Earliest possible defeat of Japan?

Most of these scenarios postulate a much greater commitment of American Strength to the Pacific. But that would mean a smaller commitment to Europe (and probably Lend Lease) so the war in Europe might have dragged on longer. That would delay any Soviet declaration of war against Japan, so that takes away one factor in a Japanese surrender.
 
As things stood in 1941 or 1942 Manilla could not support the 'fleet'. It was sufficient to support the Asiatic fleet, & a temporary visit by a larger fleet, but its facilities could not 'base' the Pacific fleet or a significant portion of it. In 1944-1945 the USN had its mobile base or fleet train, that allowed Manilia or any decent protected anchorage to serve as a long term base for the Pacific fleets. The first real fleet train was available in latter 1943 & used for the follow up to Op GALVANIC & preparations for subsequent operations. Like rebuilding the carrier fleet with the new Essex class its difficult to find a PoD that allows the fleet train much sooner that mid 1943.

A temporary visit by a larger fleet may be sufficient. The Pearl Harbor ambush scenario costs IJN its fleet carriers, but not its battleships; if the U.S. sends a large force to the Philippines, the Japanese may decide that sending out the battleships to intercept for the long-planned decisive battle is the way to go. Many did not believe at this point that carriers would be critical to a major fleet engagement, but of course in fact the presence of U.S. carriers and absence of Japanese carriers would make a huge difference, possibly resulting in a near total wipeout of the Japanese battleships as well. And if the IJN has virtually no capital ships at all left, the U.S. doesn't need a very big force at Manila, and can pull back those ships that it can't adequately keep supplied in such a forward position.
 
But what's the end game? A blockade alone might have starved millions of civilians, but by itself would never have convinced the military to surrender. You would probably still have to wait for the bombs to be ready.
With no oil they can't fly planes or move ships. With no steel they can't make anything. With no food they feed troops.
 
The report on the annual rice harvest came in later July. It was extremely negative. Combined with the reports and estimates for the food supply in the next 6-9 months it was clear famine could be expected during the winter and probably no relief in the spring.
That raises a thought but were there ever any proposals looked at to attack Japan's agriculture directly? I mean chemically or biologically.
 
Japan was not entirely without natural resources. They made synthetic fuels and by later in the war they had dispersed much of their industry just as the Germans did. If there was no invasion and no A-Bombs they could have continued their resistance for years.
 
Japan was not entirely without natural resources. They made synthetic fuels and by later in the war they had dispersed much of their industry just as the Germans did. If there was no invasion and no A-Bombs they could have continued their resistance for years.

While the Japanese people died in their millions of starvation and disease
 
Also without many of the strategic materials required to make weapons
Which again doesn’t matter. Just like North Korea the mere fact of continuing to exist counts as a glorious victory against the decadent westerners who dare not try to invade our glorious paradise, etc etc.
 
But they gave up after Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Yes, when it appeared that the Americans could obliterate them all with no chance to strike a blow in return. Even then there were military men who wanted to hold on. It was only the direct order of the Emperor that forced them to surrender. Would he have done the same because some people were starving?
 
Sure. So what? The military isn't going to care. ...d.

It was running 50% in the cabinet. The Army still dominated half the critical voting positions, with the Navy and others holding the other half. After the Marianas fell & Tojo was replaced by Suzuiki in latter 1944 the 'peace without victory' faction emerged. They gradually moved from two to half by August 1945. Given sufficient pressure in late 1944 or 1945 the never surrender group might have been reduced to half the cabinet months earlier.

... It was only the direct order of the Emperor that forced them to surrender. Would he have done the same because some people were starving?

Actually it was a unprecedented vote by the emperor. The cabinet had been deadlocked for two days of continual meetings after the Soviet DoW. The emperor had attended most of the meetings & during a moment of silence Prime minister Suzuiki abruptly asked the emperor for his thoughts (the cabinet usually did not take formal votes. At this point it was redundant). Tojo the minister of defense objected, but the emperor spoke anyway & clearly was for surrender.. The pro war or Army members were so flummoxed and intimidated by the weight of the emperor they were unable to argue further. Their collective opposition collapsed as it were. PM Suzuiki took the opportunity to record it as a vote & imeadiatly composed verbal and written orders to execute a surrender. He included the emperors opinion in these making it impossible for legitimate opposition to muster further obstruction. In legal terms the 'orders' came from Suzuki as the emperor had not given a order per se, just a firm opinion that was interpreted as a privileged vote.

The Japanese language has considerable differences in nuance with English but this is the general interpretation from folks who have actually read the minutes of the cabinet meetings and observations from those who attended.
 
A temporary visit by a larger fleet may be sufficient. The Pearl Harbor ambush scenario costs IJN its fleet carriers, but not its battleships; if the U.S. sends a large force to the Philippines, the Japanese may decide that sending out the battleships to intercept for the long-planned decisive battle is the way to go. Many did not believe at this point that carriers would be critical to a major fleet engagement, but of course in fact the presence of U.S. carriers and absence of Japanese carriers would make a huge difference, possibly resulting in a near total wipeout of the Japanese battleships as well. And if the IJN has virtually no capital ships at all left, the U.S. doesn't need a very big force at Manila, and can pull back those ships that it can't adequately keep supplied in such a forward position.

The problem for the US Pacific Fleet in 1942 or 1932, is the Japanese fleet was based at Truk not Japan for a Pacific war. This gave them a huge advantage for any US fleet trying to cross the Pacific to PI. While the BB & cruisers can make it on one tank of gas thats at nominal cursing speed. At battle speeds the fuel state reached effectively empty less than half way. The Japanese have their gas station directly at hand. The USN gamed this out repeatedly in the 1920s &n 1930s & any attempt to rush the Japanese to reach the Phillipines failed, either on the map exercises or in fleet exercises at sea. If the US fleet takes the long way round via Australia & DEI the Japanese can drop back and intercept between the DEI & PI & still have the advantage.

The other problem is once the Pacific Fleet reaches PI and makes its raid, the prewar fuel stocks at Manilia are dangerously low. So, either the fleet must depart, or depend on a lot of oil tankers to get through. Singapore is a option for long term refueling. It does lack US ammunition and spare parts. OTL it took 6 months for the USN to build up a forward fleet base at Wellington NZ, and that was still too small for the entire Pacific fleet.
 
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