Eastern front 1942 - Again

Yes, there are a few important points there. Knocking out Leningrad eliminates about 900k men from the Soviets registry, captures some industry, eliminates the Baltic fleet as a threat (Soviet subs were raiding German Baltic convoys from Sweden), closes out a threat to Finland who can now use 200k more men against Karelia and Murmansk, frees up the Germans guarding that city, and allows its eventual use as a port for supply, plus yields some quality airfields.

Ignoring that it would cost the Germans and Finns so much men that it might as well be another Stalingrad, so much of the savings are lost by just attacking the city. Leningrad won't go down easy. Also not sure where that 900K number is coming from: the Leningrad Front which was defending the city consisted of a little under 300,000 men.

On top of that the loss of the city is a serious political blow to the USSR and Stalin's reputation and political standing, which means he needs to focus major resources on attacking in terrible terrain in bad circumstances to recapture it. It ends up being a version of Rzhev, but much more favorable to the Germans.
Uh... what? Stalin actually even contemplated abandoning Leningrad in 1941. He didn't hold much love for the city and regarded it as relatively too cosmopolitan. He doesn't need to attack and liberate it any more then he does any other Soviet city.

Additionally the loss of Leningrad means that there are enough Finns and other resources to cut off Murmansk and render the Arctic convoys moot, thus denying the Soviets between 25-30% of all LL.
Leaving aside the practicalities of taking Murmansk and that the Finns were bowing to heavy political pressure from the WAllies to not do it, it would probably cost much less then that. The WAllies can re-route much of the L-L shipments through the other routes which in any case were much more secure and important. Overall throughput may fall somewhat, but not in a way that will have significant impact on Soviet war economy and forces.

The Germans taking Leningrad in mid-1942 is certainly doable. But it's essentially throwing tons of men and material away for nothing more then a prestige victory.
 
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That is the thing: Leningrad might be a great idea, but it would still not be a 'knock-out' blow.

It does come across as if there is no 'knock-out' blow in 1942, it can only go one way for Germany.

... and a knock-out blow must not also knock one self out in the process. It also looks as though Moscow was such a 'knock-out'

Does it then leave Blue as the only option - again?

The thing is as well that it is nearly impossible to look at Blue without also looking at the consequences of 2nd Kharkov.

Ivan
 

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Ignoring that it would cost the Germans and Finns so much men that it might as well be another Stalingrad, so much of the savings are lost by just attacking the city. Leningrad won't go down easy. Also not sure where that 900K number is coming from: the Leningrad Front which was defending the city consisted of a little under 300,000 men.
Counting the civilians inside the city; I have read there were 900k people left in Leningrad after the evacuations, almost all men. Yeah Leningrad would be a bloodbath on par with the fight to take Stalingrad, it would not go down easy and require huge artillery and air support to attempt. But supply for it was worse than at Stalingrad and German supply was better, so it was doable if the decision was made, but that means no Stalingrad could be launched.

Uh... what? Stalin actually even contemplated abandoning Leningrad in 1941. He didn't hold much love for the city and regarded it as relatively too cosmopolitan. He doesn't need to attack and liberate it any more then he does any other Soviet city.
He might have done so, but being the birthplace of the Revolution the symoblism of the city was too much to abandon. Why did the Soviets launch such costly efforts to liberate and try and hold it IOTL then?

Leaving aside the practicalities of taking Murmansk and that the Finns were bowing to heavy political pressure from the WAllies to not do it, it would probably cost much less then that. The WAllies can re-route much of the L-L shipments through the other routes which in any case were much more secure and important. Overall throughput may fall somewhat, but not in a way that will have significant impact on Soviet war economy and forces.
I don't see how they could resist German pressure if Leningrad fell and was out of the picture. Based on all the reading I've done on LL its clear that there was not the capacity to reroute that level of supplies through other ports. To a degree later in the war it could be done, but certainly not in 1942. That loss would not be made good due to the lack of infrastructure to handle it anywhere else. What they got at all access points was the max them could have. The loss of 30% of LL in 1942 wouldn't be fatal, but it would be felt.

The Germans taking Leningrad in mid-1942 is certainly doable. But it's essentially throwing tons of men and material away for nothing more then a prestige victory.
Its more than a prestige victory, but far less than the knockout blow they needed. Case Blue was as close as they could conceivably get to that, but even then best case scenario if the prevent that operation from turning into the disaster it became IOTL it wouldn't knock out the Soviets, just drag out the war in the East.
 
Counting the civilians inside the city; I have read there were 900k people left in Leningrad after the evacuations, almost all men.

So you were just counting the city's population, not the actual number of Red Army forces in the city.

Why did the Soviets launch such costly efforts to liberate and try and hold it IOTL then?

They launched a grand total of two major efforts (the latter of which succeeded) to relieve the siege because the position of Leningrad still offered military advantages. With the fall of Leningrad, much of that impetus dissappears.

I don't see how they could resist German pressure if Leningrad fell and was out of the picture.

Same way they did OTL.

Based on all the reading I've done on LL its clear that there was not the capacity to reroute that level of supplies through other ports. To a degree later in the war it could be done, but certainly not in 1942. That loss would not be made good due to the lack of infrastructure to handle it anywhere else. What they got at all access points was the max them could have. The loss of 30% of LL in 1942 wouldn't be fatal, but it would be felt.

To start with, the bulk of the Arctic lend-lease in 1942 came through in the first half of 1942. For much of the latter half of 1942 the route was inactive following the destruction of PQ-17 in July and did not resume until November (if I recall correctly). And by inactive I mean nothing was getting through. Seeing as the Germans can't even try to take Leningrad (and by extension Murmansk) until summer 1942, that means the overwhelming bulk of OTLs Arctic 1942 lend-lease will still get through OTL. And this is before we get into the relative unimportance of Lend-Lease in 1942 anyways

As for the other ports: only the Persian route needed notable infrastructure improvement. The issue with the Pacific port wasn't the infrastructure, it was the political situation with Japan. Once that was overcome, it worked handily.

So no, the loss of Murnansk would not be felt.


Its more than a prestige victory, but far less than the knockout blow they needed.

Nah, it's entirely a prestige victory.
 
there is no good option for Axis.

do think Leningrad was a break in their northern line and was influence on Finns (Mannerheim) hedging their bets.

Britain and Commonwealth countries declared war on Finland circa Dec. '41 it would make sense from tactical and political reasons to try to defeat Soviets in north for 1942 objective.

does not conflict with otherwise adopting defensive line, I mean they were surrounding Leningrad already, not 1,000 km drive?
 
does not conflict with otherwise adopting defensive line, I mean they were surrounding Leningrad already, not 1,000 km drive?

No it conflicts in a big way, namely in resources required. It's one thing to establish a defensive line against a city. It's a whole 'nother thing to actually try and storm the place. That's going to suck in huge quantities of German troops and equipment, obviating any major operations in the center or southern parts of the front.
 
does not conflict with otherwise adopting defensive line, I mean they were surrounding Leningrad already, not 1,000 km drive?

No it conflicts in a big way, namely in resources required. It's one thing to establish a defensive line against a city. It's a whole 'nother thing to actually try and storm the place. That's going to suck in huge quantities of German troops and equipment, obviating any major operations in the center or southern parts of the front.

my point was you don't have to march across Ukraine to storm the city, and the attendant savings in fuel and wear and tear on equipment, not that they were going to be awarded key to the city.

no (major) operations in center and south? that was kind of the point, that a line along basically the Dnieper River adopted after, as you posted, the fall of Kiev but the line in north broken by Leningrad.

different from Stalingrad in that they could never be trapped if they finally eliminated the Soviet Baltic fleet.

British declare war on Finland in Dec. '41, my understanding deaths inside Leningrad peak in Jan. '42 IOTL, seems as though the siege guns sent to Sevastopol '42 could have been directed north.

just seems logical move, not that there were good options.
 
no (major) operations in center and south? that was kind of the point, that a line along basically the Dnieper River adopted after, as you posted, the fall of Kiev but the line in north broken by Leningrad.

Eh? No it wasn't. Even before the fall of Kiev OTL, German lines in the center were east of Smolensk. After the fall of Kiev OTL, the German lines were east of the D'niepr in general. From there, they plunged further eastward in October, pushing through Eastern Ukraine and Central Russia all the way to Rostov and the edge of Moscow (respectively). As a result of this push, they blew their armies last combat strength and exposed them to a Soviet riposte. Even then, the Soviet pushback only wound up shoving them part way back to their start lines. By the start of summer 1942, the Germans still retained control over most of Eastern Ukraine and a noticeable chunk of Central Russia.

my point was you don't have to march across Ukraine to storm the city, and the attendant savings in fuel and wear and tear on equipment, not that they were going to be awarded key to the city.
The Germans didn't have to march across Ukraine in 1942, as they had already done that in 1941. And in any case, much of those savings in fuel and wear and tear will be subsequently blown away trying to take Leningrad, as the strain on machinery in the subsequent attritional will be much worse

different from Stalingrad in that they could never be trapped if they finally eliminated the Soviet Baltic fleet.
Huh? The Soviet Baltic Fleet in 1942 was functionally an irrellevancy. It was bottled up in Leningrad. Indeed, most of the vessels had their guns stripped out and put in surface emplacements. The only means of supply and reinforcement for Leningrad was via shipping across Lake Ladoga. This is very analogous to the situation at Stalingrad, where the only means of supplying the 62nd Army throughout much of the battle was by shipping across Volga. In both cases, the Germans were never able to successfully halt the flow of supplies despite concerted attempts.

just seems logical move
Speaking with hindsight, it's logical but inadequate. Speaking from the viewpoint of the Germans in 1942 (who still believed they could beat the Soviets with just one more campaign), it isn't.
 
Really, the best move for the Germans in 1941 if they don't want to wreck their army and give the Soviets a war winning victory is to play it cautious: suspend operations and go over to the defensive following Kiev.

no (major) operations in center and south? that was kind of the point, that a line along basically the Dnieper River adopted after, as you posted, the fall of Kiev but the line in north broken by Leningrad.

Eh? No it wasn't. Even before the fall of Kiev OTL, German lines in the center were east of Smolensk. After the fall of Kiev OTL, the German lines were east of the D'niepr in general. From there, they plunged further eastward in October, pushing through Eastern Ukraine and Central Russia all the way to Rostov and the edge of Moscow (respectively). As a result of this push, they blew their armies last combat strength and exposed them to a Soviet riposte.

was referencing your earlier post on stopping after Kiev NOT their OTL/historical position, sorry if I was unclear.

in that hypothetical scenario it was my suggestion to consolidate in the north for both tactical and political reasons.
 
in that hypothetical scenario it was my suggestion to consolidate in the north for both tactical and political reasons.

Oh, well in that case the Germans best bet actually would be to make a maximum effort for Moscow, since without their forces getting a drumming in the winter they'd have the troops for it. The downside is that the Soviets too will be more powerful, so that might cancel out the advantages gained or even backfire.
 
in that hypothetical scenario it was my suggestion to consolidate in the north for both tactical and political reasons.

Oh, well in that case the Germans best bet actually would be to make a maximum effort for Moscow, since without their forces getting a drumming in the winter they'd have the troops for it. The downside is that the Soviets too will be more powerful, so that might cancel out the advantages gained or even backfire.

when and where do you think the Soviets would attack? believe you have posted they were not ready in 1941, and that was absent an invasion.

would they be ready in 1942 to even attempt to pierce German lines under the scenario that they had switched to defensive position
 
It is indeed bringing something new to the table.

I have picked on one specific issue:

Moscow in 1941 must clearly be viewed as first prize. I don't think we disagree on that account.

Is Moscow really first prize in 1942? If it is, yes, maybe it is worth a million troops.

If the oil is the knock-out blow, then Blue is the option to peruse.

The tougher question to ask is of course: Is there a 'knock-out' blow in 1942?

If Soviet loses enough troops and cannot supplement in the short term, they might lose the war.

This will be independent of amount reserves on the other side of Russia.

Ivan

Just a comment on the prize discussion. Moscow is a huge prize, but the real price is the Soviet armies. Getting the forces mobile, getting the Luftwaffe into a position where it can harass armies that needs to move o cover German advances and cauldron's, that it what is needed.

Basically, a major problem with the OTL decision is that not enough forces defended the southern front.

I am in no way claiming that doing so is an easy feat. Just adding to the prize discussion.
 
My two cents:

1) Was Blue the only option?
After the Moscow disaster, IMO, yes. Moscow defenses were too strong, Leningrad was unimportant in the grand scheme of things and doing nothing only meant the Russians were getting stronger

2) If Blue was the only option was it faulty in its conception or in its execution
I think the general idea behind it was good - it's just that the Axis didn't have the means to cary it out without huge Soviet blunders.



3) Could Blue have been improved enough to get the objective: The oil in Baku denied to Soviet.
Of course it could have gone worse for the Soviets. Something like this could have happened at the very beginning of the battle (Aug. 29th):
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It leaves Stalingrad wide open. It is however too late in the season and the infrastructure too poor to allow any sort of advance all the way to Baku. The axis might get some marginal benefits (permanently cutting the railway running north from Baku; taking Grozny and the port of Novorossisk; shuffling the Italian alpine divisions south into the Caucasus and the freed-up German units back north to the Don, etc), but nothing game-changing. If the butterflies add up and the axis has enough strength to halt the Soviet winter '42 offensive at the Don, it should push back the entire timetable by at least 6 months. German units might still be holding the Rhine and Vistula rivers when the first atomic bombs start falling.
 
In Operation Blau, it was the Germans who had local superiority at the outset. That would not be the case

It's hardly powers of providence to state that the correlation of forces in the Moscow region preclude a German breakthrough, as opposed to those in the Rostov-Voronezh region which were vastly weaker as a result of 2nd Kharkov.

I'm not so sure about the vastly weaker part.

The premier Soviet force by the time of Blau was the Tank Corps (TC). Of the 19 operational TCs at the start of Blau I, 14 was engaged within a week and defeated within two (another TC had also been defeated in the immediate prequel to Blau by AGS).

Id est, one of the primary reasons Blau went as well as it did was the fact that the best Soviet units (15/19 TCs) got savaged in the first two weeks, leaving the Soviets with few units to contest the German advantage until the Don bend-battles.

In other words: forces that won't be available until winter. In the summer these were not combat operational forces, which is why they were in France to begin with. By the time their available, the Moscow operation would have long failed and Soviet counter-offensives under way.

The 6th Panzer Division was close to full strength by 1.Aug. The 7th and 10th Panzer Divisions wasn't far behind.

All was kept in France as an anti-invasion force - in retrospect they would probably have been more useful at the Eastern Front.
 
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