Thank you very much for your post. I didn't want to be the one caught Eurowanking.
Heh. I would not be true to my namesake if I would hesitate about Eurowanking.
Britain would IMHO be unlikely to earlier join an European Community which starts with an integrated army.
As a matter of fact, I do assume that they would claim a special associated status, joining the integrated structures, but keep their management as far as britain is concerned on an intergovernmental level between UK government and EC government.
The EC/EU would integrate deeper and quicker - but the flipside of the coin is that it becomes less attractive for nations which are critical of more than an economic union.
These being, in practice, Britain, Ireland (being forced to follow British example because of NI), and the Nordic countries. Central and Eastern Europan nations would find the appeal of a long-established EC economic and security integration irresistible, just like OTL.
Also, the EDC would spread some problems, especially with French and Belgian colonies. There would be 3-4 members without such issues (the Netherlands only clinging on to West-Papua) and most certainly unwilling to send any soldiers into Algeria, the Congo etc. pp.
Hmm, I am skeptical about that. Germany and Italy have always been willing to go that extra step to establish their European credentials, both out of genuince committment to the ideal and as a way to regain credibility after their WWII misdeeds. Showing committment to the Euro defense would be seen as a powerful way to do the latter. Rather I can see the other countries exercising pressure on France and Belgium to find a political compromise once the Euro army finds itself embroidled into a nasty counterinsurgency operation.
The same would go for the Suez war. It would still be an Anglo-French undertaking and likely to end as in OTL. As we talk about European Integration, we would probably reach the very late 50s before we see a structures you can work with.
True, unless the Suez crisis gets delayed by butterflies ITTL, there might might or might not be the time to set up the full integration of the Western European military resouces to a degree that would reverse the Suez outcome. However, this might still happen indirectly. Even if it still remains an Anglo-French undertaking, the perceived boost to their military power created by the EC commitment might be lquite possibly enough to make the USSR hesitant ot support Egypt, or the USA willing to support the Anglo-French, or make Egyptian morale crumble.
I also don't see the Warsaw Pact falling earlier. If the unification of Europe meant a serious weakening of NATO (which I doubt) there might be a more deeper detente in the 1970s lasting into the 80s, but this might also stabilize the Sovjet Union for a few years more.
About defense-spending, I rather see Europe using the advantages of the EDC to cut down spending even more to the least necessary level.
Sorry, but neither of this makes sense. A Western Europe unified this way would never weaken NATO since America would have been its biggest sponsor, and the EDC was made to create a twin Euro pillar to the American one, not supplant it. Also, with the Cold War at its apex, it makes no sense politically that the Euro countries would use the EDC as an excuse to cut down their defense spensing to the least common denominator. There was little widespread pacifism in France and Britain at this point, and as said above, W. Germany and Italy would be eager to earn brownie points by good-faith committment to Euro integration, as they always did historically, lowering their pacifist feelings in comparison to OTL. They would keep their OTL defense spending levels, and use the savings allowed by huge economis of scale to build an Euro Army comparable to the US one. Which would force the Soviet bloc to an even more back-breaking arms race, accelerating its economic collapse.
Same goes for nuclear forces. There would surely be British and Franco-European nukes - but once they got combined there would hardly be a European consensus about expanding these forces any further.
I do not indeed envisage a massive expansion. Rather the pooling of UK-FR deterrent, plus adding some significant overhead (say a 50-80%) to account for the extra economic weight created by GFR, Italy, and Benelux, and for sheer prestige boost created by the EC's geopolitical weight).
Some member states would feel uneasy about being co-owners of nuclear forces in general.
Historically, most NATO countries (including Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy) have shown little real uneasiness about sharing control of USA nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. The difference between NATO "
nuclear sharing" and co-ownership of a an European deterrent is not that big.
But I agree with the quicker integration. European Parliament would be realized 20 years earlier. Free movement would probably be achieved a lot earlier as well. I would set the Common Market into the 70s and the Single Currency into the 80s.
True about the EP. The original plans about the political integration to oversee the defense and economic integration envisaged an European legislature, with a direclty-elected lower chamber, an upper one of national parliaments' delegations, and an executive responsible to both.
About economic integration, your estimations are almost surely a bit too timid. The OTL pace of EEC integration was substantially slowed down with the disillusionement caused by the failure of the EDC, but originally the aspirations were higher. I would say that anything slower than common market in the mid-late 60s, and single currency and freedom of movement in the mid-late 70s, is sticking unreasonable close to OTL.
At the point when the Eastern Bloc collapses, we might have the European Federal "Superstate".
Indeed.

Who would be a member though?
-The original 6
-Greece, Spain and Portugal joining in the 1980s as in OTL
These are absolutely sure. It is also possible that the attraction created by the EC accelerates the democratization of Spain and Portugal somewhat, to the late 1960s and prevents the coup in Greece, so accelerating their entry to the mid-late 1970s.
-Ireland
-the UK would join later if at all - I assume there is a point of no return in the late 70s - afterwards I cannot see Britain joining
-I am also not sure about Denmark
I think that in the 1960s Britain, confronted with open quasi-federal integration process on the continent, would negotiate a special associated status, where it would partecipate in pretty much all the integration programs, but keeping their formal management in an intergovernmental forum between the EC supranational bodies and the UK government and parliament. In practice not terribly different, but with vital face-saving about sovreignty. I see Ireland willing to join the EC in full, but opting for the association tier because of Northern Ireland. Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Sweden would join the association tier in the 1970s. Denmark and Sweden quite possibly would progress to full federal membership after the Cold War, Norway would likely stay in the association tier until the oil and fishery reserves get depleted.
Post-Coldwar:
-Austria and Finland, Malta and Cyprus joining in the 1990s, probably Sweden as well
-certainly joining:
Hungary, GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, Baltic States
-maybe joining intactly
Yugoslavia (EDC military-intervention?), Czechoslovakia
-joining with a little hesitation
Poland
Austria, GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Baltic states would surely join the full federal membership after the Cold War. With a little hesitation, Poland and Czechoslovakia would almost surely do as well. It is really a toss up whether Czechoslovakia would join as one or two states (however, in a federal Europe, the impact of the divorce would be even lesser than OTL). Finland might go in either tier, but given that they have consistently been the least Euroskeptic Nordic country, I see them going all the way.
As it concerns Yugoslavia, it matters mostly on how the butterflies of this federal EC would influence its late policies. If they boost the moderate Yugoslavists, the EC may prop them up to keep the country united. If the takeover of Serbian nationalists happens anyway, the EC would reluctantly support the secessions of Croatia, Slovenia, and FYROM, and make an early military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo to contain the mess.
Most of these states might join in 2000, maybe a little earlier.
In 2009, we might be close to a Ukrainian membership. Turkey might have joined already into an EU where single states have less influence on common decisions.
Well, the present misgivings about Turkish memberships arise from countries that would make a substantial part of the federal Europe electorate, it is not just Cyprus making a veto. An accelerated Turkish membership is certainy possible, but it would require a more prosperous Europe having less fears about mass Turkish immigration, and a strong EC making a powerful security and political stand against Islamism. Both things are however quite feasible in this Europe. All in all, since I assume that ITTL the Soviet bloc would collapse earlier, giving the EC/EU more time to digest the new central and Eastern European members, by 2009 it would be very close to admit Turkey and Ukraine both.