EDC Passed in French Parliament?

So let's say that the European Defense Community doesn't meet any opposition in French Parliament, and is then signed into effect. What would be the effects of the organization (I don't know a better word to describe it) and possible pros or cons down the line?
 
I would say that it would boost European integration to a certain degree while in OTL it re-focused on economic issues after the failure of the EDC.

I assume other crucial steps being undertaken several years earlier....common market in the 70s, single currency in the 80s.

That is - if it works. Defense policy is hard to negotiate when it comes to the use of force. I see no problems with those nations which only had to cope with the challenge of WW III in Europe - but what about France and its colonial wars?

Also, might the EDC butterfly away the creation of the Bundeswehr which would instead just be its West-German branch?
 
Britain is more likely to be pro-Europe with Eden maintaining the British position of the time. Although he was definatly for it in his memoirs, how it would have carried in the country (and whether a future Labour government would try and get out of it) must be considered.

Also, it would probably mean far greater cooperation and integration in weapons and ammunition.

With attention focused towards it, Eden may not become so focused (or misguided) on Nasser and the middle east as a whole.

NATO would certainly be very different, if it even exists.
 

Eurofed

Banned
NATO would surely keep existing, since it already was, and Americans were among the biggest supporters of the EDC. However, it would have a different shape, with an integrated European pillar balancing the American one.

An integrated European army could easily lead to an Euro victory in the Suez war, which would lead to a rather different Middle East. However, it would not likely change the outcome of the insuregency in Algeria. It might indirectly butterfly away or change the outcome of the Vietnam war (which in turn would have huge butterflies, such as the success of Great Society, no Watergate, and no rise of Reaganite Republicans in America).

European integration would be firmly headed towards quasi-federal supranational integration from the start. The EDC security integration was tied to the EPC political integration, with a directly elected European lower chamber, an upper chamber drawn from national parliaments, and an executive responsible to both to manage defense and economic integration. We would see a common market in the 60s, single currency and freedom of movement in the 70s. Britain would likely keep a special associated status, with an opt-out from political integration, but it would partecipate in the single currency and freedom of movement (and Nordic countries would likely join into such an associated status). The continental states (surely including Spain, Portugal, and Greece since the early 80s, and Austria, reunified Germany, Central and Eastern European states after the Cold War) would most likely transition to full-fledged federation by the 90s.

On the defense side, we would see a much stronger NATO, with a powerful European military (the waste eliminated by full integration would allow to make it the full equivalent of the US military, even without no raise in defence spending, and the Euroarmy would most likely curb guilt-ridden pacifism in nations like Germany and Italy). Soviet Russia would be forced to an even more expensive arms race, accelerating the collapse of its system. Say a collapse of the Soviet bloc in the 70s.
 
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Hendryk

Banned
integrated European army could easily lead to an Euro victory in the Indochina war, which would butterfly away the Vietnam war
I agree with the rest of your post, but IMHO the implementation of the EDC would come too late to affect the outcome of the Indochina war. However, starting from Suez the butterflies would be numerous enough that the Vietnam war might be averted by more indirect means.
 

Eurofed

Banned
I agree with the rest of your post, but IMHO the implementation of the EDC would come too late to affect the outcome of the Indochina war. However, starting from Suez the butterflies would be numerous enough that the Vietnam war might be averted by more indirect means.

Good point, you're quite right about Indochina, I was misladen :eek: thinking of a TL of mine where the EDC/EPC succeeds as well, but there are previous PoDs (division of Austria, West Austrian-West German reunification, American total victory in the Korean War with Korean reunification, Sovietization of Finland and Yugoslavia, etc.) as well that change the outcome of Indochina. I've edited my previous post accordingly.

Dunno how much of my TL ideas about the Middle East would be applicable to this one, but it has some interesting butterflies, such as a Mossadeq-Western reconciliation, which stabilizes Iran as a reformist pro-Western pillar (no Islamist revolution), leads to an expanded 1967-like Suez War with Arab flight from and annexation of West Bank by Israel, Egypt-Sudan union becomes a restive pro-American satellite (with a Islamist revolution likely in the wings), Iraq, Jordan, and Syria unify as the Pan-Arab United Arab Republic, castrist Cuba is butterflied away, but there is a Cuba-like nuclear standoff between the blocs about Kuwait and Arabia Saudita.

Further note about Algeria: although it is unlikely (but not impossible) thay an integrated European army would reverse the decolonization outcome, it is quite possible that it would give France enough support to make it more negotiated and gradual, butterflying away the Gaullist takeover in France. The latter would stay a parliamentary republic, although it is quite likely that European political integration would prompt France and Italy to introduce some serious checks to parliamentary instability and executive weakness. Even without DeGaulle, however, the development of an European nuclear deterrent is almost sure, and it would be rather more powerful than OTL UK-FR (say their combination, plus another 50-80% to account for German and Italian contributions). No Gaullist support for Quebec independentism could have its own butterflies, although.
 
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European integration would be firmly headed towards quasi-federal supranational integration from the start. The EDC security integration was tied to the EPC political integration, with a directly elected European lower chamber, an upper chamber drawn from national parliaments, and an executive responsible to both to manage defense and economic integration. We would see a common market in the 60s, single currency and freedom of movement in the 70s. Britain would likely keep a special associated status, with an opt-out from political integration, but it would partecipate in the single currency and freedom of movement (and Nordic countries would likely join into such an associated status).

Thank you very much for your post. I didn't want to be the one caught Eurowanking.:D

However, I cannot see such a giant speed-up of the integration-process by several decades. Britain would IMHO be unlikely to earlier join an European Community which starts with an integrated army. The EC/EU would integrate deeper and quicker - but the flipside of the coin is that it becomes less attractive for nations which are critical of more than an economic union.

Also, the EDC would spread some problems, especially with French and Belgian colonies. There would be 3-4 members without such issues (the Netherlands only clinging on to West-Papua) and most certainly unwilling to send any soldiers into Algeria, the Congo etc. pp.

The same would go for the Suez war. It would still be an Anglo-French undertaking and likely to end as in OTL. As we talk about European Integration, we would probably reach the very late 50s before we see a structures you can work with.

I also don't see the Warsaw Pact falling earlier. If the unification of Europe meant a serious weakening of NATO (which I doubt) there might be a more deeper detente in the 1970s lasting into the 80s, but this might also stabilize the Sovjet Union for a few years more.

About defense-spending, I rather see Europe using the advantages of the EDC to cut down spending even more to the least necessary level. Same goes for nuclear forces. There would surely be British and Franco-European nukes - but once they got combined there would hardly be a European consensus about expanding these forces any further. Some member states would feel uneasy about being co-owners of nuclear forces in general.

But I agree with the quicker integration. European Parliament would be realized 20 years earlier. Free movement would probably be achieved a lot earlier as well. I would set the Common Market into the 70s and the Single Currency into the 80s.

At the point when the Eastern Bloc collapses, we might have the European Federal "Superstate".

Who would be a member though?

-The original 6
-Greece, Spain and Portugal joining in the 1980s as in OTL
-Ireland
-the UK would join later if at all - I assume there is a point of no return in the late 70s - afterwards I cannot see Britain joining
-I am also not sure about Denmark

Post-Coldwar:

-Austria and Finland, Malta and Cyprus joining in the 1990s, probably Sweden as well
-certainly joining:
Hungary, GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, Baltic States
-maybe joining intactly
Yugoslavia (EDC military-intervention?), Czechoslovakia
-joining with a little hesitation
Poland

Most of these states might join in 2000, maybe a little earlier.
In 2009, we might be close to a Ukrainian membership. Turkey might have joined already into an EU where single states have less influence on common decisions.
 
An interesting idea but what exacltly is the POD, the French Parliament ratifying the EDC or something earlier causing it?
Are we definitely looking at a post war POD?
 
Britain ITTL

Assuming that the POD is simply the title I think it would be touch and go whether the UK would join the EDC immediately. However, it may complicate the shenanigans that led to the adoption of the 7.62 round.

There was already some interest in the .280 British round, especially from the Canadians and (more sicerely, from the Belgians). If Belgium were to argue perdsuasively to EDC countries in favour of the .280 it might put more pressure on the Americans, Canada stops sitting on the fence and then ... Bait & Switch.

The EDC countries twist the Belgian argument into making the adoption of the .280 as a quid pro quo for the UK joining the EDC. Seeing the an opportunity to preserve its own weapons projects and support for the 7.62 becoming increasingly precarious outside of the US, the UK signs up to the EDC.

Regarding Suez, I think it likely France might back down from attacking Egypt for the sake of preserving unity within the EDC.
 
Uniform of EDC, from the book "Die Bundeswehr und ihre Uniformen - 30 Jahre Bekleidungsgeschichte" by Jorg-M. Hormann.
The color is khaki.
This EDC soldier is a German.

edc.jpg


edc1.jpg
 

Eurofed

Banned
Thank you very much for your post. I didn't want to be the one caught Eurowanking.:D

Heh. I would not be true to my namesake if I would hesitate about Eurowanking. ;)

Britain would IMHO be unlikely to earlier join an European Community which starts with an integrated army.

As a matter of fact, I do assume that they would claim a special associated status, joining the integrated structures, but keep their management as far as britain is concerned on an intergovernmental level between UK government and EC government.

The EC/EU would integrate deeper and quicker - but the flipside of the coin is that it becomes less attractive for nations which are critical of more than an economic union.

These being, in practice, Britain, Ireland (being forced to follow British example because of NI), and the Nordic countries. Central and Eastern Europan nations would find the appeal of a long-established EC economic and security integration irresistible, just like OTL.

Also, the EDC would spread some problems, especially with French and Belgian colonies. There would be 3-4 members without such issues (the Netherlands only clinging on to West-Papua) and most certainly unwilling to send any soldiers into Algeria, the Congo etc. pp.

Hmm, I am skeptical about that. Germany and Italy have always been willing to go that extra step to establish their European credentials, both out of genuince committment to the ideal and as a way to regain credibility after their WWII misdeeds. Showing committment to the Euro defense would be seen as a powerful way to do the latter. Rather I can see the other countries exercising pressure on France and Belgium to find a political compromise once the Euro army finds itself embroidled into a nasty counterinsurgency operation.

The same would go for the Suez war. It would still be an Anglo-French undertaking and likely to end as in OTL. As we talk about European Integration, we would probably reach the very late 50s before we see a structures you can work with.

True, unless the Suez crisis gets delayed by butterflies ITTL, there might might or might not be the time to set up the full integration of the Western European military resouces to a degree that would reverse the Suez outcome. However, this might still happen indirectly. Even if it still remains an Anglo-French undertaking, the perceived boost to their military power created by the EC commitment might be lquite possibly enough to make the USSR hesitant ot support Egypt, or the USA willing to support the Anglo-French, or make Egyptian morale crumble.

I also don't see the Warsaw Pact falling earlier. If the unification of Europe meant a serious weakening of NATO (which I doubt) there might be a more deeper detente in the 1970s lasting into the 80s, but this might also stabilize the Sovjet Union for a few years more.

About defense-spending, I rather see Europe using the advantages of the EDC to cut down spending even more to the least necessary level.

Sorry, but neither of this makes sense. A Western Europe unified this way would never weaken NATO since America would have been its biggest sponsor, and the EDC was made to create a twin Euro pillar to the American one, not supplant it. Also, with the Cold War at its apex, it makes no sense politically that the Euro countries would use the EDC as an excuse to cut down their defense spensing to the least common denominator. There was little widespread pacifism in France and Britain at this point, and as said above, W. Germany and Italy would be eager to earn brownie points by good-faith committment to Euro integration, as they always did historically, lowering their pacifist feelings in comparison to OTL. They would keep their OTL defense spending levels, and use the savings allowed by huge economis of scale to build an Euro Army comparable to the US one. Which would force the Soviet bloc to an even more back-breaking arms race, accelerating its economic collapse.

Same goes for nuclear forces. There would surely be British and Franco-European nukes - but once they got combined there would hardly be a European consensus about expanding these forces any further.

I do not indeed envisage a massive expansion. Rather the pooling of UK-FR deterrent, plus adding some significant overhead (say a 50-80%) to account for the extra economic weight created by GFR, Italy, and Benelux, and for sheer prestige boost created by the EC's geopolitical weight).

Some member states would feel uneasy about being co-owners of nuclear forces in general.

Historically, most NATO countries (including Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, and Italy) have shown little real uneasiness about sharing control of USA nuclear weapons stationed on their territory. The difference between NATO "nuclear sharing" and co-ownership of a an European deterrent is not that big.

But I agree with the quicker integration. European Parliament would be realized 20 years earlier. Free movement would probably be achieved a lot earlier as well. I would set the Common Market into the 70s and the Single Currency into the 80s.

True about the EP. The original plans about the political integration to oversee the defense and economic integration envisaged an European legislature, with a direclty-elected lower chamber, an upper one of national parliaments' delegations, and an executive responsible to both.

About economic integration, your estimations are almost surely a bit too timid. The OTL pace of EEC integration was substantially slowed down with the disillusionement caused by the failure of the EDC, but originally the aspirations were higher. I would say that anything slower than common market in the mid-late 60s, and single currency and freedom of movement in the mid-late 70s, is sticking unreasonable close to OTL.

At the point when the Eastern Bloc collapses, we might have the European Federal "Superstate".

Indeed. :D:cool:

Who would be a member though?

-The original 6
-Greece, Spain and Portugal joining in the 1980s as in OTL

These are absolutely sure. It is also possible that the attraction created by the EC accelerates the democratization of Spain and Portugal somewhat, to the late 1960s and prevents the coup in Greece, so accelerating their entry to the mid-late 1970s.

-Ireland
-the UK would join later if at all - I assume there is a point of no return in the late 70s - afterwards I cannot see Britain joining
-I am also not sure about Denmark

I think that in the 1960s Britain, confronted with open quasi-federal integration process on the continent, would negotiate a special associated status, where it would partecipate in pretty much all the integration programs, but keeping their formal management in an intergovernmental forum between the EC supranational bodies and the UK government and parliament. In practice not terribly different, but with vital face-saving about sovreignty. I see Ireland willing to join the EC in full, but opting for the association tier because of Northern Ireland. Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Sweden would join the association tier in the 1970s. Denmark and Sweden quite possibly would progress to full federal membership after the Cold War, Norway would likely stay in the association tier until the oil and fishery reserves get depleted.

Post-Coldwar:

-Austria and Finland, Malta and Cyprus joining in the 1990s, probably Sweden as well
-certainly joining:
Hungary, GDR, Bulgaria, Romania, Baltic States
-maybe joining intactly
Yugoslavia (EDC military-intervention?), Czechoslovakia
-joining with a little hesitation
Poland

Austria, GDR, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Baltic states would surely join the full federal membership after the Cold War. With a little hesitation, Poland and Czechoslovakia would almost surely do as well. It is really a toss up whether Czechoslovakia would join as one or two states (however, in a federal Europe, the impact of the divorce would be even lesser than OTL). Finland might go in either tier, but given that they have consistently been the least Euroskeptic Nordic country, I see them going all the way.

As it concerns Yugoslavia, it matters mostly on how the butterflies of this federal EC would influence its late policies. If they boost the moderate Yugoslavists, the EC may prop them up to keep the country united. If the takeover of Serbian nationalists happens anyway, the EC would reluctantly support the secessions of Croatia, Slovenia, and FYROM, and make an early military intervention in Bosnia and Kosovo to contain the mess.

Most of these states might join in 2000, maybe a little earlier.
In 2009, we might be close to a Ukrainian membership. Turkey might have joined already into an EU where single states have less influence on common decisions.

Well, the present misgivings about Turkish memberships arise from countries that would make a substantial part of the federal Europe electorate, it is not just Cyprus making a veto. An accelerated Turkish membership is certainy possible, but it would require a more prosperous Europe having less fears about mass Turkish immigration, and a strong EC making a powerful security and political stand against Islamism. Both things are however quite feasible in this Europe. All in all, since I assume that ITTL the Soviet bloc would collapse earlier, giving the EC/EU more time to digest the new central and Eastern European members, by 2009 it would be very close to admit Turkey and Ukraine both.
 
Heh. I would not be true to my namesake if I would hesitate about Eurowanking. ;)

I think I am not mistaken to state that we agree on the general development following the given POD.


As a matter of fact, I do assume that they would claim a special associated status, joining the integrated structures, but keep their management as far as britain is concerned on an intergovernmental level between UK government and EC government.

Well possible to create the notorious "Europe of two velocities" this way. I claim that an associated member would wish to enjoy the economical possibilities, yet not sacrifize its armed forces...the most visible sign of sovereignty.
"A common army with Germans (!) and French (!!!) - plus that project of a tunnel? You call that security for the United Kingdom?":D
If a nation is willing to get into the EDC and not just being part of NATO, then it is "all in" in my opinion.

These being, in practice, Britain, Ireland (being forced to follow British example because of NI)

Good point. I didn't see the special situation.

Hmm, I am skeptical about that. Germany and Italy have always been willing to go that extra step to establish their European credentials, both out of genuince committment to the ideal and as a way to regain credibility after their WWII misdeeds.[...]Rather I can see the other countries exercising pressure on France and Belgium to find a political compromise once the Euro army finds itself embroidled into a nasty counterinsurgency operation.

The FRG-gouvernment was eager to rearm and to prove its value in the East-West-Confrontation, but, until the 1990s not only unwilling, but constitutionally challenged to the regard of using German soldiers outside of Germany. Also, pictures of German soldiers being involved in asymetrical warfare in Africa would rather invoke pictures of NS-misdeeds - at home and abroad! What a propaganda coup for the Communist Bloc! It would be too late to press for a political solution then.

The only feasible way to deal with the situation were for the Colonial members to set aside own units to autonomously deal with Colonial wars. Otherwise, the other members would soon assume that the EDC was not a key to their defense against the Sovjet union, but a French plot to recruit foreigners to defend its vast empire.

Algeria would be a special case, as it was officially part of Metropolitan France.

Fortunately, the worst quagmires would be in the past at the point where I assume the EDC to fully function and where the sinlge armies would fully integrate.

the perceived boost to their military power created by the EC commitment might be lquite possibly enough to make the USSR hesitant ot support Egypt, or the USA willing to support the Anglo-French, or make Egyptian morale crumble.

This could work. But it could also be possible that the USSR would try to test the EDC and to prove its inefficiency as long as it was young. Also, Moscow still needed the distraction because of Hungary.

A Western Europe unified this way would never weaken NATO since America would have been its biggest sponsor, and the EDC was made to create a twin Euro pillar to the American one, not supplant it.

I saw this as a faint possibility.

Which would force the Soviet bloc to an even more back-breaking arms race, accelerating its economic collapse.

I am sceptical here. IMHO, the Sovjet Bloc could have tried to survive even a few years longer on the outnumbered side of the arms race - as long as they can afford MAD, Overkill, quick interventions in Eastern Europe and a good deal of political oppression. #3 and #4 are cheap, #1 and #2 are there until SDI works on a grand scale....one day.

If the Sovjet Union had collapsed as soon as it couldn't compete economically, it would have done so every few years from the start on. They had to realize they lose - and I am afraid that simply took its time.

Maybe I am trapped in the propaganda of my youth, but wasn't any (conventional) European build-up meant to at least get somewhere close to the enormous numbers of Sovjet weapon systems, parity being an utopia?

The "European conventional theatre" of the arms race was where the Sovjets were never in the defensive position. The main theatre, where they struggled hard to compete, was the nuclear arsenal - even with your envisaged build-up, the European forces were trivial in comparison to the US and SU. That's why I would assume that "EUNUCFOR/FNEURO" wouldn't grow much beyond the combined Anglo/French arsenal - the priority of European defense investments would go into conventional weapon systems.

However, the new front where the Sovjet Union was hardly able to compete was High-Tech. This is where the economic development and productivity of the West comes fully into the game, this is where progress on the Civilian and Military sector benefit each other. Unfortunately, it took until the 80s to get to that stage. And it took a president like Reagan to convincingly ride that horse!

The difference between NATO "nuclear sharing" and co-ownership of a an European deterrent is not that big.

Radio Eriwan says: "In theory you are right. Actually, though, if it's not their very own nuke, Citizens can easily ignore it."

I take it for granted, that the EDC would develop nuclear weapons in the 1950s. It would also build up and maintain an arsenal until today. However, it would be a matter of political discussion every now and then.

About economic integration, your estimations are almost surely a bit too timid.

It's European. It will take time. Then it will only be half of what was originally wanted. Then there is a setback. It might take a little more time. Then there is a new initiative. :p

As it concerns Yugoslavia...
...I agree.

Concerning Turkey, I know that it is not just Cyprus. It used to be Greece - and there are several big nations hiding behind these two.

The factor I would see in favour of Turkish membership is the actual superstate with less national autonomy than in OTL. It would be quite clear that its laws and norms were to be enacted in Turkey immediately were it to become a member. Also, the Turkish state (as any other state) would have less influence on EU policies. Thus, there would be more trust that a membership meant a thorough Europeanisation of Turkey.
 
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