that Britain would panic during their moment of vulnerability?

Because whatever you may think, it is clear that by 1941 that window of vulnerability has passed for the UK, and that defeating it will be a long slog... but the USSR is still, to his mind, vulnerable.
 
Is it not possible that Hitler's original plan as of early 1940 was to force a quick decision in the West (i.e. French and British cessation of hostilities) to concentrate on Russia, and that his actions in threatening Sealion in late 1940 were because of the hope that Britain would panic during their moment of vulnerability?

IMO, he was genuinely waffling between the fundamental choices of Sealion vs. Barbarossa up until November/December 1940. Idealogy might certainly have influenced his final choice, but the waffle, and indecision, and possibility of either being chosen, was real.
 
An early disaster (1940...) leaving Hitler less certain of his brilliance and thinking of he could jsut sweep Germanys targets away. May (?) have brought earlier full Mobilization of Germany (instead of by 1943) and possibly some better results with Hitler letting some generals manage things better than he did. By June '41 with some better preparations for the Russian War it could have led to the destruction of the Soviet Union (as it was it came close to taking Moscow and kneecapping Russia for whatever that could follow)
 
I must have missed the part where Hitler transferred his army east in June 1940 and then launched the invasion of Russia in September 1940.

Because launching the invasion of Russia in September 1940 was not physically possible (not to mention, as even Hitler realized, suicidally close to the raputitsa and winter seasons). And in any case, the first orders for an invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 was issued at the end of July 1940.

I think Hitler's original plan was to win the war in the west first, then use that victory to carve a German empire in Russia second.
Then he would have stuck around and tried to finish off Britain in 1941.

The reason why the final decision between Sealion and Barbarossa took so long to resolve (July-December 1940) was because the decision was based solely on which move was most likely to win the war, not which would carve an empire in the east.
Sealion was to be launched in September 1940, long before when you claim the final decision "was resolved".

The peril of Sealion to the British is strategic - that the decision would be the original order of wars would be adhered to, and no war with Russia contemplated until Britain was defeated.
Leaving aside that this hardly might actually be the case, Hitler decides to keep trying at defeating Britain post-a-failed Sealion instead of changing strategy isn't really that much of a peril at all. It means now that the Germans are fighting a war which plays too it's weaknesses and it's enemies strengths. When it comes to fighting a naval-air war, the Anglo-American alliance is in such a vastly superior position to the Germans that Germany really has no shot. It will certainly wind-up costing the Anglo-Americans more then IOTL, but in the end they and the Soviets will still be the victors... the losers being the Germans and everybody else on continental Europe between the Pyrenees's and the Vistula. This Hitler recognized and it impacted his decision to turn against the Soviet Union ASAP.

If Hitler decides to go through with Sealion in August/September 1940, it will be with the thinking that this is his only real chance to knock out Britain via a naval-air campaign. Once it fails, that will reinforce his decision to go for Barbarossa, not decline it.

May (?) have brought earlier full Mobilization of Germany (instead of by 1943) and possibly some better results with Hitler letting some generals manage things better than he did. By June '41 with some better preparations for the Russian War it could have led to the destruction of the Soviet Union (as it was it came close to taking Moscow and kneecapping Russia for whatever that could follow)

You need to catch up on modern scholarship: Germany was as mobilized as it was going to get in 1941 and Hitler's vision was actually superior to his generals in a number of cases (the decision to go for Kiev rather then Moscow was ultimately the correct one). The idea that Germany only "fully mobilized" in 1943 or "that if Hitler only listened to his generals" are post-war myths perpetuated by people trying to distance themselves from their own association with the Nazis while still trying to retain credibility as military leaders.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
In the event that Hitler the Gitler decides that - hey, Bolshevism is fine by him!

...then why does that mean an alliance with the USSR?
What happens then?
Does the USSR hurl its industrial might against the cliffs of Britain to benefit Germany?
Or are they paid off in land? What land - India? It's got loads of Indians in it - hundreds of millions of them, and the ones who aren't pro-Empire are pro-Independence.
 
...then why does that mean an alliance with the USSR?
What happens then?

Stalin signs the treaty, then sits back and laughs as the Anglo-Americans spend hundreds of thousands (maybe even millions) of additional lives to roll over the Germans, only to walk-in at the very end with a rebuilt Red Army and seize Eastern Europe... thereby presenting the war exhausted Anglo-Americans with a fait accompli.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Stalin signs the treaty, then sits back and laughs as the Anglo-Americans spend hundreds of thousands (maybe even millions) of additional lives to roll over the Germans, only to walk-in at the very end with a rebuilt Red Army and seize Eastern Europe... thereby presenting the war exhausted Anglo-Americans with a fait accompli.
I mean more - does he accept that in lieu of payment for all the resources he's giving Germany? Or do the Germans have to ship large quantities of their own manufactured goods eastwards to pay for their rubber/POL/grain/etc/and/so/on..
 
I mean more - does he accept that in lieu of payment for all the resources he's giving Germany? Or do the Germans have to ship large quantities of their own manufactured goods eastwards to pay for their rubber/POL/grain/etc/and/so/on..

Oh, undoubtedly the latter. He'll probably apply enough pressure to keep the Germans paying but not enough to seriously cripple their ability to wage war (he wants the WAllies to be as exhausted as possible at the end, after all, so they'll be most likely to concede to the reality of his occupation of Eastern Europe). This is actually something of an improvement for the Germans, actually: the amount of manufactured goods the Soviets demanded under the 1939 and 1940 trade agreements was actually much smaller compared to how much fighting on the Eastern Front wound-up demanding...

Whether that will hold still true for the 1941, 1942, and beyond trade deals is dependent on how much the ever-more-confident-in-his-defenses Stalin demands. ;)
 
Top