Dystopian Pre Industrial Societies/States

Was it really that awful? I thought much of the Inquisition is misinterpreted due to pop culture?
It also seems to have played a role in reducing the number of witchcraft trials in the countries where it operated, which should probably be taken into account when assessing how bad it was.
Yes, the Spanish Inquisition did not murder as many people as popularly suggested. It was still part of an institution of forced religious conformity that was intended to keep religious minorities rigidly in line, and was--contrary to what I've seen some people suggest in this very thread--not something universal across pre-industrial states.
I never said that the Spanish Inquisition (or local analogue) was "universal across pre-industrial states", I said that every society has a set of views which you aren't allowed to express. Including modern society, of course -- expressing support for, e.g., Holocaust denialism or scientific racism can get you ostracised and fired from your job in virtually any Western society, and potentially (depending on jurisdiction) even sent to prison -- but it would be absurd to say that the modern West is a dystopia of forced conformity intended to keep minorities rigidly in line.
And it was bad enough that there is correlational evidence linking the presence of the Spanish Inquisition to social problems in the present day.
Has that finding actually held up, or is it another casualty of the replication crisis?
 
At least the last two examples could also be explained by the monarchs in question still hoping to get even more from the eventual peace deal if they fought on. Such behaviour isn't exactly uncommon in wars. Sometimes it pays off, as with the Romans in the Second Punic War; sometimes it doesn't, as with Napoleon post-Leipzig.
Do explain how The Winter King was ever going to do better than keeping The Palatinate?

The Swedes inflicted countless defeats on their enemies far worse than Nordlingen. Their enemies swiftly recovered. One Nordlingen and Sweden was fucked and only just about managed to limp on as a useful cats paw to the French (who were never going to allow them to be too successful). Sweden just didnt have the resources of any of the major players. Gustav Adolf was delusional about his strategic position and this delusion was in large part due to his religious convictions.

If The Hapsburgs had made a separate peace with Sweden they could have focussed everything on France and would likely have emerged from the war in a much stronger position than they began it. Fighting on two fronts is not a move.

At the end of the day No One came out of the 30 years war well. France and Sweden gained territory, but the price of victory was catastrophic civil war in France and similar events narrowly avoided in Sweden by a disastrous invasion of Poland. Usually where such an outcome is looming people make peace, however religion got in the way. This is argued by Peter Wilson.
 
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Anyway, one doesn't subjugate most of Central Mexico in half a century without high intensity warfare.
When the societies you are subjugating are not very militaristic you can.
Well no, not in the middle of combat, but they'd still be replaceable.

(Also the Aztecs gave every male in their society basic military training from a young age.)
So, lets get this straight. After a few minutes of close quarter combat the main weapon of the warrior elite is no better than a wooden club any peasant can have. Every male peasant has military training. And the warrior elite dont have horses and the strategic mobility they provide (Horses are the symbol of nobility everywhere because the strategic mobility they provide was usually the main factor enabling a warrior elite to dominate the rest of society).

Under these conditions it is absolutely impossible for a warrior elite to wield the sort of power held by the Prussian Junkers.
 
Do explain how The Winter King was ever going to do better than keeping The Palatinate?

The Swedes inflicted countless defeats on their enemies far worse than Nordlingen. Their enemies swiftly recovered. One Nordlingen and Sweden was fucked and only just about managed to limp on as a useful cats paw to the French (who were never going to allow them to be too successful). Sweden just didnt have the resources of any of the major players. Gustav Adolf was delusional about his strategic position and this delusion was in large part due to his religious convictions.

If The Hapsburgs had made a separate peace with Sweden they could have focussed everything on France and would likely have emerged from the war in a much stronger position than they began it. Fighting on two fronts is not a move.

At the end of the day No One came out of the 30 years war well. France and Sweden gained territory, but the price of victory was catastrophic civil war in France and similar events narrowly avoided in Sweden by a disastrous invasion of Poland. Usually where such an outcome is looming people make peace, however religion got in the way. This is argued by Peter Wilson.
I specifically said the last two examples, i.e., not the one with Frederick of Bohemia. He, I grant you, does seem to have been motivated by religion, although since he didn't play any major role after the Imperialists occupied his territory I don't think his decision had much to do with the middle and later stages of the war.

As for your second two paragraphs, of course it's easy to say with the benefit of hindsight that the combatants should have done this or that, but that doesn't mean that it was obvious at the time, much less that it was so obvious that we need to resort to religious fanaticism as an explanation (as opposed to, say, the natural tendency of human beings to overestimate their own talents and luck). And I'd dispute the idea that nobody came out of the war well. France managed to prevent the Hapsburgs from dominating the Holy Roman Empire, thereby saving their country from Hapsburg encirclement and achieving something which had been a major object of French foreign policy for a century and a half. Sweden, which before the war had been regarded as a second- or third-rate power, was catapulted to the foremost rank of European states, although in the event they weren't able to maintain this position.
 
it's easy to say with the benefit of hindsight that the combatants should have done this or that, but that doesn't mean that it was obvious at the time, much less that it was so obvious that we need to resort to religious fanaticism as an explanation (as opposed to, say, the natural tendency of human beings to overestimate their own talents and luck).
But it was obvious to many of the protagonists at the time. For example, we have the letters of Gabriel Oxenstierna (Brother to Axel, member of the privy council, head of the Swedish judicial system) to everyone who mattered in the Swedish government repeatedly and emphatically urging what I suggested. Pretty much all the German Princes 'Allied' to Gustav Adoph said the same.

When Gustav Adolph spoke of his talents and luck he always referenced God.
France managed to prevent the Hapsburgs from dominating the Holy Roman Empire, thereby saving their country from Hapsburg encirclement and achieving something which had been a major object of French foreign policy for a century and a half. Sweden, which before the war had been regarded as a second- or third-rate power, was catapulted to the foremost rank of European states, although in the event they weren't able to maintain this position.
France was offered far better terms in 1645 than they finally got in 1659 (most of the Spanish Netherlands and Catalonia). Had they made this separate peace with Spain then they could have redirected their forces and done well at Wesphalia. But they didn't. The strain of the protracted war which went on long after Westphalia triggered a disastrous civil war in France which left a million dead, ruined the decisive position they were in and ensured that they gained no territory from Spain.

The Hapsburgs were always a paper tiger - climate change was ravaging Spain to the point that they couldn't sustain high intensity warfare. Hapsburg 'encirclement' and the idea of House Hapsburg as a unified force and a serious hegemonic threat stems from Protestant propaganda and has been debunked by modern research.

Sweden earned the emnity of everyone and basically became a French vassal. Had they made peace after Breitenfeld they would have made friends in Germany. Swedish standing in Europe and the stability of the Swedish Empire would have been much stronger. They would have been in a position to conquer Denmark-Norway while the Dutch were occupied - which is what they really had to do if they wanted to make it as a great power.
 
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France was offered far better terms in 1645 than they finally got in 1659 (most of the Spanish Netherlands and Catalonia). Had they made this separate peace with Spain then they could have redirected their forces and done well at Wesphalia. But they didn't. The strain of the protracted war which went on long after Westphalia triggered a disastrous civil war in France which left a million dead, ruined the decisive position they were in and ensured that they gained no territory from Spain.
This is a point against your main argument, though: France and Spain were both Catholic, so France's decision to fight on after they should have made peace clearly wasn't a religiously-motivated one.
 
This is a point against your main argument, though: France and Spain were both Catholic, so France's decision to fight on after they should have made peace clearly wasn't a religiously-motivated one.
In the case of France of course the decision to keep fighting Spain wasnt influenced by Religion. I was making the point that France didnt come out well. (Of course if Sweden had made peace after Breitenfeld, France would never have had the chance to stick their beak into Germany. The last letter of Gustav Adolph to Axel Oxenstierna stressed the importance of ensuring that the final peace did not involve France gaining territory in the Empire)

Sweden and Austria kept fighting when it was in their interest to make peace and religion played a major role in these decisions. Peter Wilson argues this.

How about the Edict of Restitution? Without that (or with it abandoned when the consequences became clear) Austria could have secured a much earlier peace which put them in a much stronger position. Loads of Austrian notables urged the Emperor to abandon the Edict. But he wouldn't because: religion.
 
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In the case of France of course the decision to keep fighting Spain wasnt influenced by Religion. I was making the point that France didnt come out well. (Of course if Sweden had made peace after Breitenfeld, France would never have had the chance to stick their beak into Germany. The last letter of Gustav Adolph to Axel Oxenstierna stressed the importance of ensuring that the final peace did not involve France gaining territory in the Empire)

Sweden and Austria kept fighting when it was in their interest to make peace and religion played a major role in these decisions. Peter Wilson argues this.

How about the Edict of Restitution? Without that (or with it abandoned when the consequences became clear) Austria could have secured a much earlier peace which put them in a much stronger position. Loads of Austrian notables urged the Emperor to abandon the Edict. But he wouldn't because: religion.
Well, I'd argue that France still came out well, even if it missed the chance to come out even better by making an earlier peace with Spain.

But I think we might be closer to agreement than we seem. I'm not denying that religion played a role in people's decision-making, I just think that the common argument that the Thirty Years' War was unusually brutal because it was a religious war is overly-simplified. Whilst religion was definitely a factor in certain states joining the war (although not the only factor, as France and Saxony show), and was probably a factor in some states keeping up hostilities when it would have been better to seek peace, any effect on the war's brutality was mostly indirect, by making the war bigger and longer than it would otherwise have been and so spreading the misery further. The actual soldiers and generals don't seem to have behaved noticeably differently to their counterparts in other 17th-century wars. Louis XIV's troops, for example, ravaged occupied territory just as much as Wallenstein's and Gustavus', although since none of Louis' wars lasted as long as the Thirty Years' War the total devastation was less.
 

Fabius Maximus

I guess we are closer to agreement that may have seemed. I would just like to make two responses:

1: The 30 years war resulted in serious military developments. Some of these with the intention of avoiding similar horrors. National armies came to replace mercenary armies and 'Absolutist' top down control and discipline to an extent not existing previously was implemented - justified on the express rationale of avoiding 'the excesses of the common soldiery'. Though Peter Wilson argues this was cynical propaganda and the excesses of the 30 years war were primarily driven by commanders rather than soldiers or junior officers, the fact is that later 17th century wars were less destructive and I think this was for more reasons than their length. In the English Civil wars there were extensive negotiations re codes of war with the express purpose of avoiding 'German Barbarism'

2. The most destructive phase of the war was immediately post Breitenfeld while the Swedish army was still running on Protestant Fanaticism. As the Swedish Army became germanised and multiconfessional the destructiveness of the war decreased (source: Peter Wilson)
 
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It also seems to have played a role in reducing the number of witchcraft trials in the countries where it operated, which should probably be taken into account when assessing how bad it was.
Please elaborate.
I never said that the Spanish Inquisition (or local analogue) was "universal across pre-industrial states", I said that every society has a set of views which you aren't allowed to express. Including modern society, of course -- expressing support for, e.g., Holocaust denialism or scientific racism can get you ostracised and fired from your job in virtually any Western society, and potentially (depending on jurisdiction) even sent to prison -- but it would be absurd to say that the modern West is a dystopia of forced conformity intended to keep minorities rigidly in line.
This is a little like saying that no society allows treason in response to someone raising the point that Saudi Arabia considers apostasy a crime against the state. It is technically true, but there is such a large practical difference that it is really not comparable.
Has that finding actually held up, or is it another casualty of the replication crisis?
Neither, since it was published in August... of this year. Which is not soon enough for things to be determined either way.

However, since this is a geographic correlation survey studying all of Spain, for it to be impossible to replicate is, in my opinion, rather unlikely--they pulled a huge number of the Inquisition's records across its entire existence and used data for all of Spain. While there may be methodological issues with the paper, this isn't a failure to replicate per se--there's little reason to think that if you ran the same experiment again you'd get a different result, because they sampled about half of the estimated value of the Inquisition's proceedings.
 

Citrakayah


When the Church was at the height of its power (11th-14th centuries) very few witches died. Persecutions did not reach epidemic levels until after the Reformation, when the Catholic Church had lost its position as Europe’s indisputable moral authority. Moreover most of the killing was done by secular courts. Church courts tried many witches but they usually imposed non-lethal penalties. A witch might be excommunicated, given penance, or imprisoned, but she was rarely killed. The Inquisition almost invariably pardoned any witch who confessed and repented.
...
in Spain the Inquisition worked diligently to keep witch trials to a minimum. Around 1609, a French witch-craze triggered a panic in the Basque regions of Spain. Gustav Henningsen (The Witches’ Advocate) documented the Inquisition’s work in brilliant detail. Although several inquisitors believed the charges, one skeptic convinced La Suprema (the ruling body of the Spanish Inquisition) that this was groundless hysteria. La Suprema responded by issuing an “Edict of Silence” forbidding all discussion of witchcraft. For, as the skeptical inquisitor noted, “There were neither witches nor bewitched until they were talked and written about.”

The Edict worked, quickly dissipating the panic and accusations. And until the end of the Great Hunt, the Spanish Inquisition insisted that it alone had the right to condemn witches — which it refused to do. Another craze broke out in Vizcaya, in 1616. When the Inquisition re-issued the Edict of Silence, the secular authorities went over their head and petitioned the king for the right to try witches themselves. The king granted the request, and 289 people were quickly sentenced. Fortunately the Inquisition managed to re-assert its monopoly on trials and dismissed all the charges. The “witches” of Cataluna were not so lucky. Secular authorities managed to execute 300 people before the Inquisition could stop the trials.
Source - has Post Grad qualifications in history with a specialism in the Witch Hunts
 

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Fabius Maximus

I guess we are closer to agreement that may have seemed. I would just like to make two responses:

1: The 30 years war resulted in serious military developments. Some of these with the intention of avoiding similar horrors. National armies came to replace mercenary armies and 'Absolutist' top down control and discipline to an extent not existing previously was implemented - justified on the express rationale of avoiding 'the excesses of the common soldiery'. Though Peter Wilson argues this was cynical propaganda and the excesses of the 30 years war were primarily driven by commanders rather than soldiers or junior officers, the fact is that later 17th century wars were less destructive and I think this was for more reasons than their length. In the English Civil wars there were extensive negotiations re codes of war with the express purpose of avoiding 'German Barbarism'

2. The most destructive phase of the war was immediately post Breitenfeld while the Swedish army was still running on Protestant Fanaticism. As the Swedish Army became germanised and multiconfessional the destructiveness of the war decreased (source: Peter Wilson)
It's been a while since I read Europe's Tragedy, so I can't remember enough to comment on his arguments. But they're not the only position among historians; e.g., John Childs in Warfare in the Seventeenth Century argues that, whilst the collection of "contributions" from occupied areas became more organised during the second half of the century, it didn't become less brutal, and the civilian experience in (for example) the Ravaging of the Palatinate or the French invasions of the Netherlands and Catalonia was comparable to that during the Thirty Years' War.
Please elaborate.
What @Wesley_Lewt said.
This is a little like saying that no society allows treason in response to someone raising the point that Saudi Arabia considers apostasy a crime against the state. It is technically true, but there is such a large practical difference that it is really not comparable.
So just to clarify, is your objection to the Spanish Inquisition:

(a) No society should have any beliefs which it's taboo to express/question;
(b) Societies can have beliefs which it's taboo to express/question, but religious beliefs shouldn't be among them;
(c) Societies can have beliefs which it's taboo to express/question, but these taboos should be maintained through informal social mechanisms (e.g., shunning, ostracism) rather than through formal judicial mechanisms;
(d) Societies can have beliefs which it's taboo to express/question, and these taboos can be maintained through formal judicial mechanisms, but breaking taboos should only ever be punished with non-capital penalties (fines, imprisonment, etc.)?
Neither, since it was published in August... of this year. Which is not soon enough for things to be determined either way.

However, since this is a geographic correlation survey studying all of Spain, for it to be impossible to replicate is, in my opinion, rather unlikely--they pulled a huge number of the Inquisition's records across its entire existence and used data for all of Spain. While there may be methodological issues with the paper, this isn't a failure to replicate per se--there's little reason to think that if you ran the same experiment again you'd get a different result, because they sampled about half of the estimated value of the Inquisition's proceedings.
There are more reasons why a result might fail to replicate than simple sampling bias. Regardless, I was using "replication crisis" as a synecdoche for all the various widespread methodological problems which reduce the reliability of social sciences research.
 
So just to clarify, is your objection to the Spanish Inquisition:


(a) No society should have any beliefs which it's taboo to express/question;
(b) Societies can have beliefs which it's taboo to express/question, but religious beliefs shouldn't be among them;
(c) Societies can have beliefs which it's taboo to express/question, but these taboos should be maintained through informal social mechanisms (e.g., shunning, ostracism) rather than through formal judicial mechanisms;
(d) Societies can have beliefs which it's taboo to express/question, and these taboos can be maintained through formal judicial mechanisms, but breaking taboos should only ever be punished with non-capital penalties (fines, imprisonment, etc.)?
B and C. And informal social mechanisms shouldn't include killing people either, I will add for the sake of completeness.

Why are you going to such lengths to underplay the Inquisition, here?
There are more reasons why a result might fail to replicate than simple sampling bias. Regardless, I was using "replication crisis" as a synecdoche for all the various widespread methodological problems which reduce the reliability of social sciences research.
Okay, can you see any methodological problems in the paper which cast doubt upon it? If not, why do you doubt it? Do you doubt all research that comes from the social sciences?
 
Yes, the Spanish Inquisition did not murder as many people as popularly suggested. It was still part of an institution of forced religious conformity that was intended to keep religious minorities rigidly in line, and was--contrary to what I've seen some people suggest in this very thread--not something universal across pre-industrial states. And it was bad enough that there is correlational evidence linking the presence of the Spanish Inquisition to social problems in the present day.
I find the entire premise of the article very weird, you are looking at density of inquistional trials and comparing it to modern data while ignoring the fact that urbanization means that a lot of the Spanish population has been shuffled around or concentrated in places that in the past would have had far smaller population and thus locally lower densities of inquistional events(because the modern municipalities are generally smaller in urban areas and the density of inquisitions is NOT population adjusted, either for the past or today).

If what I said above is not wrong then essentially a lot if not most of this correlation should be purely a function of the modern size of municipalities caused by urbanization.
Smaller municipalities = lower amounts of inquistions in the past and smaller municipalities = higher modern urbanization = higher GDP which creates the correlation.

I hope I'm not wrong, I'll keep reading to make sure.
 
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If you look at their methods, they state that they attempt to compare similar geographic units.
I'm not really privy on non-basic statistics but I can't help but note the fact they keep repeatedly pushing their own interpretation and views before the data and at the end of the day the actual effect is factually very marginal(5-10% difference in median or average nominal GDP per capita and education).
: In places with no persecution, median GDP per capita was 19,450€; where the Inquisition was active in more than 3 years out of 4, it is below 18,000€. For a municipality with average GDP per capita, a one standard deviation increase in inquisitorial intensity (0.058) is associated with a 330€ decline in average annual income per capita, while going from the 75% to the 99% percentile reduces income by 1,428€. Our estimates imply that, had Spain not suffered from the Inquisition, its annual national production today would be 4.1% higher – or 811€ for every man, woman, and child.
Once we control for our standard set of covariates and fixed effects, going from no exposure to the Inquisition to half of all years being affected by persecutions would reduce the share of the population receiving higher education today by 2.7 percentage points, relative to a mean of 47.5 percentage points – a 5.6% relative reduction. Tables A.6 and A.7 provide full results for alternative specifications and outcome measures.
Obviously the article still fails to address the fact people moved around a lot in the last 2 centuries if not before(especially considering the small municipal areas), I guess the land/soil remembers the persecution and not the people...
 
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I'm not really privy on non-basic statistics but I can't help but note the fact they keep repeatedly pushing their own interpretation and views before the data and at the end of the day the actual effect is factually very marginal(5-10% difference in median or average nominal GDP per capita and education).
: In places with no persecution, median GDP per capita was 19,450€; where the Inquisition was active in more than 3 years out of 4, it is below 18,000€. For a municipality with average GDP per capita, a one standard deviation increase in inquisitorial intensity (0.058) is associated with a 330€ decline in average annual income per capita, while going from the 75% to the 99% percentile reduces income by 1,428€. Our estimates imply that, had Spain not suffered from the Inquisition, its annual national production today would be 4.1% higher – or 811€ for every man, woman, and child.
Once we control for our standard set of covariates and fixed effects, going from no exposure to the Inquisition to half of all years being affected by persecutions would reduce the share of the population receiving higher education today by 2.7 percentage points, relative to a mean of 47.5 percentage points – a 5.6% relative reduction. Tables A.6 and A.7 provide full results for alternative specifications and outcome measures.
Alright, look. This was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Peer review isn't flawless, but it did pass it, and you've admitted that you don't know enough statistics to bring up any methodological issues--the most you can do is note that the effect is small (but people care quite a lot about a roughly five percent increase in GDP).

I'm going to suggest that you might want to seriously consider that several centuries worth of religious persecution that only ended a couple centuries ago may have effects in the present day.
Obviously the article still fails to address the fact people moved around a lot in the last 2 centuries if not before(especially considering the small municipal areas), I guess the land/soil remembers the persecution and not the people...
By all means, produce evidence demonstrating that the scale of movement was so massive as to make this a nonsensical argument, keeping in mind that even if a lot of people, total, move around, if not enough move around at once they and their offspring will end up acculturating.
 
B and C. And informal social mechanisms shouldn't include killing people either, I will add for the sake of completeness.
Well (b) just seems kind of arbitrary to me, particularly since, for many modern people, politics plays the same psychological role as religion did in the past. As for (c), I'd rather be investigated by the Inquisition than be ostracised by my neighbours, as at least with the Inquisition I'd have a chance to prove my innocence.
Why are you going to such lengths to underplay the Inquisition, here?
Because I find the Black Legend kind of annoying.
Alright, look. This was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Peer review isn't flawless, but it did pass it, and you've admitted that you don't know enough statistics to bring up any methodological issues--the most you can do is note that the effect is small (but people care quite a lot about a roughly five percent increase in GDP).
Passing peer review doesn't mean that a paper's methodologically sound. It may be that the reviewers just didn't have the time/interest to look into the methodology closely, or that they thought the paper's conclusions were interesting and so applied lower standards.
By all means, produce evidence demonstrating that the scale of movement was so massive as to make this a nonsensical argument, keeping in mind that even if a lot of people, total, move around, if not enough move around at once they and their offspring will end up acculturating.
Surely the paper's authors should have been the ones to do this?
 
Alright, look. This was published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Peer review isn't flawless, but it did pass it, and you've admitted that you don't know enough statistics to bring up any methodological issues--the most you can do is note that the effect is small .
I can easily question the methodology and claims which is what I did, what I can't do is read the finer results and regression statistics which may or may not matter given the basic idea behind the thesis is on shaky grounds.
On the purely statistic side I can try and make tentative question about whether they actually account for population density(to me it seems they corrected for raw population figures), why the R^2 of the trust-inquisitional density correlation and some other correlations is so low.
Another argument is if it really makes sense to exclude the 14-15 tribunal cities just because of potential bias when the argument is that the inquisition instilled fear and you'd think being near of where people were sentenced and maybe executed(I imagine people weren't executed back in their home village but maybe I'm wrong) would make those cities strongly subservient on this front.
I'm going to suggest that you might want to seriously consider that several centuries worth of religious persecution that only ended a couple centuries ago may have effects in the present day.
The authors clearly set up to prove their beliefs and this small effect what they ended up with, clearly it doesn't seem to have an actual large effect even if we say there are no issues with it.
But there are many factors that could make the analysis even more shaky, for example their GDP per capita figures derive from "nightlight" because they don't actually have GDP data for 3/4 of the municipalities.
By all means, produce evidence demonstrating that the scale of movement was so massive as to make this a nonsensical argument,
Well we would need to define what massive means first, the average modern municipality has an area of 60-70km2 and would have had a population of 1000-2000 people so at this point even marital ties or small distance migration between 2 municipalities, one that had a larger amount of trials and one that had a smaller amount, would muddy the results which makes sense considering how patchy the distribution is, also to consider is the cumulative impact of plagues, famine, coastal raids and warfare in the 1500-1800 period and then urbanization and industrialization.

keeping in mind that even if a lot of people, total, move around, if not enough move around at once they and their offspring will end up acculturating.
I don't see the logic in people quickly forgetting or starting to care about the inquisition just because it happens or doesn't happen in the immediate vicinity or that the supposed cultural transmission is this immediate and this complete.
If the inquisition was so effective in instigating fear in the wide population through relatively few trials(On average 1 trial per 10000 people a year? Or 1 per 5000 during the peak period in the mid 16th century?), it's weird that we are assuming that it only worked on a temporal axis for generations and not spatially beyond 10km from your location.
 
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