It however would have faced a greater submarine threat, going by that. And that would have made a proper buildup harder.
Earliest possible Allied victory?
- Thread starter Orko
- Start date
I think an Allied victory in December 1944 is possible if the Russians keep going after Bagration instead of the halt in Poland before Warsaw and the various Balkan diversions. The German Army in the East needed to be put back together again and was badly disorganized before that pause allowed for the spearheads in the Carpathians to be beaten back
If you pair that with an Allied attack on Holland and then across the North German plain that uses a conventional motorized assault over open ground, amphibious assaults over the Rhine, and then starting up again using tanks and motorized forces (essentially, what was done in March 1945), you can even with supply problems get an offensive over the Rhine that has momentum and can lead to a general German collapse. The Volksturm and Naval/Reserve units had not yet been mobilized and Germany's defenses were very weak in Northern Germany
The easiest answer here however is a successful July 20 plot and a surrender by the General Staff. The Allies will need to move in quickly to disarm the party organizations from taking back control, though
If you pair that with an Allied attack on Holland and then across the North German plain that uses a conventional motorized assault over open ground, amphibious assaults over the Rhine, and then starting up again using tanks and motorized forces (essentially, what was done in March 1945), you can even with supply problems get an offensive over the Rhine that has momentum and can lead to a general German collapse. The Volksturm and Naval/Reserve units had not yet been mobilized and Germany's defenses were very weak in Northern Germany
The easiest answer here however is a successful July 20 plot and a surrender by the General Staff. The Allies will need to move in quickly to disarm the party organizations from taking back control, though
I did a calculation on the cost in cargo shipping to feed and otherwise maintain the 'liberated' Italian population 43-45. It turned out to not be trivial. Cost of sustaining several corps or a army in terms of cargo capacity. Mostly for essentials like grain and coal. Then some medical supplies, clothing, ect...which was fairly trivia. The grain sent included fodder for the farm animals. Slaughtering those enmass would have further wrecked the liberated regions economy, thus requiring more imports of food.
Wonder what it would have cost the Germans Had the Allies just sat of Sicilly, Sardinia, Corsica and waved?
From Ellis 'Brute Force' the average Luftwaffe operational strength fluctuated between 6500 & 5000 total from all fronts. The US alone had over 4000 operational aircraft in the ETO/MTO mid 1943. The Brits & Red air force together exceeded that. Compounding the problem was all three were able to replace losses of both airframes and aircrew at rates higher than their average combat and operating loss rates. The Germans could maintain a 5000+ operating strength of aircraft by reducing production of twin engine models in favor of single engined, and by cutting corners on quality. That latter kept up the delivery of accepted aircraft, but increased mechanical losses down the line. Closer to the core the Germans had to reduce training time to keep up front line squadron strength. By early 1943 the German student pilots flight hours had fallen to 200. The US rookie had 240+ & the RAF student was getting close to 300 hours. By the end of 1943 the disparity in training was near 2-1 in favor of the RAF & US pilot.
Ike & everyone else commanding these operations considered them risky & sweated the possibility of defeat. With hindsight we can see how the several amphib ops were over insured & few or none in any danger.
Post war estimates place Italy as at its peak possessing 7% of the global war making capacity. The US & Britain together controlled close to half at their peak.
Air support depended mostly on Sardinia and Corsica. The actual logistics base for Op DRAGOON was Algiers. Naples & the minor Italian ports were at capacity supporting the Allied 5th & 8th Armies. The US divisions used embarked from the Italian ports, but their follow up and supply tail went to Africa. Or directly to the US after the lodgment /port was established. That applied to the French corps as well, tho some small support came from Corsica. This was pretty much the plan for the ANVIL operation as well. South Italy as the primary base in early 1944 was too inefficient.
Depends on what area you are landing at. In 1942 the Brits wrote a plan for landing on the east coast of the Cotintien peninsula, knowing it was sheltered from the autumn westerlies & had extended periods of calm water off shore. The specific site selected for this landing was at the village of Madiline, just a kilometer or two from the initial assault on UTAH Beach twenty months later.
Certainly not the size of the overall OVERLORD operation/s Trying to accomplish the same strategic objectives, or worse the spectacular historical events is unreal. A sensible objective is to build up a largish army group over the winter, then start a spring offensive, with supporting landings elsewhere. Seizing the Bereton or Cotintien peninsula in the summer or autumn of 1943 is not beyond reason. Once the essential ports are secured then the amphib fleet is free for use elsewhere. Further ops in Med aimed at a eventual landing in the south of France. & diverting the German elsewhere would be practical. In the spring or summer a new landing in the NW to further confound the Germans.
Starting your April 1944 campaign in France with a army group already ashore and the option of landing elsewhere with more armies makes things difficult for the defense.
A close look at Op JUBILEE shows the Brits were leaving out everything they had practiced in 300-400 previous years of their littoral warfare or amphib ops. It looks even worse when you compare the JUBILEE plan to the previous RUTTER plan. Montbattens original plan looked a lot more like success or something written up by people who had actually thought it through.
Only what are the Germans going to be doing during that winter?
Also when you mean build up, do you mean slowly over time? That's just feeding your initial force piece by piece into a fight (and there will be fighting because no matter what there's no way the Germans will let the allies establish a foothold like this). That's not very good way to run a seaborne invasion.
Given how the weather window was crucially important for D-Day I don't think Madiline is going to be suddenly immune from that if it's only a km or two away from UTAH?
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Ok but you still need to take Italy to take and keep Sardinia and Corsica as base of operations right? And do you fancy running logistics to the south of France from Algeria if Italy isn't taken?
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The Red Army did launch a series of major operation in 1943. Their defense or counter offensive at Kursk was not trivial. By the end of the year they were well on the way to recovering the prime agricultural region of the Ukraine. The Germans did not have a option for shifting reserves from the east to the west in 1943. They were to hard pressed. Their strategic reserve such as it was that summer or autumn was in Italy, the 10th Army. OTL the Allies were successful at dispersing German reserves with their Deception & Masckrova operations. We might assume that does not change.
Not really that much of a joke (as per the rest of the link) and it was only after devoting an immense amount of time and resources, they had what they had. And even then harbours were still an issue until Antwerp
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This is a pretty good idea IMO. Stalin's screwing-over of the Warsaw Uprising allowed the Germans precious time to regroup and certainly extended the war. A less evil leader launching a supporting strike right as Warsaw goes up in revolt would force the German rout to continue.
Well they did run the Logistics for Op DRAGOON from Algeria & the US OTL. The Italian ports were to near capacity OTL & required a lot of rebuilding. Algiers had been a major port before the war, was undamaged, and had improvements since captured in Nov 1942. Ditto for the other African ports like Oran & Bone. Bizarre & Tunis had been badly damaged which is why they were not depended on for Op HUSKY. For that the 8th Army embarked & was based from Alexandria (except eat Canadians who embarked in the UK). The US 7th Army was based in Algeria, tho the 45th Inf Div originally embarked in the US.
Only they had already invaded Italy a year earlier and were at the Gothic line by that point OTL. The context here was not doing Italy