The prolonged period of rapid trade volume growth without wartime and post-war interruption continues to integrate the European economies, with most of them kicking and screaming all the way.
Prospects are good for some earlier technological developments, like containerization and standardized shipping, perhaps driven by an Anglo-American first move.
The United States continues to have its ups and downs, but industrial development and sustained open door to European immigration supports a more sustainably growing economy than the war-trade sugar high.
In the event that German, Russian, and other competition for industrial products spurs support in the British Empire for Imperial Preference or a related system of Imperial protectionism of a lasting nature, there could very well be a significant degree of trade diversion and investment to light industry and primary product processing in parts of the Empire.
Most major powers will suffer serious strain in the short-term in financing the growth of their military expenditures, particularly with the need to keep up in terms of quality and technical improvements. A slowdown in growth rates of military consumption could lead to some economic dislocations in a number of supporting heavy industries, if and when it occurs.
Argentina could maintain its relative position in terms of per capita wealth, but would probably need a greater degree of investment in human capital in order to support new industry.
What will be very noticeable, and was commented on post-war by Keynes, is the growth in agricultural demand compared to the growth of agricultural output. With American, Canadian, Argentine, etc populations rapidly growing there will be serious concerns regarding British food imports--and this will be partially mirrored in the Empire generally, given the substantial population growth in South Asia.
The demand and interest will be there for an analogue of the Green Revolution, and the early antecedents of Borlaug's methods were in place. If a wealthier world develops Green Revolution methods and practices earlier, governments globally could end up much more stable as lower-class living standards would improve with lower food prices and higher quality. This could also impact attitudes toward Imperialism, as European nations would not have felt the need to support domestic agriculture without the concerns of wartime privation, and thus a great deal of agricultural development and investment could occur outside European metropole.
Even without an earlier Green Revolution though, there would be much more time for Russian land reform and Siberian settlement to sink in, and for Russian agriculture in general to approach western levels of productivity. Expanding rail networks, not just in Russia, would promote agricultural settlement and production in places otherwise not intensively farmed for lack of markets. This might apply most to interior Africa, and Brazil's grasslands.
Trying to model this out to the 1980s (let alone modern day) is too hard without something more concrete though, the range of possibilities is simply huge.