Earlier Cold War Detente?

Though it is often overlooked, the early/mid 1950s saw a slight detente in the Cold War-De-Stalinization, the Korean Truce, Eisenhower reducing the defence budget,the fall of McCarthy , etc. This detente ended with the rebellions in the Warsaw Pact in OTL, but did it have to? Could the 1950s be February, leading to a March in the 1960s? Or was it just an illusion all along? Or do you have no idea what I'm blathering on about? Or why I'm using a multi-question format?
 
It depends on who takes power after Stalin. Beria was a power-crazed monster, but he had scant loyalty to Marxism by the time Stalin died and saw East Germany in particular as a major drain on Soviet resources. So he may really have proved willing to withdraw from it and see a united & Finlandized Germany. If that could help secure stronger economic ties and technology (particularly consumer goods where the Soviets really lagged) from the west.

So for all his personal depravities and crimes Beria might be the most ''reform'' or ''pragmatically minded'' politburo member. Still in this case a lot of people at least in the higher ranks of the army & party are going to get a first class ticket to a camp in Siberia or Kazakhstan.:eek:

Or you could stick to the OTL fight for power after Stalin's death but butterfly away Khrushchev’s habit of latching on to strange schemes, like growing corn in land totally ill-suited to it. And make him a little more statesman like when it comes diplomacy.

Additionally make him more reform-minded and have him go further in denouncing Stalin, restore a greater degree of democracy at least within the CPSU itself. Also having him start more serious economic reforms. (Which at this early stage would work much better as the Soviet economy was still booming rather than stagnant/moribund as it was during Gorby’s time) also wouldn’t hurt matters.
 
It depends on who takes power after Stalin. Beria was a power-crazed monster, but he had scant loyalty to Marxism by the time Stalin died and saw East Germany in particular as a major drain on Soviet resources. So he may really have proved willing to withdraw from it and see a united & Finlandized Germany. If that could help secure stronger economic ties and technology (particularly consumer goods where the Soviets really lagged) from the west.

So for all his personal depravities and crimes Beria might be the most ''reform'' or ''pragmatically minded'' politburo member. Still in this case a lot of people at least in the higher ranks of the army & party are going to get a first class ticket to a camp in Siberia or Kazakhstan.:eek:

Or you could stick to the OTL fight for power after Stalin's death but butterfly away Khrushchev’s habit of latching on to strange schemes, like growing corn in land totally ill-suited to it. And make him a little more statesman like when it comes diplomacy.

Additionally make him more reform-minded and have him go further in denouncing Stalin, restore a greater degree of democracy at least within the CPSU itself. Also having him start more serious economic reforms. (Which at this early stage would work much better as the Soviet economy was still booming rather than stagnant/moribund as it was during Gorby’s time) also wouldn’t hurt matters.

While a democratic and reforming Beria would be a deliciously ironic way to have an early detente, I personally think the "better" Khrushchev scenario to be, well, better. A slight, early POD n his personal life would be perfect for making him more reaonable-he may even resolve *1956 peacefully and with US help, or maybe even butterfly it away totally. Add that to a better economy, and I think we might have an end to the Cold War by the '70s-which would have interesting consequences in th US. Would that be plausible?
 
I personally think the "better" Khrushchev scenario to be, well, better. A slight, early POD n his personal life would be perfect for making him more reaonable
I don't think this is a goer. Khrushchev's bombast, his confrontational politics, were pretty important for two reasons.
1. They appeased his domestic opponents. Khrushchev's more radical reforms were offset somewhat by his foreign policy initiatives. Going for full detente too early could create some significant rifts.
2. They gave Khrushchev the motiviation/incentive to actually defeat his more significant opponents. A laid back Khrushchev will get run over by the Anti-Party group. Instead Khrushchev wasn't going to take it, and instead turned the tables by demanding a Central Committee sessions.

Something else to consider is whether the US was really ready for detente in this period. This was the US where politicians could 'lose China', suffer from a 'missile gap', and lets not forget that whole Vietnam thing. The US still enjoys a significant strategic advantage over the USSR, and sees no reason to change the status quo.

Now compare this to Brezhnev. Brezhnev compromised with his opponents, rather than tried to buy them off. The US at this stage was stuck in Vietnam and starting to look for a way out, and it's economy was starting to bite. Anti-communism was still there, but dulled somewhat. Brezhnev racketed up military spending and closed the real missile gap with a roll out of ICBMs. In these circumstances, detente was possible.
 
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