Deleted member 1487
I apparently confused the Warsaw defense force with a full on army; rather it was a few divisions that were deployed there.
http://marksrussianmilitaryhistory.info/RUSS1914.html
http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/914RIAB.pdf
East First in 1914?
- Thread starter miketr
- Start date
I apparently confused the Warsaw defense force with a full on army; rather it was a few divisions that were deployed there.
http://marksrussianmilitaryhistory.info/RUSS1914.html
http://www.cgsc.edu/CARL/nafziger/914RIAB.pdf
POD
The POD does actually matter, not so much the what as the when. The planning for the elimination of France began in 1904 or earlier. Without that and the belief it could be done the Germans will be looking at a different force structure and possibly different diplomacy
If its choosing between two pre war plans- well the direction of travel of the trains will tell the neutral observer which way the Germans are going and they will try and use faster mobilisation times to hit the Russians hard fast.
After that its a matter of opinion and bias as to whether the Russians are the 1812, 1914,1940s version.
Plan XVII (1913 so different intelligence on German intentions may lead to a different plan) was actually a mobilisation and concentration plan not a war plan - albeit as executed it folded into one.
The POD does actually matter, not so much the what as the when. The planning for the elimination of France began in 1904 or earlier. Without that and the belief it could be done the Germans will be looking at a different force structure and possibly different diplomacy
If its choosing between two pre war plans- well the direction of travel of the trains will tell the neutral observer which way the Germans are going and they will try and use faster mobilisation times to hit the Russians hard fast.
After that its a matter of opinion and bias as to whether the Russians are the 1812, 1914,1940s version.
Plan XVII (1913 so different intelligence on German intentions may lead to a different plan) was actually a mobilisation and concentration plan not a war plan - albeit as executed it folded into one.
On the POD you can have it occur with zero or near zero pre-war changes. They had a war plan to mass east; they chose not to use it. If people want it, Wilhelm orders Moltke to mass East when Russia mobilizes and doesn't back down. Moltke throws a fit as it means using a plan from the dead files but when for once Wilhelm digs in Moltke can either obey or resign, so he carries out his orders.
Michael
7th / 11th is stuck till Romania's intentions become clear. Is see from your reply down that 6th wasn't at Warsaw at this time do you know when it became active and with what units?
The Keegan mentions that the Russians didn't tell their allies about G.
Complain, moan and remember. Allies annoyed at each other is not a good thing to have right from the start of conflict; especially if long held assumptions then go down in flames when faced with reality. Do I think that France would refuse to attack or declare war? No. I do wonder if they might be angry enough that later on they drag their feet in terms of helping Russia.
Michael
Deleted member 1487
Not off hand. I suggest you try Nafziger's OOBs to see what you can find.
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/6-я_армия_(Российская_империя)
Perhaps, perhaps not. A few days difference won't matter that much when Russia is the brunt of the attack. I've been looking over French war plans and it seems that Germany might have a chance to take Briey-Longway before the French can react, which will cause some issues for the French 3rd army on their way toward the Germans.
Also it looks like Plan XVII seems to include a sweep through Arlon by the French 5th army, so it looks like there might be a minor violation in 1914 by the French.
katchen
Banned
McMeekin (September 1914) notes that when France declared war, the Poincaire Government was days away from perhaps falling due to a scandal over Henriette Cailluaux's love letters to Poincaire. If the Tsarist Okhrana had been on top of that situation, they should have been able to make that situation public when Poincaire was preparing to back Russia up and cause Poincaire;s government to fall and France not to declare war at all in a timely fashion against Germany. That would be a good, if ungentlemanly POD.
Mass east
Well thats questionable, certainly as late as 1914.
But whatever.
How do you intend to force a victory in a two front war?
Well thats questionable, certainly as late as 1914.
But whatever.
How do you intend to force a victory in a two front war?
Deleted member 1487
Negotiation. By the end of 1914 France will be stymied on the German border with minor gains, the CPs will probably hold Poland up to the Bug river and half of Lithuania, while Serbia has been crushed and occupied. The Entente would have effectively lost at this point, as the British are neutral and the Ottomans have entered the war and effectively blockaded the only warm water port Russia has. Murmansk hasn't really been set up until 1916. The CPs aren't blockaded and can import huge amounts as needed. At this point its an attrition war the Entente cannot win given Germany's lead on shell production and artillery tubes. So Russia and France can take their loss in early 1915 or later with much more consequences politically and territorially.
Germans plan for Western armies once they committed to going east in the event that France turned out to be hostile was to do a hasty attack to try to disrupt the French attack and then dig in. So maybe they get the French Iron mines or maybe not.
Michael
Deleted member 1487
Its just over the border, though fortified. It took 3 days to capture the area IOTL:
http://www.europeana1914-1918.eu/en/contributions/2788
For what it is worth from your map the German XIII Corps captured the area, that is the Wurttemberg Korps. Going by Garrison the XVI is the closest followed by XXI. In theory if the Germans were to try to do a hasty attack it would be those two corps doing it.
VIII and VIII Reserve would I suspect be the follow on formations.
Michael
And how do you force the Entente to negotiate? Nothing that has happened is a catastrophic defeat for either Russia or France. Not a victory certainly but all you have achieved is an interminable 2 front war with the threat of British and/ or Italian intervention.
What you are proposing is the eo 1915 situation (but the Russians have 2 more armies) which OTL remained static until 1917 and the Russian collapse.
TTL all the Russians are doing is trading space for time and evacuating an indefensible salient
Noone in 1914 believed that a war was sustainable that long.
What you are proposing is the eo 1915 situation (but the Russians have 2 more armies) which OTL remained static until 1917 and the Russian collapse.
TTL all the Russians are doing is trading space for time and evacuating an indefensible salient
Noone in 1914 believed that a war was sustainable that long.
katchen
Banned
Oops! It would be Germany's intelligence service that would want to get those letters published and delay French entry into the war as soon as the Kaiser knew that Poincaire wanted war with Russia.
You have some assumptions here.
1) The Germans don't manage to bleed the Russians over time that results in same losses over all but instead of two big battles it takes 3 months.
2) You are ignoring any changes positive to the Central Powers like say all the historic Hapsburg losses.
Other unknowns
How did things play out on Western Front?
What is the exact stance of Italy and UK?
As to why do France and Russia cut a deal? By fighting on what do they hope to achieve and what is realistic to achieve?
Michael
What does Germany hope to achieve?
Thats the basic point. Noone in 1914 believed or was organised for a long war. The entire point is it would be violent, decisive and short. Thats the experience of the Balkan wars ( less so russo japanese, but that from the Russian point of view at least was more like an embarrassing colonial and naval war.)
What you are trying to sell to Germany is a strategy of exhaustion that at best assumes the other guy will collapse before you will (and both would happen quickly) and at worst a multi year war that both impoverishes the nation even in victory and assumes Russia or France will collapse before you do.
A plan to attack in the east based on pre war knowledge is a plan for an indecisive war thats costs a fortune in lives and treasure. If thats the option being put forward - why go to war?
Why not just mobilise and defend Germany with a threat to attack Russia IF they intervene in Austria's justifiable action against the Serbian terrorists?
If you want to come up with a plan to attack Russia in 1914 do so, but do it on the basis that you will have to destroy Russian armies not on an assumption that they will just conveniently vanish.
Remember also if the enemy has 3 options available to him he will inevitably choose the 4th.
Thats the basic point. Noone in 1914 believed or was organised for a long war. The entire point is it would be violent, decisive and short. Thats the experience of the Balkan wars ( less so russo japanese, but that from the Russian point of view at least was more like an embarrassing colonial and naval war.)
What you are trying to sell to Germany is a strategy of exhaustion that at best assumes the other guy will collapse before you will (and both would happen quickly) and at worst a multi year war that both impoverishes the nation even in victory and assumes Russia or France will collapse before you do.
A plan to attack in the east based on pre war knowledge is a plan for an indecisive war thats costs a fortune in lives and treasure. If thats the option being put forward - why go to war?
Why not just mobilise and defend Germany with a threat to attack Russia IF they intervene in Austria's justifiable action against the Serbian terrorists?
If you want to come up with a plan to attack Russia in 1914 do so, but do it on the basis that you will have to destroy Russian armies not on an assumption that they will just conveniently vanish.
Remember also if the enemy has 3 options available to him he will inevitably choose the 4th.
I am sorry you are failing to grasp a key point, I am not making anything up here in terms of plans. The split of forces and orders were GERMAN war plans. Last updated during the Balkan Wars.
The Germans move west vs France and Belgium is well known. I am exploring what the Germans might do if they went with an older war plan.
As to why attack vs. defend, its a mind set thing. They were not very big into defensive plans when they had any type of choice in the matter. They were the poster child for the adage of "The best defense is a good offense..." Put another way I see the chance of Imperial Germany adopting strategic defense on both fronts as highly unlikely; other opinions might differ of course.
Michael
Deleted member 1487
Stabilizing A-H by giving them cover to crush Serbia, cut off Russian ambitions in the Balkans, and smash up Russia so they don't outpace Germany in terms of military power, which they were set to do in a few years; Germany was interested in maintaining the balance of power in her favor and she got a chance to do so when Russia mobilized against A-H. Had Russia not, then Germany could sit back and let A-H wipe out a major source of instability and ensure its long(er) term survival.
That's somewhat false; Germany though the war was going to last into 1915 and then a negotiation would end it. Britain too planned on the war lasting into 1916. Russia and France as far as I can tell didn't think it would last years, nor did A-H.
To a degree yes, but they anticipated that they would be able to smash Russian and French military power, which would keep them as the principal military force on the continent, rather than the Franco-Russian alliance getting any stronger and overriding A-H (which was weakening) and Germany (which was reaching its power limit). This plan would be predicated on winning a few decisive battles and knocking out the principal source of trouble, Serbia, while convincing the French and Russians that they would lose or at least not win, so better cut a deal in the short run. It would be a prisoner's dilemma situation once Serbia was crushed and Britain was neutral (and the Ottomans in the war), either they could cut a deal and end the war or bank on an exhausted stalemate; so Germany could run up points by winning a few important victories with A-H and wait out their enemies; attritionally Germany and A-H can win in the long run once they gain certain objectives. With the Ottomans in the war Russia is going to collapse economically with the Dardanelles closed and France will be broke by 1916. So long as Britain stays out and the CPs don't do something stupid like invade Belgium, they had a winning hand after 1914. Just don't make any mistakes and your enemies lose.
Because it settles the Serbian question, cuts off Russian ambitions in the Balkans, and weakens Germany's enemies more relative to the CPs.
Because that let's Russia mobilize completely, which is bad news for Germany; the reason they went for quick victory in France was to defeat her before Russia was fully ready to fight; here without Germany declaring war on France she would anticipate beating several Russian armies before they were all ready, which would fulfill the beating the enemy in detail before his full strength was drawn up. As it was Russia ordered mobilization about A-H and if Germany mobilizes then Russia mobilizes against Germany and attacks A-H, who cannot beat Russia and Serbia together on her own. So Germany has to get mobilized first, beat some Russian armies, take the pressure off of A-H so that they can complete the defeat of Serbia and bring their full weight against Russia, and then go for the big combined win against Russia by holding important territory in Poland, the Baltics, and Ukraine while letting the Russian economy collapse and France, if it declares war, will bash itself bloody in the west.
That's what the plan was, defeat Russian armies, grab important terrain, and wait for A-H to finish its job in Serbia so that they can fight the rest of the Russian armies when they mobilize together.
Which would be?
Moltke and several other German leaders were very concerned that any war would be a multi-year grind match. I have found a number of quotes from Moltke that turned about to be dead on. You would assume that the Chief of Staff of a major country would have something of a clue.
In any case I think the thread has run its course. Thanks for the help from various posters.
Especially Wiking; while all of your comments I might not have agreed with but I did found all of them interesting.
Michael
Originally posted by Wiking
Why are extensive territorial gains needed to justify the war? Particularly if this is presented as a war of necessity and a defensive war against contrived Franco-Russian aggression, rather than a war of choice. Plenty of countries have fought wars of defense or extended defense, where they have not gained much territory if any. (Britain and US in WWII, US in Korea, UK, France and Sardinia in the Piedmont in the Crimean War, etc.)
I also, I don't see the "trade" aspect. If focused on the east and capable of advancing to the Vistula (which is covering a territory larger than Alsace-Lorraine), the Germans and Austrians are likely going to be able to keep or drive the Russians completely out of East Prussia and Galicia in a matter of weeks.
...this shouldn't be hard to do in a single campaign, particularly if the Russians discover they are the main target and are deliberately ceding ground to preserve their forces.
Yes, the west will be a pain in the rear for Germany. The prospects of defending there are pretty good, although even defense there will be costly. Having to counter-attack to recover French salients will be even more costly.
Probably could still be handled with a minority of Germany's overall force and accomplished in the first fighting season however.
Why are extensive territorial gains needed to justify the war? Particularly if this is presented as a war of necessity and a defensive war against contrived Franco-Russian aggression, rather than a war of choice. Plenty of countries have fought wars of defense or extended defense, where they have not gained much territory if any. (Britain and US in WWII, US in Korea, UK, France and Sardinia in the Piedmont in the Crimean War, etc.)
I also, I don't see the "trade" aspect. If focused on the east and capable of advancing to the Vistula (which is covering a territory larger than Alsace-Lorraine), the Germans and Austrians are likely going to be able to keep or drive the Russians completely out of East Prussia and Galicia in a matter of weeks.
...this shouldn't be hard to do in a single campaign, particularly if the Russians discover they are the main target and are deliberately ceding ground to preserve their forces.
Yes, the west will be a pain in the rear for Germany. The prospects of defending there are pretty good, although even defense there will be costly. Having to counter-attack to recover French salients will be even more costly.
Probably could still be handled with a minority of Germany's overall force and accomplished in the first fighting season however.