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https://books.google.de/books?id=LfhDBgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=bergstrom+ardennes&hl=de&sa=X&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAGoVChMI_7WZy7mGyAIVJYtyCh2sBgO6#v=onepage&q=bergstrom%20ardennes&f=false
Reading the conclusion section of Christer Bergstrom's new book on the Battle of the Bulge, he makes some interesting points about how well the Germans did when you look at the details of the offensive (though gets into how poorly the Waffen-SS did despite every advantage). Even though we discussed this before I wanted to try and do it again based on what Bergstrom had to say, even though I know what some usuals will say (yes this means you Obsessednuker). What if instead of Wacht am Rhein and Bodenplatte the Germans threw their December offensive at the Soviet forces massing in the East for their January offensive? Perhaps even somewhere in Hungary.

Luftwaffe units had a much better chance in the combat environment in the East than in the West:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bodenplatte

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Bulge_order_of_battle#Axis_Forces
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wehrmacht_forces_for_the_Ardennes_Offensive
Hitler earmarked three armies for the offensive: the Sixth Panzer, Fifth Panzer and Seventh Armies. These accumulated over 240,000 soldiers, spread over seven panzer divisions, two panzer brigades and thirteen infantry divisions. The bulk of the offensive's armored strength was in the Sixth Panzer Army, which was tasked with the capture of the Belgian port of Antwerp. To its south was the Fifth Panzer Army, outfitted to protect the Sixth's flank while it crossed the Meuse River. The southernmost flank was covered by the Seventh Army, composed of three infantry corps and ordered to protect the Fifth Army's southern flank and tie down American reserves in Luxembourg.

Apart from these three armies the Wehrmacht also designed two special units to aid the offensive. One of these was a battalion-sized airborne formation tasked with dropping behind American lines during the first day of the offensive, allowing a panzer division from the Sixth Panzer Army easy access across the Meuse. The second unit was a panzer brigade, intending to go behind enemy lines dressed in American uniforms to give false orders and spread confusion among American defenders in the Ardennes. Also earmarked for the offensive were around 800 aircraft, deployed by the Luftwaffe, to provide air support to German forces and destroy much of the Allied air power on the ground.

To prepare these forces the German high command increased the call-up age range and recruited from Eastern European countries controlled by German forces, increasing manpower on the Western Front from roughly 400,000 to just over one million soldiers.
Here is an interesting bit about how the Western Offensive seriously weakened the Eastern Front:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wehrm...rdennes_Offensive#Impact_on_the_Eastern_Front
On the eve of the Soviet Vistula–Oder Offensive, in January 1945, the Red Army had an impressive force of 1,670,000 soldiers, 28,360 artillery guns and heavy mortars, over a thousand Katyusha rocket launchers, 3,300 armored fighting vehicles and nearly 3,000 aircraft.[124] Against this, two out of five army groups positioned on the Eastern Front, Army Group Center and Army Group A, lay in the path of the Soviet offensive; together, they could count on roughly 980,000 personnel, 1,800 armored fighting vehicles, and nearly 900 combat aircraft.[125] During December 1944 the Wehrmacht had concentrated the bulk of its mechanized forces and logistical support on the Western Front, reducing its ability to defend Germany's eastern border from the Soviet Union.[126] For example, 2,299 new and refitted tanks had been delivered to the Western Front by December 1944, while German forces in the East had only received approximately 920.[127] In January 1945 the Wehrmacht was roughly 800,000 men short of complete strength, despite the reorganization of German units in order to take into consideration manpower losses, much if its strength used for the Ardennes Offensive.[128]

This was made clear to the German Armed Forces' high command when General Heinz Guderian presented them with intelligence on the impending Soviet assault, and on a comparison of strength; the German general claimed that the Red Army had an advantage of eleven to one in infantry, seven to one in armor and twenty to one in artillery.[129] It was then mentioned that the defense of the Eastern Front would require the redeployment of armored divisions from the Ardennes.[130] In fact, von Rundstedt had asked for the Ardennes Offensive to be called off on 22 December 1944, in favor of reorienting Germany's armored strength to the East, but this was flatly refused by Hitler.[131] The offensive against American forces in the Ardennes forest had preoccupied Hitler's mind, and the Eastern Front had suddenly become of secondary importance to the Wehrmacht High Command[132] For example, the Sixth Panzer Army would not be transferred to the Eastern Front until 16 January 1945.[133]
So what if Hitler accepted that the best option at this point was fight the Soviets to the hilt and let the Wallies off instead? What could be achieved in the East relative to the West with the Wacht am Rhein forces and Bodenplatte forces used there?

The extra forces amassed in the West would have given the Germans near parity in the East.
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