Eagles of the Reichsbanner | A firmly republican Germany

Eagles of the Reichsbanner


A collection of maps, scenes, and invented discussions, looking into a world in which the 'Weimar' Republic thrives​

Firstly, a summary of what has already been made and posted, spoilered below.

Spoiler: Maps

Spoiler: Europe in early 1920

Europe, just before the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch

Translated descriptions:

While the traitors to the republic and country gather around Kapp and Lüttwitz, the Hungarian Wars and Italian-Serbian war are losing steam in southwestern Europe. In the East, the collapse of the Bolshevik dictatorship begins, as the so-called "Red Army" begins to break under the continuous assault of an alliance of republican and reactionary forces coming from all sides. In the West, the weakened Entente powers send old war materiel and advisors, while in Germany the anti-republican scum is being coaxed into a "crusade" against the Bolsheviks.

In FINLAND, both republican and soviet rule have fallen in the wake of the civil war. Friedrich Karl von Hessen, a noble who fled Germany, rules as Fredrik Kaarle, King of Finland. His power is based on the Freikorps and Jäger troops in the country, who stand ready for a bloody suppression of any new uprising. In Helsinki, new nobles and officers arrive daily, fleeing the Revolution in Germany or Bolshevik rule.

Along the BALTIC COAST sit the half-formed states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, who are bound together in the PREUßENBUND, a reactionary alliance against the Bolsheviks. This alliance is strengthened by the imperialist troops of the North-Western Army, troops from Finland and several Freikorps units. Together with Poland, the Preußenbund is the strongest anti-Bolshevik force in the Russian Civil War.



Some notes

In Hungary, the end of the war is unable to bring peace. After a coup, a communist government takes power in Budapest, forming the Soviet Republic of Hungary. Surprisingly, they find broad support among the more conservative members of Hungarian society - but not for their internal policy. Under the new government, the quickly-reforming Hungarian army marches out to secure the borders of the old Kingdom.

Czechoslovakia and Hungary sign an armistice in Vienna, not long after German-Austria unites with Germany, freeing up Hungarian troops to fight their other neighbors. Over the past year, this war has died down, all sides unwilling to give up their claims but more and more unable to press them.

In the east, the new states formed after the withdrawal of German troops have either collapsed into rival governments (in Ukraine, the Hetmanate, Directorate, remnants of the People's Republic and the Soviet Republic all claim to be the only true government) or formed a somewhat shaky alliance against the Bolsheviks. The Preußenbund, or "Prussian League", is nominally under the leadership of Wilhelm of Prussia, grandson of Wilhelm II, though he is careful to present himself as, at most, first among equals.

The still-shaky Prussian League can itself be split into two main groups - the various small states, including Finland, of the north, which are more under Wilhelm's influence due to the large number of German Freikorps troops present (who are, at least in theory, loyal to him alone) and the lack of larger forces of their own. In the south stands Poland, affiliated primarily for the purposes of coordinating military efforts against Bolshevik forces.

Meanwhile, further east, the various White forces of the civil war are finally able to catch their breath and advance again after the Bolshevik offensives of 1919. The Prussian League's advance has forced the Red Army to all but abandon many of their new gains, and the Whites are beginning to return to their previous strength.

Spoiler: The Russian Federation in 1922

The Russian Federation in 1922

The Russian Federation emerged from the dust of the Russian Civil War, even as desperate Bolshevik holdouts continued to fight in Moscow and some of the surrounding areas. The Federation was declared in the Kremlin only hours after it had been evacuated by the Bolshevik government, as republican forces attempted to preempt any attempt to immediately restore the monarchy, or even establish a unitary state. Built on the shaky foundation of factions only willing to tolerate one another until not doing so did not invoke another civil war, the Federation's first months have been marked by attempts to restore some degree of central authority and deal with the immediate aftermath of the civil war.

In terms of organization, the Federation has adopted the provisional measure of allowing the various autonomous governments and regional councils that arose during the civil war to remain in place; several areas have been "consolidated" in a process that is largely a surrender to the de facto lack of state control - of the various autonomies recognized in this fashion, only the so-called "T-K Autonomy" is the result of Federation-level cooperation; as a region considered vital both for its industrial and agricultural outputs, the area has been placed under special administration. Elsewhere, negotiations are ongoing with dozens of micro-republics that sprung up during the anti-Bolshevik revolts in the final phase of the civil war.

In the west, several areas once part of Russia remain outside the Federation; some simply entirely reject its legitimacy as a Russian state while others have officially seceded from it or have been recognized as outside Russian control by treaty. The "new duchies", referring to the Duchy of Pskov, Duchy of Novgorod, Duchy of Archangelsk and Grand Duchy of Ingria-Karelia are all self-proclaimed "temporary administrations" that state a desire to reunify with a legitimate successor to the tsarist government.

This aim - the re-establishment of the old regime - is the goal of several of the authoritarian groups within the Federation, though among them is a split between unionists who advocate for a renewed, centralized Russia, and the group sometimes called the Tsarist Federalists, for whom the retaining of outlying regions such as Georgia, Ukraine or Finland is worth granting concessions in the form of regional autonomy within a federated empire. Both groups are split by disagreements on regency, the question of the legitimate successor and on the short-term matters of tactical cooperation with the Federation versus obstructionism.

The republican faction is similarly split; while many Kadets drifted into the authoritarian camp during the war, some remained in support of a democratic regime, and groups such as the Union for the Regeneration of Russia work to continue bridging the gap between the various political positions in the republican camp (and between the republican and authoritarian/monarchist ones, though this has proven increasingly difficult after the fall of the Bolsheviks). Beyond these political splits are other matters, such as the question of recognizing permanent forms of the new autonomies and mostly-independent nations within the former empire, as well as growing disagreements between groups supporting a democratic federation as a vehicle for achieving their goals of maximum autonomy and those who seek a stronger federal government.

For the time being, the fear of further foreign intervention, another Bolshevik-style revolution and the peasant uprisings that erupted near the end of the war have dissuaded the various victors from fighting amongst themselves, though only a handful of measures have achieved any kind of broad support; important matters such as the clearing of the so-called Red Zone, and the re-extension of state control over the various atomized areas of the former Empire are largely left to whichever group has or is attempting to gain control over the area (though they can expect harassment and complaints if their efforts ever seem too successful). Debates rage in Moscow over the federation's constitution, but also about the legitimacy of the All Russian Constituent Assembly, the means by which a new one could be elected, the time for a new election, which groups should be allowed to vote were such an election to occur, the matter of whether a temporary government should be established to enact various policies beforehand, and other matters that have effectively stalled progress towards a united federal government.

Notes on selected areas

The Red Zone: De jure simply a portion of a larger autonomous area, the Red Zone is called such for the pockets of remaining Bolshevik partisans that remain in it, as well as the (false) assumption that many of the overtly hostile micro-governments within it are all aligned with the fallen Bolshevik regime. The railways leading out from Moscow have been secured, but beyond them neither the Federation nor any group within it is presently capable of exerting authority over the area, though the Republican Army and Kotlas Directory are said to be in secret contact regarding a joint operation to pacify parts of the area.

The Hetmanate of Ukraine: Almost as decentralized and unstable as the Federation, the Hetmanate is itself a federal union of Ukraine and the Kuban Cossack Host. Claiming the entirety of Ukraine, but in fact cut into several disconnected regions by the "Black Belt", Republic of Ukraine and T-K Autonomy, the Hetmanate is heavily reliant on local warlords, atamans, to control its territory.

The Black Belt: Comprised of the Donbass Special Autonomy, the Krywbass Special Autonomy and the region known as "Makhnovia", this area is partially within and partly outside the Federation, with the former two portions under foreign influence due to a treaty with Poland that allows them special economic access to the area, and the other the most well-known result of the atomization, an area under the protection of the Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine, which actively fights against any attempt to exert outside authority over the region.

The Volga German Autonomy: Centered on Saratov and Kosackenstadt across the Volga, the Volga German Autonomy is generally autonomist, though some groups support republican or tsarist factions.

The Far East Autonomy: Coming under increasingly heavy Japanese influence during the course of the civil war, the region was organized into its own autonomy in late 1921, when British and American forces began leaving the area and the checks on Japanese power faded. In exchange for continued support for the anti-Bolshevik forces, Japan has received extensive economic influence (if not outright control) over the area, which is one of the strongholds of anti-Federation obstructionism.

Spoiler: The Prussian League in 1922

The Prussian League


"The Prussian League is a fascinating piece of the region's history. Unfortunately, it remains widely misunderstood and the complexities of its internal workings are left aside in favor of simple explanations of 'Prussian imperialism' or even 'monarchist solidarity'."
- Küllo Raud, "Germans in Estonia - From Order to League"
"Imagine being Willy 3 and realizing you literally have an army without a state, so you go and reconquer part of Prussia. Gotta make Voltaire proud lol"
- Franz_Olaf_Olaf_Olaf, "A Bigger Prussian League?" on www.historycounterfactuals.com
After the German Revolution in November 1918 and the resulting end to the Great War, peace only returned to part of Europe. The German Republic's withdrawal from the east, the poor state of the postwar German economy, and the legions of battle-hardened (or simply traumatized) young men in search of a future that could not be guaranteed by the Republic all contributed to the creation of an unusual alliance. Where and when the Prussian League came into existence is not entirely clear; some say it came to be as late as early 1922, when the name first became used in official legal documents, while others point to the correspondence of Rüdiger von der Goltz, Wilhelm Friedrich (later Wilhelm III), Carl Gustaf Mannerheim and Nikolai Yudenich as the nucleus of the later League. Beginning as cooperation between several anti-Bolshevik forces, the name 'Prussian League' (originally in German as Preußenbund) was used to describe the coalition/alliance by von der Goltz in 1920, when it was primarily comprised of German Freikorps (who were allowed into the area, but not otherwise supported, by the German Republic).

During the course of the Russian Civil War, the Prussian League grew to be the largest anti-Bolshevik faction in the west, temporarily including Poland as well. As the war came to a close and the Russian Federation was proclaimed, the various administrative bodies that had been assembled by advancing League forces were rapidly converted to a series of new states; while a portion of former League troops and the territory they held accepted entry into the Federation, the northern and western regions withdrew. Legally speaking, Pskov, Novgorod, Archangelsk and Ingria-Karelia are purely temporary in nature, states that will protect and look after the people until a legitimate Tsar returns to Moscow, avoiding republican influence in the meantime. By this point, the League had expected westwards as well, with Wilhelm Friedrich returning to Königsberg during the German Civil War of 1920.

Shortly after the civil war ended, Poland and the states under its influence began to withdraw from the League (though those who see the League as being created, rather than formalized, by the Rigan Treaties of 1922 will of course argue that Warsaw was never in the League and therefore did not leave), maintaining limited military and political cooperation until the mid-1920s. Apart from this change, and small shifts in the League's border with the Russian Federation, the Prussian League remained stable until the German invasion of Prussia.

Selected Details
The Kingdom of Finland: Under what is often called the "triple-minority government" (the minorities referring to Swedish, Russian and German aristocrats, the latter two often émigrés fleeing their respective countries' revolutions), Finland has only slowly begun to heal the scars of the Finnish Civil War. Its army continues to be trained by Prussian officers, with Prussian bases scattered across the country, while remaining politically 'pure' so as to be reliable in the event of another civil war. An agreement between Finland and the Grand Duchy of Ingria-Karelia, brokered by Wilhelm III, oversees the slow transfer of more of Karelia to Finland.

The Kingdom of Prussia: Restored by the simultaneously enthroned Wilhelm III, the Kingdom of Prussia came about when the German Civil War turned against the monarchist forces, and it claims the entirety of Prussia's 1918 territory as well as its legitimacy as the only German state. With its forces hardened by the Great War, Russian Civil War and German Civil War, its western border heavily militarized and small forces based across the entire Prussian League, Prussia has returned from the grave and catapulted its way to being a regional power, for the time being.

Åland Islands/Ahvenanmaa: Currently host to the largest new-Prussian naval base in existence, the islands are in a peculiar situation due to a series of agreements between Prussia, Finland and Sweden. The interests of the island's inhabitants are represented by a special official from Sweden, and all official business on the islands is done bi- or trilingually (Swedish, Finnish and German being the languages in use); the Kingdom of Sweden also has special military observers on the island, on which Finland is barred from stationing troops of its own. The Prussian troops on the islands are under further restrictions based on these treaties, which also limit the size of artillery which can be placed on the island and number of off-duty members of the Prussian Army or Navy that are allowed on the island.

Variants
A number of variants of this map can be found here.

Spoiler: The Three Ps

Translation by Franzius Nichtreimer.

Composed in February of 1921 in Berlin by Heinrich Finderlohn, The Three Ps is generally considered to be a reaction not only to the dominance of the "Three Ps" of political discourse between early and late 1920 (these being the coup by Kapp and Lüttwitz, the entry of Poland into the ensuing conflict, and the declaration of the restoration of the Kingdom of Prussia in Königsberg) but also of the strong influence the events had on literature during that same time.

Spoiler: Original

This is my first time doing something like this, so it may be a bit rough around the edges, but the idea is to put together a timeline from all the stuff I've gathered, without opening with massive walls of text or focusing on scenes of individual events. My own experience of history has been heavily influenced by discussion of said history, and in the discovery of complex realities within the simple explanations and myths that float around the "popular" understanding of events, so (and this may already be clear based on the "counterfactual" forum bit above) I'll be trying to work that in where I can.

Due to my preference for visual depictions of events (read: maps) and desire to further my own ability to make said depictions, some matters are likely to be developed/explained in more detail when I make the map relevant to said events; I'm planning on using historycounterfactuals.com forum threads and bits of writing meant to be papers on various subjects to pick up the slack, and cover areas where a map is unlikely to be relevant (like when I get into France's politics, which will be heavily impacted by its de facto loss of the war). Depending on how things go, both of these could be guided by reader polls if I can make them work.

And finally, a disclaimer: despite the name, there will be a lot of attention paid to other countries, for a variety of reasons - setting the stage for later events, wanting to shed light on other developments caused by the differences that cause changes in Germany, and so on.

 

Very interesting!

Automatic watch, excited to see more.

 

Next up: Two Hundred Republics - The Atomized Ukrainian Hetmanate.

 

(A quick note beforehand: sorry for the long delay between posts, I got caught up in some things and ended up delaying the text portion significantly, until it seemed silly to only post that when the map was near completion. In the future updates should be more regular, though February is likely going to be a very busy month for me, so we'll have to play it by ear.)​

Two Hundred Republics
The Atomized Ukrainian Hetmanate
- by Terry Brachman -
(excerpt reproduced with permission)​

While the entire history of the Hetmanate of Ukraine is a fascinating one - colleagues of mine have written entire books on its relations with various other Ukrainian governments, its place within the Russian Federation and its own federative structure - I have chosen to focus on a small slice of it, in order to properly examine the eight years often called the "Dvisti Period" (a term which itself possesses an unusual history, entering use after a mis-reading of a telegram; 'Dvisti' merely means 'two hundred'). Starting in 1922 with the declaration of the Federation in Moscow, the fighting within and on the borders of the Hetmanate of Ukraine came to an end. While skirmishes continued, and only a small portion of the country was actually under the Hetman's control, large-scale fighting came to an end by autumn.

The end of the conflict often called the Russian Civil War did not, however, bring immediate stability to the Hetmanate; much of the country was outside of the central government's control; even that which was, was generally under the rule of a local warlord - an ataman - who could decline to follow the Hetman's instructions if he so chose. The most well-known of these warlords was Nestor Makhno, who could call on the largest singular armed force in Ukraine at the time; it is no coincidence that 'Makhnovia' was not inside the Hetmanate (or even the Federation) during this period. The majority of warlords, however, were not able to muster this level of support. Individually, they were generally forced to work within the framework the Hetman provided, though the atamans collectively held enough sway to topple several attempts at centralizing reforms.

Beginning in 1924, after gathering the support of enough of the atamans to have sufficient military strength, the Hetman launched a campaign of consolidation that lasted almost seven years. It was an affair confined to the borders of the Hetmanate (except for a few occasions, such as in 1927 when the Hetman acquired Polish permission to bring a force into Crimea via the Krywbass Special Zone), yet it resembled a slow conquest of foreign territory more than a civil war. This campaign has, as late as the 1970s, been misunderstood as an ideologically-motivated struggle (see Junghusser's Against the Reds and Greens for an example which tries to place the campaign in the context of greater anti-republican, anti-socialist measures taken by other Russian states during this period). Further examination of the available information, which has increased significantly in the wake of the discovery of what has been called a "treasure trove" of correspondence, government reports, military examinations and other documents below the manor of Pavlo Skoropadskyi.

It is before this background that I will begin; in order to ensure that this book is appropriately accessible to those readers not already familiar with Ukrainian history, I will open with a description of the circumstances in which the Hetman's campaign was launched. As the name of the period implies, there were as many as two hundred (confirmed by written record) supposedly independent republics within Ukraine at the end of large-scale hostilities in 1922. The splintering of centralized state authority, represented by the power of the atamans, had gone further over the course of the collapse of the Russian Empire; the complete atomization of the state resulted in a complete lack of external authority during a period in which the countryside was saturated with young men and weapons.

Under these circumstances, with state power gone, radical changes and new declarations coming with every new piece of information from the outside world, it is not especially surprising that many villages declared themselves subject to none. The dozens of republics, some consisting of a single village, some a town and its surrounding lands, others of stretches of countryside which had banded together for protection, sprang up in response to the anarchy that preceded the outbreak of the Anti-Bolshevik Conflict, also called the Russian Civil War, and this trend only intensified in the following years. Skoropadskyi's first government was overthrown by an uprising that mobilized these dozens of micro-states, but its replacement could exert little more authority than the Hetman; as a result, little changed 'on the ground'.

With the entrance of Polish troops to the intra-Ukrainian conflict, the Kiev government gained a significant advantage in 'clearing out' their section of the country; as a result of Polish military and administrative assistance, the 'Dvisti' was a relatively short period in the People's Republic. The distinct lack of central authority in the Krywbass, Donbass and 'Makhnovia' regions meant that the phenomenon there changed its face significantly, lacking any immediate existential threat. In the Hetmanate, however, Skoropadskyi and, later, the Kuban Cossacks, presented a constant danger that ensured the dozens of fortified villages and towns (many of which entered small-scale 'wars' of their own, fighting one another over territorial disputes or for control over trade) which created an environment entirely different from those present elsewhere in the Ukraine.

 

The Hungarian Intervention​

Alternatively referred to as the “Hungarian Intervention”, “Five-Party Intervention” or “Anti-Soviet Intervention”, the conflict which took place in Europe in 1925/26 between the Hungarian Soviet Republic, Republic of Germany, Republic of Poland, Czechoslovak Republic, Kingdom of Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and brought about the end of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

The seeds of the conflict go back as far as 1917 in some cases (and a case can be made that the war was only the most recent form of a greater conflict going back centuries), but the groundwork for the Hungarian Intervention was laid in 1924 with the shift in politics resulting from the second Reichstag elections of the Republic of Germany.

With the end of the first phase of Germany’s rearm-and-reform program, and a new government seeking to return the country to the status of great power after its “political coma” following the revolution and civil war, some kind of conflict was all but inevitable. The question became not if, but when Germany would fight - and against whom.

The two primary opponents were already clear in 1924; the Kingdom of Prussia, still claiming the entirety of Germany, stood in the northeast. But a conflict on the Weichsel would likely mean drawing in Poland, and her sphere - as well as the Prussian League. A war with half the Baltic and most of Eastern Europe was more than either the government or the army wanted.

To the southeast was the Hungarian Soviet Republic. A pariah, with hostile relations to most of its neighbors, the state was the perfect target for aggression even before it slipped into a political crisis in August of 1924. As unrest grew within the country, and stories of the Red Terror began to circulate in European papers, the first plans for an intervention took shape.

The Republikanischer Soldatenwehr began preparations for mobilization against Hungary, its expensive wishlist approved by the new government and production of armored vehicles further increased. Members of the German and Czechoslovak General Staffs meet in secret to discuss joint military action against Hungary.

Stresemann first visits Paris, in what is officially a meeting to aid in normalizing the still-icy relations between the two countries. Less officially, Stresemann is able to acquire French approval of an intervention against Hungary - no support, but tolerance. The right-wing French government, beset in its colonies by the rapidly-escalating Rif War and in the Métropole by renewed political strife, happily presents the meeting as proof of France’s great power status when the intervention begins.

Next on Stresemann’s list is London, where preparations have already begun for the weathering of a potential large-scale strike after Red Friday. The British approve an intervention, but attach conditions in an effort to ensure that the result is not merely German dominance of the Balkans.

In Germany, a conference is hosted in Vienna, to discuss the entry of other parties into the intervention. At the time, the chief candidates were Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, though representatives of Italy and Poland had also been invited. The first to agree outright was the delegate from Romania, eager to end the technically ongoing conflict in Transylvania.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was faced with a more precarious situation - to the west and south was the Italian possession of Adriatica, a construct that combined ‘Green’ Montenegro, the Albanian Principate and the portions of Croatia, Dalmatia, Herzegovina, Bosnia and Carniola that had been occupied by Italy in the conflicts following the end of the Great War. The continued tension resulting from the overlapping territorial claims of Adriatica and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes left both sides anticipating further conflict; it was only after Mussolini’s announcement that no hostilities would commence during or immediately following a Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian participation in a war with Hungary that the matter was sufficiently resolved for the Kingdom to join.

Italy, despite not directly joining the intervention, pledged material support and to allow for any volunteers who wished to take part in the conflict to do so. While both were primarily symbolic gestures, a total of 8,000 volunteers eventually joined the fighting (primarily assisting German forces, and remaining north of Lake Balaton, to avoid potential conflicts with Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian troops).

Poland, in the process of a longer diplomatic shift away from the Kingdom of Prussia, agrees to join the intervention. Additional discussions regarding trade relations, post-intervention influence in Hungary, and several other topics are had between Polish and German officials, though the results remain secret.

In Hungary, the crisis that began in late 1924 worsens. The support the regime had gathered by refusing to give up territory to its neighbors, and then kept for several years by working to resolve the acute issues plaguing the populace (generally a lack of food) was drying up. Radicals were organizing an ‘internal opposition’ to the policies that were, in their eyes, a betrayal of the revolution of 1919, while those who had temporarily worked alongside the Soviet government despite political differences were now beginning to agitate for a return to more conservative politics.

The crackdowns and internal tension in Hungary intensified; while German, Czechoslovak and Polish officers planned a sequence of attacks, with Romanian and Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian entry beginning several days later, the Hungarian forces on its southern and eastern border were weakened due to fears of a coming uprising.

The acute casus belli of the intervention would not be the growing unrest in Hungary, however. The day after the Nyitra Riots began, the Czechoslovak Republic issued a formal ultimatum to Budapest, demanding “immediate and permanent vacation of all occupied Czechoslovak territory”. A week was given for Budapest to respond, though Czechoslovak forces mobilized after only four days, and German troops began to mass in southern Silesia as well as around Vienna.

In Hungary, the ultimatum was rejected by the Soviet government and - contrary to the expectations of the “Hungarian Whites” who were awaiting the collapse of the regime - the internal crisis seemed to end almost immediately. On the final day of the ultimatum, Hungary mobilized its forces, and on July 13th, 1925, the fighting began with the Czechoslovak-German bombardment of Hungarian troops in the village of Ostra.

 

The Intervention Begins



Mobilization and its Aftermath
by Eric Almásy​

While the first shots of the intervention were fired on the 13th of July, the days directly leading up to it involved the parties making final preparations for the coming conflict. In Germany and Czechoslovakia, the divisions planned for use in the intervention were in position to attack for the last few days of the ultimatum, while elsewhere there were delays. In Poland, portions of the reserve force were activated and moved to the border with Hungary individually - often called the "Secret Mobilization", this was generally kept out of the public eye even as reports of Hungarian posturing on the border were spread in the Polish news. Romania's mobilization began mid-way through the ultimatum, and their forces were ready for battle when it ran out...at least, on paper; in truth, it took several more days for the entirety of the force considered necessary to breach the Hungarian defenses to be arrayed. The mobilization of Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian forces was plagued with mishaps stemming from the poor state of infrastructure in the country, but by the time the intervention began, the majority of S-C-S divisions were combat ready.

The Hungarian mobilization was a disaster - during the growing unrest of late 1924, most of the forces active on the southern and eastern border were weakened significantly, with many "divisions" being reduced to half strength or less. This both freed up additional troops for placement in and around various cities and helped assuage growing fears in Budapest of a military uprising; the latter also drove a second measure which would hamper later mobilization efforts: the gathering of all heavy artillery from units considered politically unreliable into large depots in central Hungary. Only the 25-division-strong force in the northwest, facing Czechoslovakia and Germany, was considered entirely reliable; as a result, it was both the best-equipped force of the Hungarian Red Army and most frequently used as a source for militia troops. By early 1925, the Army of Upper Hungary had been reduced from 25 divisions to 21. On July 13th, this was the only Hungarian army that could be considered ready for any combat beyond basic defensive operations.

Halfway through the ultimatum Budapest never planned to accept, the full mobilization of the Hungarian Red Army began. From the first minute, issues in logistics and coordination arose - the Hungarian railway network was strained to the limit just by the transport of troops, but beyond that there were now thousands of pieces of heavy artillery that needed delivering, with tens of thousands of shells and in some cases stacks of rifles waiting in line behind them. These issues were further exacerbated by last-second changes to the timetable, ad hoc decisions to shift the positioning of entire divisions, and the fact that several important railway junctions were unusable for several hours due to railway workers striking. When the fighting began, areas not directly involved in fighting were deprioritized, but the necessity of transporting the wounded from the front and an ever-growing amount of supplies to it rapidly consumed any slack that was gained from this measure.

For the entirety of the conflict, Hungarian forces would be hamstrung by logistical problems and supply issues, especially regarding ammunition for heavy artillery and replacements for destroyed or lost guns.

The Gyor Offensive and Unternehmen Augustus
by Jerry Robinson

​

While often described as its own operation, the "Gyor Offensive" was in fact only the first phase of the ambitious Unternehmen Augustus, the German plan to force the retreat of the Army of Upper Hungary from its dug-in positions and encircle any that could be pinned down by an attack from across the Czechoslovak border. Beyond its obvious goals of capturing the cities of Sopron and Gyor, the primary objectives of the offensive were threefold: firstly, the establishment of a defensible position in Hungarian territory, as a base for potential further offensives to the south; secondly, misleading the Hungarians with a push towards Budapest; and thirdly, the better positioning of forces for the pivot northwards for the next phase of Unternehmen Augustus.

All three of these goals were met; more ambitious goals, such as the encirclement of the defenders of Sopron, could not be achieved, and losses were higher than originally expected. At the end of offensive operations, however, German forces took defensive positions along the Raba and Leitha rivers, Hungarian forces had been pushed back (and forced to abandon significant amounts of artillery, in some cases unable to even destroy them before retreating) and the road to the north was open. Bratislava, captured in a swift attack (itself dubbed Stromquerungsangriff - "River-crossing attack"), was occupied shortly after the beginning of the "Gyor Offensive". A company of Czechoslovak cavalry entered the city at the head of the German force, both a symbolic gesture towards Prague and to the inhabitants; a group of civilian and military administrators arrived shortly thereafter from Czechoslovakia, coming via Vienna to take over the day-to-day affairs of the city.

The First Panzersturm
by Tommy Phi

​

Contrary to popular belief, the incredible success of German armored forces in the Baltic were not a dramatic bursting onto the world stage of an entirely new weapon. The machines, the doctrine, the strategy, were all known factors by that time (despite the surprisingly slow pace at which some nations realized the implications of the German successes in Hungary). Tanks had been undergoing continuous development in Germany since the end of the war in 1918, but even with the generous funding granted to the German Army in 1924, only a handful of at-the-time modern tanks were available for the intervention in Hungary. Instead, the bulk of German armor was made up of earlier designs such as the Oberschlesien II (several Oberschlesien Is were apparently brought in as replacements during the end of Augustus, but only due to unexpectedly heavy losses and delays in production).

Due to worries that an infantry attack would be unable to break through and overrun Hungarian positions north of the Army of Upper Hungary (chosen due to being the 'weak link' between the AUH and the less-formidable Northern Defense Army) because of the rough terrain, the entirety of German armor would be concentrated there. The goal of the attack (as a part of Operation Augustus, it did not itself have an official name, but it was informally referred to as the Schlesienangriff, "Silesia Attack") was to use the fast-moving tank forces to pierce Hungarian lines and prevent their falling back to new defensive positions. Originally, the Silesia Attack was expected to overrun several Hungarian formations close to the border entirely - this never occurred. While German tanks were able to pursue retreating Hungarians, the destruction of larger Hungarian units was not achieved.

The lessons learned by the Germans during the Silesia Attack would form the basis of many advancements in doctrine and tank design of the late 1920s, not only in Germany but in Poland as well - the Poles would later purchase licenses for the Oberschlesien I at the height of the German-Polish détente in 1927, producing variants for their own growing armored force.

 

The Pincers Close​

Spoiler: Map

Disaster in the Northwest
by Alfonso Nortega​

Much has been said, on this site and others, of the genius of Augustus and Plan S (Plan Słowacja). It encircled the Army of Upper Hungary, trapping over 20 divisions and robbing the Hungarian Red Army of its best-trained, best-equipped and most reliable forces. The encirclement and the rapid advance of German and Polish forces made the hopes of Berlin and Warsaw for a quick victory seem just around the corner; internally, the loss of the "bulwark" of the mountainous north and exposure of Hungary proper to the advancing enemy resulted in the decisions that would later undermine the popular support of the Soviet government without properly addressing the military issues resulting from the loss of this force.

Yet despite this wealth of material, the picture painted of the encirclement is often an inaccurate one. The most common narrative focuses on the German offensives of Unternehmen Augustus, leaving aside the context in which the attacks took place and the situations surrounding them. These ignore the important role played by the Polish Plan S, both in securing the German flank and in diverting various reserve divisions that would otherwise have placed themselves before the German advance. Beyond that, they tend to place great importance on the German armor, calling to mind images of a wave of Oberschlesien IIs crashing through a valley, guns blazing as Hungarian defenders flee in panic. While it cannot be said that the armored spearhead of the northern pincer of Augustus was not of importance, depicting it as slicing through Hungarian defenses like butter is far from reality, as is any depiction that does not include the heavy losses these spearheads took during the fighting. At the end of Augustus, both armored divisions had been forced to consolidate actual armored regiments and take on significant numbers of outdated Oberschlesien I tanks to replace those disabled or destroyed by fighting; for the remainder of the Intervention, one of the two divisions remained in Nyitra, taking no further part in fighting while it was rebuilt. Not much later, the second left the front lines as well. The Hungarian Intervention was an important landmark in the history of German armored forces, but a great amount of this significance comes from the extensive evaluation of its failures during the operations it was involved in, and the limitations shown during the conflict.

The second most common narrative places its focus not on Germany, but on Poland. It heralds Plan S as the height of military genius, but in doing so actually denigrates the actual skill of Polish military leadership during the Intervention by ascribing every event to Plan S. On the assumption that due to the presence of plans to supply, instigate and support Slovak uprisings during their attack the Poles were behind every anti-Soviet action taken by the population of the region, these narratives build a great scheme to destroy Soviet control of Slovakia. In reality, the Polish advance was one marked by the need to constantly reconsider options and adapt to changes in the situation. Missteps were made and plans had to be abandoned in the face of changing circumstances (more than one uprising meant to pave the way for the Polish advance never happened due to the surprising success of early Polish attacks throwing entire divisions of Soviet troops into the areas meant to rise up).

The reality of the successes of Augustus and Plan S is more complex than "German armor cut through the Soviet defenses like butter" or "the Poles planned everything" and involve a number of mistakes on the Soviet side that enabled and accentuated the more successful moves of the German and Polish commanders. The first of these was political in nature - the siphoning of forces from the Army of Upper Hungary to bolster the security of the regime. The second was simple the entire operational plan of the Hungarian Red Army; it planned for defense on all fronts but the Czechoslovak one (and assumed Polish neutrality), where a series of offensives were to punch through the opposing defenses and force a swift capitulation, after which a small number of militias would be sent further west to carry out the inevitable communist revolution that would arise out of the failure of the Czechoslovak Republic. Following the plan, the Army of Upper Hungary would then be pulled back and its forces divided, sent to bolster any front that was wavering.

The offensives of the Army of Upper Hungary did not breach Czechoslovak defensive lines. The greatest advance of Soviet forces was 3.4 kilometers (roughly 2.1 miles), and much of this ground had to be given up in the face of Czechoslovak-German counterattacks. What the attacks (which continued to be ordered by Budapest even as it became clear that the Army of Upper Hungary did not possess the strength to break through, and the threat of encirclement grew) did achieve was a massive consumption of everything Hungary sorely lacked. Politically reliable young men, armed with the most modern weapons at Hungary's disposal, supported by almost fifty percent of its heavy artillery, were fed to a meat grinder that consumed tens of thousands of stockpiled shells at a rate hampered primarily by the intense bombardment Hungarian artillery was subjected to by the opposing German and Czechoslovak guns. These fruitless offensives consumed upwards of thirty thousand men, in dead, captured and wounded; this number was increased by the reinforcement of the attacking forces with a further fifty thousand men in an attempt at a final breakthrough.

As the situation become more and more dangerous, with German troops threatening to link up from the north and south and cut off the Army of Upper Hungary, Budapest demanded another attack - and it was given one. In an eight-day offensive that eventually involved every division on the Hungarian side of the front, the defenses of the Czechoslovak forces were put to their harshest test. When the smoke cleared, and the news came that German forces had completed the encirclement, the Army of Upper Hungary ceased its attack. The reserve forces wheeled around to guard the army's rear, but there was no hope of a break-out. The offensive capability of the army had been thoroughly exhausted, and before long the pocket collapsed, Hungarian resistance crumbling as its ammunition and food supplies ran out.

The final success of Unternehmen Augustus was not solely a product of German force of arms and strategy, but also of the stubborn refusal of Budapest to change its strategy or properly respond to the growing threat the northern and southern German forces represented.


Up next is the final Hungarian Intervention update (probably), which will cover the collapse of the HSR and then lead into the major question that follows it: the fate of Polish-supported Slovakia.

 

Spoiler alert: This is not the last Hungarian Intervention update...but the next one will be, promise!

The Collapse of the Hungarian Red Army
by Katerina Menshikova​

In the face of growing German and Polish superiority in the north, as well as continued pressure in the south and east, the Hungarian Red Army faced increasing difficulty in holding back the invaders from September onward. Yet while the situation on the front was dire, it was the reality behind the front that erased any hope the Hungarian Red Army had to establish and hold a proper defensive position. During the "Second Mobilization" after the disaster in the north, hundreds of thousands of men were drawn up for service. Yet even after these men were drawn into the army, several hurdles had to be cleared before they could arrive on the front and reinforce the line.

For a freshly-conscripted or reactivated reservist, drawn from a town or village (the cities were largely exempt from conscription into the Red Army, with men instead drafted into work in the various factories necessary to continue the war), the first experience of the war was often in the form of waiting. The lucky ones would have uniforms and training weapons, spending their time drilling and perhaps even firing a handful of shots from their rifles (the M95s used by Austria-Hungary were the primary weapon of the Hungarian Red Army, with many training and regular weapons having been made during the earlier war); the less fortunate would be called to the barracks only to find that their uniforms and weapons were yet to be present. The continuing crisis of logistics that plagued the Hungarian war effort resulted in a significant gap between the calling up of troops and the ability to move them to the front and supply them.

The combination of these issues with the great failure that had resulted in the loss of Slovakia and the encirclement and destruction of the Army of Upper Hungary caused a crisis of morale that would only grow over the course of the war. Often, front-line units would degrade both materially (replacements of both men and equipment rarely matched combat losses) and in terms of "fighting spirit" - the result was a growing number of desertions, erosion of discipline and an ever-increasing likelihood of entire formations surrendering in the face of enemy attacks. These issues exacerbated one another, as the inability for Hungarian forces to retreat without a significant loss of men and material caused a growing need for the already-insufficient reinforcements. The Hungarian railway network, already overwhelmed when the war began, could not keep up with the requirements of the army. Civilian transportation was limited, then stopped entirely, but even these measures could do little to improve the situation.

Compounding the myriad issues facing the Red Army on and behind the front was the inevitable result of the overstraining of the Hungarian railways and roads. Despite Hungary's agricultural production remaining high enough to feed its population, food had to be rationed due to massive constraints in transportation and the shrinking pool of labor available for farm work during the harvest. In the last phase of the war, soldiers on the front could not be guaranteed sufficient food, and as news spread of the crisis, the regime's remaining support evaporated. The turn of the Transylvanian Army on the Soviet Republic, and the uprisings that erupted in several rural areas, were the end result of this crisis of confidence.

Spoiler: The Southern Pincer

The plans for German-Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian joint offensive


Results of the first push

The Hungarians successfully withdraw, shortening the front using Lake Balaton to secure their northern flank​

Bewegungskrieg in the South
by David Johnson
​

Much ink has been spilled over the topic of German armor in the Hungarian Intervention, of the innovations resulting from the experience, of the technical and doctrinal expertise gained by the Germans. Yet it was in the southern regions of Hungary that one of the largest maneuvers of the war was performed. Bewegungskrieg, describing a war of movement, aptly sums up the rapidly-moving, rapidly-changing front following the opening moves of Unternehmen Arnold. In days, the German and Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian (SCS) forces dislodged the Hungarian defenders, forcing them into a withdrawal that would, with brief interruptions, continue all the way to the Danube.

Following the first attacks and the rapid advance of German and SCS troops, the staff of the Army of the South recognized the threat of an encirclement. Acting quickly, they began to pull east, with some Hungarian formations only pausing for a few hours before the new orders arrived. While not perfect - a series of railway mishaps resulting from the lack of maintenance of the now heavily over-burdened Hungarian railway network resulted in the abandonment of almost 350 pieces of light and heavy artillery, and several divisions were unable to avoid being overtaken and encircled - the maneuver saved the army as a whole, allowing them to stabilize and shorten the front. With the northern flank of the Army of the South now protected by Lake Balaton, the remaining forces could be more heavily concentrated.

Even this was not a solution, however. The front remained too long for the weakened Hungarian force to effectively defend against a dedicated attack. Another attempted encirclement from the south would force either another retreat or risk the destruction of the army. Correspondence between division commanders and the Army of the South's staff make clear just how sorely the front-line forces were hurting for manpower, equipment and ammunition; optimistic estimates expect a month's worth of time would pass before the Hungarians would be forced to the Danube. In practice, the successes of German forces in the "sickle cut" to the north forced the immediate evacuation of the region by the Hungarian Red Army.

Spoiler: The Sickle Cut

Technically Unternehmen Luzius, the Sickle Cut was a successful German operation meant to cut Budapest off from the rest of Hungary. It was conceived as a war-ending blow, as the Germans were already growing worried of an extended conflict; at the time it was unclear just how close to collapse the Hungarian Red Army and Hungarian Soviet Republic were - orders had come from Berlin to force a decision before the intervention lost popularity and the German offensive became bogged down.

​

The situation at the beginning of Luzius


The situation after the initial attack; at this point, the Hungarian front is all but dissolved in the south​

The threat to the Army of the South is clear; fear of a second disaster erupts in the Red Army


Unternehmen Fuchsjagd, the offensive of the southern forces following the Hungarian retreat, results in several encirclements


Budapest and its surroundings bristle with newly-raised divisions, but none have the fighting power to attack the advancing Germans
Further east, continued attempts to conscript men and gather grain result in a series of uprisings


Budapest is isolated; the otherwise triumphant Army of Transylvania is forced to shorten its front
Bela Kun arrives in Debreczen; the stage is set for Lajos Csatay's coup​

 

@KanonenKartoffel Can I ask, is the Pod of this TL post WW1? Only I can't figure out why a Republican Germany would be holding onto Alsace Lorraine? Beyond that its all really good work, please keep it up.

 

As a German who quite likes Weimar Republic politics - especially on the far-left - this is obligatory for me!

Wer hat uns verraten? Sozialdemokraten!

 

Thanks!

There isn't a single PoD that results in all of the differences - the earliest changes are a less brutal occupation/quasi-colonization policy in the east in 1915 and onward, while the first big change is in 1917, where the French army mutinies don't happen (resulting in larger ones in 1918). The result of the changes in the WWI period are a negotiated peace at the end of the war, which involves Germany giving up its African colonies and agreeing to pay reparations to Belgium (France, Britain and Germany all pay, though the former two only cover 1/3 of the cost between them). To answer the second question I'll need a bit of wind-up, so you may need to bear with me for a bit.

One of the things I've tried to do while working on the timeline is avoid anything that sets up too much of a clear good guy / bad guy dichotomy - while the German republicans are better than a lot of their political opponents (and the Republic will sure as hell never get within an order of magnitude or two of the evils of the Third Reich), they aren't perfect. To many of them, even if they're in theory more open to letting the people decide things, Alsace-Lorraine is Elsaß-Lothringen and an integral part of Germany, even before we get into questions of whether the people there would necessarily want to return to France or stay in Germany (while public opinion seems to have shifted sharply towards France during the war, the French never held a vote on the matter so it's unclear whether this was a majority feeling or not).

Then there's politics. Post 1920 and the brief civil war, one of the largest stabilizing forces of the Republic stems from a mistake made by Wilhelm (of Prussia, later III) - a formal invitation to Poland to join the fighting against the Republic. This was seen as a betrayal, and even normally monarchist papers were hard-pressed to give it anything but overtly negative coverage, while everything from the center leftwards called it proof that the monarchists wanted to dismember Germany and rule over whatever slabs of it they could get their hands on; Wilhelm's coronation as King of Prussia was seen as "evidence" of this, as well.

In this context, the generally anti-republican right morphs into "Vernunftrepublikaner" - republicans not of conviction, but of practicality. For them, the republic is the lesser of two evils, an eyesore to tolerate in order to avoid what they see as an inevitable collapse into anarchism and partition if the nation is split by another civil war. This shift provides the republic with more stability, with anti-republican actions being far more likely to actually be punished by judges who see it as a threat to Germany's territorial integrity rather than something to pardon, as well as making coalition-building far more possible; after all, with the looming threat of invasion in the backs of the minds of many (and frequently brought up whenever it's time to allocate money for the army, or finally decide on some important policy), it's far easier to overlook differences in policy.

So, in front of this background, anyone who would actually want something like a series of plebiscites to be held in Alsace-Lorraine, northern Schleswig, what we would call the Sudetenland, and German Poland can't really say it without committing political suicide. France is for the moment not interested in conflict over A-L, and bound by the peace treaty to "not seek forceful re-drawing of the Franco-German border" anyways.

 

The Capitulation
excerpt from "Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen - A History of Hungary - Part VI: 1900-1950"
by Mark Bonder
​

In the face of the military disaster in the west, a reasonable government would consider surrendering, in the hopes of being able to dictate some terms on the basis of their remaining military strength. After all, the Transylvanian Army was still relatively undamaged, and the intervening nations had clearly been expecting a short conflict. As shown previously, such a reasonable government could have emerged from the Budapest regime in response to the continued defeats of the Hungarian Red Army. By the time Budapest was encircled, this possibility was gone; Bela Kun and a handful of radicals were able to escape - by chance, only the more moderate of their party was discovered and captured during their journey to Debreczen - and even as the Black-Red movement erupted into armed rebellions, the only plans made were for further fighting.

On the 10th of November, Lajos Csatay accepted a secret deal with Romania. In exchange for amnesty and a swift release of any soldiers under his command from captivity, he turned west. Bringing 2,400 men he deemed "of exceptional loyalty to the national idea [...] even when this must be placed above the currently-sitting national government" with him, he made his way to Debreczen. The accounts of those present at the meetings between him, the rump government and the chiefs of staff of the Hungarian Red Army are not entirely in agreement. Some claim he demanded a capitulation of the government, and arrested them when they denied him. Others describe "outwardly normal meetings with [...] various ministers, giving no sign that he was intending to arrest them the following morning".

Either way, on the morning of the 14th of November, 1925, Lajos Csatay announced that the Soviet government had been arrested for treason and ordered all Hungarian soldiers to cease offensive action. By that evening, an armistice was in effect. Twenty-four hours after the armistice began, the capitulation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic was formally announced. Sporadic fighting would continue for almost three weeks, especially in some areas around Budapest, as Red Army militias continued to resist, and the occasional encounter between advancing interventionist forces and demobilizing Hungarian troops led to brief skirmishes.

Describing his motives in his memoirs, Lajos Csatay wrote primarily of a "continuous fear [...] that Hungary would need to be bled white" to rid itself of the Soviet government, and that "even the most extreme of actions seemed justified [...] by their necessity to protect Hungary, the nation, and the Hungarian people, from destruction". He would go on to play an important role in the full demobilization of Hungarian forces, and then in their reconstruction later.

The Post-Intervention Order
excerpt from "Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen - A History of Hungary - Part VI: 1900-1950"
by Mark Bonder
​

After the final collapse of the Soviet regime and the capitulation by Lajos Csatay at Debreczen, the Hungarian Soviet Republic ceased to exist as a state. At the time, two rival governments claimed Hungary, while a Slovak state was forming under Polish influence. In addition to these three new polities, significant areas of the Hungarian Soviet Republic were claimed by the intervening parties - Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes all expanded greatly.

The two Hungarian governments were dependent on occupying foreign powers; Germany (Sopron), and Poland (Visegrad). The name of the former came from the place of its declaration and location of its government's first meeting - technically speaking it was the Republic of Hungary. The second was known as Visegrad Hungary due to its declaration in the town, chosen for its historic status as the site of a congress of the Bohemian, Hungarian and Polish kings. Of the two governments, Sopron was by far the stronger one, both in terms of land and population under its (nominal) control, and in terms of practical authority within its 'borders'. As it had grown from the League for a Free Hungary (a group of anti-Soviet generals, politicians and economic elites) and was entrusted with civil administration of the first areas of Hungary occupied by Germany, it was able to call on a wider range of individuals for its personnel needs as well as having more contacts with which to cooperate when rebuilding state institutions. Despite this relative advantage, Sopron was far from independent. Its actions required the consent of commanders of the occupying German force, and often had to be executed by them as well - Sopron was allowed only a very limited complement of soldiers, with any other armed organization (including a police force possessing firearms) forbidden to them.

Visegrad Hungary was continuously plagued by the tumultuous circumstances of its creation. Declared in response to the already-built Sopron government, its ministers were more haphazardly assembled and several left after only weeks of service; the posts of Defense and Economy were sometimes called the "revolving door ministries" because of the high turnover these positions had. Unlike the Sopron government, it was allowed to assemble a proper military force, though this existed primarily on paper; the 50,000 men of the "Visegrad Army" were almost all PoWs captured by the advancing Polish forces in Slovakia. Some, while technically a soldier of the Visegrad government, remained in PoW camps in Slovakia for the entirety of that government's existence. Visegrad was technically the Kingdom of Hungary; the thirteen-year-old Otto von Habsburg was theoretically in line to become king, but in practice no preparations were made for a coronation or even to bring Habsburgs back into the country.

In the northwest, Czechoslovakia immediately began to reintegrate the regions that came under their control - they were the only of the intervening powers to not occupy a portion of "inner Hungary", though they did have troops in Budapest. Tensions between Czechoslovakia and Poland rose over the region the latter had under its control; the Czechoslovak government saw the Slovak anti-Soviet resistance and institutions as portions of the Czechoslovak Republic, while Poland acknowledged Slovakia as independent. After several months of negotiations, Poland and Czechoslovakia agreed to allow a plebiscite in the region to decide its fate; Czechoslovakia agreed to allow a similar vote in its new eastern territory if the Slovakian result was significantly in favor of independence.

Romania occupied and annexed the remainder of Transylvania, referring to the earlier decision of the National Assembly of Romanians of Transylvania and Hungary to unite with Romania. Beyond this, it occupied Hungarian territory east of the Tisza that had not already fallen under Polish control. Due to the lack of success in, and costly nature of, its various offensives during the intervention, Romania pursued a harsher policy in its occupied area than the others. Its troops were also faced with the task of dealing with the uprisings that had erupted shortly before the collapse of the Soviet regime. After several violent clashes, Germany and Poland mediated and a peaceful solution was found.

Budapest was a nominally internationalized city. In practice, despite the presence of garrisons from each intervening power, German troops controlled the surrounding countryside, all ways into and out of the city, and had roughly twice as many men inside the city as the other powers combined. In practice, Budapest served as a place for the intervening powers to deliberate on what actions would be taken in Hungary - both on a higher level, in terms of occupation length and the best method to rebuild a Hungarian state - and regarding more mundane administrative matters, such as the scheduling of repairs along stretches of railway split by an occupation border.

Starting in December, France and Britain were represented in Budapest; Italy had joined in late November. In February of 1926, the "Final Treaty on Reorganization of the Hungarian State and Reconstruction of a Hungarian Administration" was signed, between the intervening powers, the competing Hungarian governments, and the Slovakian Provisional Government. Hungary west of the Tisza was unified under a single government, which quickly took over day-to-day administration of the country.

What remained to be seen, in the plebiscite to be held on the 15th of March, 1926, was the fate of Slovakia.

---

Alright, this is it, the light at the end of the tunnel. The Hungarian Intervention is done, now. The epilogue, so to speak, may be long or short, but the most relevant bit is the Slovakian Plebiscite. I decided this would be a good point for a reader poll, since it could reasonably go either way. Since this timeline is being posted elsewhere as well, I'll be doing it via a Google Form thing, which is here.

 

I would personally like Slovakia to be part of Czechoslovakia, but I think a free Slovakia is much more original and will allow you to be more creative with the lore.

 

Wow...

These maps are excellent! Great scenario too, I enjoyed scrolling through the thread. Were these maps made in Adobe Illustrator.

 

I think both options have some interesting consequences, for sure.

Thanks! The maps are all made in Inkscape; I occasionally use GIMP to touch up a few things do some effects.