Early Modern Era Genius Tactician

Suppose you have a hypothetical general in the 1400s to the 1740s, which I'm going to call the Early Modern Era for the sake of making it easier to say. I know people usually call Napoleonic Wars in the Earl Modern era, but Napoleon kind of redid the whole war thing, so I'm not going to count that.

This general is an above average in most aspects of what a general needs to do. What is expected of a general of this time?

I think it was expected him to be of noble birth. Not to say there weren't merit promotions, but that's the norm.

An officer, including a general, was expected to a polite gentleman.

The leader of the army was expected to be charismatic. Since the King usually isn't there, it falls to a general doesn't it?

A general is expected to know which battles should be fought.

A general should be able to keep his army fed. Sometimes this isn't exactly doable when the government gives you a terrible position (like the Continental Army in the American Revolution), but if your faction produces enough food to eat and enough powder to shoot, there isn't much of an excuse to run out of it (which many armies managed to do).

An officer, including generals, should be able to figure out which of his subordinates are loyal and competent.

This hypothetical general is better than most of his peers at all that. But what does he really shine in? He's a master tactician.

On the battlefield, he can dissect the enemy and anticipate ambushes (line fighting was more common than ambushes, but it can happen). He'll never fall for a fake retreat. He anticipates enemy artillery locations. In field battles in both plains and rough terrain (forests or even lightly wooded areas), he's a master at making wins on the defense and offense. When on the defense, he can easily prevent a beachhead made by attackers. The general is also a master of cavalry tactics.

Now obviously, there is only one of him. Should he ride on a horse and go to the front? This gives him maximum visibility and reaction time. It also means he could fall to friendly fire (which many a frontline general did). As there is only one of him for his kingdom, that's kind of a big deal On the other hand, directing from the back means that there is a delay. Scouts have to make observations, go to the general, and then go back with the relevant orders since no one invited the radio and I don't even think semaphores are in use on land at this time either.
 
This hypothetical general is better than most of his peers at all that. But what does he really shine in? He's a master tactician.

Actually prowess in siege warfare would probably be more important; big battles tend to get more attention because they're so dramatic, but wars were generally won or lost based on which side could take their enemies' cities.

Now obviously, there is only one of him. Should he ride on a horse and go to the front? This gives him maximum visibility and reaction time. It also means he could fall to friendly fire (which many a frontline general did). As there is only one of him for his kingdom, that's kind of a big deal On the other hand, directing from the back means that there is a delay. Scouts have to make observations, go to the general, and then go back with the relevant orders since no one invited the radio and I don't even think semaphores are in use on land at this time either.

AFAIK generals usually stationed themselves behind the main body of the army, far enough back to be out of the worst of the danger but close enough to see what was going on and issue orders accordingly.
 
Actually prowess in siege warfare would probably be more important; big battles tend to get more attention because they're so dramatic, but wars were generally won or lost based on which side could take their enemies' cities.

What if we add a master of fortification design (if given preparation time of course not just told to run out to the enemy and build a fort there) and cooking up night raiding parties against siege engines to his repriotorie? In the Great Siege of Gibraltar, the British sallied out against the numerically superior forces and demolished several batteries and spike some others (which apparently is faster than blowing up)
 
AFAIK generals usually stationed themselves behind the main body of the army, far enough back to be out of the worst of the danger but close enough to see what was going on and issue orders accordingly.

"Close enough to see what's going on" can be pretty damn close. Marlborough was far enough forward at Ramillies to have his horse shot from under him and be ridden over by the cavalry of both armies, and Vauban liked to inspect breaches personally to ensure they were practical (and similar antics that eventually lead to Louis XIV issuing orders that he was to be restrained, if necessary, to stop him risking his neck).
 
I would assume that, especially at the beginning of this period, a master general needed to, above all else, be good at organizing the various constituent armies under his command.

Clearly mercenary management was important - failure to do so leading to strategic/PR disasters such as Rome 1527 and Magdeburg 1631 - but the coalition warfare prevalent during the period also required generals to make sure their subordinates/equals did what they were told. Generals who failed at this (such as Richard III failing to anticipate Stanley's betrayal at Bosworth Field 1485, or the fractured Swiss command at Marignano 1515) almost always lost their battles.

In terms of logistics/strategy, I think it was van Creveld that said that generals in the age of 'living off the enemy' generally went where the food was, thus conceding a lot of the strategic/operational initiative that was characteristic of the post-Napoleonic age.

Tactically, I would think the chaos of the battlefield would make on-site control quite difficult: during the English Civil War, Prince Rupert was notorious for charging his cavalry away from the battlefield, and even potentially 'decisive' events (such as Gustavus II Adolphus' death at Lutzen) took time to filter down to the rank-and-file.
 
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I wouldn't call Rupert even a good tactician...

So what would "above average" mercenary management be? Just make sure they get paid?

Really, the Hapsburgs could have avoided that embarrassment just by paying the mercs
 
So what would "above average" mercenary management be? Just make sure they get paid?

Well, getting paid is the first and foremost thing (and that is itself not easy, as the need for gold might mean going to places you don't want to go to, or making deals you don't want to make), but one also needs to do the typical personnel management stuff of knowing strengths, weaknesses and so on, and using this knowledge to develop your battle dispositions and plan... oh, and also make sure your allies don't stab you in the back by betrayal or flight.

Of course, personnel management has always been a necessary quality of generals, but with added emphasis during the medieval + early modern period due to armies of the period being composite, non-standard, and of dubious loyalty. Later on, drill would provide an answer to this.

(Also I wasn't saying that Rupert was a good tactician, just that commanders had difficulty reining him in during the heat of battle)
 
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