Earliest possible introduction of B-29 bomber?

CalBear

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The Japanese senior military (this includes the emperor) was in a state of denial. Maybe the Manchurian shock brought them to reality, or maybe not. I doubt it. Here is why.

I do not subscribe to the Russian theory, simply because the Japanese used the Russians as their conduit to the Americans starting in July 45. Note that their ambassador in Moscow (the Americans had broken into Russian and Japanese diplomatic traffic.) told the Tokyo regime that the Russians were not sending true messages to the Americans and were not reliable intermediaries. Yet the Japanese persisted. Then that poor gentlemen, Kantaro Suzuki, used an unfortunate kanji; Mokusatsu, when he was asked about the Potsdam Declaration. That was it as far as the Americans were concerned. Russians or no Russians it would be war to the knife. There was intense debate about whether to demonstrate the atomic bombs or use them in certain American quarters. I'm not sure modern Americans understand what the debate was about. It was a question of basically three things...

1. America's economy was finally at the breaking point. The money, the resources, the manpower was at its limit.
2. The Navy way would kill 10 million or more Japanese and take 18 months. With Japan so destroyed; it could very well degenerate into a repeat of 1880s east Asia only with 20th century weapons. WW II up until 1945 had been bad enough. Imagine another 35-40 million killed as civil war in China and violent de-colonization erupts all through the Western Pacific as the Japanese lose policing power before the Allies can get in to maintain some order? THAT was what Suzuki was worried about.
3. Russian American clash. The prize; Japan. Truman was afraid of that outcome. The bomb was his declaration to Moscow; "Hands off."

As an addendum; the Army way would have killed about 4-6 million Japanese and taken about 12-16 months. The Russians would have tried for Hokkaido and screwed it up and screamed for American help. Or if they were smart, they would have chewed on Manchuria and Korea and laughed as the Americans bled out hundreds of thousands of dead and made themselves infamous as butchers in East Asia. Did one know that just to make the landings on Kyushu, the Americans were prepared to use "special munitions" in Ford manufactured copies of German V-1 buzz bombs? In other words, the Americans were prepared to break treaties and international conventions just to get ashore? That is how savage the end game was. Russians were irrelevant and the Japanese certainly knew it. It was the Americans coming for them, not Moscow.

Finally: the Japanese estimated the US had two bombs (6 assemblies waiting on Hanford plutonium). The next American strikes would be on the Kanto plain. One knows what that means? The Japanese quit. Nagasaki was enough. Hirohito said so.
The Japanese were indeed very much hoping (for reasons that are somewhat fuzzy, given the history of Soviet/Japanese relations) that Uncle Joe & Company would act as an intermediary with the Allies and push for a favorable solution. That was why the Soviet entry into the War was even more jarring than would otherwise have been the case. Not only was the Red Army manhandling the Kwantung Army, but the hoped for favorable broker had not only failed to appear, but was actively killing IJA personnel en masse.

The debate over the Bomb and if a demonstration was indeed a strong one. The demonstration was rejected out of a not unreasonable concern that a fizzle or a straight up dud would make things worse. The U.S. unquestionably used the Bomb in part as a message to Stalin, but Japan was not the area of Concern, Western Europe, where the Red Army had a utterly massive manpower advantage (and where the U.S. had been rapidly stripping out both ground personnel for further combat in the Pacific and rotating fighter and bomber squadrons through the U.S. to train up in new equipment, including trading in B-17s and B-24s for B-29s) was. There is also the rather unfortunate, but obvious desire to gauge the weapon against an actual target (the U.S. did't mark Hiroshima, Kokura, Niigata, Nagasaki, and Yokohama off limits for LeMay's mission planners by accident).

The U.S. was far from the end of its tether. It might have reached a political crisis by Summer of 1946 if Japan hadn't been finished off, but that had little to do with personnel per se and much more with general war weariness. Japanese causalities were, quite literally, of not consequence to the American electorate where literal hatred of the Japanese was extremely wide-spread.
 
"The U.S. was far from the end of its tether. It might have reached a political crisis by Summer of 1946 if Japan hadn't been finished off, but that had little to do with personnel per se and much more with general war weariness. Japanese causalities were, quite literally, of not consequence to the American electorate where literal hatred of the Japanese was extremely wide-spread."

1. American leadership has to be cognizant and has to live with the consequences of policy decisions. "We break it. We own it." That means whatever happens to Japan is America's to repair. Choices have associated costs. And once Americans entered country, there was none of "literal hatred of the Japanese." Maybe the American attitude was not as one imagines?
2. Physics applied works. The only thing that could go wrong with the bombs is if the imploder failed. Trinity obviated that one.
3. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/46345.htm
4. The Americans were done; maxed out (1945).

Explanation: war bond drives were falling off, virtually everyone walking not in uniform was either in a war plant, growing food, providing administrative support or caretaking directly to the war effort. It seems to have escaped notice that a 26,000 ship navy and merchant marine, 400,000 planes, 2,000,000 military vehicles of all types (half sent to the allies, most of that to the Russians) got made between 1941 and 1944. The US Army in Europe is breaking up AAA battalions and gutting service units to find infantry replacements, and they scrounge the infantry for tank crews. There is a trained officer shortage, because too many field grades are shot up.

How is it going at sea? The navy is so huge now that it is short manned on many ships. Speaking of the fleet, there is a slue of ships backlogged for battle damage or refit because there is a shipyard worker labor crisis in progress.

Our "best admiral" will not help matters out either once the final butcher's bill for his typhoons and his Leyte Gulf fiasco is tallied up.

The Russians scream for more planes, more fuel (aviation gas) more food, more trucks, more machine tools, even more uniforms! Then there is Germany in America's lap. That country is going to face a 45/46 winter without a government, without a crop harvested and at least 10 million people wandering around who need attention urgently. Who can help? There are the British, but what can they do? France? Their new government will be lucky if they can get through the winter after allied and German armies tore their country up in 1944. Can they do it without assistance. Of course they will be screaming for help, along with the Low Countries. And let us not forget Italy. Or the Balkan nations.

Russia? After their Great Patriotic War they are on a high, but as a matter of future cold war fact, Stalin has ruined them. They probably need more help than anybody, but it is Stalin, so Truman will say no.

America was at the end of her tether. There was nothing left to spare: manpower, money or resources.
 
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How much faster and higher flying was B-29 compared to B-17?

That depends on how clean each plane was. And at what altitude.

B-17 was about 128 m/s (~460 km/hr.) at 6,000 m nominal maxed out. Service ceiling was just above 11,000 m or above 35,000 ft.
B-29 was about 158 m/s (~570 km/hr.) at 6,300 m nominal maxed out. Service ceiling was about 9,700 meters or just under 32,000 ft.
 
That depends on how clean each plane was. And at what altitude.

B-17 was about 128 m/s (~460 km/hr.) at 6,000 m nominal maxed out. Service ceiling was just above 11,000 m or above 35,000 ft.
B-29 was about 158 m/s (~570 km/hr.) at 6,300 m nominal maxed out. Service ceiling was about 9,700 meters or just under 32,000 ft.


Was the B-29 @ 350ph that much harder to intercept, than the B-17 @ 284 mph?

I don't see the desperate need?
 
Was the B-29 @ 350ph that much harder to intercept, than the B-17 @ 284 mph?

I don't see the desperate need?

It comes down to bomb load. The B-17 was a 1600 km mission to Berlin from east Anglia bomber that could carry 1.7 tonnes of bombs.

The B-39 was a 2500 km Marianas Islands to Tokyo mission capable bird that could carry about 9-11 tonnes of bombs depending on whether it flew Low Medium High or Low High Low and whether the guns were stripped out for fuel and bombs. Plus it could carry Fat Man if shackled right.

Note that a Lancaster was a 4 tonne bomb-load mission to Berlin bomber? From Okinawa it would have been a good add-on to American efforts.
 
It comes down to bomb load. The B-17 was a 1600 km mission to Berlin from east Anglia bomber that could carry 1.7 tonnes of bombs.

The B-39 was a 2500 km Marianas Islands to Tokyo mission capable bird that could carry about 9-11 tonnes of bombs depending on whether it flew Low Medium High or Low High Low and whether the guns were stripped out for fuel and bombs. Plus it could carry Fat Man if shackled right.

Note that a Lancaster was a 4 tonne bomb-load mission to Berlin bomber? From Okinawa it would have been a good add-on to American efforts.

Looks like Lanc I and III were good for 6350 kg (14000 lbs) on 1660 mile trip - to Berlin and back no problems. link
Fortress III (B-17G) was good for 1600 miles trip with 4540 kg bom load.
 
Looks like Lanc I and III were good for 6350 kg (14000 lbs) on 1660 mile trip - to Berlin and back no problems. link
Fortress III (B-17G) was good for 1600 miles trip with 4540 kg bom load.

Let's see if we are reading that table the same way? When I read range, at 14.000 lbs I expect to see the number for miles endurance at cruise. 1660 miles/2 is 830 radius. Berlin from East Anglia is about what? Something like 940 miles?

Sorry, going metric on you here (~ 200 mph cruise =90 m/s) 10 hours being a typical mission : 3,240 km mission endurance/2= 1620 kilometers one way. It's looking more like 10,000 lbs or 4536 kg to me.

And that is with no 10% fuel reserve.
 
I would think it would be easier to google what loads were historically carried on various missions by assorted aircraft rather than calculate. Also, old farts like me remember that British and American bombers flew miles per hour and carried pounds and tons.
But anyway, enjoy.
 
You cannot trust the internet to give you the right numbers sometimes. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

And it keeps me mind agile to check it.
 
Let's see if we are reading that table the same way? When I read range, at 14.000 lbs I expect to see the number for miles endurance at cruise. 1660 miles/2 is 830 radius. Berlin from East Anglia is about what? Something like 940 miles?

Sorry, going metric on you here (~ 200 mph cruise =90 m/s) 10 hours being a typical mission : 3,240 km mission endurance/2= 1620 kilometers one way. It's looking more like 10,000 lbs or 4536 kg to me.

And that is with no 10% fuel reserve.

London to Berlin as the crow flies = 579 miles or 932 km. linky
 
You cannot trust the internet to give you the right numbers sometimes. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

And it keeps me mind agile to check it.

You cannot trust anyone all the time for correct numbers, but bomb loads to Berlin are fairly well documented. I, for one, trust documented history before I trust calculations which may and often do overlook historical factors.
 
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