Earlier Soviet invasion of Manchuria?

One thing I've always wondered is the Stalin's delay for operation August Storm during the Second World War. I wonder what's the earliest possible date for Soviet invasion of Japanese Asian mainland territories and what effects it could have?

My gut instinct is that an invasion already in August 1944, after loss of Marianas, defeat of IJN carrier force and when sub warfare was starting to have real strangling effect on Japanese economy, would have been well feasible. While it would have been a bloodier affair than OTL operation, casualties were not exactly Stalin's concern. Soviet forces already in place were more than ample to conquer Japanese possessions on mainland.

This would have risked distruption of trans-pacific Lend Lease route for some months, but there would have been real benefits for Soviet Union. First, control of Northern China would have been assured and China could be held under tighter leash in the future. Second, all of Korean peninsula clould be puppetized by Stalin. Third, and most importantly, Soviets would definitely get an occupation zone in Japan.

I wonder if this has been discussed before?
 
August 1944 is right on the heels of Bagration, which was massive by itself. Switching large numbers of well equiped forces and logistic support to Siberia when Germany was still a going concern makes no sense. It would only weaken Soviet forces and limit their operations stalin was no fool, he properly judged the situation.

Besides, it's not as if there was a rush to defeat Japan, US were still far away, unlike in Europe where they were much closer to Germany.
 
August 1944 is right on the heels of Bagration, which was massive by itself. Switching large numbers of well equiped forces and logistic support to Siberia when Germany was still a going concern makes no sense. It would only weaken Soviet forces and limit their operations stalin was no fool, he properly judged the situation.

The opponent of Soviet forces in Far East, the Kwantung Army, by August 1944 was already a hollow force and there's likely to be no need of additional forces for offensive which can be executed by the forces already in place. While it would be a set-piece fight instead of smooth blitzkrieg of OTL it's still, like OTL, be a guaranteed victory.
 
The opponent of Soviet forces in Far East, the Kwantung Army, by August 1944 was already a hollow force and there's likely to be no need of additional forces for offensive which can be executed by the forces already in place. While it would be a set-piece fight instead of smooth blitzkrieg of OTL it's still, like OTL, be a guaranteed victory.

Supplies? Commanders? Air support?

Again, why bother? Americans were still far away and not likely to come a-knocking any time soon so why go to troubles with opening a second front? And by not supporting it fully, as they did OTL, they don't really gain anything they wouldn't gain later.
 
If Stalin decides to wage his own independent war in the Pacific, he risks the thing most important to him at that time - a working partnership with the West in creating the postwar world that legitimizes his conquests.

Stalin was certainly opportunistic and ruthless, but he placed a high value on cooperating with other great powers. In order to achieve his aims in Europe, which is far more important to him than Manchuria or the rest of Asia, he needs the US and UK to accept the Soviet position.

Invading Manchuria without consultation with the US and China basically tells the Western Allies that Stalin is not a reliable partner for the postwar period. It sends alarm bells all over the place. Yalta Conference would be very different. Red Army POWs and Vlasov's Army won't be turned over if they want to stay in the West. The Polish government in exile might be better supported. The US and UK might quickly agree to Bulgaria entering the war as an Ally so that the Red Army can't enter the country, and the Bulgarian government never becomes dominated by Communists.

Hell, a Soviet Union that does whatever it wants in August 1944 might even impact the US Presidential election. While its hard to see Dewey winning, it does become a possibility. It will also change the disposition of FDR's cabinet early on, and the US might begin actively planning for a more confrontational stance while the war is raging.
 

katchen

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Could Roosevelt and Eisenhower have held back General Patton and General Devers from going to Berlin in 1944 and ending the European war "too soon" because they did not have the Yalta Agreement with Russia in place yet? Devers WAS held back in late November -early December 1944 when his 5th Army could have crossed the Rhine, gone into Bavaria and thence Berlin and prevented the Battle of theBulge. But that would have freed up Russia to attack in the Pacific.

It is entirely possible that an early Russian attack on Japan would have vindicated Churchill's warnings about Russia, perhaps even leading to a separate peace with Nazi Germany. Remember, there was a big faction in the United States that had been sympathetic to Nazi Germany prior to WWII that included such people as Senator Prescott Bush (Bush Sr.'s father, who's Union National Bank dealt extensively with Nazi Germany). It was Japan that had attacked the US, not Germany. This faction was centered in the Republican Party, with Roosevelt's coalition for the war as fought being Northern Liberal Democrats--and strangely enough, Southern conservative Democrats. Concern over Russian move could well have played into a push for a CONDITIONAL surrender with Nazi Germany and war with the USSR. I believe that it could go that far, especially if the Republicans won the 1944 election. And I believe that Stalin feared it could go that far too, which is why he waited as long as he did to open up a pacific front against Japan and settled for relatively modest gains.
 
If Stalin decides to wage his own independent war in the Pacific, he risks the thing most important to him at that time - a working partnership with the West in creating the postwar world that legitimizes his conquests.

Stalin was certainly opportunistic and ruthless, but he placed a high value on cooperating with other great powers. In order to achieve his aims in Europe, which is far more important to him than Manchuria or the rest of Asia, he needs the US and UK to accept the Soviet position.

Invading Manchuria without consultation with the US and China basically tells the Western Allies that Stalin is not a reliable partner for the postwar period. It sends alarm bells all over the place. Yalta Conference would be very different. Red Army POWs and Vlasov's Army won't be turned over if they want to stay in the West. The Polish government in exile might be better supported. The US and UK might quickly agree to Bulgaria entering the war as an Ally so that the Red Army can't enter the country, and the Bulgarian government never becomes dominated by Communists.

Hell, a Soviet Union that does whatever it wants in August 1944 might even impact the US Presidential election. While its hard to see Dewey winning, it does become a possibility. It will also change the disposition of FDR's cabinet early on, and the US might begin actively planning for a more confrontational stance while the war is raging.
Considering that the Western Allies gave the Soviet Union huge concessions to get them to enter the war against Japan in 1945, after Germany was defeated, it makes no sense whatsoever for them to be opposed or alarmed at such an invasion. In fact, this will substantially improve relations as the Soviets are helping them shorten the war in Japan. Not to mention that this would limit the territory the Soviets could capture in Europe.
Bulgaria joining the Western allies requires an invasion of Greece - a mostly pointless endeavor which had little backing by the allies.
Of course, with the war seemingly ending quicker, FDR will probablt be reelected by an even larger margin.
As for the Soviet POW's and especially Vlasov's army, such an event is unlikely to change the main reason they were handed over - if the Western Allies refuse to hand over Soviet prisoners, Stalin will not hand over Western prisoners.
 
If Stalin decides to wage his own independent war in the Pacific, he risks the thing most important to him at that time - a working partnership with the West in creating the postwar world that legitimizes his conquests.

In OTL the Western Allies were making concessions towards USSR in order to get Stalin to attack Japan. USN was in process of giving Soviet Union significant amphibious capability in order for Soviets to participate in invasion of Japan.

I don't understand why this would in any way risk Stalin's popularity within US/UK leadership. Most likely this would be a huge popularity boost. As for effects on the European theater I don't see any impact. Enough forces in the Far East were already in place and their participation would not have any really significant effect on the European war whatsoever.
 
In OTL the Western Allies were making concessions towards USSR in order to get Stalin to attack Japan. USN was in process of giving Soviet Union significant amphibious capability in order for Soviets to participate in invasion of Japan.

Do you have any sources for that? Because i find that highly unlikely.
 
Do you have any sources for that? Because i find that highly unlikely.

For quick link, check Project Hula

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Hula

"As the plan was finalized, the United States was to transfer 180 ships – 30 Tacoma-class patrol frigates (U.S. Navy hull classification symbol PF), 24 Admirable-class minesweepers (AM), 36 auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS), 30 large infantry landing craft (LCI(L)), 56 submarine chasers (SC), and four floating workshops (YR) – to the Soviet Union by 1 November 1945, training about 15,000 Soviet Navy personnel to operate them."

This was, of course, in addition to Soviet Pacific Fleet which was not an inconsiderable force in it's own right. An earlier involvement of Soviet Union in the Pacific War would likely involve more significant naval lend-lease.

As for pressing the Soviets to join Pacific war, this was pressed by UK and US already in Tehran conference of 1943. Roosevelt was not fighting the Cold War.
 
For quick link, check Project Hula

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Project_Hula

"As the plan was finalized, the United States was to transfer 180 ships – 30 Tacoma-class patrol frigates (U.S. Navy hull classification symbol PF), 24 Admirable-class minesweepers (AM), 36 auxiliary motor minesweepers (YMS), 30 large infantry landing craft (LCI(L)), 56 submarine chasers (SC), and four floating workshops (YR) – to the Soviet Union by 1 November 1945, training about 15,000 Soviet Navy personnel to operate them."

This was, of course, in addition to Soviet Pacific Fleet which was not an inconsiderable force in it's own right. An earlier involvement of Soviet Union in the Pacific War would likely involve more significant naval lend-lease.

As for pressing the Soviets to join Pacific war, this was pressed by UK and US already in Tehran conference of 1943. Roosevelt was not fighting the Cold War.

Okay, well when you said in your last past "USN was in process of giving Soviet Union significant amphibious capability in order for Soviets to participate in invasion of Japan." I found it highly unlikely the Americans would give the USSR the capability to invade Japan itself(which wouldl most likely be Hokkaido island). But operation Hula hardly gives the USSR the means to launch an invasion on the home islands but looks rather more like a formality to ensure Stalin would have no choice but to keep to his word and attack 3 months after Germany surrendered.
I don't think the Soviet union would have had enough ships even with Operation Hula to invade Hokkaido island. and without the Operation Hula ships the Soviet Union was capable enough to invade Sakhalin island so they didn't get them for that purpose.

The USA would not want the Soviets to land on the Japanese home islands. Or even threathen to do so. Therefor an earlier invasion of Manchuria and Soviet ability to attack the Home Islands by air and sea would not make the Stalin more popular among the Western allies.

BTW, i don't know the status of Hokkaido island in 1945 but i suspect it was heavily fortified and invasion wouldn't have been easy. I think a small Soviet invasion force by sea would have been suicide.
 
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