Let's say all the circumstances for the Pershing to be put into action a year or so early occured. What effect would it have on the European theater, if any?
1. An understanding and acceptance of the flaw in 1940s US armored doctrine, that tanks in fact do fight other tanks.
2. The knowledge that the PzV was NOT going to be organized into seperate battalions like PZVIs but make up half og the authorized strenght of the Panzer Divisions. From what we had seen that was the common understanding until Normandy.
3. Confirmation that the 76mm was NOT going to be able to handle the frontal armor of the PzVs and PzVIs. Oops, that's what the Ordance folks had been saying and were provided WRONG only after D-Day (and I think COBRA).
4. Solutions to the strategic log issues of getting them to the ETO (shipping, trains/rail, fuel usage, crappy engines etc)
5. Acceptance by the Commanders in the field that they were needed.
Assume all of that and maybe you have enough M26s in England on June 5th to field one battalion of 50-60 to each of the Armored Divisions (16 I think) waiting to come ashore. Infantry Divisions still get M4s (now maybe more then one Bn per division).
If we have them and the Brits don't (no M26s for all the armor attacks around Caen), no change until during/after COBRA. Once the breakout starts, they start to break-down (bad fan belts). Attack slows/stalls earlier due to comnbined breakdowns and greater fuel usage.
Nice for the Bulge Counter-attack, but not many in that AOR along the line on Dec 16th.
Second exploitation across Germany spring of 45, same results as the dash across France, lots of M26s on the side of the raod while M4s charge ahead.
As has nbeen stated before, a better solution is a better armed (90mm) and armored (Jumbo) version of the M4.