DWBI-Invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese in 1941?

*This is my first DBWI thread, so if I make any immature mistakes please let me know!:)

After reading several books on the Pacific War it seems that the Japanese were planning to invade the Philippines during their land/resource grab in Southeast Asia :eek: apparently because the islands were directly across their Home Islands and the Southern Resource Area! Now in history as we know it of course the Japanese never invaded, but what will have happened if they did? Personally I think it will have turned into a bloodbath for the Rising Aun, after all MacArthur was well stocked with supplies and will probably have ample time to prepare? Not to mention ticking off the greatest industrial power on the planet? It was insane for them to bypass the threat of the Philippines but they will have to be even more crazy to take on the U.S.! But what will the repercussions of this be had they tried? What will the effect of the U.S. joining the war right then have on the course of the European War?

Anyone's thought are welcomed!:)
 
*This is my first DBWI thread, so if I make any immature mistakes please let me know!:)

After reading several books on the Pacific War it seems that the Japanese were planning to invade the Philippines during their land/resource grab in Southeast Asia :eek: apparently because the islands were directly across their Home Islands and the Southern Resource Area! Now in history as we know it of course the Japanese never invaded, but what will have happened if they did? Personally I think it will have turned into a bloodbath for the Rising Aun, after all MacArthur was well stocked with supplies and will probably have ample time to prepare? Not to mention ticking off the greatest industrial power on the planet? It was insane for them to bypass the threat of the Philippines but they will have to be even more crazy to take on the U.S.! But what will the repercussions of this be had they tried? What will the effect of the U.S. joining the war right then have on the course of the European War?

Anyone's thought are welcomed!:)

The Japanese give up the ghost quicker if the US steps in. As it stands, they had to cry Uncle when the USSR, fresh from paying the butcher's bill for Hitler's Insanity, decided to smash them to shit and back for even more influence and prestige (revenge for Russo-Japanese War).

Even if Uncle Joe didn't do it, they were losing in Asia. The Allies managed to pry the resource area from them a year before then, and then were mostly freeing Indochina due to a ammo starved and slowly food starved IJA when Stalin announced the fuckening upon Nippon with his crack and pissed Red Army. So most likely a less Red Asia, and a bigger West Germany and no Red Austria. Probably no North and South Italy to boot.

Plus a far less painful butchers bill and it's not as likely that the USSR would have a coop military due to manpower issues.

Also our name wouldn't be mud for the next three decades in the west.
 
The Japanese give up the ghost quicker if the US steps in. As it stands, they had to cry Uncle when the USSR, fresh from paying the butcher's bill for Hitler's Insanity, decided to smash them to shit and back for even more influence and prestige (revenge for Russo-Japanese War).

Even if Uncle Joe didn't do it, they were losing in Asia. The Allies managed to pry the resource area from them a year before then, and then were mostly freeing Indochina due to a ammo starved and slowly food starved IJA when Stalin announced the fuckening upon Nippon with his crack and pissed Red Army. So most likely a less Red Asia, and a bigger West Germany and no Red Austria. Probably no North and South Italy to boot.

Plus a far less painful butchers bill and it's not as likely that the USSR would have a coop military due to manpower issues.

Also our name wouldn't be mud for the next three decades in the west.

Italics are OOC.

Why will the IJA be resource-starved? They did have the entire Southern Resource Area and facing off the Kido Butai will only be the British Navy, which the Japanese have local superiority over. By the time the Soviets and Nazis beat each other to a pulp I can easily see Stalin unleashing his elite troops on Japan to reagain lost prestige and credibility....but Red Europe? Without sufficient logistics and a bigger casualty count?.....pls elaborate?


Ummm, did you come from one of those Communist propaganda schools we hear about every so often? The temporary uprisings in Italy and Austria was ruthlessly crushed by the Nazis, and they managed to fight the Soviets to a standstill, but that didn't stop them from imploding a decade later....but that's neither here nor there. The gamble to crush the Japanese who are suffering massive attrition on land against the ever-improving Chinese forces worked spectacularly, to be sure, and did a lot to restore national pride and confidence in the wrecked country. The co-op military in the Red Army was the first of its kind, and was only brought by the desperation of the situation, hell, if the Nazis did the same who knows where we will be....

If by the "Allies" you mean the British Commonwealth and the numerous gureilla groups they funded then I guess they were a significant thorn in the Japanese Empire's side, but they weren't close at all to recapturing the Southern Resource Area. Although the terrain in Indochina is a heaven for gureilla fighters.....

But what sorts of PODs will be needed to bring about an invasion of the Philippines?
 
OOC: Where on earth did you get "Red Europe" from in my post? I had a more westward Iron Curtain, not Red Europe.. Imagine about half to 2/3s of the US Occupation going to the DDR instead, and Austria being drawn whole hog. Northern Italy being about where the Germans were in 1944, september or so. The USSR had to do more of the legwork after all.

And Japan was essentially on a shoestring budget for much of their campaigns, and that resource area can only help so much in terms of their resource shortage.

Also nice work in essentially dismissing my entire post.:mad:
 
.....

But what sorts of PODs will be needed to bring about an invasion of the Philippines?

Not a big one. Like you wrote it was seriously considered. The main debate in Tojos cabinet was the real attiude of the US. Roosevelts policy had been clear, but the new administration was ambigious. They still responded to the China lobby & were still cooperating with the British embargos vs Japan, but were also reversing the US military mobilization & dropping hints about a way out. As it was they correctly guessed the Isolationists & other 'Firsters' would leave the Brits and Soviets hanging.
 
Well, as shown by the US doctrine of the pre-emptive strike when they eventually launched their assault from the PI, MacArthur would have used his B-17s to hit the Japanese air bases before they could launch attacks. Meanwhile US submarines would be hunting down any invasion fleets.
 
I'll buy off on the sizable US sub fleet damaging a invasion fleet, but not on the big bomber strike. We have pleanty of data prepared by the Brits, from both theirs and German/Italian records on the number of bombers it takes to get a effective strike; or more accurately - series of strikes. I've never bought off on the idea the B17 was some sort of mega bomber. the Brits acquired a few & while they had better high altitude performance their payload and accuracy was not significantly better than any others.

By late 1941 the Far Easter Air Force on PI had nearly 50 B17 & half that many B18 Bolos. Using British analysis the 50 or 60 B17s would have been a annoyance & spectacular propaganda. But the actual damage over a few days, or months would have been negligible. Beyond that the new administration in Washington was demobilizing & its very unlikely any additional bombers would be sent to PI. Folks like to point to the several hundred still in the US in early 1942, but they pass lightly over the fact that 45% of those were grounded and not combat worthy. The orders for the parts needed to upgrade them to combat worthiness and resolve some problems had been canceled shortly after the new administration came into office.
 
Actually going by war studies conducted after the war the US Admiralty believed it could end Japan by 1945 on the seas and with the Japanese grabbing too much then the sub fleet and the big fleet could've ended it pretty darn quickly (2-4 years)

Also the US was the biggest supporter of China, where do you think the experience from the M17 rifle was designed from? A void?:D

Silly Brits.
 
I'll buy off on the sizable US sub fleet damaging a invasion fleet, but not on the big bomber strike. We have pleanty of data prepared by the Brits, from both theirs and German/Italian records on the number of bombers it takes to get a effective strike; or more accurately - series of strikes. I've never bought off on the idea the B17 was some sort of mega bomber. the Brits acquired a few & while they had better high altitude performance their payload and accuracy was not significantly better than any others.

By late 1941 the Far Easter Air Force on PI had nearly 50 B17 & half that many B18 Bolos. Using British analysis the 50 or 60 B17s would have been a annoyance & spectacular propaganda. But the actual damage over a few days, or months would have been negligible. Beyond that the new administration in Washington was demobilizing & its very unlikely any additional bombers would be sent to PI. Folks like to point to the several hundred still in the US in early 1942, but they pass lightly over the fact that 45% of those were grounded and not combat worthy. The orders for the parts needed to upgrade them to combat worthiness and resolve some problems had been canceled shortly after the new administration came into office.

I'm not sure about the subs either. Weren't there some tests performed on some surplus torpedoes a few years later that the USN was expending and the results showed that the US torpedoes of that time period had some serious design flaws?
 
Alright let's all agree on one thing, if Japan went to war the US would've lost the Phillipennea due to prewar planning (ironically which became the basis for Australia, India, NZ, and UK plans on Japan.) that making Japan stretch would've been te only course to win the war.

To answer the sub problems, it's probably no worse than the Kriegsmarine toro problems of te Norway campaign. But by 1941, less than a year later those problems were fixed. How long would it take to fix those issues, 6 to 8 months at best

Plus the US was assembling a quite impressive fleet at the time. From 1943 onwards Japan's only option was to bend over and the US used it quite well

Look at the 'battle' of the South China Sea when the Japanese attacked a convoy protected by the Des Moine and a Cleveland plus four destroyers in a case of bad timing. They had 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light, and 6 torp boats they call destroyers.

Result:
1 US destroyer sunk, light damage on heavy units, Cleveland damaged irreparably
1 Japanese heavy sunk, a light which blew up after a salvo, 2 destroyers sunk.

Yamamoto made te right call in 1941 to attack Singapore
 
They might have a chance to win. But it depends on how will they deal with the US Navy.

If they are insane enough, they could actually try their luck and launch a preemptive strike at Pearl Harbor. :eek:
 
They might have a chance to win. But it depends on how will they deal with the US Navy.

If they are insane enough, they could actually try their luck and launch a preemptive strike at Pearl Harbor. :eek:

I counter, US building program that made enough ships for 2 Japanese navies that was ongoing.
 
I'm not sure about the subs either. Weren't there some tests performed on some surplus torpedoes a few years later that the USN was expending and the results showed that the US torpedoes of that time period had some serious design flaws?

Those were the Mk14 models. The US sub base at Cavite was stocked with a older & well tested model. It had less range & explosive power, but was the better weapon for the older S boats. Both were derived from WWI experience. The Mk14 was a replacement that emerged from the late 1920s & was intended for the newer classes of subs speced in the same time period from the latter 1920s through the 1930s. Those had their development problems as well. All of which came out of inadaquate funding for the US military during the Depression. Actually other than for the breif 'panics' such as the was scare of 1939-41 & those of the latter 1940s & fifties the development funding of the US War Department & Navy Department has been poor & a lot of promising weapons have been disapointing.
 
Actually going by war studies conducted after the war the US Admiralty believed it could end Japan by 1945 on the seas and with the Japanese grabbing too much then the sub fleet and the big fleet could've ended it pretty darn quickly (2-4 years) ...

That is the long forgotten War Plan Orange that existed through the first four decades of the 20th Century. It was rolled into the Rainbow Plans during the 1940 mobilization & lived on in the post 1941 plans. In simple terms the plan was to carry a sort of active defense of the eastern Pacific, Hawaii & Alaska, the Panama Cannal & west coast of N America. Raids & attacks of opportunity would be carried out to attrit the IJN Navy. After 18-24 months a massive naval construction and training program would provide a overwhelming fleet to carry a offensive across the Central Pacific to seize a string of forward naval bases. From these Japan would be blockaded and forced to negotiate peace terms. it was expected the Japanese would see sense & negotiate long before the offensive ran its course. US Naval stratigists & political leaders from 1907 through 1941 expected a armistice would come once Japans navy was defeated.
 
That is the long forgotten War Plan Orange that existed through the first four decades of the 20th Century. It was rolled into the Rainbow Plans during the 1940 mobilization & lived on in the post 1941 plans. In simple terms the plan was to carry a sort of active defense of the eastern Pacific, Hawaii & Alaska, the Panama Cannal & west coast of N America. Raids & attacks of opportunity would be carried out to attrit the IJN Navy. After 18-24 months a massive naval construction and training program would provide a overwhelming fleet to carry a offensive across the Central Pacific to seize a string of forward naval bases. From these Japan would be blockaded and forced to negotiate peace terms. it was expected the Japanese would see sense & negotiate long before the offensive ran its course. US Naval stratigists & political leaders from 1907 through 1941 expected a armistice would come once Japans navy was defeated.
To be fair the US Navy wasn't interacting with the army when it was created and the Allies followed that line of thought till Formosa
 
To have any chance of Japan attacking the Philippines you have to remove Macarthur. The Japanese were afraid to invade as long as he was present on the islands.

Don't believe me read his autobiography.
 
To be fair the US Navy wasn't interacting with the army when it was created and the Allies followed that line of thought till Formosa

Actually both were failing to inteact properly. The Navy had the primary input for War Plan Orange & it was worked out over multiple fleet exercises at sea, map exercises, logistics studies, and industrial evaluations. Despite underfunding for planning staff, staff training, and research WPO was by the early or mid 1930s a realistic plan that fit the Navy capability at the start and the US industrial capacity. At least as far as the USN went. The Army side has less out their in the secondary sources & I've not seen any portions of the actual documents. The very brief summaries I've seen from the 1920s - 1930s promised 50,000 combat ready soldiers in the first six months of a Pacifc war & up to 100,000 at nine to twelve months out. What would have been ready in 18 months I cant say. I do know the US army participation in amphibious training in the 1920s was desultory. They did participate in up to brigade strength on one occasion, there was a Joint Board, a Lt Col Walther Krueger sat on it, and he had attended the Naval War College. However in 1932 the Army participated in only a battalion size exercise, and I cant find any evidence the Army was involved in any amphib training between 1932 & 1939. In 1939 the Army restarted as the 3rd Div planned & prepared a for a division size exercise tht was executed in January 1940. OTL two combined navy/Army Amphibious Corps were stood up on each coast during 1940.
 
To have any chance of Japan attacking the Philippines you have to remove Macarthur. The Japanese were afraid to invade as long as he was present on the islands.

Don't believe me read his autobiography.
:rolleyes:
Yeah, and the HMS Ark Royal is a sailing ship and not a nuke carrier.

(OOC: No Ark Royal since the original carrier has lasted more than 20 years.)
 
One of the interesting items not raised here is the hypothetical attack on Oahu. this speculation derives from 1930s fleet exercises where USN carriers of the Red Force made air attacks on the harbor and base facilities. There are claims the Japanese planned such a attack. Nothing in the form of staff planning documents has turned up & no eyewitness testemony has emerged. There are on record records from strategy confrences where a list of potiential targets in the eastern Pacific were considered. The evaluation if any was brief & it seems the idea was dismissed.

In any case the US fleet was moved back to the West Coast in 1941 after Roosevelt left office & such a attack became relatively pointless.

I have seen some well done evaluations of how the Japanese could have made a attack on a US fleet based on Oahu. It would have been practical, tho the outcome from the subsequent battle is fairly unpredictable. Perhaps if: Roosevelt had been reelected; if: the fleet had remained at Oahu; if: the Japanese had declared war on the US; if they had given serious consideration to such a attack. Far to many PoD there but there is a outside possibility of such a attack.
 
Top