Eastern Bloc democracy with an earlier death of Stalin

So let's say that Stalin dies shortly before the US rolls out the Marshall plan (so some time in 1947) and Stalin's successors follow a similar path as they did after Stalin's OTL death, and let the existing policies roll on for a while as they focus their efforts on the power struggle.

Can this result in a longer period of "Bloc politics" in the satellite states of Eastern Europe? And what might that evolve into if the Soviets don't tighten the leash on Eastern Europe until, say, 1950 or so? Is it possible that Eastern Europe might evolve into a community of Finlands (i.e. countries with full democracy at home, defensive alliances and extensive trade with the Soviet Union)? Might Tito make good on the distraction of the Soviet leadership after Stalin's death to make himself more important inside the Soviet sphere of influence (perhaps even to the point where the Communist parties in the other states become more than simple Soviet stooges)? Would the behind-the-scenes power of the Soviet "advisers" and the Communist party in the Satellite states mean that open one-party rule was inevitable at this point? Might the Satellite states stay exactly where they are politically, with almost all the power behind the scenes in the hands of Soviet "advisers" and the Party and outward power passing through the hands of a collection of Communist, Socialist and Peasant parties?

(For those who don't know about Eastern Bloc politics in this period, a good overview of the "Bloc politics" that existed before the Soviets moved to open one-party rule in the Satellite states can be found here).

fasquardon
 
I wonder if the Soviet successor leadership would be willing to send something akin to the Stalin Note (about reunification) and what the western reaction would be to new (less belligerent?) counterparts.
Also, would there be any effects in Asia? Had Chiang squandered his last chance already?
 
I wonder if the Soviet successor leadership would be willing to send something akin to the Stalin Note (about reunification) and what the western reaction would be to new (less belligerent?) counterparts.
Also, would there be any effects in Asia? Had Chiang squandered his last chance already?

I suspect that the initial western reaction would be excitement that the new leadership might be more amenable to Western interests, followed by disappointment when those in the power struggle show that they are going to be entirely conservative until someone has proven themselves to be top dog.

After that, much depends on who wins the power struggle.

As to Asia:

The Soviets were still de facto backing the East Turkistan Republic (though it was officially a part of China again since the treaty of friendship had been signed between Chiang's Republic of China and the Soviet Union in 1946) and there were clashes between a combination of ROC and Kazakh forces against the ETR in September 1947 and against Mongolia in June 1947 to July 1948. See here for the wikipedia.

In China, the civil war had already re-started in 1946 and it is hard to see how to avoid a Communist victory without a PoD before 1947. See here for the wikipedia.

In Korea, the Autumn Uprising would be a recent memory and something like the Jeju Uprising inevitable once the UN had decided to hold separate elections in the South. That would in turn mean that something like the Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion happened. While I think the skirmishes between the South and North of Korea that happened from 1948 to 1950 are hard to avoid, an actual Korean war might be avoided with different Soviet leadership. (Or perhaps we would simply see South Korea start the war as Rhee's forces invaded North Korea as the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea feared.)

In Vietnam, North Vietnam was already fighting the French and the French puppet regime in the South, however, the course of that struggle could be greatly changed by the Chinese Civil war following a different course. Also, if the Korean war doesn't happen, then the US involvement in Vietnam may either be avoided or delayed.

In other news, Stalin dying early may lead to an earlier start to the Space Race when the Soviets launch this.

fasquardon
 
By 1947, the Soviets had their empire and they were going to keep it. There is no Tito-Stalin split. Moscow might tolerate a bit more deviation from internal policy, but there will not be a transition to a Finland style case.

If Stalin died in 1945, then it is possible for lots of changes. A lot of Soviet leaders wanted continued cooperation with the United States. Stalin kept complaining in 1945 and 1946 that his diplomats were too cooperative with the US, and eventually the party line of confrontation was established. By 1947, this has been accomplished. But a death in 1945 would likely see a foreign policy of cooperation with the West in exchange for continued economic aid and eventual trade. In that case, we may see a Finlandization scenario for Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. Real democracy in Czechoslovakia. And some kind of compromise in regards to Poland that is very favorable to Moscow. We are also going to see a much different occupation of Germany and some kind of joint plan on what to do with it.
 
Would the behind-the-scenes power of the Soviet "advisers" and the Communist party in the Satellite states mean that open one-party rule was inevitable at this point?

I think so. By 1947, the process of communist takeover was well underway. Stalin's death would change some patterns, but not nearly enough to preserve the pseudo-democratic political system.

Some of the Eastern Block states were formally not under one-party rule; for example, Bulgaria was ruled by a coalition of the Communist Party, the Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union and a few minor parties. But the junior partners were mostly reduced to appendages of the Communist Party and the power dynamic was similar to a conventional one-party state. Maybe in this case these "popular front" coalitions would stay around longer, in more countries, and maybe even enjoy a slight increase in independence and influence, but it's hard to see any major changes.
 
What happens if the post-Stalin Soviet leadership accepts the Marshall plan?

Let's say that Stalin dies on or slightly after 5th June 1947, meaning Marshall makes the speech outlining the plan (and the offer to include the Soviets) as per OTL on that day.

Let's further suppose that those who initially end up in control in the first months after Stalin's death either decide to accept the plan in truth, or decide that the US Congress will not agree to a plan that includes the USSR and that appearing to accept the plan will not compromise the USSR and may let them score diplomatic points.

And what effect would Marshall aid almost going to Eastern Europe, but getting aborted by Congress (likely meaning that the US replaces it with a West-only version), or the Marshall aid going through to both West and East have?

And is it realistic that in the event that Congress refuses extending aid to the USSR specifically but approves it for everyone else, that the Soviet satellites "voluntarily" reject it in the name of Socialist solidarity?

fasquardon
 
I'm not sure if ITTL post-Stalin USSR government will be any less harsh - as it would be most likely headed by Andrei Zhdanov, a hardliner.
 
I'm not sure if ITTL post-Stalin USSR government will be any less harsh - as it would be most likely headed by Andrei Zhdanov, a hardliner.

Zhdanov was already well on the way to drinking himself to death. I don't see him living past 1950.

And no less harsh than what? Stalin or OTL's Khrushchev regime? As far as I can tell, after WW2, even the most ardent of Stalin's henchmen were suffering from murder-fatigue. I've read of no-one who wanted to continue arbitrary murder and massive gulag system of Stalin's years, though some were in favor of replacing it with more specific murder and a much smaller gulag system.

fasquardon
 
So, somewhat related to my original post, according to wikipedia, Tito had this plan to unify Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and Greece (a Greece in which the Communists had won the civil war) into some sort of confederation. Assuming the Soviets have no firm hand at the tiller until '49 or '50, is there any way Tito's plan can happen?

I have to say, it seems rather grandiose.

If it can happen, anyone have any thoughts as to how such a confederation might effect dynamics in Eastern Europe? I could either see the Soviets having to deal with it (and evolve towards dealing with other Communist regimes as equals, probably for the better) or overreacting (and invading Yugoslavia or similar).

fasquardon
 
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