Effectiveness of 1950s Soviet Aerial Nuclear bombing run

With the use of NIKE missiles and Britain’s ROTOR radar system, how successful would the nuclear aerial bombing of the US be with Soviet bombers? How many targets could they hit and what would be the success rate?
 
Probably few, if any; ADC and NIKE along with mass detection methods meant it'd be very hard for the Soviets to get through given their limited bomber force. The Soviets largely skipped that stage of nuclear weapons, instead largely focusing on missiles later on as their main method.
 
There are a few things that would let the Soviets be slightly more successful then they would have otherwise been, such as the fact they managed to get their hands on copies of American IFF transponders. There were also teething issues with the semi-automatic intercept controls like SAGE that left it unexpectedly vulnerable to even rudimentary jamming (something that was corrected for in the early-60s) and the back-up systems hadn't been established yet. That would have left US air defense systems with WW2-style manual control, which worked well enough against props and prop-jet hybrids but had proven obsolete in the age of pure jets and turboprops. Still, the bottom line is that the Soviets were distinctly lacking in the raw number of transcontinental bombers needed to cover for combat and operational losses, so while they probably could land a dozen or so nuclear hits that isn't remotely going to be enough to do more then hurt the US.

First of all how will Soviet bombers reach north AMERICA?

Since the OP specified the "1957ish", the Tu-95 would have been well in service. The big problem is there was only about ~50-100 of them in service in the late-50s, depending on the specific year your looking.
 
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There are a few things that would let the Soviets be slightly more successful then they would have otherwise been, such as the fact they managed to get their hands on copies of American IFF transponders. There were also teething issues with the semi-automatic intercept controls like SAGE that left it unexpectedly vulnerable to even rudimentary jamming (something that was corrected for in the early-60s) and the back-up systems hadn't been established yet. That would have left US air defense systems with WW2-style manual control, which worked well enough against props and prop-jet hybrids but had proven obsolete in the age of pure jets and turboprops. Still, the bottom line is that the Soviets were distinctly lacking in the raw number of transcontinental bombers needed to cover for combat and operational losses, so while they probably could land a dozen or so nuclear hits that isn't remotely going to be enough to do more then hurt the US.

I think it would patently obvious what was occurring to NORAD when hundreds of unplanned for flights, not responding to communications and coming on the flight paths expected for Soviet bombers show up on screen. Even ignoring that, SIGNT intercepts alone would detect them as they began to marshal from their air bases while still in the USSR in the first place.
 
I think it would patently obvious what was occurring to NORAD when hundreds of unplanned for flights, not responding to communications and coming on the flight paths expected for Soviet bombers show up on screen. Even ignoring that, SIGNT intercepts alone would detect them as they began to marshal from their air bases while still in the USSR in the first place.

Soviets didn't really have the requisite number of bombers to make hundreds of flights, unless we're assuming they tack on the bombers that could make a one-way flight (although I imagine those would be assigned to strike targets in Europe and Asia). As for SigInt... perhaps. Depends on how much the Soviets rely on orders issued via landline and having their pilots fly in on radio silence. There remains the problems of American intercept controls of the era, though. Still, the fundamental issue is that the Soviet bomber fleet is small enough that even simple point-defense intercept would inflict enough losses for a sustained campaign to be simply out of the question. The Soviets might deliver a few nukes in a single go, and that'll be it. By the late-50s, Soviet Long-Range Aviation was rather well equipped, organized, and trained... there just simply wasn't enough of them.
 
Soviets didn't really have the requisite number of bombers to make hundreds of flights, unless we're assuming they tack on the bombers that could make a one-way flight (although I imagine those would be assigned to strike targets in Europe and Asia). As for SigInt... perhaps. Depends on how much the Soviets rely on orders issued via landline and having their pilots fly in on radio silence. There remains the problems of American intercept controls of the era, though. Still, the fundamental issue is that the Soviet bomber fleet is small enough that even simple point-defense intercept would inflict enough losses for a sustained campaign to be simply out of the question. The Soviets might deliver a few nukes in a single go, and that'll be it. By the late-50s, Soviet Long-Range Aviation was rather well equipped, organized, and trained... there just simply wasn't enough of them.

Given the unspecified nature of the exact year of conflict, I just decided to be liberal and assume at least 100 Tu-95s. As for intercept controls, by 1957 the DEW Line, the Mid-Canada and the Pinetree Line are all operation even if SAGE fails. Given the Tu-95 is a prop driven bomber, manual intercept won't present that much of an issue.
 
Given the unspecified nature of the exact year of conflict, I just decided to be liberal and assume at least 100 Tu-95s. As for intercept controls, by 1957 the DEW Line, the Mid-Canada and the Pinetree Line are all operation even if SAGE fails.

All of these were merely warning systems to let SAC know the Russians are coming, not intercept systems to vector in fighters and air-defense missiles. Even the Mid-Canada and Pinetree lines were regarded as obsolete against jets and contra-rotating turbopropers, which is why the DEW line was built. All of that said, even the current day North Warning System occasionally misses a Russian Tu-95 probe, not picking the bombers up until after they've turned for home, so even these early-warning systems are hardly any sort of guarantee. The Russians these days are usually intercepted, but a lot of that is because in peacetime they mostly want people to see what they're doing and are not at all covert about their maneuvers. But when they fly up without any of the cues that usually let the US know when and where they're coming, then the job becomes actually very tricky.

Given the Tu-95 is a prop driven bomber, manual intercept won't present that much of an issue.

Contra-rotating turboprop. Rather significant difference there, comparable to a pure-jet like the B-47/52 rather then a pure prop like the B-29/Tu-4 or prop-jet hybrid like the B-36. Manual intercept would very much be just as inadequate against the Tu-95 like it would be against a B-52 or '47. Point-defense intercepts will probably do the bulk of the killing.
 
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All of these were merely warning systems to let SAC know the Russians are coming, not intercept systems to vector in fighters and air-defense missiles. Even the Mid-Canada and Pinetree lines were regarded as obsolete against jets and contra-rotating turbopropers, which is why the DEW line was built. All of that said, even the current day North Warning System occasionally misses a Russian Tu-95 probe, not picking the bombers up until after they've turned for home, so even these early-warning systems are hardly any sort of guarantee. The Russians these days are usually intercepted, but a lot of that is because in peacetime they mostly want people to see what they're doing and are not at all covert about their maneuvers. But when they fly up without any of the cues that usually let the US know when and where they're coming, then the job becomes actually very tricky.

Yeah, that's kind the point; with three different lines to detect incoming Soviet bombers, any lackings in SAGE itself is made up for by the fact ADC has enough assets and warning time to respond. Would it be perfect? Of course not, but more than sufficient to prevent any serious damage. I'd also say comparing the North Warning System failing to detect a single bomber is rather different than dozens if not hundreds of bombers crossing three different warning lines set up on a wartime footing.

Contra-rotating turboprop. Rather significant difference there, comparable to a pure-jet like the B-47/52 rather then a pure prop like the B-29/Tu-4 or prop-jet hybrid like the B-36. Manual intercept would very much be just as inadequate against the Tu-95 like it would be against a B-52 or '47...

How so? The Tu-95's maximum speed is 520 mph, about 100 mph less than either the B-47 or the B-52 and its cruising speed is 200 mph less. At 340 mph, that places it not that far from the B-50.
 

Khanzeer

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Even if 100 tu95 have the range, they would be unescorted and USA /canada have 1000 + interceptors, it would be the great arctic Turkey shoot
 
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Yeah, that's kind the point; with three different lines to detect incoming Soviet bombers, any lackings in SAGE itself is made up for by the fact ADC has enough assets and warning time to respond. Would it be perfect? Of course not, but more than sufficient to prevent any serious damage.

That depends on how you define "serious" damage. Because even managing to land a thermonuclear bomb on a single city can be argued to be "serious damage" to a country and has historically proven to be enough of a potential economic and humanitarian catastrophe to make decision makers think twice about starting a war. Certainly the Soviets in the late-50s, even if they magically manage to get 100% of their aircraft and bombers through, have no prospect of doing something like knocking out the US ability to annihilate the Soviet Union. But wiping out a couple of the US's largest economic centers, with all the long-term problems that'll inflict on the US? Yeah, they can do that.

Everything beyond that is quibbling on the details.
 
Even if 100 tu95 have the range, they would be unescorted and USA /canada have 1000 + interceptors, it would be the great artic Turkey shoot
Just a minor point.. With the exception of interceptors defending portions of Alaska, my understanding is that the bulk of interceptions would take place much further south in the 1950's era.

Although (at least some of ?) the DEW line stations apparently had some provisions for actually controlling interceptors, its main role was early warning. For the most part the pine tree line of Ground Controled Intercept radar sites would have controlled the first waves of interceptors. This line was more less a bit north of the Can / US border.
 
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Soviets didn't really have the requisite number of bombers to make hundreds of flights, unless we're assuming they tack on the bombers that could make a one-way flight (although I imagine those would be assigned to strike targets in Europe and Asia). As for SigInt... perhaps. Depends on how much the Soviets rely on orders issued via landline and having their pilots fly in on radio silence. There remains the problems of American intercept controls of the era, though. Still, the fundamental issue is that the Soviet bomber fleet is small enough that even simple point-defense intercept would inflict enough losses for a sustained campaign to be simply out of the question. The Soviets might deliver a few nukes in a single go, and that'll be it. By the late-50s, Soviet Long-Range Aviation was rather well equipped, organized, and trained... there just simply wasn't enough of them.
Re warning of a potential Soviet bomber attack. Apparently the U.S. (and presumably Canada) expected (or perhaps hoped) to receive warning of an impending attack by noticing the staging of Soviet bombers to remote air bases that were significantly closer to North America.

I suspect Sigint would have been involved in detecting this preparations but there were presumably other means involved as well. (In 1957 overflights by U.S. air craft is a possibility.)

Edit to add:
In the 1980's I spoke to some one who more or less convinced me that a likely out come of the U.S. detecting the staging of Soviet bombers to northern air fields in the late 1950's may well have been a preemptive attack by the U.S. It is impossible to know for certain what might have happened but that doesn't seem entirely out of the question to me.
 
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Given the unspecified nature of the exact year of conflict, I just decided to be liberal and assume at least 100 Tu-95s. As for intercept controls, by 1957 the DEW Line, the Mid-Canada and the Pinetree Line are all operation even if SAGE fails. Given the Tu-95 is a prop driven bomber, manual intercept won't present that much of an issue.
My understanding is NORAD really didn't want to have to manually control interceptors when dealing with Tu-95 type targets. The speeds and distances involved apparently made manual interception control quite difficult.

That being said in 1957 I suspect NORAD would have been able to send multiple flights of interceptors against each bomber that was detected by GCI radar. (I have read accounts of NORAD practicing sending streams of interceptors against each target, apparently part of the reason for this was to allow each controler on the ground to manage multiple interceptors with out adding much to their work load.)

I suppose a mass raid could saturate the ability of a single GCI site to control the necessary interceptors to catch all the bombers, but I believe there was a reasonable degree of overlap of GCI coverage in that era...
 
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How so? The Tu-95's maximum speed is 520 mph, about 100 mph less than either the B-47 or the B-52 and its cruising speed is 200 mph less. At 340 mph, that places it not that far from the B-50.
And at 520mph, it won't have the range to even get to CONUS. Cruising Speed is 440mph.
 
My understanding is NORAD really didn't want to have to manually control interceptors when dealing with Tu-95 type targets. The speeds and distances involved apparently made manual interception control quite difficult.

That being said in 1957 I suspect NORAD would have been able to send multiple flights of interceptors against each bomber that was detected by GCI radar. (I have read accounts of NORAD practicing sending streams of interceptors against each target, apparently part of the reason for this was to allow each controler on the ground to manage multiple interceptors with out adding much to their work load.)

Also should note that ADC and ANG had more interceptors than the Soviets had bombers that could reach the USA, and most of them had the capability of the nuclear Genie or nuclear Falcon AAMs
 
And at 520mph, it won't have the range to even get to CONUS. Cruising Speed is 440mph.
True but presumably when flying thru the likely coverage of the pine tree line (and presumably other radar sites) the bombers would have flown as fast as they could have :)
 
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