E Boats for Sealion

A yes the Department of Petroleum Warfare the originators of the Flame Fougasse. God help any German who triggered one of those!
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The poster whom I was replying to described scorched earth, which is why I referenced operation Alberich, people do not do Alberich on their own territory, even Nazis and Stalinists; moving stuff out of the way, such as Soviet shipment of factories east of the Urals yes, burning farms and poisoning wells, no

No army plans to give booty to the enemy

The British army didn't plan or intend to leave the kit and support infrastructure of 12 divisions for the Germans to feast upon in France in 1940

The British army didn't plan or intend to leave an entire corps worth of fuel depots behind in Greece in April 1941, which the Germans captured in tact, and a division and a half worth of POWs either

They didn't plan to leave all the booty that Rommel took from them the first 18 months of the North African campaign (except maybe the El Adem thing at Gazala which was inexplicable incompetence)

Their planning wasn't even wise enough to transfer all the Luftwaffe POW's the French where holding before they asked for the armistice, returning over 400 crew members to the Luftwaffe who could have been shipped back to Britain and taken off the board (which would have significantly delayed the BOB and diluted the LW pilot pool, rendering the battle far easier and likely shorter)

Keeping in mind that I reject every sealion scenario with any POD after 1935 as being 10,000 percent impossible, I would also just as firmly reject any notion that the British Army of July 1940-October 1940 is the one British army that wouldn't leave booty behind if defeated in battle, even though in the battles before and after with the same leadership structure... they left booty behind, I don't let false nostalgia or victors history blind to me to what was... the dad's army/home guard would not have done anything more against regular army field divisions that Hitler's Volksgrenadier divisions or Stalin's militia divisions
Only we're comparing apples and oranges here, the examples above you gave while valid for the general point about the Brits leaving stuff behind was the regular British army rapidly retreating in a 3rd country to their embarkation point and being rapidly chased by mechanised forces while the infantry followed up and nicked the good stuff (artillery kills you, infantry steal your stuff).

That's not going to happen here because there's not going to be some German blitzkrieg forcing the British troops to drop everything or avoid capture, because what Germans that get there will be a poorly equipped force on foot. There will be no threatened encirclements and cauldrons to flee unencumbered from.

These is no equivalent of the French holding POW's and signing a separate armistice

There is no equivalent of POWs held in Greece and not evacuated off a 3rd country


Any scorched each is going to be sabotaging any domestics facilities so they can's be seized by the Germans, be that ports, or fuel dumps. This will be done because as per above the Germans won't be able to move fast enough to apply enough pressure to stop it.

Maybe the parachute troops can if they land right on top of something, but they can't then stop the RAF from bombing whatever they land on or the RA from shelling it



P.S. while yes it's better to take it with you sometimes you just can't and the Russians burned crops and destroyed other resources while retreating in 1941
 
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How many anecdotes do you want? I can do you nearly starting WW3 by single-handedly invading the USSR.

But we've all done that after a night's drinking, haven't we.
someone always thinks they know a place that serves late, and the beer mission starts
 
snip
Speaking of those inventive chaps at the PWD, during summer 1940 they were working on Operation Lucid. The plan was to load up old tankers with oil, petrol and explosives and then sail them into the invasion ports. Given that the plan involved each ship carrying a thousand tons of fuel it would have been quite spectacular had they worked out the practicalities.
Sir Francis Drake would have agreed to that plan.
 
The poster whom I was replying to described scorched earth, which is why I referenced operation Alberich, people do not do Alberich on their own territory, even Nazis and Stalinists; moving stuff out of the way, such as Soviet shipment of factories east of the Urals yes, burning farms and poisoning wells, no

No army plans to give booty to the enemy

The British army didn't plan or intend to leave the kit and support infrastructure of 12 divisions for the Germans to feast upon in France in 1940

The British army didn't plan or intend to leave an entire corps worth of fuel depots behind in Greece in April 1941, which the Germans captured in tact, and a division and a half worth of POWs either

They didn't plan to leave all the booty that Rommel took from them the first 18 months of the North African campaign (except maybe the El Adem thing at Gazala which was inexplicable incompetence)

Their planning wasn't even wise enough to transfer all the Luftwaffe POW's the French where holding before they asked for the armistice, returning over 400 crew members to the Luftwaffe who could have been shipped back to Britain and taken off the board (which would have significantly delayed the BOB and diluted the LW pilot pool, rendering the battle far easier and likely shorter)

Keeping in mind that I reject every sealion scenario with any POD after 1935 as being 10,000 percent impossible, I would also just as firmly reject any notion that the British Army of July 1940-October 1940 is the one British army that wouldn't leave booty behind if defeated in battle, even though in the battles before and after with the same leadership structure... they left booty behind, I don't let false nostalgia or victors history blind to me to what was... the dad's army/home guard would not have done anything more against regular army field divisions that Hitler's Volksgrenadier divisions or Stalin's militia divisions
What seems clear is your utter contempt for the British, and simply saying you reject Sealion doesn't reflect the arguments you keep postulating. In France the British weren't planning on the French collapsing in six weeks and didn't prioritize the transfer of POW over their own wounded, shocking. The Fall of France, the battles in North Africa and the defence of Britain were very different sets of circumstances. The British actually learned lessons from what happened in France and unlike France or the Middle East there was zero chance of being taken by surprise by any amphibious assault. By September any German troops who somehow got ashore are only getting their hands on British supplies once they reach a convenient POW camp.
 
No they didn't...
I am certain that Dr Paddy Griffith says or certainly gave the impression that the Germans were 'allowed' to cross in an interview I once read

From here?

"A number of senior officers from both sides of the 1940 firing line took part, and some were inevitably a trifle, er, 'surprised' to find that we first allowed the Germans to cross the Channel, and then actually defeated them on land!"

Certainly in the wargame itself the first wave landings were only opposed by MTBs the excuse given that it took a day before the Fleet could arrive - which seems to ignore the difficulties and delay that the Germans could expect in simply forming up the invasion fleet - telegraphing their intensions and giving ample time for the majority of the RN ships to sortie.
 
Certainly in the wargame itself the first wave landings were only opposed by MTBs the excuse given that it took a day before the Fleet could arrive - which seems to ignore the difficulties and delay that the Germans could expect in simply forming up the invasion fleet - telegraphing their intensions and giving ample time for the majority of the RN ships to sortie.
I think it also ignores the other vessels the RN had available in and around the Channel, which was likely more than the KM had supporting the landings. Because Revenge was in the area, and I'm sure there would have been several destroyers too.
 
I am certain that Dr Paddy Griffith says or certainly gave the impression that the Germans were 'allowed' to cross in an interview I once read

From here?

"A number of senior officers from both sides of the 1940 firing line took part, and some were inevitably a trifle, er, 'surprised' to find that we first allowed the Germans to cross the Channel, and then actually defeated them on land!"

Certainly in the wargame itself the first wave landings were only opposed by MTBs the excuse given that it took a day before the Fleet could arrive - which seems to ignore the difficulties and delay that the Germans could expect in simply forming up the invasion fleet - telegraphing their intensions and giving ample time for the majority of the RN ships to sortie.
Genuine question, whereabouts is that quote from? I remember reading an interview with Paddy Griffith some years ago and it looks like this might be from that article, would love to revisit that.
 
Just had a look at Richard Cox's "Operation Sealion" write up of the wargame & it starts with the German forces arriving at the correct beaches at the correct time, which is more than the Allies managed at Normandy, with what seems to be total surprise on the British side then proceeds with the ground & airborne operations.
If that is from Cox's dramatisation of the game it looks a lot different to the original Telegraph writeup. In that the Germans were spotted at 11pm, codeword Cromwell was issued and the RN directed the Home Fleet South immediately. The invasion fleet was attacked by a Cruiser and Destroyers from the west (Portsmouth) and lighter forces including MTBs from Dover. The RN lost the Cruiser and 2 Destroyers, the Kreigsmarine lost 3 Destroyer, in addition the Germans lost 20 barges sunk and 20 cut adrift (from memory it was either 20 of each or 40 of each, I'm getting old, but I've posted the lower figure). It was estimated that at least half of the barges had difficulties landing and/or landed at the wrong location.

Not quite the "the Germans landed unmolested" that people think.

Someone mentioned that the barges would be spotted as they moved down the coast but at most they were expected to take 5 or 6 hours to go from embarkation ports to the start points and most of that journey would have been done via inland water ways. Again I'm thinking of this from memory.

The annoying thing is with these damn threads is that in general we all agree on the final outcome... Sealion failure, but they just get bogged down in unrealistic assumptions and dredging over the same details over and over again. The RN has no need to stop the landings, only to prevent resupply, they knew that, they planned to do it that way, and everything I've read from contemporary documents shows that was the case. The war game in 1974 just confirms that.
 
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Part of the plan for Sealion involved the Germans gathering together the invasion fleet off Calais over a period of three days. Yes, Calais, what you can see from standing on a cliff top with a pair of binoculars. I don't think they'd get the advantage of surprise.
As for the fuel situation once ashore, the Petroleum Warfare Department had already made sure they'd be plenty of petrol waiting for them once they got ashore and started to push inland.
Speaking of those inventive chaps at the PWD, during summer 1940 they were working on Operation Lucid. The plan was to load up old tankers with oil, petrol and explosives and then sail them into the invasion ports. Given that the plan involved each ship carrying a thousand tons of fuel it would have been quite spectacular had they worked out the practicalities.
I think they did try the modern version of a " Hellburner" ( a fireship that was packed with gunpowder) or " fireship" at least once. The problem was since the trip was intended to be one way they chose an old barely sea worthy freighter which didn't work right. If they'd used a more seaworthy ship it might have worked somewhat.

And they obviously used one of those old American 4 pipers loaded with explosives and rammed it into a German occupied french port.
 
The poster whom I was replying to described scorched earth, which is why I referenced operation Alberich, people do not do Alberich on their own territory, even Nazis and Stalinists; moving stuff out of the way, such as Soviet shipment of factories east of the Urals yes, burning farms and poisoning wells, no

No army plans to give booty to the enemy

The British army didn't plan or intend to leave the kit and support infrastructure of 12 divisions for the Germans to feast upon in France in 1940

The British army didn't plan or intend to leave an entire corps worth of fuel depots behind in Greece in April 1941, which the Germans captured in tact, and a division and a half worth of POWs either

They didn't plan to leave all the booty that Rommel took from them the first 18 months of the North African campaign (except maybe the El Adem thing at Gazala which was inexplicable incompetence)

Their planning wasn't even wise enough to transfer all the Luftwaffe POW's the French where holding before they asked for the armistice, returning over 400 crew members to the Luftwaffe who could have been shipped back to Britain and taken off the board (which would have significantly delayed the BOB and diluted the LW pilot pool, rendering the battle far easier and likely shorter)

Keeping in mind that I reject every sealion scenario with any POD after 1935 as being 10,000 percent impossible, I would also just as firmly reject any notion that the British Army of July 1940-October 1940 is the one British army that wouldn't leave booty behind if defeated in battle, even though in the battles before and after with the same leadership structure... they left booty behind, I don't let false nostalgia or victors history blind to me to what was... the dad's army/home guard would not have done anything more against regular army field divisions that Hitler's Volksgrenadier divisions or Stalin's militia divisions
From what I understand once the invasion threat seemed real the Brits did make a successful effort to tightly control civilian petrol supplies in coastal areas deemed likely for invasion. So just driving up to a British petrol pump to refuel wouldn't have been as viable as say during the fall of France.
 
someone always thinks they know a place that serves late, and the beer mission starts
The father of one of my friends was with the 8th army in africa and italy.
In Italy 2 of his friends came back from a nearby village, having had a bellyful of the local vino collapso.
Except the nearby village was still in german hands.
Our 2 heroes had sidestepped that problem by not drinking in places that had germans in them.
 
The father of one of my friends was with the 8th army in africa and italy.
In Italy 2 of his friends came back from a nearby village, having had a bellyful of the local vino collapso.
Except the nearby village was still in german hands.
Our 2 heroes had sidestepped that problem by not drinking in places that had germans in them.
Reminds me of all the incidents in the ACW where US Soldiers would covertly trade with secesh soldiers.

Generally US soldiers would trade Coffee for Rebel Tobacco. And of course booze both ways.
 
What seems clear is your utter contempt for the British, and simply saying you reject Sealion doesn't reflect the arguments you keep postulating. In France the British weren't planning on the French collapsing in six weeks and didn't prioritize the transfer of POW over their own wounded, shocking. The Fall of France, the battles in North Africa and the defence of Britain were very different sets of circumstances. The British actually learned lessons from what happened in France and unlike France or the Middle East there was zero chance of being taken by surprise by any amphibious assault. By September any German troops who somehow got ashore are only getting their hands on British supplies once they reach a convenient POW camp.
sigh, I don't have contempt for their military they where on the good guy team, and they won the war after all

it is more than fair, to say that their immediate prewar and 1st half of war operational and strategic management and competence was poor

The day they declared war on Germany, as one of the foremost industrial worldwide powers... they had built single digit (I have often heard 2 as the actual number) tanks that where competitive with a panzer 3 or 4

After 8 months of mobilization they had produced a field army that was 1/8th as strong as Germany's in infantry and just under 1/10 as strong in tanks, and the retort to that issue is... well we were doing air force and navy; fine the air force didn't stop the Luftwaffe from establishing superiority over france, and it failed to damage or seriously impede any of the German bridge heads or lines of advance, in particular their bomber assaults on the Meuse bridge heads resembled a 1940 charge of the light brigade.

The Dyle plan was not a a complete French invention, the British where the senior partner of the Entente and their troops where the spear head of the Dyle plan. They allowed themselves to suffer a collapse of nerve, and commit grave strategic errors, over reports from 55 year old French reservists that Rommel had "thousands of tanks" breaking through at Dinnat, which was less than 70 miles from British air bases, from which they could have launched recon sorties to verify that in fact there were not 2000 tanks at Dinnat; saying they didn't plan for France to collapse in 6 weeks ignores their own role in not bringing enough to the table to help France fight, and belittles the fact that France took well in excess of 10x the casualties the British did prior to the armistice, Churchill's blaming them is out of style with most modern or independent histories

Although Panzers filling up at local petrol stations did happen and helped the German advance, they had already knifed through to major military depots and captured significant military stocks of fuel and munitions in tact, you could evac all the civilian fuel you want, it doesn't help if the army collapses on itself (France) or has extraordinary lapses in competence and leaves undefended stockpiles where the enemy can get them, (Greece/North Africa)

Telling me they learned lessons from France, but then left an entire corps Fuel depot in tact for the Germans to scoop up in Volos Greece in April 1941 (which the Anzacs didn't carry off or burn on their way out) feels quite incorrect (that depot BTW nourished their entire advance into the peleponese), especially when looking at their follow on behavior about letting supplies fall into enemy hands in North Africa over and over again
 
The Dyle plan was not a a complete French invention, the British where the senior partner of the Entente and their troops where the spear head of the Dyle plan.
The French had about ten times as many troops, they were on the continent but you think the British were the senior partner? Well it's novel viewpoint, I'll give you that.
 
Reminds me of all the incidents in the ACW where US Soldiers would covertly trade with secesh soldiers.

Generally US soldiers would trade Coffee for Rebel Tobacco. And of course booze both ways.
In 44 Transylvania, soviet scouts showed some tendency to have dinner at hungarian field kitchens. Everybody was hungry, tired, and it was dark, so... No need for violence, tin out, soup in, get lost, next.

I have some respect for those guys, first time in Budapest they rode the tram just before the siege instead of walking.
No, they did not had tickets.
 
sigh, I don't have contempt for their military they where on the good guy team, and they won the war after all

it is more than fair, to say that their immediate prewar and 1st half of war operational and strategic management and competence was poor

The day they declared war on Germany, as one of the foremost industrial worldwide powers... they had built single digit (I have often heard 2 as the actual number) tanks that where competitive with a panzer 3 or 4

After 8 months of mobilization they had produced a field army that was 1/8th as strong as Germany's in infantry and just under 1/10 as strong in tanks, and the retort to that issue is... well we were doing air force and navy; fine the air force didn't stop the Luftwaffe from establishing superiority over france, and it failed to damage or seriously impede any of the German bridge heads or lines of advance, in particular their bomber assaults on the Meuse bridge heads resembled a 1940 charge of the light brigade.

The Dyle plan was not a a complete French invention, the British where the senior partner of the Entente and their troops where the spear head of the Dyle plan. They allowed themselves to suffer a collapse of nerve, and commit grave strategic errors, over reports from 55 year old French reservists that Rommel had "thousands of tanks" breaking through at Dinnat, which was less than 70 miles from British air bases, from which they could have launched recon sorties to verify that in fact there were not 2000 tanks at Dinnat; saying they didn't plan for France to collapse in 6 weeks ignores their own role in not bringing enough to the table to help France fight, and belittles the fact that France took well in excess of 10x the casualties the British did prior to the armistice, Churchill's blaming them is out of style with most modern or independent histories

Although Panzers filling up at local petrol stations did happen and helped the German advance, they had already knifed through to major military depots and captured significant military stocks of fuel and munitions in tact, you could evac all the civilian fuel you want, it doesn't help if the army collapses on itself (France) or has extraordinary lapses in competence and leaves undefended stockpiles where the enemy can get them, (Greece/North Africa)

Telling me they learned lessons from France, but then left an entire corps Fuel depot in tact for the Germans to scoop up in Volos Greece in April 1941 (which the Anzacs didn't carry off or burn on their way out) feels quite incorrect (that depot BTW nourished their entire advance into the peleponese), especially when looking at their follow on behavior about letting supplies fall into enemy hands in North Africa over and over again
You do realise that the French army in May 1940 was in the north 100 divisions strong. The BEF was 8 plus 2 lines of communication divisions. The Belgium army was 22 Divisions the Dutch was 9. The British were effectively a junior partner in May 1940.

So yes the French suffered 10x more losses but had a force 10x stronger - go figure

And the German army did not share your opinion in their post battle assessment

The majority of the Civilians in the expected landing zones were evacuated (40% of Kent’s entire population was evacuated by Sept 1940). Given the intense preparation for a German invasion over the best part of 4 months I do not think that the situation in South East England matches that of the BEF at Dunkirk / France or the ANZACs in Greece.

All defeated army’s leave vast amounts of kit behind even the Germans.

As for tanks Britain had built 2 Matilda IIs by Sept 39 - perhaps that's what you are thinking about?

They had built other tanks such as the A9 and A10

Britain started rearming for a return to the continent in late 38 / early 39 and did not start conscription until May 39 - they were never going to remotely match a continental army in a single year - it takes 3 and a half years.
 
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