"Easy" 1911 PoD for a franko-russian 2-months victory 1914

Opening Post : the Question

NoMommsen

Donor
...

Our scenario: The British declare neutrality and Europe goes to war. Miracles happen and everything goes the French and Russian way The Germans are defeated in East Prussia, Conrad can't escape in Galicia and France goes through the gap and separates the German first army and destroys it. The ensuing German retreat turns into a panic and the German army collapses. The French reach the Rhine by Oct 1 1914 and the war ends

France and Russia are free to dictate any terms they desire

Our questions: What terms do the Franco-Russians dictate?

What is the future of the British Empire?

Yes I know that this is borderline ASB with a POD of 1914 though easily done with a POD of 1911 or so. If anyone wants to argue about the plausibility, we can start another thread. The important points are the British didn't know the outcome when they chose to intervene and many observers thought this likely
@Aphrodite , you asked for/proposed it youself.

IMHO the scenario you proposed in the thread the quote above is taken from IS ASB.

But you offer to discuss a PoD of 1911 - as you write it, it seems you mean a single PoD -by which it can be "easily done", that the then rendered military power No.1 can after just 3 years be completly defeated in just 2 months - 9 weeks - 63 days - time.


I am really eager to hear of this super-powerfull PoD.
 
Aphrodites "Proposal"
There are several actually. The cleanest would be- Alexeseyev wins the argument in Russian war planning. The East Prussian offensive is dropped and 17 of the 29 divisions are sent south for an invasion of Galicia followed by sweeping into Silesia. This avoids the difficult terrain of East Prussia which is the real reason the Russian offensive failed. It would delay that attack on Germany by a couple of weeks causing problems for the French offensive.

This leads the French to adopt a better defensive-counter offensive strategy. They abandon the Alsace offensive and pull the 1st and 2nd armies back towards Paris as a strategic reserve. They can be sent north to deal with a German sweep through Belgium or south to invade Alsace. The fortresses of Lille and Maubeuge should also be properly defended. Since the French are now standing on the defensive, there is no need for the 3 year law and the money spent on it can go for strengthening the reserves and buying artillery

The situation on September 1 in the East would be the 8th German army is still fixed in East Prussia by the 12 Russian divisions, Conrad totally whipped in the South and a twenty to thirty Russian divisions prepared to sweep into unprotected Silesia. In the West, the Germans would be in awful shape. They will have to send far more than just two corps to deal with the Russians, about four more corps would be stuck laying siege to Lille and Maubeuge. The French are also in much better shape having avoided the horrid offensives of the Battle of the Frontiers

The French counteroffensive should succeed in dividing the German 1st and 2nd army as in OTL but being stronger can take full advantage and encircle the 1st German army or throw the 2nd across the 3rd. In either case, the German front would collapse and a retreat begun. All retreats are prone to panic and collapse. This one is almost certain to do so. The Germans would have been beaten in the East, they were exhausted and now defeat has happened in the West. The hope of victory is gone and the men exhausted from their march into France. Morale will collapse and the German army will with it.

Even if the Germans manage to retreat to their own fortress line, they are doomed. With the Russians having free reign in the East and the French sitting on the German iron reserves, its hard to imagine the Germans wanting to continue the war

There's also one where Plan XVII actually works but I was saving it for another thread
 
Answering the Proposal Part 1 a

NoMommsen

Donor
@Aphrodite , I'm sure you expected me to have some ... issues with your proposal(s). ;)

First : I don't see a "clean" way, how the Alekseyev-Plan could be implemented at first at all. ... aka I question the probability/plausibility/possibility of your PoD already.

In February 1912 a conference of every military heavy-weight available (beside the Tsar), from War Minister Sukhomlinov, over head of Defense Commitee Grand Duke Nikolai and the then Chief of Main Staff Zhilinskiy to the Quartermaster General and chief of the Intelligence section of the Main Staff Danilov, the head of the artillery department (who's name I can't find atm) to the chiefs of the western military district including their chiefs of staff.
They had to decide about a new deployment scheme based on the mobilization scheme of 1910 (a "new" mobilization scheme was planned to become operational in 1914, but had to be postponed IOTL, since it wasn't ready, though "parts" of it were used during IOTL mobilization).

Two proposals were presented to them : the Danilov-Plan and the Alekseyev-Plan.
But instead f making a decision of either-or they made a decision of Neither-Nor.
The conference decided for BOTH !

And in May 1912 the Tsar approved their recommended "revised Plan 19" with its both variants "A" for Austria and "G" for Germany, as we know it from OTL.
Btw : this Plan with its already heavy leaning towards/against Austria still owed more to the Alekseyev-Plan, than to the Danilov-Plan.

The reasons for this "super-salomonic" decision :
the strong factionalism, that overshadowed the russian military establishment in particular. This factionalism went along several lines of friction :
- pro-Sukhomlinov vs. anti-Sukhomlinov regarding his
- - personal politics
- - military reform politics
- - military financial politics
- adhaerents of defensive (the "traditional" russian stance for decades) or offensive (the "new", worldwide "en vogue" stance) "thinking" in general
- adhaerents of fortress-updating or fortress-abandoning
- adhaerents of equipping the army with field guns or with stationaryheavs fortress guns
- asseeement of the main threat : Austria-Hungary or Germany
- assessment of the main political-strategical target : Austria-Hungary (for the Balkan) or Germany (Big/Great-Power status)
- place-value of keeping restive Poland occupied
- place value of the franko-russian alliance

These different position were already developing for quite some time (in essence since the russo-japanes war) prior to the named conference. Not to forget, that many of the higher russian military echolons were "administrative"/"political" soldiers, owing their positions NOT to troops assignments and military expertise but to courtier behavior to the war ministry, the ... tsarist court or "working their way up" the bureocratic ladder (was it Yanushkevic od Zhilinskiey, who never commanded more than a company ?).

The solution to this hotch-potch of positions on the aforementined conference, where "political questions" - internal as well as foreign - were of much more importance, than technical-tactical-operational questions, was :
the Neither-Nor or Both solution, as with the "revised Plan 19" IOTL.

Now :
How do you make the adoption of the Alekseyev-plan against the above mentioned, multiple odds happen ?

... perhaps the Samowar, the conference participants are served from is internallly lead-lined ? ... causing a common vision of St.Georg or the Holy-Mother-Mary ?

Anything else than such a compromise solution would have needed as well as caused a major reshuffle of personalities throughout the whole russian military with effects similar to the military "effectivness" as the stalinistic military purges, with more or less "fictional" effects on the political and militarily personal enviroment of the Tsar in the buil-up to the war, with more or less "fictional" effects on the outbreak of a/the war at all.
 
Answering the Proposal Part 1 b

NoMommsen

Donor
However, for the sake of arguement lets assume the Alekseyev-Plan gets adopted in spring/summer 1912 as the ITTL "revised deployment Plan 19" without (too ?) much changes to the cast of the "dramatis personae".

Second : I also don't see a "clean" way, how the adoption of the Alekseyev-Plan leads to french military adopting a "better defensive-counter offensive strategy".

This they HAD already since 1909 !

It is called Plan XVI and its last iteration, covering better than before the french-belgian border and creating more and more readily available reserves was presented by the then "chef d'État-Major des armées" General Victor-Constant Michel, Joffres predecessor, in 1911.

The plan was rejected (comment of the war minister : "comme under insanity") in July 1911, the already counted upon for being too defensive Michel was sacked and instead ... Joffre, the advocatus angeli/diaboli for "l'esprit d'offense" was made his successor.
Joffre - at first - kept the Plan XVI, though not exactly and to the full extent as planned by Michel. Nevertheless he and his acolytes were working on ... something better all over 1911/12. And in April 1913 the Plan XVII, as we know it was accepted by the "Conseil supérieur de la guerre".

  • But you now propose that the russian choice of the Alekseyev.Plan, which abandoned an initial attack on Germany for an initial attack on austrian Galicia - in which it neglects and abandons the military part of the franko-russian alliance of simultaneous attack on Germany - changes Joffres and Foch's and dozens of other french high-military thinkers minds as well as many politicians (including the president), while they are working on a new plan, from their (almost religious) believe in the offense back to the defense ... for which Michel was just sacked.
  • At the same time, when the french were already pissed by the russians "unoffensive" stance/military plans and capabilities against Germany (almost sionce tzhe alliance was forged), started to question the value of this alliance. Surely another russian military plan putting Germany on the list of military priorities further/again on the lower part would have a tremendously improving boost for the alliance (insert *irony button*).
You might argue from your/our highpoint of hindsight with the "experience" of further 100 years of war-fare (including all of the WW1), that France didn't have much of a choice than to comply to whatever turn the russian politics take.
I am quite sure, that the contemporary frenmch politicians would have seen it very different - as well as there were an alternative at that time, "just" reaffirmed during the 2nd Morocco-crisis, during which the russians didn't do much (not to say nothing) to support France.
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Therefore I question the probability/plausibility/possibility of an adoption of the Alekseyev-plan at all :
you don't provide a PoD for that, you only assume it.

I also question the probability/plausibility/possibility of a somehow in Russia adopted Alekseyev-plan to change the french strategic choice of the time, as illustrated by the change from Michel to Joffre.
... and not even changing the whole run-up in international personnel and shape-of-alliances to the WW1 as we know it to something completly different.
However, you don't provide an explanation for this to be achieved and only assume it again (... beside ASB-sized butterflies from the first "event").




More to come for an assessment of the "practical" recuperations as stated by you.
...and the ignorance of eventual reactions of at least the germans to it.
 
Answering the Proposal intermezzo 1

NoMommsen

Donor
After having digested the first two cups of lead-lined-samowar tea, before serving the third a lil' "intermezzo" before proceeding to the some more "thorough" thoughts.
Since the French are now standing on the defensive, there is no need for the 3 year law and the money spent on it can go for strengthening the reserves and buying artillery
This is an almost absurd simplification of the reasons and the political discussions, that lead to the introduction of the 3-year service in france in summer 1913, far of reality, only "designed" to fit your wishes.
It also construct a causality of military money spending and esp. on equipping the french army with artillery, that simply did not exist, at least not to the here wished for importance.

However, for the sake of arguement let this sequencing of wished for improbabilities happen. What would be its effects in summer 1914 ?
Almost ... nil.

There would be one more class of reservists available for the price of one class of active soldiers less.
Well, yeah, HUGE boost of executable military power ...

There would be ... what kind of guns just ordered in autumn 1913 after not-introducing 3-year-service, their delivery just beginning in summer 1914 ?
Mobile howitzers to accompany moving/advancing troops or more stationary defensive artillery in the upgrade fortresses of Lille and Maubeuge (and perhaps some more other places) just as the russian ally has been/is doing ?

After less than a year the effects are negligible.
 
However, for the sake of arguement lets assume the Alekseyev-Plan gets adopted in spring/summer 1912 as the ITTL "revised deployment Plan 19" without (too ?) much changes to the cast of the "dramatis personae".

Second : I also don't see a "clean" way, how the adoption of the Alekseyev-Plan leads to french military adopting a "better defensive-counter offensive strategy".

This they HAD already since 1909 !

It is called Plan XVI and its last iteration, covering better than before the french-belgian border and creating more and more readily available reserves was presented by the then "chef d'État-Major des armées" General Victor-Constant Michel, Joffres predecessor, in 1911.

The plan was rejected (comment of the war minister : "comme under insanity") in July 1911, the already counted upon for being too defensive Michel was sacked and instead ... Joffre, the advocatus angeli/diaboli for "l'esprit d'offense" was made his successor.
Joffre - at first - kept the Plan XVI, though not exactly and to the full extent as planned by Michel. Nevertheless he and his acolytes were working on ... something better all over 1911/12. And in April 1913 the Plan XVII, as we know it was accepted by the "Conseil supérieur de la guerre".

  • But you now propose that the russian choice of the Alekseyev.Plan, which abandoned an initial attack on Germany for an initial attack on austrian Galicia - in which it neglects and abandons the military part of the franko-russian alliance of simultaneous attack on Germany - changes Joffres and Foch's and dozens of other french high-military thinkers minds as well as many politicians (including the president), while they are working on a new plan, from their (almost religious) believe in the offense back to the defense ... for which Michel was just sacked.
  • At the same time, when the french were already pissed by the russians "unoffensive" stance/military plans and capabilities against Germany (almost sionce tzhe alliance was forged), started to question the value of this alliance. Surely another russian military plan putting Germany on the list of military priorities further/again on the lower part would have a tremendously improving boost for the alliance (insert *irony button*).
You might argue from your/our highpoint of hindsight with the "experience" of further 100 years of war-fare (including all of the WW1), that France didn't have much of a choice than to comply to whatever turn the russian politics take.
I am quite sure, that the contemporary frenmch politicians would have seen it very different - as well as there were an alternative at that time, "just" reaffirmed during the 2nd Morocco-crisis, during which the russians didn't do much (not to say nothing) to support France.

I am well aware of Russian war planning. There were many plans proposed at various times. They change base on capabilities, perceived enemies and the general political situation. You might not see a clean POD for Alexseyev's plans to be adopted. Suffice it to say, it was one of the plans that was seriously considered. There are pros and cons to it but he had plenty of supporters. There are also risks to it. The planners backed off and adopted the hybrid Danilov-Alexseyev plan of OTL. It isn't inevitable that they do so. Your position that there was opposition and therefore it couldn't be adopted leads to an endless chicken and egg argument. If I was to argue that the POD is FF not being assassinated, you would say "Why", if I said he didn't go to Sarajevo, you would still ask "Why'

It leads to nothing but OTL being possible. This is never the case especially with a country like Russia. Ultimately, all war planning is in the hands of Nicholas and Alexseyev ranked high enough that he could memorial the Emperor directly. I don't intend to get into arguments of what goes on in Nicholas's head

As for the Franco-Russian pact this is one of the reasons they don't adopt Alexseyev's plans. Its rather weak. The purpose of the Russian offensive was to draw the Germans off the French. Whether they do so to save Germany or Austria is immaterial. Its also keeping with what Obruchev and Kuropatkin always told the French before the Manchurian War. Russia must keep its options open to secure the best military outcome and that an offensive before the 30th day was impossible

Joffre himself never liked the East Prussian plan by the way. He favored a more direct invasion of Germany going for Berlin. He did agree with Alexseyev's conclusion that an attack on East Prussia would be very difficult and unlikely to lead to decisive results.

The French might not like it but they will probably bow to reality- if Germany mobilizes, France must do so no matter what the Russians do. If they don't, the Germans could sweep into their country with impunity. Plan XVII was adopted with the understanding of an early Russian offensive. If they don't think that is happening, then changing their plans is the logical conclusion- or in this case, keeping to the old plans

Michaeel's plan is not the Plan XVI of old. It is based on the use of reserves which most Frenchmen realized were not up to the task. They needed to be upgraded with better NCO's for example This meant money the previous government hadn't spent. However, if the French know that the Russian offensive is going to be delayed two weeks, then the idea of an early offensive becomes idiotic. Even Joffre would understand that. The spending on the three year law is extensive and it only resulted in a three day increase in mobilization- not one added man to the front. It was controversial from the start, was destined to be repealed and the main reason it was ever passed was because the government took the position that the "russians are insisting"

More to come
 
After having digested the first two cups of lead-lined-samowar tea, before serving the third a lil' "intermezzo" before proceeding to the some more "thorough" thoughts.
This is an almost absurd simplification of the reasons and the political discussions, that lead to the introduction of the 3-year service in france in summer 1913, far of reality, only "designed" to fit your wishes.
It also construct a causality of military money spending and esp. on equipping the french army with artillery, that simply did not exist, at least not to the here wished for importance.

However, for the sake of arguement let this sequencing of wished for improbabilities happen. What would be its effects in summer 1914 ?
Almost ... nil.

There would be one more class of reservists available for the price of one class of active soldiers less.
Well, yeah, HUGE boost of executable military power ...

There would be ... what kind of guns just ordered in autumn 1913 after not-introducing 3-year-service, their delivery just beginning in summer 1914 ?
Mobile howitzers to accompany moving/advancing troops or more stationary defensive artillery in the upgrade fortresses of Lille and Maubeuge (and perhaps some more other places) just as the russian ally has been/is doing ?

After less than a year the effects are negligible.


Oh please- first, the French adopted the 3 year law by inducting the class of 1914 early. The result is that almost two thirds of the Frenchmen in 1914 had less than a year of training. There is no loss of executable military power. Indeed, the French power would probably be increased

The measure was highly controversial. The government would have had a much easier time convincing the people to pay the money than spend a year in the barracks. If its give us money or give us men, money is coming. In fact Benazat who sat on the Parliamentary budget committee, admitted that the request for the heavy artillery was deleted not because of funds but because the 3 year law had absorbed all the political capital. So yes, the likelihood of the French having spent large sums on their artillery is extremely likely

You also are overestimating the time requirements. The French spent 250,000,000 francs on the 3 year law. That buys a lot of toys. Increasing the shrapnel reserves by an extra 1000 rounds per gun would only cost 60,000,000 for example. The French hd 4200 75s in 1914. By comparison, the Russians built 1500 in 1905
 

BooNZ

Banned
You also are overestimating the time requirements. The French spent 250,000,000 francs on the 3 year law. That buys a lot of toys. Increasing the shrapnel reserves by an extra 1000 rounds per gun would only cost 60,000,000 for example. The French hd 4200 75s in 1914. By comparison, the Russians built 1500 in 1905

To fulfil your fantasy, the French need to easily overcome German defensive positions.

With the benefit of hindsight, you are advocating more French light artillery with shrapnel munitions, when OTL those were ineffective against defensive positions. OTL large numbers of Heavy artillery (ideally howitzers) using vast quantities of high explosive shells was generally recognized as the optimal method to deal with entrenched defensive positions. The above is the opposite to the OTL French doctrine of prioritising light artillery and the preserving ammunition before an offensive.
 
To fulfil your fantasy, the French need to easily overcome German defensive positions.

With the benefit of hindsight, you are advocating more French light artillery with shrapnel munitions, when OTL those were ineffective against defensive positions. OTL large numbers of Heavy artillery (ideally howitzers) using vast quantities of high explosive shells was generally recognized as the optimal method to deal with entrenched defensive positions. The above is the opposite to the OTL French doctrine of prioritising light artillery and the preserving ammunition before an offensive.

This is one of the worst misrepresentations of the fighting in August 1914 ever presented. The French don't have to overcome "strong defensive positions" they just have to take advantage of the opportunities that develop OTL. Trench warfare doesn't develop until quite late and the French have no problem pushing the germans from the Marne.

The notion that the 75 was ineffective in trench warfare is also one of the dumbest myths propagated about the war. It was highly effective and that's why they produced so many during the war. The idea that trench warfare meant that one side sat in its trenches and waited for the other one to attack makes no sense and doesn't correspond with reality.

To say the 75 didn't provide the firepower that was needed would mean that the Germans spent their entire time with their heads down inside the trenches-which is wrong. Trenches were routinely taken and counterattacks immediately ordered. As were diversionary attacks throughout the battle- otherwise the attacker would ignore entire sectors.

The 75 also had an excellent over the horizon capability- if you dug the pits for it.

Finally, I mentioned the light artillery only in passing as an example of what could have been done. You might want to look into what the French proposals in 1912 really were- they would shatter the notion that the French were doomed
 

BooNZ

Banned
This is one of the worst misrepresentations of the fighting in August 1914 ever presented. The French don't have to overcome "strong defensive positions" they just have to take advantage of the opportunities that develop OTL. Trench warfare doesn't develop until quite late and the French have no problem pushing the germans from the Marne.
In ideal conditions the French and British managed to give exhausted German forces a polite shove, but not exactly the multiple battles of annihilation required to fulfil your fantasy.

The notion that the 75 was ineffective in trench warfare is also one of the dumbest myths propagated about the war. It was highly effective and that's why they produced so many during the war. The idea that trench warfare meant that one side sat in its trenches and waited for the other one to attack makes no sense and doesn't correspond with reality.
I think the WW1 French record on the offensive speaks for itself...

Finally, I mentioned the light artillery only in passing as an example of what could have been done. You might want to look into what the French proposals in 1912 really were- they would shatter the notion that the French were doomed
I have previously recommended you read Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War, by Robert A. Doughty. Joffre's offensive doctrine doomed hundreds of thousands of Frenchmen, but in your quick French victory fantasy, an offensive French strategy is mandatory.
 
The French counteroffensive should succeed in dividing the German 1st and 2nd army as in OTL but being stronger can take full advantage and encircle the 1st German army or throw the 2nd across the 3rd. In either case, the German front would collapse and a retreat begun. All retreats are prone to panic and collapse. This one is almost certain to do so.

Ha ha ha no. It's not ASB like the OP said though. It just requires a lot of luck on the side of the French. Key bullets are duds. The weather always cooperates with the French. The German lower officiers hesidate. And so on. Anything physically possible is not ASB, but I must say this isn't very plausible.
 
Having the Franco-Russian Armies win the war within two months, meaning the war ending in early to late November is quite impossible IMHO. BUT the Entente can win the opening phases of the war in a decisive way, which can in turn gives them a great advantage on the long run. BUT this requires not one but several PODs:
-The Plan XVI wasn't a great miracle which would destroy the Heer within 8 weeks. It was far better than the Plan XVII on a strategic pov sure but it had its flaws. The idea of merging active units with reserve ones to create 40 000 strong divisions was quite foolish and this idea cost more to Michel than his proposal to create a mass of troops aimed at countering a German Offensive in Belgium (in fact, during the war council of 1911, no one really criticised him about this idea, including Grandemaison). So have Michel be less dumb about his fantasy of creating large divisions and the War Council could possibly accepts the possibility of a German action in Western Belgium. Basically, if the French manage to stop the Germans at Charleroi, you're already putting the Entente in a far but really far better position. But for this they need more men and a well-protected left flank, meaning they need to use reservists in a massive way and to get real BEF support.
-Artillery: the 75 is great as a field gun. On a flat terrain, its range and amazing rate of fire turns into a gun far superior to its German equivalents. But if there are slopes and reverse slopes, the German heavy howitzers gain the upper hand. So France need a heavy howitzer able to conduct effective counter battery fire. A group or regiment of 155mm guns per Corps (ideally 24 guns) could already do wonders.
-The reserves: France needs to create reserves corps and to use them from the very beginning. Joffre indeed created this kind of units called "GDR" ("Groupements de Divisions de Reserve" or "Reserve Divisions Groups") but there were few of them.
-The BEF: John French isn't a great commander and disliked the French. You need another commander or at least a good and agressive chief of staff which has a good relationship with the French: Henry Wilson could do the trick for August-September 1914 but then you need to prevent the Curragh Incident from happening (and if Wilson would be good for the war of movement of August-September, he would be terrible for trench warfare).
-The Russians: I'm not saying anything here. There are people who know more about it than me.
 
Answering the Proposal Part 2 a

NoMommsen

Donor
As "threatened", here comes a third cup of of lead-lined-samowar tea :

German ignorance of obvious changes for two years without any effect on german deployment/concentration/operations and other plannings.


In the East :
IOTL the germans had a pretty close picture of russian deployment-plans before 1914 and deployments after 28th July 1914, gathered by their consuls all over the russian empire, quite densly distributed in the Warsaw-, Vilnius-, St.Petersburg- and Kiev-military-districts, gathered by trades- and salesmen (until 1914 Germany was the single biggest russian trade partner), gathered by their military attachees and other diplomatic personnel by listening to political, diplomatic as well as military "gossip" floating" around in St.Petersburg as well as Moscow and other places not at least due to the already mentioned factionalism (or is that also butterflied/handwaved aways by whatever magical PoD you might use); also by regular visits of russian troops, monitoring their exercises, mobilisation exercises, military maneuvers.
And as it seems from my readings so far, the germans IOTL knew even better about the russian deployments opposite to austrian Galicia, than the austrians themself (IIRC there was also some ... "strong" involvement of german intel in finding out about Redl).

But ITTL they don't see the build-up of logistics (i.e. railways) in and to the southern parts of russian Poland, necessary to transport and support a force of 3 russian 5-corps-armies with their cavalristic additions.

And ITTL they also don't monitor the military exercises, maneuvers and (esp.) mobilization exercises pointing to the massive force build-up in case of war in southern Poland, seriously threatening Silesia, esp. industrially important upper Silesia.

And ITTL (not ?) looking at the russian military activities for two years they will ofc also miss, that there isn't any Narew-Army anymore, only a Njemen-Army of roughly half of what was anticipated as the overall russian force opposite to East-Prussia earlier on as well as IOTL in the 1912, 1913 and 1914 threat assessments as well as the much more defensive task of these troops compared to OTL.

And ITTL they also "miss" the becomming more and more obvious, simply visible neglect of the Warsaw fortress complex (Warsaw-fortressbelt, Warsaw-citadell, Novogeorgiesk, Zegrze) as well as of almost every Narew-Bobr fortress (Pultusk, Roshan, Ostrolenka, Lomza) with only (maybe) Osowiec, Grodno and Olitsa, maybe also Kovno (as IOTL) being maintained/updated/reinforced as the base for the now considerably smaller (oh, mentioned it already) Njemen-Army.

Yep, absolutly plausible, that all of the german/prussian general staff miss over two years of (not ?) watching their most feared adversary the massivly growing threat against Silesia as well as the ever dwindeling threat of East-Prussia.
And ofc they miss a day by day more noticeable, almost teasing operational possibility :
a HUGE gap between the now residual russian North-West Front and strong(est) right wing of the russian South-West Front from the neglected Warsaw-area fortifications at the lower Vistula to the San-confluence at the middle to upper Vistula.
An open invitation to turn either the southern flank of the TTL Njemen-Army or the northern flank ... well not flank the BACK of the South-West Front three "strike" armies. To me its seems almost as if the russians "wiggle with their ass" here.

russian plan 1912 a.jpg

I would/will agree, that with our knowledge of hindsight such operation(s) would be logictically "unsound" at least.
However, given the contemporary military attitude of all war participants towards logistics (this ofc includes the germans, who at least were IMO least off the mark of possibilities of their troops though still [perhaps often too] far off), their contemplation would be well within military thinking.

(A more detailed discussion of such possible operations maybe later.)
 

NoMommsen

Donor
You also are overestimating the time requirements. The French spent 250,000,000 francs on the 3 year law. That buys a lot of toys. Increasing the shrapnel reserves by an extra 1000 rounds per gun would only cost 60,000,000 for example. The French hd 4200 75s in 1914. By comparison, the Russians built 1500 in 1905
Any sources on that ?
That seems to me a wee bit excessive to spent a quarter BILLION francs in just one year only on military ... whatever.

Oh, what actually DID they spent all this money on in just one year ?
 

NoMommsen

Donor
...

The 75 also had an excellent over the horizon capability- if you dug the pits for it.

...
HUH !?

Erhm, ofc, ...
... digging a pit is quite a ... "standardized" task, making shooting tables established in peacetime absolutly reliable for the gunners in wartime conditions.

It's ofc quite simple to redig the pit everytime, you need another shooting angle, that is still not within the limited possible elevation of the "75".

And if you need to lower the range and revert - maybe in defense against attacking infantry - to its use as a field gun, a task in which the "75" was unparalelled, well, just pull the 1.5 tons plus gun out of the pitch with the 6 men around and find a firm place of ground to ram the box-trail into in the right direction ... easy !
 
Answering the Proposal Part 2 b

NoMommsen

Donor
In the West :
Here again you assume, that the germans don't change anything for two years, after the french - their primary war target - have adopted/carry on with their defensive strategy/military doctrine.

IOTL the german intel on french deployments/concentrations (Plan XVI as well as XVII were only "early concentration" plans and no operationasl plans, to be changed for actual deployment as the needs arise to whatever front the supreme commander (Joffre) might decide upon) was worse than on russian plans. However, though they "missed" in their assumptions IOTL somehow 4th Army (as an army of its own), they got the concentration phase regarding corps and amount of troops quite right.
Less by "agents" of whatever profession, than by simple "watching" exercises (again) and especially ... reading. In France there was a lot of military literature, books, magazines, regular publications. Many french officers "liked" to see their name printed. There was also a quite aware press, since everything militarily was watched in republican, socialistic leaning France with much attention and an attitude more "suspiciously" than "friendly".

ITTL the amount of such literature discussing an offensive as well as a defensive "war-plan", sometimes also in more ... "detail" would exceed of what was published IOTL, when the "new" offensive attitude "won" with one of his strongest advocats becoming "The Boss". Also there would be noticable/visible updating/improving at least the fortresses of Lille and Maubeuge, as you proposed.

But, as with the russian visible changes and preparations, ITTL the germans are blind and deaf and keep on with their plans as IOTL :
  • as if there are now NO new/renewed, blockading french fortresses at the franco-belgian border seriously affecting the cruciable timetables to reach the northern french plains
  • what clearly shows, that the french will NOT come out into the open to fight and with that killing the operational idea behind Schlieffens "solution" for a quick victory in the west :
    • avoid/turn the french fortresses
    • "lure" the french into the open on their "open" (no/not upgraded/maintained fortresses) left flank
    • destroy/defeat the major part of the active and available military force of France in Belgium and/or northern France
  • ofc ITTL the germans would deploy the same troops/amount of troops in Lorrain and Alsac as IOTL, with now NO active troops of 1st Army and 2nd Army threatening to attack into Lorrain or Alsac, no active troops supporting the two french fortress lines north and south of the Trouee des Charmes, which is now NOT guarded by active troops anymore.
But the remaining garrison troops and now to special operations level upgraded/trained two reserve division-groups will still ofc be "threatening" enough for the germans to still deploy the 13 Corps of OTL in the same manner of OTL from Thionville to Mulhouse.

... very plausible ...
 

NoMommsen

Donor
...

There's also one where Plan XVII actually works but I was saving it for another thread
Actually Plan XVII worked very well, exactly as Joffre had planned it ...

only that the germans weren't there, where he wanted them and that he didn't believed the evidence contrary to his believe for a few days.
 
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