Early and decisive Entente victory?

The Imperial Russian army was hopelessly outdated; the 1915 retreat was almost guaranteed.

To paraphrase Trotsky in his "History of the Russian Revolution":

It[the Imperial Russian Army] was only useful against powers lesser then or equal to itself; In no way could it fight off Germany, a more advanced power than itself, and expect to win.

By 1916-7, all hope was lost. The peasant-soldiers in no way wanted to fight on the eastern front anymore; when they returned home to their villages they started seizing land from landowners.
For the Entente to win an early victory, Russia has to in someway win against the combined forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Lest Alien Space Bats swoop down and deliver laser guns to the Russian infantry, I cannot see a way for the Russian Army to triumph on the battlefield.

Actually, interestingly enough, the Russian army had a slight technological edge over its foes (and allies) and was fast in terms of movement (at the beginning of the war) due to their keeping a large amount of combat troops ready. If there had been a general, like Brusilov, who exploited these advantages, they could have done quite a bit better.
 
The Imperial Russian army was hopelessly outdated; the 1915 retreat was almost guaranteed.

To paraphrase Trotsky in his "History of the Russian Revolution":

It[the Imperial Russian Army] was only useful against powers lesser then or equal to itself; In no way could it fight off Germany, a more advanced power than itself, and expect to win.

By 1916-7, all hope was lost. The peasant-soldiers in no way wanted to fight on the eastern front anymore; when they returned home to their villages they started seizing land from landowners.
For the Entente to win an early victory, Russia has to in someway win against the combined forces of Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Lest Alien Space Bats swoop down and deliver laser guns to the Russian infantry, I cannot see a way for the Russian Army to triumph on the battlefield.

Its 1915 retreat was the result of an army group fighting itself to depletion and exhaustion in mountainous terrain. There was nothing outdated here, there was superior CP concentration of forces and ammunition against inferior Russian concentration of both. Gorlice-Tarnow was the product of very simple military rules, the Russian recovery of the fall likewise reflected that Germany no more had the logistics to invade deep into Russia in WWI than it did in WWII. Russia was fatally weakened by political, not military realities. Militarily it had one of the best careers of all the belligerents, but it's that political reality that made the battles superfluous.
 
Trotsky is not really a reliable witness on the Imperial Army but all he is saying is it could not beat Germany on its own - which it never tried or intended to do. It did fight reasonably successfully for 1914 - mid 1917.

Germany may have had bigger shell stocks but they were all grossly inadequate for the job. The pre war reserve had been fired off by September. No-one had anticipated the level of use - famously the British fired off in 35 minutes of bombardment at Neuve Chappelle the equivalent of the entire usage in the Boer war. In fact the German shell crisis (and artillery tube crisis) was even more acute than the allied - at least according to the guy that ran that part of the German war ministry. They had more or less the same problems just fewer newspapers writing about them and less success in solving them. Not that it would have mattered in a short war but they also had crises of zinc, copper, brass, aluminium compounded by the type of gun they were using (type of breach really)

But Blair’s basic point remains - there is a long lead time between offensives because of the need to build up stocks.
 
Trotsky is not really a reliable witness on the Imperial Army but all he is saying is it could not beat Germany on its own - which it never tried or intended to do. It did fight reasonably successfully for 1914 - mid 1917.

Germany may have had bigger shell stocks but they were all grossly inadequate for the job. The pre war reserve had been fired off by September. No-one had anticipated the level of use - famously the British fired off in 35 minutes of bombardment at Neuve Chappelle the equivalent of the entire usage in the Boer war. In fact the German shell crisis (and artillery tube crisis) was even more acute than the allied - at least according to the guy that ran that part of the German war ministry. They had more or less the same problems just fewer newspapers writing about them and less success in solving them. Not that it would have mattered in a short war but they also had crises of zinc, copper, brass, aluminium compounded by the type of gun they were using (type of breach really)

But Blair’s basic point remains - there is a long lead time between offensives because of the need to build up stocks.

Blair's point is not entirely valid in terms of Russia, not least because Russia's leadership was completely and utterly incapable of making decisions in this war. While it made an appallingly large number of bad ones in the next, it actually made them. WWI Russia.......feet of clay is an inaccurate description. More like feet of cotton candy. And even then it took Germany three wars with three separate iterations of Russia to finally push Russia over.
 
Brusilov in charge in 1914?! I have to admit, this made me squee a bit (I love being a nerd). How far do you think the Russians could advance into East Prussia under his command anyway?

Based upon logistics limitations, and the german withdrawal plans etc. I see a Russian offensive that takes the whole thing as pretty plausible before they have to stop at the vistula. The fun part is what happens then. OTL the Russian plan had 4 of their 6 starting armies against the AH.

The plan was to absorb the Austrian attack they knew was coming and do a kind of WW1 backhand blow on them. Conrad duly attacked, and got himself punched in the face. Minus Brusilov the Russian counter will plausibly be less effective, but still drive them back to the Carpathians.

OTL the Russian mobilization was completed just about the time the newly formed 10th and 11th( i think) armies needed to be fed into the NW to shore up the wreck of Tannenberg. ITTL the NW front is victorious, the AH is still driven back, and just about the time the Marne is starting the Russians now have 4 armies on the Vistula and southward, facing whatever is left of the German 8th. And there is a really big gap between the Germans and the Austrians right at Silesia.

Given the all or nothing brilliant strategic planning of the Germans at the time, i can easily see them determining to "follow the operational plan", in the west, and still figuring to turn east after France is defeated, lose the Marne, lose East Prussia, have the AH defeated, and lose Silesia. Then they have to send half their western armies to the east to shore things up, and lose the race to the sea and have the west go pear shaped too as the are driven back into Belgium.

And then they run out of nitrates.
 
That's......actually plausible in a sense. Germany might actually be deceived by "well, it's all going according to plan" and then "Oh my God, we can't even make ammunition" happens. Brusilov in 1914 was just one of the commanders of the Front, there were at least a few others who were competent. The guy that actually cracked the Austro-Hungarian lines in this case was not him, while the overall front command was infinitely superior here to that in East Prussia.
 
And with the Russians in possession of Breslau and Koenigsberg, and maybe Brussels back in Belgian hands by October, the Ottomans take a long look at their prospects. And instead of a hero's welcome, Souchon gets arrested and turned over to the Russians for seriously exceeding his orders, and the Ottomans stay out.
 
And with the Russians in possession of Breslau and Koenigsberg, and maybe Brussels back in Belgian hands by October, the Ottomans take a long look at their prospects. And instead of a hero's welcome, Souchon gets arrested and turned over to the Russians for seriously exceeding his orders, and the Ottomans stay out.

Even without the Ottomans it's difficult to see the Russian Empire's domestic situation allowing it to hold out in a long war. Unless Germany runs out of nitrates ITTL, there will be a long war. Now, if this happens plus the nitrates issue......I wonder if Russia doing well against both Germany and Austria-Hungary actually helps Russia or hurts it?
 
Even without the Ottomans it's difficult to see the Russian Empire's domestic situation allowing it to hold out in a long war. Unless Germany runs out of nitrates ITTL, there will be a long war. Now, if this happens plus the nitrates issue......I wonder if Russia doing well against both Germany and Austria-Hungary actually helps Russia or hurts it?

A successful war (up until that point, anyway) would shore up the Czar's position quite a bit.

Of course, there's still the issue of Rasputin fucking up things back home, and the Czarina's immense unpopularity.
 
Even without the Ottomans it's difficult to see the Russian Empire's domestic situation allowing it to hold out in a long war. Unless Germany runs out of nitrates ITTL, there will be a long war. Now, if this happens plus the nitrates issue......I wonder if Russia doing well against both Germany and Austria-Hungary actually helps Russia or hurts it?


This is true, although with France and Russia in a better position, and Germany consequently worse, a long war could potentially only go to 1916-17. Which could lead to the survival of the Czarist state.

Ideally, the Russians would suffer enough to lead to reforms, but not enough to total governmental collapse. And if Nicky is still around, and a serious part of the postwar negotiations, he won't want to see the removal of the Monarchy from Germany either. So maybe more constitutional monarchy in both Germany and Russia, so no Hitler or Stalin, a surviving Ottoman empire so more stable middle east, and enough industrialized modern war that everyone has had enough for a couple of generations.

Ideally.
 
Even without the Ottomans it's difficult to see the Russian Empire's domestic situation allowing it to hold out in a long war.

If Turkey remains neutral, Russia's domestic situation improves considerably. Why? Because most of Russia's foreign trade (especially grain exports) went from Black Sea ports through the Turkish straits.

The closure of the Straits to Russian commerce was a big economic hit to Russia.

Also, if Turkey remains neutral, the western Allies can send military aid to Russia via the Straits, which is the short convenient route. OTL, the Allies tried to ship stuff via Arkhangel and Vladivostok, with obvious difficulties.
 
A successful war (up until that point, anyway) would shore up the Czar's position quite a bit.

Of course, there's still the issue of Rasputin fucking up things back home, and the Czarina's immense unpopularity.

On the other hand, a successful war like this might lead the Tsar to learn the wrong lessons from this war in terms of domestic politics, leading to the paradox of an anti-Tsarist revolt in a victorious Russia. It should be noted that Russia technically took three governments and two wars to be beaten in WWI as it was.

This is true, although with France and Russia in a better position, and Germany consequently worse, a long war could potentially only go to 1916-17. Which could lead to the survival of the Czarist state.

Ideally, the Russians would suffer enough to lead to reforms, but not enough to total governmental collapse. And if Nicky is still around, and a serious part of the postwar negotiations, he won't want to see the removal of the Monarchy from Germany either. So maybe more constitutional monarchy in both Germany and Russia, so no Hitler or Stalin, a surviving Ottoman empire so more stable middle east, and enough industrialized modern war that everyone has had enough for a couple of generations.

Ideally.

The devil is in the details of limiting the violence and shocks to the Tsarist system to that degree.

If Turkey remains neutral, Russia's domestic situation improves considerably. Why? Because most of Russia's foreign trade (especially grain exports) went from Black Sea ports through the Turkish straits.

The closure of the Straits to Russian commerce was a big economic hit to Russia.

Also, if Turkey remains neutral, the western Allies can send military aid to Russia via the Straits, which is the short convenient route. OTL, the Allies tried to ship stuff via Arkhangel and Vladivostok, with obvious difficulties.

I'm not entirely sure this helps with the internal weaknesses Nicholas's regime faced. Remember that Nicholas II was a very weak Tsar who tended to promote idiots, not competents (birds of a feather). In this he was a standard monarch of one era in the absolute worst time to be such a man.
 
On the other hand, a successful war like this might lead the Tsar to learn the wrong lessons from this war in terms of domestic politics, leading to the paradox of an anti-Tsarist revolt in a victorious Russia.

I think this, or some variant of it, the likely outcome also.


The devil is in the details of limiting the violence and shocks to the Tsarist system to that degree.

I did say ideally.

:)
 
I think this, or some variant of it, the likely outcome also.

At the same time what people miss is that the fall of the Tsar does not necessarily mean an OTL-style RCW or anything of the sort. Tsarism falling without a Civil War or a USSR on the OTL model is the best scenario for Russia and everyone else, as it means a regime that has increasingly only one way to sustain itself topples, while it's extremely unlikely for anything too much worse than it was to replace it.
 
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