Could Estado Novo fall in the 1950s or 1960s
How would this impact Portugal
How would this effect Portugal's colonies
How could it succeed?Yes, it was possible. You could have the Botelho Moniz coup attempt in 1961 succeed.
Around what time and who would in charge ?Botelho Moniz wanted decolonization. You would see Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique become independent earlier.
How could it succeed?
Around what time and who would in charge ?
Best POD would be for the Armed Forces (with US support) to tell the Government that they wouldn't allow the 1958 election to be stolen from Humberto Delgado, promising in return a peaceful transition.Could Estado Novo fall in the 1950s or 1960s
How would this impact Portugal
How would this effect Portugal's colonies
Best POD would be for the Armed Forces (with US support) to tell the Government that they wouldn't allow the 1958 election to be stolen from Humberto Delgado, promising in return a peaceful transition.
Décolonisation would probably follow, with the possibility that Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Timor Leste would become part of some sort of Commonwealth that would allow them to maintain very close links with Portugal. Protecting Timor from Indonesia would require the blessing of the USA.
Overall, it would almost certainly have been better than OTL for all parties involved.
How willing would the military be to go against the government and who would lead it against the government?Best POD would be for the Armed Forces (with US support) to tell the Government that they wouldn't allow the 1958 election to be stolen from Humberto Delgado, promising in return a peaceful transition.
Would it be possible for pro-Soviet governments to still come to power in Angola and Mozambique ?Décolonisation would probably follow, with the possibility that Cabo Verde, São Tomé and Timor Leste would become part of some sort of Commonwealth that would allow them to maintain very close links with Portugal.
Why wait for a messier solution when you have a clean smooth POD earlier?What about the Botelho Moniz coup attempt in 1961? It had the tactical support of the American government of John F. Kennedy.
The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique had more to do with ethnic groups than politics. Each group looked for backers and adopted the politics of their backers. It's likely that there would still be civil wars in both countries, and short brutal coups in Guiné, but it's hard to guess if the URSS would co-opt the right side in such a situation.How willing would the military be to go against the government and who would lead it against the government?
Would it be possible for pro-Soviet governments to still come to power in Angola and Mozambique ?
Regarding the 58 elections, it was clear Delgado had massive popular support. What needed to happen was for the leading generals to meet, agree that they would support him, gather discret support within the Armed Forces (a small, tightly knit organization at the top at the time) and then send a delegation warn the government that they would not accept election fraud and would stage a coup if Delgado was not the next president.How willing would the military be to go against the government and who would lead it against the government?
Would it be possible for pro-Soviet governments to still come to power in Angola and Mozambique ?
I'm not sure if Delgado could exert enough influence to pull off something like that.
The Botelho de Moniz coup could have succeeded, but it's not just a matter of organization to get that to happen. Botelho de Moniz and his allies initially intended to have a palacian coup. Their objective was not to overthrow the regime but to use military force to put pressure of Américo Thomaz, the president of the republic, to remove Salazar. When this failed, they moved on to an actual military coup. The problem was that some generals who might have been ok with the palacian coup, were not ok at all with the military coup, so they ultimately sided with Thomaz and Salazar. So, there are two ways the Botelho de Moniz coup can succeed:
I have a strong suspicion that, to get the Estado Novo to fall earlier, be it in 1958 or in 1961, you need to get the government to commit some mistakes when it comes to dealing with the military. Make them do stupid appointments or stupid funds allocation. It's important that more people in the military leadership feel alienated.
- The palacian coup succeeds. This is fairly unlikely, seeing as Americo Thomaz was a staunch Salazarist. Maybe it could help to get rid of the counter-coup preparations undertaken by ultra-right General Kaúzula de Arriaga, but I'm not sure if we can really make it so that the coup is seen as so certain to succeed that Thomaz is forced to conceed.
- The military coup succeeds. For this, you need to get the support of more generals. Some were persuaded not to take part by their more right-leaning colleagues, but even if remove all persuasion I'm not sure if the number of coupists would be enough.
Anyway, Botelho de Moniz wanted decolonization, but not immediately. If the coup succeeds, the Portuguese will likely ally with the western-backed UNITA to defeat the Soviet-backed MPLA. Then, there would be some kind of political arrangement. I find it fairly likely that the Portuguese will end up trying to hold on to some piece of Angolan soil, maybe more than just Cabinda. I think there were proposals in the 60s that would have led to an UNITA-led state being formed in the interior while parts of the coast remained Portuguese. I anticipate the nogotiations would be fairly complex. This is all for Angola, of course. In Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique there were no right-wing, western backed independance movements for Portugal to reach a compromise with. In Guinea-Bissau they may have no choice but to give in to PAIGCV, unless they really want to keep fighting for very long. This party supported the independance of both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde as a single state, but the Portuguese would likely not give them Cape Verde because they have no reason to do so (also, it could potentially lead to a soviet-friendly state in the Atlantic). In Mozambique, the situation is more complicated. I'm not sure if Botelho de Moniz could reach an understanding with the FRELIMO (maybe only the north becomes independent?). São Tomé likely stays Portuguese, as does Timor (without the prospect of a communist takeover in Portugal, Indonesia has no reason to invade and there is a sufficently large loyalist element on the island to avoid independence if there is political will to do so).
If we go with Humberto Delgado taking power in 1958 instead of Botelho de Moniz, the fate of the colonies is even more uncertain. 1958 was before the beggining of the colonial war, and, although tensions were rising already, it don't think there was that much opposition to colonialism yet, not even in the democratic movement (even the PCP had only just came out in favor of decolonization one year yearly). I don't know what Delgado's personal views on the matter were...
Also, if you want an even earlier fall of the Estado Novo, general Norton de Matos may have a chance in the 40s.
I'm not sure if Delgado could exert enough influence to pull off something like that.
The Botelho de Moniz coup could have succeeded, but it's not just a matter of organization to get that to happen. Botelho de Moniz and his allies initially intended to have a palacian coup. Their objective was not to overthrow the regime but to use military force to put pressure of Américo Thomaz, the president of the republic, to remove Salazar. When this failed, they moved on to an actual military coup. The problem was that some generals who might have been ok with the palacian coup, were not ok at all with the military coup, so they ultimately sided with Thomaz and Salazar. So, there are two ways the Botelho de Moniz coup can succeed:
I have a strong suspicion that, to get the Estado Novo to fall earlier, be it in 1958 or in 1961, you need to get the government to commit some mistakes when it comes to dealing with the military. Make them do stupid appointments or stupid funds allocation. It's important that more people in the military leadership feel alienated.
- The palacian coup succeeds. This is fairly unlikely, seeing as Americo Thomaz was a staunch Salazarist. Maybe it could help to get rid of the counter-coup preparations undertaken by ultra-right General Kaúzula de Arriaga, but I'm not sure if we can really make it so that the coup is seen as so certain to succeed that Thomaz is forced to conceed.
- The military coup succeeds. For this, you need to get the support of more generals. Some were persuaded not to take part by their more right-leaning colleagues, but even if remove all persuasion I'm not sure if the number of coupists would be enough.
Anyway, Botelho de Moniz wanted decolonization, but not immediately. If the coup succeeds, the Portuguese will likely ally with the western-backed UNITA to defeat the Soviet-backed MPLA. Then, there would be some kind of political arrangement. I find it fairly likely that the Portuguese will end up trying to hold on to some piece of Angolan soil, maybe more than just Cabinda. I think there were proposals in the 60s that would have led to an UNITA-led state being formed in the interior while parts of the coast remained Portuguese. I anticipate the nogotiations would be fairly complex. This is all for Angola, of course. In Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique there were no right-wing, western backed independance movements for Portugal to reach a compromise with. In Guinea-Bissau they may have no choice but to give in to PAIGCV, unless they really want to keep fighting for very long. This party supported the independance of both Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde as a single state, but the Portuguese would likely not give them Cape Verde because they have no reason to do so (also, it could potentially lead to a soviet-friendly state in the Atlantic). In Mozambique, the situation is more complicated. I'm not sure if Botelho de Moniz could reach an understanding with the FRELIMO (maybe only the north becomes independent?). São Tomé likely stays Portuguese, as does Timor (without the prospect of a communist takeover in Portugal, Indonesia has no reason to invade and there is a sufficently large loyalist element on the island to avoid independence if there is political will to do so).
If we go with Humberto Delgado taking power in 1958 instead of Botelho de Moniz, the fate of the colonies is even more uncertain. 1958 was before the beggining of the colonial war, and, although tensions were rising already, it don't think there was that much opposition to colonialism yet, not even in the democratic movement (even the PCP had only just came out in favor of decolonization one year yearly). I don't know what Delgado's personal views on the matter were...
Also, if you want an even earlier fall of the Estado Novo, general Norton de Matos may have a chance in the 40s.
Delgado envisioned a federation of Portugal and the colonies.
It's very difficult to find sources, but there's a reference to it in here (page 10):Do you have a source for that?
I think that's the common althist trope for this scenario, but I've never actually seen confirmed that that was what he wanted
It's very difficult to find sources, but there's a reference to it in here (page 10):
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/22936/III_01.pdf?sequence=12
Too optimistic, and that's a relative term, since the parts of Angola and Mozambique that would become independent in that scenario would be in a worse situation than OTL.Very interesting, thank you for that. I managed to find the entire "Colonial Plan of the Portuguese Opposition" in Portuguese: http://casacomum.org/cc/visualizador?pasta=02587.014.004#!1
Quick summary for those of you who can't read the language:
Now, the big question is, could this be successful? Or are the late 50s too late?
- The Portuguese Empire would be reorganized as the Federal Republic of the United States of Portugal.
- Mainland Portugal, together with Madeira and Azores as well as "all colonies which do not have sufficient population to become their own states" (presumably Macau, until de handover at least, and maybe Cabinda?) would form the Federal State, which I presume would have that name because it was supposed to be administered directly by the federal government. The other states would be Angola (including São Tomé e Principe), Mozambique, Guinea (including Cape Verde), India (Goa, Daman and Diu) and Timor.
- The states would have self-determination, though I presume the union would be indissoluble (as the repulbic is "federal")
- The government would commit to integrate the Africans, end all discrimination and raise their standard of living
- A plebiscite would be held in each state to approve both the federal constitution and the constitution of each state.
The first test to Delgado's aims would be the conflict with the Indian Union over the State of India. Unlike Salazar, he would surely be diplomatic towards the Indians, and he would suggest a plebiscite. But would the Indian Union accept a plebiscite (I assume Portugal would have the support of the west in this scenario, so maybe they could be persuaded?). If yes, would the people of Portuguese India choose to remain Portuguese under the new federal republic?
For Portuguese Africa, I suppose Delgado will have to choose between rushing the referendum (effectively disenfranchising much of the African population) or wait until a proper census can be conducted and use that time to campaign with the Africans as well. Either way, I don't think the war can be avoided, as Delgado's promises of federalism will certainly not deter the independence movements (at least not the marxist ones, and for the others... well, they may lose western their backers but that's no guarantee they'll stop fighting). It becomes a question of how much the new democratic Portugal is willing to commit to a colonial war, as well as to which point the west will back it, and of how committed it will be to actually integrating the Africans and raising their standard of living.
I think the most realistic scenario is probably for Portugal to create the new states out of just southern Mozambique, coastal Angola, the African islands, Timor and possibly Portuguese India and give independence to the rest. And this is already me being fairly optimistic...
The big lie was that very soon those African resources would turn Portugal into a rich country. This was a lie because Portugal was just too small to handle the vast task of developing Angola and Mozambique.
But Angola and Mozambique would drift into full independence very fast. The superpowers would make sure of that.
There is a major problem that is legitimacy.Well, to be fair, Portugal didn't exactly need to do that all by itself. Foreign investment entering the colonies could help a lot. Also, while I do agree that developing the entirety of Angola and Mozambique would likely be something impossible to do, it may be possible to develop some coastal regions of Angola and some parts of the south of Mozambique just enough to gain a relative amount of good faith from the general population.
This is what I'm not so sure about. You see, the Americans were generally very fond of people who were very fond of them. And Delgado was very, very fond of them. If he did manage to gain power, the first thing he would do would be ingratiating himself to Washington. I don't think they would be indiferent to his cocksucking.
The new Portuguese regime would be very close to the US and the west in general, and, while I don't think they would fully embrace Delgado's aims of creating a colonial federation, I think it's likely they would support him in the short term, even if they see it as only a first step towards decolonization. They surely wouldn't lose the opportunity to work with a staunch American ally such as Delgado and risk letting Angola and Mozambique become independent under soviet-backed independence movements. When it became clear that the war was not going to end soon, they would pressure Portugal to give the colonies full independence. But what's different in this case from OTL is that the terms of independence would likely be dictated by a negotiation between Portugal and the rest of the west. I can see some chunks of coastal Angola and southern Mozambique staying Portuguese. Some cities in Angola got to have white majorities during the 60s and 70s, so I don't find it at all implausible that between white settlers and relatively well integrated blacks a general consensus around remaining with Portugal could be built, assuming Delgado can be at least more tactful when it came to dealing with the native populations than the Estado Novo was. Once Portugal's semi-isolation is over, and western money starts coming in, these coastal Angolan and southern Mozambican regions will become the epicentres of local development. Things will still be rather awful in most rural areas, but for those privileged few who happen to live in the developing regions, quality of life can improve quite considerably.