Could an earlier second front have been opened up in Europe? Where and when could it have taken place?
I suspect this may have been asked before, but I'm curious anyway.
I suspect this may have been asked before, but I'm curious anyway.
Earlier Second Front in WW2
- Thread starter Willmatron
- Start date
Look up Operation Sledgehammer, now it wouldn't have worked for very long, but its a second front.
Possibly launched instead of the Italian campaign. A landing site in the Cherbourg Peninsular would likely be sealed off too easily. A landing in Southern France would have the rik of a still active Axis Italy and German units hitting from the right flank. The most likely landing would be in the Pas de Calais. 9th and 10th SS were forming here in the summer/autumn of 1943 though they were only partly trained and lacked experience. However Allied troops woould have lacked training and battle experience as well. And the Allies would not have had the Mulburrey Harbours and other specialised equipment. TheGermans would have been able to redeploy most or all of the units they deployed to Italy in OTL.
A landing in France in ' 43 without Pluto, mulberries or hobarts funnies, or overwhelming air superiority, is going to have really have a really tough time. Otoh, the German defenses arent nearly as strong.
My guess is that they hold, but are basically held to a slowly expanding pocket for the first several months, as logistics will totally suck until they take and repair a major harbour.
Even then, the balance of forces will favour the allies way less than in '44.
My guess is the US has to expand its army beyond the 99 divisions of otl, and that the Rhine is reached sooner than otl .. but not by much.
American casualties will be much, much hiigher than otl.
My guess is that they hold, but are basically held to a slowly expanding pocket for the first several months, as logistics will totally suck until they take and repair a major harbour.
Even then, the balance of forces will favour the allies way less than in '44.
My guess is the US has to expand its army beyond the 99 divisions of otl, and that the Rhine is reached sooner than otl .. but not by much.
American casualties will be much, much hiigher than otl.
If anything that would probably be self defeating for the Allies, the Germans garrisoned Norway with something like 300,000 troops so the Allies would have to fight through them. It might get you some airfields closer to eastern Germany and Central Europe but on balance I think you're better off leaving those 300,000 guys sitting out the war doing nothing but eating up resources whilst you get on with the main job of invading the European mainland.
Well this is 1943. The Allies still have not totally won the UBoat war yet and the Soviets are in dire need of supplies. Securing Northern Norway secures the route to the Soviets. That's what I had in mind.
There's always the Frisian Islands 
On a more serious note, getting into Europe via Greece could be another option. The Soviets wanted a Second Front to ease off the pressure the Germans were putting them on Soviet soil. What more better way to divert troops from the Eastern Front than an Allied drive through the Balkans? This could possibly happen around immediately after Monty secures Africa. I'm sure Churchill had entertained this idea sometime during the war.
Only problem is that it's a much more longer and troublesome route to Berlin. Also, think of the post-war consequences. There's a chance that the whole of Germany and parts of France and Italy might fall under Soviet influence.
The Soviets have the Persian Corridor. Getting supplies shouldn't be a problem unless the amount of it coming through Iran is not much.
On a more serious note, getting into Europe via Greece could be another option. The Soviets wanted a Second Front to ease off the pressure the Germans were putting them on Soviet soil. What more better way to divert troops from the Eastern Front than an Allied drive through the Balkans? This could possibly happen around immediately after Monty secures Africa. I'm sure Churchill had entertained this idea sometime during the war.
Only problem is that it's a much more longer and troublesome route to Berlin. Also, think of the post-war consequences. There's a chance that the whole of Germany and parts of France and Italy might fall under Soviet influence.
The Soviets have the Persian Corridor. Getting supplies shouldn't be a problem unless the amount of it coming through Iran is not much.
How many Poles were there to form divisions? And how many French Colonial troops? Many of the U.S. troops were held back in the US to reduce the strain they would put on the logistics system until they were needed.
A big concern would be the strength of the Luftwaffe if there was an earlier invasion. The big push in early '44 was to reduce the strength of Luftwaffe forces in France by destroying support structure in Germany and forcing them to pull units back to defend the home front. The Uboats had to be defeated to allow Atlantic convoys to bring enough excess supplies and equipment to build up for the invasion
You'd need the following butterflies. One, no war with Japan; two, France fights on from North Africa from the get-go; three, the North African shore free of Axis troops by early 1941 (no Rommel); four, Hitler provocation in the Atlantic and declaration of war brings the U.S. into the fight in mid-1941; five, a speeded up massive response to the U-boats; six, earlier use of fighter escorts with extra fuel tanks to accompany U.S. bombers over Europe; seven, U.S. troops overcome their greenness in war in Italy in mid-1942, not in 1943. This might, marginally, make a 1943 invasion of Northern France possible, although it would be a lot bloodier for the Allies than in OTL. I'm not sure it would succeed. Ike as Supreme Commander would be essential, but with Wavell involved in planning on highest level and Harold Alexander as ground commander instead of Monty.
Have followed this one in six or seen seperate discussions. Always interesting.
Much of that actually existed. The floating docks had been designed in 1942 and tested in January 1943. The concrete breakwaters as well. Other items like the pierced steel planks used to pave the roadways off the beach or the DUKW amphib trucks were already in use from late 1942 or earlier. The bulk of the construction and preperation of the Mulberry harbor parts was accomplished in about four months from January 1994 to May. If the invaders wanted a prefabricated harbor and effective over the beach supply badly enough they could have had that. Note that the supply of two armies in Sicilly was accomplished across the beach for the better part of four weeks.
Certainly the Axis or Germans would not have that. For 1943 German aircraft production was 23,372 (Italian for 1942 was 2,739) of all types & combat models was 18,853. The Germans started 1943 with 3,443 operable front line combat aircraft, raised that to just over 5,000 by June, and ended the year with 4,667. The Italians started 1943 with a bit less than 1,000 operable combat aircraft, not all 'front line'.
Allied production for the year was: USSR 29,8841 combat models; US 53,343; UK 18,455.
Year start (In ETO/Med) was USSR 3,088; US <2,000; UK 5,257
June 1943: USSR 8,290; US 6,586; UK 6,026
December: USSR 8,500; US 11,917; UK 6,646
(Numbers are from John Ellis s 'Brute Force' Tables 41 & 42)
Obviously this is not the sort of overwhelming air superiority the Allies had in 1944, tho as Tybaults line went "Tis not as wide as a church door nor deep as a well, but twill do."
From memory there were four German infantry divisions defending Normandy in the summer of 1943. One just late from the Russian front. In June 1944 there were at least five infantry and two armored in arms reach of the Normandy beaches.
Against the opposition of 1944 it took about three weeks to clear the Cotientin and secure Cherbourg. I agree there would be no spectacular breakout as in 1944, but then no one expected it then either. France was suposed to not be cleared in less than 220 days, vs the 90 days it actually took.
One of the arguments that emerges in this discussions is exactly what each side at hand. Absent the US forces from the Med and the Brit 1st Army It is not overly optimistic to think the Allies might have a army group of fifteen divisions ashore in a month. What else arrives depends on how well the Allies organize their cargo shipping for this campaign.
In all these discussions of the 1942 invasion (or its 1942 counterpart) I've found a marked lack of understanding of the actual air and ground forces available to each side, and their effectiveness. I know I've learned a lot of suprising things when investigating the actual numbers deployed to one location or another.
Much of that actually existed. The floating docks had been designed in 1942 and tested in January 1943. The concrete breakwaters as well. Other items like the pierced steel planks used to pave the roadways off the beach or the DUKW amphib trucks were already in use from late 1942 or earlier. The bulk of the construction and preperation of the Mulberry harbor parts was accomplished in about four months from January 1994 to May. If the invaders wanted a prefabricated harbor and effective over the beach supply badly enough they could have had that. Note that the supply of two armies in Sicilly was accomplished across the beach for the better part of four weeks.
Certainly the Axis or Germans would not have that. For 1943 German aircraft production was 23,372 (Italian for 1942 was 2,739) of all types & combat models was 18,853. The Germans started 1943 with 3,443 operable front line combat aircraft, raised that to just over 5,000 by June, and ended the year with 4,667. The Italians started 1943 with a bit less than 1,000 operable combat aircraft, not all 'front line'.
Allied production for the year was: USSR 29,8841 combat models; US 53,343; UK 18,455.
Year start (In ETO/Med) was USSR 3,088; US <2,000; UK 5,257
June 1943: USSR 8,290; US 6,586; UK 6,026
December: USSR 8,500; US 11,917; UK 6,646
(Numbers are from John Ellis s 'Brute Force' Tables 41 & 42)
Obviously this is not the sort of overwhelming air superiority the Allies had in 1944, tho as Tybaults line went "Tis not as wide as a church door nor deep as a well, but twill do."
From memory there were four German infantry divisions defending Normandy in the summer of 1943. One just late from the Russian front. In June 1944 there were at least five infantry and two armored in arms reach of the Normandy beaches.
Against the opposition of 1944 it took about three weeks to clear the Cotientin and secure Cherbourg. I agree there would be no spectacular breakout as in 1944, but then no one expected it then either. France was suposed to not be cleared in less than 220 days, vs the 90 days it actually took.
One of the arguments that emerges in this discussions is exactly what each side at hand. Absent the US forces from the Med and the Brit 1st Army It is not overly optimistic to think the Allies might have a army group of fifteen divisions ashore in a month. What else arrives depends on how well the Allies organize their cargo shipping for this campaign.
In all these discussions of the 1942 invasion (or its 1942 counterpart) I've found a marked lack of understanding of the actual air and ground forces available to each side, and their effectiveness. I know I've learned a lot of suprising things when investigating the actual numbers deployed to one location or another.
A quarter of the total aid to Russia was delivered through the Arctic convoys. That is a considerable amount. Given that the Arctic convoys also represented the shortest route for supplies to the Soviet Union, one cannot substitute them by dimply enlarging the aid given through the Persian corridor and/or the Pacific shipping. Please bear in mind port&rail capacity in Persia is not unlimited.
If the success of the Arctic convoys is in jeopardx, the Allies may have to find a way to secure their safety by invading Northern Norway. I don't see a land campaign in Norway accumulating. But invading Norway would tie down Nazi troops, cause attrition to the Luftwaffe and eliminate the Kriegsmarine surface fleet (by provoking it to act). Furthermore Swedish iron ore shipments to Germany can be contested by such a move.
A good POD to cause a Norwegian operation to be considered, would be to have a couple of more of Allied convoys being destroyed like in 1942, the way it happened to PQ-17.
That's a worse idea than invading Italy.OKH_1946 said:
Have you looked at the geography of the outlets? The Germans could block the routes out with a couple of brigades scattered on the passes.
I don't have the link offhand (as usualbsmart said:
). There's a site I've seen analysing the numbers, so you might try Google (or site search, since I saw it here).That was actually a lot easier than it looked OTL. The Brits managed to do it the hard way. (Here, I will trot out my favorite chestnut, more *VLR Stirlings in Newfoundland in '40.bsmart said:
) Had there been more RCAF CC Stirlings (which RAF BC claimed were inadequate for bombing Germany), defeating the U-boat would have been possible much sooner, which enables faster buildup in Britain, enough to counter the OTL weakness.Beneficial, but not essential.Alien and Sedition Bat said:
As noted, not: just more *VLRs.Alien and Sedition Bat said:
Beneficial, but not essential. Simply change the offensive from city bombing to river/canal minelaying & canal/railyard bombing.Alien and Sedition Bat said:
Seeing Wavell's efforts to reform British Army training in Africa, to more closely resemble German's combined arms approach, I'd far rather he be in Monty's OTL place. (That requires he not get fired & sent to British Siberia...Alien and Sedition Bat said:
)Nothing like the same degree of fortification & mining as OTL June '44, all thanks to Rommel.Carl Schwamberger said:
TTL, it would probably not be as stiff.Carl Schwamberger said:
One thing's for sure: there'd be no 21. Pz in Caen to bugger things up.
And without the Italian Campaign, there'd be experienced Canadians in 1st Army, instead of relatively green ones, which means the attacks at Caen & Falaise would go off better.
I'm far less sure there wouldn't.Carl Schwamberger said:
These figures are for 44-45 so would have to be reduced slightly but from memory not by much ... and if the Russians were a little more cooperative and allowed more Poles to leave captivity it might swell even further
... in total by July 1945 the ranks of the Polish contingent had swelled from 195,000 ground troops to just short of 230,000. Enough to man approx. 11-12 divisions. In addition they operated 27 warships including 2 Cruisers, 9 Destroyers and 5 Subs + numerous smaller craft. Then there were the Polish RAF squadrons 4 bomber squadrons and 8 fighter squadrons plus flights attached to other units.
For comparison: The US /French military aid agreement of 1943 was based on a French ground force of 240,000 men divided into five US style infantry & two armored divisions, plus corps overhead & one army HQ. The French also stood up some air wings from other manpower & US aid, and other infantry/mech units out of their own resources in the colonies or captured German kit.
Poles
Personal history there was a lot of post war bickering between polish armoured and other formation vets and descendants based on the armoured guys finding replacements from ost battalions in Normandy.
Personal history there was a lot of post war bickering between polish armoured and other formation vets and descendants based on the armoured guys finding replacements from ost battalions in Normandy.