Early specification for Luftwaffe bomber

The reason the UK went with strat bombing at first was a belief that gas bombing was a case of MAD, as I understand it.
They kept with it because, well, they had no other way to hurt Germany for a couple of years at least. And it became kind of self perpetuating - sunk costs and all that.

Oh it makes sense in some ways that became apparent with time and bombing certainly had a political impact on the Reich as well as in the UK long before it became truly effective.

The point is not that it is not necessarily a good idea to have a strategic bombing force simply that it is not as clearly an obviously good idea in the 1930s as hindsight suggests and even with hindsight it looks an extremely expensive option.
 
Actually the cost of Bomber command is not large at all.

Incidentally most of below also goes to changes in German production.

Total UK expenditure (in terms of production capacity ) on the Air Force is proportionally on a par with US, German and Japanese air force spending. Fahey (yeah got the couple of orders mag out on that one, no biggie) gives a very comprehensive account of the costs of fielding an air force.

So for example he allocated 500m GBP (ish) of the cost of bomber command to wages costs. Quite correct but unless you change the proportion of manpower in the air force it’s a pass through, Ditto air frame, fuel, ordnance, shipping losses runway construction etc.

The cost of Bomber command would be the marginal cost of RAF model B vs RAF model A. You can argue that but heavy airframe rises late war when there is a constant of victories in the west punctuated by pauses to both redeploy and for shipping so doing better is complex and really nothing to do with the level of expenditure on the army.

Now you can argue about effect of the CBO ( and when you do start with 50% + of the german productive capacity until 45 was geared around air warfare and most of that was always pointed west) but until mid 44 at the earliest the only way of launching attacks on Germany itself was using long range bombers and the mass use of long range bombers (43) coincides with the collapse of germany's strategic position.


Basically unless you assume the UK wants to substitute a technologically intensive manpower and casualty light form of war for a tech light(er) but manpower and casualty intensive form of warfare it makes sense to build the best and most comprehensive air force you can.

Armies are cheap BTW. At the peak month of german production USSBS gives Weapons (9.3) AFV (7.8), Motor vehicles (2.4) and Half tracks(1.6), with Ammunition as 24% and Aircraft as 48.3%. This is the record low month for the Navy at 4.5. ( powder is the other one) so Germany used maybe 17% of production on the army with another 12% on ammunition for it.

So ‘improving’ the army means either a smaller navy or smaller air force with the double issue for the British that you have to deploy it overseas and it will run casualty rates in the infantry Bn of 100% per month.

Why?

Incidentally the Manhattan project is one intermediate deliverable. The Beneficial Gain is dropping the bomb on a target. Bomber command costs do that, for equivalence using Fahey’s method you would include the B29 programme ( and other prototypes) the USMC, Pac Fleet, Fleet train etc because until you have B29 on Tinian you are not capable of achieving the objective.
 
Gannt

I am not quite sure what you are arguing. You don't like Fahey's accounting method then say so. If you are arguing that the accounting method used to calculate the figure cited by Wikipedia might be different than that is a valid point that needs to be born in mind when making cost comparisons.

If you are arguing that any of the above posters are saying that bombing was not the best available option in the time period 1940-1944 then point to evidence in a posters remarks. If you are arguing that using Fahey's chosen accounting method his figures are wrong then prove it with evidence using the same accounting method.
 
There are two arguments.

The cost of Bomber Command on Fahey’s method is as far as I can tell an accurate and comprehensive whole system cost.

However it is the cost of having ANY air force of that size with the marginal cost difference between say a force of X number 4 engine heavies and X number 2 engine being the cost of bomber command. With the assumption that both are deployed in the same way with the same infrastructure, i.e. that a twin or single engine force does not also involve an additional cost of deployment overseas.

So following his method replacing 4000 heavies with 4000 FGA would be a saving on airframe and crew costs ( probably on fuel not so sure about ordnance) but only if the 4000 FGA were also deployed in the UK. Once you deploy them to a place they can have an effect for most of the war you have to, following Fahey, include the shipping costs of deployment and any additional infrastructure.

In fact all the major powers air force costs represent a similar proportion of their overall expenditure in WW2 and are incredibly expensive, which is why they are a big boys toy.There is no particular reason to suppose that the UK would have spent less in absolute terms on an air force, if they did they would have been the exception amongst the major powers of WW2 and all of the British emphasis was to substitute machines for manpower.

The other issue is the effectiveness of Bomber command. That’s a combination of the direct damage they cause and the cost of the defences put in place. Overall the cost of the German Air and air defence forces represent 50-60% of all German manufacture with even in 42 around 25% of the Luftwaffe combat strength being deployed in air defence in the west, plus the FLAK and its ammunition, and that’s before the CBO kicks off in a big way.
To have an equal effect on Germany any alternative force structure has to deliver the same at, presumably lower cost.

The comment on the Manhattan Project is that comparing the production of a bomb to that of delivering the bomb to a target is erroneous. The end result of the Manhattan project of itself is the ability to blow up the place you make the bomb in it then has to be delivered to the target.

Fahey’s costs include that for bomber command so for a like for like comparison you would have to add the costs of the delivery vehicles, infrastructure and acquisition of the infrastructure to get a like for like comparison.

What does it take to get to be able to build the airfield on Tinian?
 
There are two arguments.

The cost of Bomber Command on Fahey’s method is as far as I can tell an accurate and comprehensive whole system cost.

However it is the cost of having ANY air force of that size with the marginal cost difference between say a force of X number 4 engine heavies and X number 2 engine being the cost of bomber command. With the assumption that both are deployed in the same way with the same infrastructure, i.e. that a twin or single engine force does not also involve an additional cost of deployment overseas.

So following his method replacing 4000 heavies with 4000 FGA would be a saving on airframe and crew costs ( probably on fuel not so sure about ordnance) but only if the 4000 FGA were also deployed in the UK. Once you deploy them to a place they can have an effect for most of the war you have to, following Fahey, include the shipping costs of deployment and any additional infrastructure.

In fact all the major powers air force costs represent a similar proportion of their overall expenditure in WW2 and are incredibly expensive, which is why they are a big boys toy.There is no particular reason to suppose that the UK would have spent less in absolute terms on an air force, if they did they would have been the exception amongst the major powers of WW2 and all of the British emphasis was to substitute machines for manpower.

The other issue is the effectiveness of Bomber command. That’s a combination of the direct damage they cause and the cost of the defences put in place. Overall the cost of the German Air and air defence forces represent 50-60% of all German manufacture with even in 42 around 25% of the Luftwaffe combat strength being deployed in air defence in the west, plus the FLAK and its ammunition, and that’s before the CBO kicks off in a big way.
To have an equal effect on Germany any alternative force structure has to deliver the same at, presumably lower cost.

The comment on the Manhattan Project is that comparing the production of a bomb to that of delivering the bomb to a target is erroneous. The end result of the Manhattan project of itself is the ability to blow up the place you make the bomb in it then has to be delivered to the target.

Fahey’s costs include that for bomber command so for a like for like comparison you would have to add the costs of the delivery vehicles, infrastructure and acquisition of the infrastructure to get a like for like comparison.

What does it take to get to be able to build the airfield on Tinian?

Yes if I am understanding you correctly then it does have to born in in mind that the Manhattan project cost would have been far greater by Fahey's method as the wikipedia figure of $2 billion seems to have been arrived at by the cash accounting process.

Now the effects of the bomber offensive on the enemy are rather harder to quantify. Part of the problem is that it worked as part of the Combined Bomber Offensive. It was the Americans who provided the bombers that drew up the day fighters to be destroyed by allied fighters that were mostly American. Even what might seem a relatively simple assessment of bomb damage becomes harder as in part German records are less than complete but also because the effects of day bombing enhanced the effects of night bombing and vice versa.

That said bombing was certainly a sensible choice from the British perspective. You are already fully conscious of this but I mention it for the benefit of others but because of the quirks of our geography the British Army is essentially a tool of power projection. Thus cuts to the British Army in favour of Bomber Command makes far more sense than say cuts to Fighter Command or the Royal Navy as you are simply trading one means of power projection for another and given the factors on the ground (not to mention in the air) Bomber Command was far more effective at reaching the enemy.

Even had it cost Britain more than it cost Germany to repel it would likely have been worth it as it was in many ways our actual delivery of a second front. The British Army on the other hand was restricted to peripheral operations until it had an ally of equal (and eventually greater power) in the shape of the US Army.

To try and get back to the point that was lost a little while ago. The cost advantages of strategic bombing force from the German perspective are not so nearly clear cut. Also based on the evidence of what it took to make the Anglo-American strategy effective it is not clear either that any amount of spending the Germans could conceivably afford would result in the effective degradation of the UK's ability to resist.
 
Quite. the german position is the flip side of the coin.

Unless they spend more resources that anyone else did on Air Forces ( and its hard to see where that comes from) the strategic bomber force is a direct swap out of the 'tactical' air force, to be of value it has to achieve more than the tactical force ever did.

Its not really going to do that unless the people on the receiving end either divert more to air defence than OTL or suffer improbably large damage.

One thing about german losses. The germans lose 10-14% of fighter pilots per MONTH from July - October 43. Then repeat from Jan - April 44.

In many ways the air war is a lot like the U boat war ( or any other attritional war) the losing side is fairly competitive and then it collapses suddenly. But the collapse is the result of the cumulative pressure not a sudden event.
 
I
So I am currently writing a TL where I am behind on the technical aspects of some Luftwaffe requirements. Something like this would take over the whole TL or vice versa so I am posting it seperately. Please respect that.

The change is in the 1933 call for air craft designs. They called for (disclaimer, wiki quote):
During 1933, the Technisches Amt (C-Amt), the technical department of the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) ("Reich Aviation Ministry"), concluded a series of research projects into the future of air combat. The result of the studies was four broad outlines for future aircraft:[6]

Rüstungsflugzeug I for a multi-seat medium bomber
Rüstungsflugzeug II for a tactical bomber
Rüstungsflugzeug III for a single-seat fighter
Rüstungsflugzeug IV for a two-seat heavy fighter

Now assume already at this time they include a 4 engine heavy bomber so that not only Dornier and Junkers are invited to participate as they were in 1935 resulting in JU89.
I would assume this design is to anticipate an engine like the DB600 but may be tested as a prototype with the BMW VII which was ready in 1930 it seems (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BMW_VII). These engine types were also both tried on the DO17.
The Range needs to be sufficient to hit targets in northern england from Germany.

Now lets not go into what they are not doing. Assume this program can get 10% of the LW budget of OTL and remember there are no aluminium shortages here and neither were there until later IOTL.

Now, what might the german aircraft industry come up with? You can assume either that they do or do not think that the engines will improve their output from the 700 hp's range towards the 1000 hp range.

So what's exactly the question? What the bomber looks like, or what the German's give up?
 
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