Earlier Gorlice-Tarnow

  • Thread starter Deleted member 1487
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Deleted member 1487

What if the Germans, instead of wasting 4 corps of experienced infantry at the 2nd Masurian lakes battle instead used their extra forces to launch an earlier Gorlice-Tarnow to relieve Przemysl?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Bat ... rian_Lakes
Despite the Wiki-entry's repeating of the false claims of Hindenburg-Ludendorff, less than 50,000 prisoners were actually taken and losses among the experienced soldiers committed was atrocious in the winter weather. It also did not clear East Prussia of Russian troops. There was a better target, Przemysl, which would help their ally, hurt the Russians and maintain Austro-Hungarian prestige, which was vital for keeping Italy out of the war.

If launched in February, the operation would still suffer from the weather, but if launched at the right place with proper Austro-Hungarian support, i.e. Gorlice-Tarnow instead of through the Carpathians, it would save Austrian troops form winter attrition and really not add anything to German losses compared to the historical outcome of the winter campaign in East Prussia.
Also, by letting Brussilov attack unopposed like he was trying to, he would have separated his flank from the Russian 3rd army, just like what happened in April, which made it a real possibility that he could be cut off in the Hungarian plain.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorlice%E2 ... _Offensive

If launched, there was a very real chance of the combined power of Austria (as yet undiminished by the Carpathian offensives) and Germany breaking the Russian siege of Prezemysl just in time before food runs out. The attack would set the Russians back to the San and allow the fortress complex to serve as a base for future operations in May. Though unlikely to hurt the Russians as bad as the historical Gorlice-Tarnow, mainly due to the weather allowing the Russians to slip away, as the CPs will not be able to truly exploit their breakthrough, it will be worth it, preventing the loss of over 120,000 Austrian troops at Przemysl and the wasteful attacks in the Carpathians that Conrad von Hötzendorff launched to relieve it throughout the winter.

So what does everyone think about this?
 
Hmm most of the corps used at Second Masurian Lakes were not experienced. They were the Dec triangular reserve divisions.

In addition to 8 German ID incl. Guard Corps, Eleventh Army had a lot of heavy artillery with copious ammo and a very effective commander/COS combo in Mackensen/Seeckt (and one of the corps commanders was von Francois) So merely assembling 8 ID is only part of the package.

Anyway if it succeeds in relieving Przemysl it makes a big difference. You would see a much stronger KuK army in 1915 and Italy would likely remain neutral.
 

Deleted member 1487

I picked up a copy of Hoffmann's diaries, which comes with notes about the campaigns he served in and they stated that the 10th army had been formed from regiments taken from existing divisions and that Falkenhayn was quite pissed that they were used in such a way for so little gain and high exposure casualty rates. Perhaps I need to look again.

Edit:
Looks like you were right, but nevertheless, the presence of these new reserve corps (plus one active corps) with the Beskiden ski corps could make a huge difference if coordinated with Conrad's February attacks, or better yet supplanting it with a more sensible plan that took greater advantage of the Austrian numerical advantage.
 
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An alternative

I've seen a battle map showing divisions for both Eighth and Tenth Armies and it is mostly the Dec reserve divisions though there are some other formations like 10th and 11th Landwehr.

How about this as an alternative? In Dec Falkenhayn sent 5 corps east. He gave 4 to the Dynamic Duo and the fifth got sent to help the A-H in Carpathia.

OK so WI Falkenhayn sent only 1 corps to Ober Ost and formed a Tenth Army with the other 4 in Gorlice Tarnow. This attack would start while Limanowa is underway so in addition to rescuing Przemysl you might completely unravel Southwestern Front.
 
One other thing

Stavka was planning another invasion of East Prussia using Tenth and Twelfth Armies when Second Masurian Lakes occurred and if nothing else succeeded as a spoiling attack. If you don't have Second Masurian Lakes then this invasion is highly likely to materialize (which it did in Operation Unicorn)
 

Deleted member 1487

Stavka was planning another invasion of East Prussia using Tenth and Twelfth Armies when Second Masurian Lakes occurred and if nothing else succeeded as a spoiling attack. If you don't have Second Masurian Lakes then this invasion is highly likely to materialize (which it did in Operation Unicorn)

Granted, but when was the attack supposed to take place? It could run in the winter weather and bog down quickly given Russian logistic and munition deficiencies. Besides, hadn't the Germans developed strong defenses in East Prussia by this point?

Personally I would sacrifice a few miles of East Prussia to relieve Przemysl.
 

Deleted member 1487

I've seen a battle map showing divisions for both Eighth and Tenth Armies and it is mostly the Dec reserve divisions though there are some other formations like 10th and 11th Landwehr.

How about this as an alternative? In Dec Falkenhayn sent 5 corps east. He gave 4 to the Dynamic Duo and the fifth got sent to help the A-H in Carpathia.

OK so WI Falkenhayn sent only 1 corps to Ober Ost and formed a Tenth Army with the other 4 in Gorlice Tarnow. This attack would start while Limanowa is underway so in addition to rescuing Przemysl you might completely unravel Southwestern Front.

Was the 5th corps the Beskiden corps or part of Südarmee? I like that idea too, but then how does the German army cover Poland? Obviously second battle of Lodz/Warsaw isn't likely to happen, which would be a good thing...
 
Granted, but when was the attack supposed to take place? It could run in the winter weather and bog down quickly given Russian logistic and munition deficiencies. Besides, hadn't the Germans developed strong defenses in East Prussia by this point?

Personally I would sacrifice a few miles of East Prussia to relieve Przemysl.

Russian Tenth Army would run into a fairly strong defensive position. Twelfth Army attacking west of Johannisburg Forest would be hitting less well prepared defenses. The nature of the terrain and the German defenses would cause the two Russian armies to at least initially diverge and not be mutually supporting allowing for possible defeat in detail.

As far as it is worth it Falkenhayn was very probably not told the real size of the A-H forces trapped at Przemysl which was a double whammy ---more troops at risk and more troops eating up the food reserves.
 

Deleted member 1487

Russian Tenth Army would run into a fairly strong defensive position. Twelfth Army attacking west of Johannisburg Forest would be hitting less well prepared defenses. The nature of the terrain and the German defenses would cause the two Russian armies to at least initially diverge and not be mutually supporting allowing for possible defeat in detail.

As far as it is worth it Falkenhayn was very probably not told the real size of the A-H forces trapped at Przemysl which was a double whammy ---more troops at risk and more troops eating up the food reserves.

Given how much the Austrians were begging for German support, it would make no sense not to tell Falkenhayn what was going on. The Habsburgs had no qualms about making false statements to the Germans about cutting a separate peace deal in 1914-1915 to leverage more military support.

When was the Russian 12th army formed? It thought it wasn't until much later in 1915, i.e. summer. This would be more than enough time to launch a February attack, end in March-April and be ready for the Russians. Besides, more troops were readied before then anyway, so even without the forces committed to the early Tarnow campaign, there will be troops ready to meet the Russian offensive into Prussia.
 
Given how much the Austrians were begging for German support, it would make no sense not to tell Falkenhayn what was going on. The Habsburgs had no qualms about making false statements to the Germans about cutting a separate peace deal in 1914-1915 to leverage more military support.

When was the Russian 12th army formed? It thought it wasn't until much later in 1915, i.e. summer. This would be more than enough time to launch a February attack, end in March-April and be ready for the Russians. Besides, more troops were readied before then anyway, so even without the forces committed to the early Tarnow campaign, there will be troops ready to meet the Russian offensive into Prussia.

The Russian Twelfth Army was forming while Second Masurian Lakes was going on and NW Front is criticized for not using it to rescue Tenth Army. Fully formed it would have 6 corps incl. the Guard Corps---nothing to sneeze at---and von Plehve would be its commander.

After Second ML Ober Ost did not go passive. There was a follow up campaign which is poorly covered in most histories and essentially it was Ober Ost vs Twelfth Army. Pollard has a little more than most. Let me quote:

"It was here that his main strategic objective lay. The thrust against the Niemen had been simply designed to drive the Russians out of Prussia and protect the left of the German offensive to the south on the Narew and Warsaw. Since the German failure in December a Russian army had been pushing slowly down the right bank of the Vistula in front of Plock. This movement was checked in February, and the Germans hoped by an advance from Mlawa to get across the Narew south of Pultusk. The centre of the Russian defence was at Prasnysz where eight roads meet, but the defending force was weak, and on 24 February the Germans captured the town. But the extreme Russian left made a heroic stand on the ridge between Prasnysz and Ciechanow against Germans in front and on both sides of them. Their resistance produced a situation somewhat resembling that at Lodz, for a rapid concentration of Russian reinforcements swept round to the help of the flank at Ciechanow, while others attacked the German left at Krasnosielce. The Germans encircling Ciechanow found themselves encircled at Prasnysz, and as at Lodz they had to fight desperately for three days to escape. They were assisted by the rudimentary equipment of the Russian forces; rifles and ammunition were scarce, bayonets and hand-grenades were none too plentiful, and some of the privates are even said to have fought with pitchforks. By such hand-to-hand and bloody warfare the Germans were driven out of Prasnysz back towards Stegna and Chorzele and their flank attack on Warsaw foiled. Ruszky's strategy and Russian heroism had gained one of the most singular victories in the war."
 

Deleted member 1487

This is good to know, but the German experience you cite was on the attack against superior Russian numbers. They were advancing into the bag, away from their defensive positions. Use three corps to cover the 8th army from an attack by the Russian 12th, with strong defensive positions and restricted areas of deployment, further Russian attacks are likely to end up like Lake Naroch if the Russian ammo situation was as bad as the quote indicated.

Use the remaining corps combined with the Beskiden corps and the German units of the Südarmee (3 in total) to form the 8 divisions necessary. The Austrians stand on the defensive in the Carpathians while the attack goes in with the German forces and the AH 4th army at Gorlice-Tarnow, perhaps with supporting actions by the Pflanzer detachment, which was successful in its clearing of Bukowina.
 
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