Earlier ICBM for US

Shevek23 wrote:
In order to get a substantial jump on the operational date of USA's first missile, I would suggest a dual POD. One element is that indeed the MX-774 program is funded and extended without hiatus. However glancing at the history the OP provides, which is backed up by others such as at Encyclopedia Astronautica, it seems to me that Convair actually lost little time in the gap, which was not more than 3 years before the program leading to OTL Atlas was authorized, by 1951 in fact. In the three years between the tests of the 3 HIROC models that were the outcome of MX-774 and the Air Force's renewal of the development contract, Convair continued to work privately on the ICBM concept. Furthermore in 1955 Atlas was given top priority; perhaps if it had that from 1951 it might have gotten to the various stages of development somewhat earlier, but vice versa this does suggest that overall it was being pushed nearly as fast as possible all along. Considering how rapidly relevant state of the art, in rocket engines and in control electronics, was advancing that decade, we might question whether it was possible to push success many years farther back. And indeed as late as the Mercury orbital phase in 1961 and '62, the Atlas boosters available to NASA were still somewhat prone to failure! Eventually they became quite reliable indeed, but bear in mind that the first "operational" Atlas base at Vandenberg was rushed into service for political reasons in the wake of Sputnik, and was not actually operational for some time after that.

More than one POD may in fact be required as it wasn't "just" the funding/support hiatus that was an issue but the initial decision to concentrate on air-breathing "cruise" missiles as a "logical" extension of existing manned aircraft as the most 'near-term' missile type. On top of that was the propellant debate of "operational-versus-efficient" for missiles, and the question if along with everything else being 'accelerated' does Parsons cast-able-double-base solid propellant breakthrough come earlier as well? Guidance and Control, (GnC, or G&C depending on how terminological you want to get :) ) was primitive and though for some reason it was expected that development and production of GnC for cruise missiles would be more 'near-term' ICBM GnC was just about as tough in the short term to develop. And while continued funding and support would have undercut the rivalry for the same within the Air Force it might be questionable that this would lead directly to a more vigorous overall support for ICBM development. While the ICBM had advocates both in and out of the Air Force they were not in positions of power prior to around 1953 to where they could 'force' a compromise and get development started. (Even then it took to 1955 and pretty much and act of Congress/the President to get the program going as an actual, rather than just paper, priority)

"A" primary POD would be having Von Karman finding much more validity to ballistic missiles as a 'near-term' weapons system. As it was in "Towards New Horizons" he had MUCH more faith in 1) Manned Supersonic Bombers, 2) Air Breathing Supersonic Cruise Missiles (as an adaption/extension of the same technology) and finally while admitting the Ballistic Missile could be the most important weapon he ranked it last because he felt development of the various required elements, (propulsion, airframe, GnC and support systems) would be protracted and lengthy compared to the first two weapons systems.

Our hind-sight would tend to say that's wrong but given the actual operational 'utility' of a Big-Atlas, (required if we don't assume as rapid an advance for atomic and H-bomb research which technically never lost support or funding along the way but did suffer several set-backs and wrong turns along the way) was minimal and would have filled an 'operational' role very similar to the Russian R7 missile with just about as rapid a phase out and short service life. And then there's the question of would TTL followed OTL with an earlier history? While innovative the pressure supported design wasn't widely accepted which is why Martin was given the go-ahead to begin the design process on what became the Titan as a back-up. More so we can also look at the fact that two other "main" players were not involved in ballistic missile design ONLY because they were already pursuing "higher priority" work on intercontinental CRUISE missiles instead! (North American and the Navaho and Northrop and the Snark) And in Boeing's case they had both the BOMARC, and the B-47/52 in or going into production and no spare capacity...

Change up the priorities and support and the US main ICBMs could easily have been based on something totally different!

By the way the idea that earlier success with a more or less functional ICBM would buy more time for early Space Race launches to be on better shaken down, more reliable vehicles assumes that the Space Race itself would not be pushed forward by that very success! OTL, after all, the Soviets launched Sputnik pretty much as soon as they could; fortunately it was the International Geophysical Year, which would not be the case earlier, and Sputnik flew in the context of American boasting about its plans to launch Vanguard in the course of that 18 month "year." But if in fact either the USA or USSR had an ICBM of R-7 or OTL Atlas capabilities operational, why doubt that they would follow through, within a year or so at latest, with a satellite launch? If the USA did it first, very possibly there would be no "Space Race," or something called that perhaps might be a leisurely and gentlemanly affair compared to the US panic at Soviet successes of OTL. Many people then suggest that without Sputnik/Vostok panic, causing Kennedy to set a self-imposed deadline for a crewed Lunar mission, the US program would develop methodically and sustainably, on a modest but solid budget constraining the program to build carefully and that at some point this ATL would overtake our overall accomplishments OTL, for we are allegedly severely damaged by NASA developing a dysfunctional institutional culture, poisoned and spoiled by the Apollo glory days.

Unless you change the 'politics' (who's President at the time) Ike is going to delay launching a US satellite and he's going to still go with the Navy "Vanguard" program as it was a very integral part of his policy to AVOID confrontation with the USSR where he could.

And specifically he was against turning "space" into another battleground which made no sense to just about anyone else as it was pretty clear the USSR didn't have any such idea. Vanguard was clearly not a weapons platform and as clearly had little "utility" as either a missile or a satellite launcher and Eisenhower was adamant that the US maintain that posture.

From there it's arguable that if Vanguard had been ready first if he would have found other ways, (he'd already significantly slowed and hindered the program by withholding support and funding) to delay an actual launch so the Soviets would be first. (For the given reasons of avoiding political or territorial protests having the Soviets launch first makes all sorts of sense as they can't protest what they are already doing. And there is a very real possibility that the USSR backed into a corner will push the right to 'engage and destroy' overflying spacecraft even if doing so heavily interferes with their own plans. There's a TL for you! A "space age" where everyone and anyone with the capability takes 'pot-shots' at overflying spacecraft and satellites. In order to get the most chance of a 'successful' overflight you need to launch from 'off-shore' with a "low" {just outside the atmosphere} and fast trajectory to get across before an intercept can be set up. That's an ugly set up :) )

A lot of the 'panic' could have been avoided with a successful US satellite launch soon after Sputnik. As it was the US had a string of 'failures' even after "Explorer 1" flew and topped off with the USSR putting the first man in orbit and the Kennedy "Lunar" goal is pretty much inevitable. Anything 'closer' and despite public and official pressure there would be a lot less support for a billions of dollars/short time table way to 'prove' the US is equal to or superior to the Russians.

Frankly assuming an R7 like booster available around the same time to the US and as long as any US 'response' is within a few months of a Russian "first" the level of 'panic' should remain fairly low key. Have an American be the first person in space, (Sheppard almost was) even if it was suborbital and while the USSR will publicly point out the 'difference' the public perception, especially in the US will be vastly different than OTL.

It is possible that if the TL goes on the tortoise strategy advocates will get their fanservice at last with some sort of space station program that evolves and never terminates, leading to sustainable and never ending Lunar missions maybe. But the plodding, which far from seeming sustainable to me seemed to stagnate and stumble all too plausibly, suggests to me that the more realistic expectation is that without something like Kennedy's panic, a slow and incremental sideline space program might simply deliver less. The idea that Apollo burned us out may be wrong; it may be that the high intensity took us to a high water mark that indeed we are dithering on surpassing, but perhaps without that surge, we'd be even farther behind.

Sputnik was the initial impetus to jump-starting the US space program and had the US not the USSR put a 'man-in-space' first it is likely the US would have stuck with Apollo being the follow on to Mercury and aimed at servicing and supporting a LEO space station with a planned upgrade program to give it circumlunar and/or lunar orbital capability by the mid-70s as was planned in 1959/60.

Using recoverable variants of the Saturn-1 booster to loft both Apollo missions and space station components the 'lead' would tend to switch back and forth between the super-powers over time and it's also possible that interest would wane over that same timeframe as the public lost interest. It's hard to see that happening though because even at its lowest the public 'interest' has been pretty high and costs spread over time tend to appear lower than they are. I suspect it WOULD appear 'stagnant' compared to OTL perception but that's again tainted by OTL Apollo program, and while it might even appear to be more vulnerable to political or public periods of active opposition the apparent cost and effort IS in fact going to be looking lower and more "sustainable" than anything during the Apollo era and probably more so than the Shuttle era as well.

"Surpassing?" At this point in time we seem to be dithering on even keeping the status-quo let alone equaling past achievements and there's an obvious reason for it in that we can't seem to imagine doing anything on any scale less than 'repeating Apollo'. And the sad part is the most recent "burst" of activity prior to the SpaceX ITS, (and that hasn't generated as much overall 'interest' as the previous plan) was based fully on the idea of "doing" Apollo again BECAUSE Apollo "worked" so well with some minor changes thrown in! It is hard to imagine that by the mid-to-late-70s with an Earth orbital infrastructure of stations and/or support that at least a joint mission to the Moon would be planned to happen. It would be the 'perfect' time for such a mission and while politics could derail it I would think it unlikely at that point. What is hard for most people OTL to imagine is NOT having the 'monster' boosters of the N1 or Saturn-V but in truth you really don't NEED them to have a viable orbital and beyond program.

As to what happens if the US accelerates their ICBM program I think it likely that the USSR would as well and most likely it would run into many of the issues it did OTL but it might NOT lead to the same outcomes. Then again the actual details might be 'worse' and/or 'better as well. Yangel almost died in the Nedelin disaster along with some other top engineers so what if they do so in TTL? For one thing it puts Korolev in a more secure position but also constrains him to develop militarily 'useful' rockets rather than "space launch" vehicles which might butterfly away the R7 as we know it. And don't forget several 'high level' politicians were there as well which could cause a re-thinking of the rush to get service. (Probably not but...)

The development of solid propellant is a under-reported history, (I have a paper in fact from a couple of years ago that points out that very issue, I'll see if I can find a link for it) but almost all who've studied it agree that they keys were the missed opportunities and research early on which had to be repeated and rediscovered mainly due to attitudes of secrecy and scorn for both researchers and research. Goddard, like the Wright brothers before him, was so insistent on patent rights and secrecy over recording and sharing knowledge that most of the work he'd done on solid propellant prior to WWII had to be re-invented by other researchers all over again. And this applied to much of his liquid propellant work as well.

I've mentioned the American general attitude towards "rocket" research in the early 20th century and it was for this reason Goddard actually shared MORE information with people outside the US than inside! That he feared patent and knowledge stealing from organizations and people inside the US was the main reason he did not work with or more closely with groups such as GALCIT or MIT. He simply didn't trust them to take his work as seriously as he felt they should and if they DID take it seriously he was afraid they were going to steal it...

In the end several things have to happen and while some are pretty basic and came early, like the discovery of double-base, castable propellant (1942 OTL with added developments during the war) and the adoption of the internal burning 'grain' booster (@1948-ish) some were very non-intuitive, (such as added aluminum which "common wisdom" and math had shown only worked up to 5% but really when much higher proportions and finer grain particles were used the ISP went through the roof but that wasn't found out empirically till the late 50s) and frankly were pretty much "hard work and a lot of luck" finds in the US and more so with the Soviets. (Again there's some evidence that a lot of this stuff was researched earlier but nothing came of them and the research was probably 'lost') Part of MX-774 was solid propellant and even with the Minuteman coming along in the late-50s getting it PRIOR to that point is probably not going to happen without some major early butterflies that just don't seem in the cards.
(Not the history I was looking for but here's one for solid propellant and Aerojet: file:///C:/Users/Randy%20Campbell/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/ADA406104.pdf)

On peroxide:
As you know this is one of my "peeves" as I don't think the stuff has gotten nearly the respect, (and that's actually part of the problem as it doesn't and therefore people tend to have accidents with it, sell below) it deserves as an oxidizer.

The problem with peroxide is it tends to decompose spontaneously or at least that's the observation. Truth is yes it does but less so at higher purities which being this is seen as "unstable" certain 'stabilizers' are added which dilute the H2O2. Get it 'low' enough (average below about 40%) and it stops decomposing for the most part. Thing is get it near "high test" levels, (over 90%) it ALSO pretty much stops decomposing, even more interesting is if you chill it to around 5 deg. C (41 deg. F) it also does not decompose. Note that decomposition is NOT an issue if you have a vented storage container. Outside storage of a vented 55 gallon drum of 90% H2O2 over 17 years resulted in a drop to @84% over the time period with no incidents. (The same facility stored another vented drum of 90% in "chilled" storage over the same 17 years and the drum last tested as 90.5% which is probably due to more accurate test instruments. But note there was NO degradation or decomposition)
(http://www.hydrogen-peroxide.us/history-US-General-Kinetics/AIAA-2005-4551_Long_Term_Storability_of_Hydrogen_Peroxide.pdf)

In the US especially H2O2 has a bad reputation and mostly it's the users fault. For example during WWII the US Army gave out a contract to a research organization, (my notes say GALCIT but I can't find my confirming citations and besides for those notes I "need" it to be them so take it with a grain of salt :) ) to test HTP as a propellant. As the R&D organization didn't WANT to get involved with HTP, (having a higher interest in solid propellant and their own liquid designs) they had built and installed on the Army test range an UNVENTED storage container for HTP and had it filled. Needless to say over the weekend the un-vented tank 'failed' to contain the "spontaneously decomposing" HTP by catastrophically having a structural failure and, so they explained to the Army, you see why you don't want to have anything to do with this stuff? Once German and later British results for HTP were examined some in the US again became interested in it as an oxidizer. And they were so confident that it's 'stability and reaction' issues were overblown they 'floated' several hundred pounds of it on a similar amount of kerosene to show how 'stable' it was. As they noted there were only a 'few' spots of mixing and ignition but it self-regulated so was not an problem. Till they tried it again several weeks later and it, (due to contamination, weather and other factors) self-ignited as soon as they started pouring! Well OBVIOUSLY it's all the HTPs fault!

And on and on of course. The thing is it has to be respected which LOX is (mostly because it's cryogenic) and hydrazine is, (because it's toxic) but we must admit that it also is a bit less efficient than LOX as well which is why it got a down-check for operational use. Couple that with the inability to store it for long periods of time, (again we know a bit more NOW but they didn't then) and as an 'operational' weapon propellant it's not much better than LOX. Some changes due to a specific POD and this might change...

Randy
 
Shevek23 wrote:
Here is where we need the POD that keeps the Air Force funding Convair's project despite the OTL factors that led to termination of the contract. Perhaps we overlooked the most obvious hurdle; President Truman is bogged in partisan gridlock, and he himself is not keen on upholding unnecessary expenses for Defense. The Air Force is already consuming a lot of money, while the Navy feels shortchanged, and relative to the Bomber Boys they are--but the Army is the service that has really been drastically cut back, down to just a tiny fraction of their WWII peak and yet burdened with tasks far exceeding those they had before war preparations began. The Army must maintain a substantial presence in Europe after all, since Germany is still under occupation, as is Japan. The draft continues, to draw in new young men so that older soldiers can go home and get out of it after their stint. But funds are tight, and Congress is controlled by Republicans hostile to Truman. Truman and the Democrats alone are hardly to blame exclusively for the frugal state the military is falling into; Republicans ideologically wish to cut back spending across the board, including the military. The big partisan fights are over whether to extend or even continue existing New Deal programs--Truman wants to expand them and fights hard to do it, but Congress blocks his initiatives. We argued over a bunch of contingent reasons for the Air Force to abandon HIROC and Convair's whole ballistic missile plan, but how much of it was simply penny pinching, with Air Force brass feeling they need, despite being the most favored service, to circle their wagons and abandon everything that might look dubious that was not essential?

I am not sure how to pull the political rabbit out of the hat, but perhaps instead of looking for extraneous factors like a worsening East/West conflict versus OTL, we can sustain the older POD by having the Air Force brass involved become so impressed with Convair's general progress that they decide keeping the rocket program going is the right thing to do?

1) Von Karman puts ballistic missiles ahead of supersonic cruise missiles in "Towards New Horizons". As below bonus points if he has a "personal" stake in HTP as a propellant.

2) Ballistic Missiles have a bigger reputation than OTL. For example if Ike was killed, (it was possible OTL) by a V2 there's more discussion on their possibilities than OTL because they have a 'big-name' victim attached. Or if the captured V2's make a better impression than OTL.

3) Von Braun does not come to the US/survive the war and his team will fall apart rather rapidly as funding goes away. ABM will need a new plan and given the scenario they might try and side-slip the Convair missile program into a shorter range "Redstone" equivalent.

4) Politically/technically if HTP has such a "good" reputation in the US it will most likely be considered for use before LOX is despite the higher efficiency of LOX due to its compact nature and storability. It might be that everyone defaults to HTP instead of LOX for starting purposes, so NAA may use HTP-Kerosene for the Navaho booster combination which devolves from there to several other uses as a 'standard' engine.

5) Dewey defeats Truman! Dewey was planning on raising taxes and boosting funding for the military and if he'd won in 1948 it is a lot more doubtful the Air Force would have been forced to choose between manned bombers and missile research. Eisenhower btw ran on the promise to both end the Korean war AND cut back military spending not increase it. As it was he only managed one of the two due to the changing nature of the Cold War but his entire "New Look" policy and dependence on massive nuclear retaliation, (and CIA covert-operations) was an attempt to reduce military spending. Unfortunately the 'Bomber Gap' he ran on forced him to continue outlays to "close" the gap which didn't exist and then Russian missile progress forced him to spend in that area as well. The downside of the suggested scenario is that the 'Bomber Gap' card would not play and since missile development would be further along that would not be an election issue either.

As for scenario's I've hinted at mine above but to wit:

At some point during WWII a US research organization is given an Army contract to do research on HTP and not wanting to deal with the stuff they contract out to get an unvented storage tank built on the Army base to 'dissuade' the Army from further research. Unlike OTL there is a serious mix-up in the plat numbers and instead of being built in an empty field/range the tank is built and filled in a spot only several yards from the main HQ building. The weekend passes and nothing happens. Over the next week the mix-up is discovered and the tank, which is located inside the Commissary Cold Storage building is drained and the tank moved but the Army is both curious as to why the tank didn't explode, (which the R&D organization keeps hinting to hear about so they can get back to some 'real' work) and more than a bit upset that said R&D organization basically planted a 'bomb' (during wartime mind you) on an active Army base...

Needless to say the R&D organization is "tasked" with explaining things with the proviso they don't all go to prison IF they can figure out why and what happened...

As I noted I really want this to be GALCIT and Von Karman who gets put in the bullseye for this one :)

BTW: "Hussy" become "Hustler" which unfortunately means they need to find a different name for the B-58 but keep in mind that originally the "Agena" was the "Hustler" stage due to its original purpose being an air-launched missile for none other than the B-58 :)

Randy
 
Fasquadron wrote:
@Shevek23: The idea looks broadly plausible. I am wondering two things though:

* What purity are you assuming for the peroxide?

As noted the closer to 100% the better but till the early 50s commercially in the US it was hard to get concentrations past @27%. See:
http://www.hydrogen-peroxide.us/his...nt_Uses_of_Rocket_Grade_Hydrogen_Peroxide.pdf
(Already cited, so be that way... Here's another :) )
http://www.hydrogen-peroxide.us/his...uction_and_use_of_Hydrogen_Peroxide-pitch.pdf

* Where is the US going to get its peroxide? As far as I can remember, both Britain and the US did not have a strong peroxide industry, and in the 40s the best both could produce was something like 65% pure or 70% pure. The best Peroxide in the world at that point was the 80% pure stuff the Germans had made in WW2 (build up at enormous expense to support their rocket and submarine programs) and I don't think the US or UK had access to the German technology. And the US didn't even have access to the high purity stuff that the Brits got from Germany - during the division of the loot, the British got all of the stored peroxide (which was where all the British rockets got their peroxide).

By the mid-1920 the US had a major hydrogen peroxide production industry as it was used at up to 30% concentrations for various chemical process. Over 100 manufactures with the majority of producers having switched to the more efficient electrolytic process. (See above)

The problem of getting higher concentrations is the needed distillation equipment which isn't necessarily cheap but is pretty much high school level chemical processing if you have the right equipment. Getting somewhere between 25% and 40% in bulk by the late 20s is pretty easy.

Maybe the greater pre-war interest in peroxide over in the US means that when looting Germany, the Americans make sure to get ahold of some of the tasty German peroxide and the British get more of something else in compensation. As a result, Convair has some "free" 80% pure peroxide to play with, encouraging their interest in the oxidizer just as it encouraged British interest in peroxide in OTL.

Actually both England and the US had a more extensive and better producing HTP industry, (though lower concentration) than Germany did, we both (rightly) were surprised but not impressed by what the Germans had done. What ramped production up after the war, (and significantly reduced the price and increased concentration) was post-war propellant use possibilities. The British did start off using "surplus" German HTP but rapidly develop their own 'brand' of much more pure 85% HTP and the ability to produce and distill it from local stocks. (It never made sense to ship to the US as the distance was to great and the product would significantly decay by the time it arrived)

I'm ok with the Truman scenario except for a few points:

Problems with "Truman wins/Continues FDR's legacy" is that Truman was (and would be) focused on getting back to 'normal' as much as possible which is why he was immediately cutting the military and foreign commitments as much as possible. (Arguably this lead to the Korean war as the US was not seen as 'committed' to Asia as much as Europe) He took the fact that he won, (as you note btw) as a 'mandate' from the people that his policy should continue and be broadened with the effect the military got cut even more, (and along with it MX-774) which is not going to change much even under those circumstances. Truman wanted to 'get back' to normal of expanding the New Deal after the war was over, (his fiscal policy was literally to budget domestic spending first and anything "left over" was divvied out to the Military with the majority going to the Air Force and Atomic Weapons) and was disinclined to pursue confrontation, especially outright military confrontation, with the numerically superior USSR. He therefore was aiming to balance the USSRs number with US atomic might and when the dominos, (China, Berlin, USSR A-Bomb and then Korea) all came tumbling down the US was caught short. (Oddly Eisenhower pretty much continued the same 'policy' but was seen as a stronger 'opponent' towards the USSR than Truman)

I actually suspect FDR would have had the same 'agenda' despite probably more of an understanding in the needing of a firm hand to deal with Stalin. At the time the war was coming to an end FDR was just as concerned with the post-war US outlook as that of Europe and would likely have been inclined to do much the same as Truman did in reducing the US military and "trusting" Stalin to play nice. I'd suspect that FDR might see the writing on the wall sooner but I doubt he could get Truman to keep his focus on international over domestic issues especially once the Republicans took control of Congress.

Shevek23 wrote:
But meanwhile, Truman being made aware of the verbal promise Roosevelt made Churchill to share the proceeds of the Manhattan Project (after all, Britain did allow MP to cherry pick much from Tube Alloys, so this was no mere sentimental gift, more of an honest payment on a partnership agreement) means he is committed too, besides FDR is sitting right there for the next couple years. Congress intervenes and blocks the full transfer of data; Britain gets more than OTL but less than they were promised, and to try and compensate, the dual US administration seeks closer cooperation with the British in broader, other matters, who by now are under Attlee's Labour ministry anyway.

I've my doubts that Truman wasn't aware of the promises made to Churchill OTL and choose to take the advice to ignore them in favor of keeping the secrets in the US. The US was already getting indications by 1947 that much of what was being passed to Britain was getting to the Soviet Union as we'd already had significant leakage evidence of our own from 1944 onwards. While we (it turned out assumed but at the time it was thought differently) had a handle on our own leakage since the Soviets were still getting information the only 'obvious' source had to be the British. So the high level decision was made to cut them out and ignore the verbal promises of FDR. (Note had FDR continued towards 1947 it is arguable that he might have move to formalize the agreement but as a majority of the American military and intelligence community were against such a move and advised Truman against it I'm not sure how far he would have gotten under the circumstances)

There is more of a sense that the USA should repay for British gifts made during wartime, to look after British interests with the Commonwealth perceived as a more equal partner, and this is easier for the New Dealers knowing Labour is also progressive. This extends to technical matters especially.

What POD would bring this about? While it's possible that FDR was more 'favorable' towards more equal British/American relations there was billions in outstanding "Lend/Lease" debt not to mention both FDR and Truman were of the opinion that Britain should give up its empire as part of the post-war world. As far as the US public and general government were concerned it was Britain that needed to 'repay' US "gifts" and support even from before we officially entered the war. And the sooner the better. A surviving FDR might be able to temper that sentiment somewhat but not a lot as it was both generally the accepted view of the way the war had unfolded AND technically and legally true. At no point was there any official belief that the US "owed" the British for atomic secrets let alone any of the technology we actually licensed (stole some would say) from them as we had in fact developed most of the initial technology ourselves already. (Lockheed had proposed it's own jet turbine engine AND an advanced aircraft to carry it in 1939, the L-133 and L-1000 and we already were experimenting with microwave radar frequencies)

While British Labour was seen as 'progressive' they were not seen as the same thing as the American "progressives" and in fact they were understood to be far more 'socialist' than most Americans were comfortable with. Once the Republicans were in charge of Congress "cooperation" was going to be difficult at best. Even the "Conservatives" weren't viewed with a huge amount of favor by the Republican's and frankly the average American saw the US as having "saved" Britain and that they should be grateful towards the US not the other way around.

Randy
 
(Not the history I was looking for but here's one for solid propellant and Aerojet: file:///C:/Users/Randy%20Campbell/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/ADA406104.pdf)

Was this supposed to be a link to somewhere on the internet?

fasquardon
 
If FDR lives a while longer, is it possible he hands the Navy a mandate to develop orbital rocketry?

From a history I'd have to search for all over again, the USN was keenly interested in developing rocketry and with the goal of achieving orbit in mind, right after the war. They approached the Air Force, then still Army formally, for forming a cooperative committee with both services sharing funding and projects. USAAF was not interested, it died. What if the Navy brass brings their case to the President?

Like many 20th century Presidents, Roosevelt had a personal preference for the Navy, having been involved in it (like his cousin-predecessor as civilian administrator, Undersecretary of the Navy). So--is it possible that seeing the Navy, a service cast into some shadow by the A-bomb, facing across the board budget cuts that would fall least on the Air Force, seeking a new mission in orbit and beyond, showing a keen interest while the Air Force wants to conservatively stick to the atmosphere, and cast his full influence behind authorizing long-term R&D to the service that is showing initiative? Perhaps in the context of having gambled with Manhattan Project and seeing that pay off, he affirms the importance of the US government backing blue-sky projects like this and establishes the view that the Navy is the right service to do that job?

I've been fooling around a bit with a speculative ultra primitive launcher using only V-2 level tech; I'm going to see what Silverbird makes of it. Surely if it could work at all it would be pretty gigantic, just to put up a one tonne or less beeper satellite that is merely a stunt demonstration. But if it could work, I think that sets a lower bound even earlier than 1955--it says that even really primitive rockets can do the job if only there is ample money to make a giant one. There are other problems that may make it practically impossible even if it might work on paper--engine reliability for one.

Meanwhile, I framed the tentative track to what I took to calling the Big Blonde Beast Booster without assuming the whole US rocket effort all shifts to peroxide; it is just sufficient if Convair alone takes that track.

I also wondered at first if the risky balloon tank design should be favored, but seeing that HIROC already employed it, went with it.
 
If FDR lives a while longer, is it possible he hands the Navy a mandate to develop orbital rocketry?

From a history I'd have to search for all over again, the USN was keenly interested in developing rocketry and with the goal of achieving orbit in mind, right after the war. They approached the Air Force, then still Army formally, for forming a cooperative committee with both services sharing funding and projects. USAAF was not interested, it died. What if the Navy brass brings their case to the President?

Like many 20th century Presidents, Roosevelt had a personal preference for the Navy, having been involved in it (like his cousin-predecessor as civilian administrator, Undersecretary of the Navy). So--is it possible that seeing the Navy, a service cast into some shadow by the A-bomb, facing across the board budget cuts that would fall least on the Air Force, seeking a new mission in orbit and beyond, showing a keen interest while the Air Force wants to conservatively stick to the atmosphere, and cast his full influence behind authorizing long-term R&D to the service that is showing initiative? Perhaps in the context of having gambled with Manhattan Project and seeing that pay off, he affirms the importance of the US government backing blue-sky projects like this and establishes the view that the Navy is the right service to do that job?

The Navy instigated a study/plan to which the Air Force responded with their own RAND generated report on the "World Circling Spacecraft" but there was little official, (government and higher-ranking service member) interest. Cooperatively there were several suggested 'joint' programs but the USAF was totally disinterested, (and rightly saw such activity as taking away from the manned bomber and specifically their primacy as the main nuclear arm of the US military) there was interest from the Army because both they and the Navy saw it as a means to actually bypass the Air Force control and primacy on nuclear delivery but they couldn't get higher authority to be interested.

Which is where getting such a proposal to the Presidential level is going to be an issue. Unless the surviving FDR has a fundamentally different approach to post-war fiscal and domestic priorities the military will still get some significant cuts backs. Not directly enough to effect such R&D programs and MX-773 and similar Army and Navy projects but this was also the point where attempts by both the Army and Navy to retain a role in the nuclear age led directly to very visible and public fights with the Air Force that they both lost. (USS America, the B-36 debate, and missile technology leaks for examples) If Truman is the 'anointed' successor to FDR than he's going to have a significant input on post-war doctrine and this was how he viewed the "post-war" world initially.

I've been fooling around a bit with a speculative ultra primitive launcher using only V-2 level tech; I'm going to see what Silverbird makes of it. Surely if it could work at all it would be pretty gigantic, just to put up a one tonne or less beeper satellite that is merely a stunt demonstration. But if it could work, I think that sets a lower bound even earlier than 1955--it says that even really primitive rockets can do the job if only there is ample money to make a giant one. There are other problems that may make it practically impossible even if it might work on paper--engine reliability for one.

Even at this early stage all the studies "baselined" pretty much V2 technology and found you could do orbital with it. It would be huge but pretty straight forward. The problem was "at this time" it was very much in-clear if you could do anything reasonable without a "man" in the loop, and the lack of larger payloads simply precluded putting a man on board the satellite. (No one even knew if a human could function under high acceleration or weightlessness and the assumption of most bio-medical "experts" was that they could not)

Meanwhile, I framed the tentative track to what I took to calling the Big Blonde Beast Booster without assuming the whole US rocket effort all shifts to peroxide; it is just sufficient if Convair alone takes that track.

I also wondered at first if the risky balloon tank design should be favored, but seeing that HIROC already employed it, went with it.

The problem was one of scale. HIROC wasn't that big and there were both engineering and mechanical questions if a "balloon" tank of the large size needed could be built or would work under the stress of launch. The fun thing is Convair made a lot of choices for the design BECAUSE they were needed for the balloon tank that then would have been supportive of peroxide as a propellant. But they were not actually BASED on the use of peroxide but lucky coincidences.

The thing is with the overall 'effort' if peroxide gets a big enough boost to be considered for Atlas it will probably have much more appeal across the board because of that same boost. Everything from liquid propellant battlefield/tactical missiles to IRBMs like Jupiter or Thor suddenly get some serious operational advantages over using most other combinations. Where this gets more back towards OTL is when the development of more energetic propellants comes along such that of the Titan-II and even there the actual 'reasoning' might be very different in outcome. (Titan-II propellants were to replace the operationally problematic LOX specifically but if you already don't USE LOX...)

Randy
 
Ah. As in, still used regularly today as one of the world's great and iconic launchers?

Atlas, as it was, lasted as a Sat launcher 2004 before redesigned away from the MA-5 '1/2' Stage setup

And the thing is IF you postulate enough messing with peroxide to get an 'operationally' stable missile propellant that allows the Atlas-1-ish to achieve Titan II like operational ability, especially in a larger LV, you have the possibility it might serve longer. But again a large Atlas is NOT going to fit into a silo well, if at all so there is that as a problem but a smaller (3-engine, 1.5 stage vehicle) WILL and will be about as effective as the Titan-1 was if a bit smaller payload. Tradeoffs...

Randy
 
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