Eastern Front WW1 What If

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
  • Start date

Deleted member 1487

As I love WW1 what ifs, especially in regards to the Eastern Front, here is the latest one to spring to mind.
Recently when reading "Blood on the Snow" by Graydon Tunstall, which covers the Carpathian campaigns in the winter of 1915, the author discusses three great bloodlettings that destroyed the Austro-Hungarian forces. These were the Galician 1914 campaign, the October-December battles that began with the arrival of the German 9th army by Cracow and ended with the battle of Limanova, and the three Carpathian campaigns of 1915. The last of these officially cost about 800,000 soldiers, though the Mr. Tunstall suggests the real cost was close to 1,000,000. From this point on there was literally no more trained soldiers at the front and the weakness displayed later on was the direct result of the complete destruction of all trained manpower. I think this is a gross simplification, but is definitely a major factor in poor performance of Austria-Hungary post May 1915.

Despite the losses of the Galician campaign the Habsburg forces were still capable of recovery and learning from their mistakes. Much of the dead weight at the command level (though not all by any means including Conrad himself) was gone and serious tactical reevaluations had occurred.
That said, the real turning point for the Austro-Hungarian army (IMO) was the counter offensive in October 1914 that relieved Przemysl, but by November saw the CP forces thrown back to their starting line several hundred thousand men fewer. The bloodletting continued through December, as the Russian pressed into the Carpathians and reduced the Austro-Hungarian armies in the East to little more than 300,000 men.

POD
What I am proposing is this: What if Conrad had heeded the protests of his generals and sat on the defensive after September, digging in and resisting through December? His forces were badly in need of rest, reinforcement, and reorganization, as they had lost about 45% of their forces on the Eastern front. His generals demanded a period without offensive action so this could occur, but Conrad demanded the Germans help him attack. Had the Austro-Hungarians sat still, I propose the following:

They could receive reinforcements, including from the Serbian sector where Potiorek had just suffered yet another defeat.

Defensive trenches could be dug and a proper defense line sighted on the foot hills of the Carpathians.

Przemysl could be safely left to its own devices for now thanks to being properly provisioned and defended.

Supplies could be built up for the offensive after the Germans brought in enough reinforcements from the West.

Austro-Hungarian and German cavalry formations could sabotage logistics in Central Poland before the Russians could deploy forces to the theater (i.e. in October), much like historically.

This all could work because the Russians were halted by the weather, poor infrastructure in Galicia, the change of rail gauges from the Russian to Austrian widths limiting supply to Russian forces, and the Russian repositioning of their armies to the north. The Austro-Hungarians possessed the best intelligence services of the war and knew Russian plans, which did not include attacking them for a couple of months. So they had the time necessary to create the heavy positions they needed to hold out and rebuild.

Having done so the Austrian would be well prepared for the Russian attacks in late October-November, which would save them hundreds of thousands of casualties and rely on the logistical difficulties the Russians were having to blunt their advance. If the Austrians were well prepared to meet the Russians on ground of their choosing with extensive trenches, Brussilov and Dimitriev's forces would not have nearly an easy time advancing against the Austrian trenches as they were having trouble massing enough artillery shells during this period. Basically, unlike OTL, the Russians are halted further forward near the Dunajec and Carpathian foot hills.

Of course all this requires Conrad and AOK realizing the capabilities of their armies, which is nearly ASB :( but as this is a what if, let's play along. Though ultimately the Austro-Hungarian forces would be in positions somewhat forward of their historical ones, they would be far better off with their forces being considerably more intact in 1915 than OTL. Basically by the time they were ready to go on the offensive and the Germans were ready to support them with the forces used for the Südarmee, the fighting would not be in the Carpathians, but rather forward in the foothills, where the weather would not be as harsh and the supplies lines would be secure. Also having larger and more experienced formations still intact for the 1915 offensives, the Russians won't be able to defend nearly as well against the militia sent against them historically.

I was thinking about writing a TL about this, anyone interested?
 

Redbeard

Banned
By nature I'm interested in Habsburg ATLs (as well as Habsburg OTL), and I think you have many valid and interesting points. I don't think your initialising PoD of having the Habsburg leadership realise the limitations of their forces is that ASB.

After all the traditional approach of Habsburg commanders through the centuries was a certain caution - the army must be kept intact by all means - as long as the army was intact the Empire would exist - and winning or loosing this or that battle/war was secondary.

So Conrad's eagerness to attack at all costs IMHO was the exception and a more traditional commander would be likely to act as your POD describes. After all A-H was deeply overstretched in 1914 and staying on the defensive vs. Russia until Serbia is finished off for good would be common sense.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
The simplest POD is to have Franz Graf Conrad von Hötzendorf NOT reappointed as chief of staff in 1912 following his sacking in 1911. Conrad's only military virtue was his aggressiveness. He was of the aggressive and stupid commander mold; IE just about the worst possible. I think case could be made that any other senior KuK officer would have done a better job.

You could have the Hapsburgs do something logical like sit on the defensive vs. the Russians and attempt to pound the Serbs.

Michael
 

Deleted member 1487

The simplest POD is to have Franz Graf Conrad von Hötzendorf NOT reappointed as chief of staff in 1912 following his sacking in 1911. Conrad's only military virtue was his aggressiveness. He was of the aggressive and stupid commander mold; IE just about the worst possible. I think case could be made that any other senior KuK officer would have done a better job.

You could have the Hapsburgs do something logical like sit on the defensive vs. the Russians and attempt to pound the Serbs.

Michael

The major problem for the Galician offensive was the Germans. Wilhelm personally contacted Franz Josef and demanded that his armies attack the Russians to keep them off the backs of the limited German forces in the East while the victory in France was won. Conrad wanted to sit on the San-Dniester line, but was forced by his Kaiser to attack. He was also deluded into thinking this meant the German 8th army was going to be the supporting force to attack from the north to pull of the Seydlitz operation. This is why the Austrians deployed on the San-Dneister instead of using trains to deploy to the Lemberg area, which would have made sense. Instead his troops had to march to be the battlefield from the middle of Galicia. And if Conrad wasn't around in 1914, then the situation would have been entirely different in August, another TL that I intend to write one day.
However, then Potiorek would have been the chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, and we know what he did in Serbia....
 
The major problem for the Galician offensive was the Germans. Wilhelm personally contacted Franz Josef and demanded that his armies attack the Russians to keep them off the backs of the limited German forces in the East while the victory in France was won. Conrad wanted to sit on the San-Dniester line, but was forced by his Kaiser to attack. He was also deluded into thinking this meant the German 8th army was going to be the supporting force to attack from the north to pull of the Seydlitz operation. This is why the Austrians deployed on the San-Dneister instead of using trains to deploy to the Lemberg area, which would have made sense. Instead his troops had to march to be the battlefield from the middle of Galicia. And if Conrad wasn't around in 1914, then the situation would have been entirely different in August, another TL that I intend to write one day.
However, then Potiorek would have been the chief of staff of the Austro-Hungarian army, and we know what he did in Serbia....

And we know how well Conrad did; yes Oskar Potiorek was way to aggressive in Serbia and got his command chopped up. A better chief of staff wouldn't have played game with mobilization the way Conrad did, or at least gotten the full capacity out of the rail system and would have kept a tighter reign on Potiorek. Pick some other Hapsburg officer instead. Conrad was energetic and was fairly competent from an administrative point of view but his solution to all problems was to beat on it. He trashed the KuK in winter of 1914-15.

The solution to the problem requires a different personality.

Michael
 

Deleted member 1487

And we know how well Conrad did; yes Oskar Potiorek was way to aggressive in Serbia and got his command chopped up. A better chief of staff wouldn't have played game with mobilization the way Conrad did, or at least gotten the full capacity out of the rail system and would have kept a tighter reign on Potiorek. Pick some other Hapsburg officer instead. Conrad was energetic and was fairly competent from an administrative point of view but his solution to all problems was to beat on it. He trashed the KuK in winter of 1914-15.

The solution to the problem requires a different personality.

Michael

Conrad was not general staff trained and did not think to challenge the rail department about its deployment plan, which did not make anywhere near the full usage of Habsburg railways. Potiorek used to be the adjunct of the pervious army Chief of Staff, the one prior to Conrad. In fact, he was the favorite for the slot until Franz Ferdinand chose the corps commander Conrad after seeing him in action training his troops. Conrad had no combat experience and was a tactician pure and simple. Potiorek would have been the chief of staff of the K.u.K. and probably a much better choice than Conrad for the position. In this scenario he would have had to deal with the Bosnia situation and be rattled plus driven for revenge to the same degree as OTL.

That said, my POD is focused on a scenario where Conrad reacts differently to the defeat in Galicia. We can start another thread about a different CoS of the AOK if you'd like; I'd be more than happy to discuss that POD
 
Always glad to see something in-depth and properly researched on an aspect that I havent gotten around to. WW1 Eastern Front is something I havent had enough time to delve into and this might kick-start me. I've read a bit on Tannenberg, and on Riga later on. Not much on A-H Campaigns.

That said, I forsee the ATL converging with the OTL around the time of the Kerensky Offensive. Russia was rotten clear thru, just mattered if it was a big stick or a small one that broke their back.
 
Top