Since the start of the 20th century Dutch governments considered the Japanese Empire as the largest threat to their colonial jewel the East Indies. This was even confirmed with the Russo-Japanese war of 1905.
In order to counter any threat politicians demanded naval units which were larger and faster than the protected cruisers and armored cruisers. After much debate in 1914 a battle fleet was planned around 4 battleships. However due to the outbreak of what was later called the great war this plans were shelved.
The Netherlands remained neutral during this conflict, albeit it was squeezed between the major belligerents and it cost a large effort to remain it neutrality.
Sitting literary first row in this devastating conflict it appeared that the capital ships of the German Empire and the British empire were in adequate to enforce any changes in the conflict. In matter of fact the battleships and battle cruisers were compared with the enormous amount of capital involved a large disappointment. Only one, relative new naval unit showed remarkable achievement, which were the German submarines. Not only the sinking of three ( old) armored cruisers by the German U-9 in 1914 abut during the whole conflict it became clear what the capabilities were of this relative in-expensive weapon. Due to their neutrality and their contacts Dutch naval officers were well aware of the plans and tactics some German navy officers envisioned during and direct after the Great War.
Already at the time of the Great War, Mr Rambonnet, the man who made the canceled Dutch Battle fleet plan changed his vision and presented in 1920 complete new fleet plan which was not based on battleships or any other surface ships at all. The Fleet plan of 1920/22 regarded the submarine as the primary offensive weapon to defend the Dutch East Indies against an (Japanese)invasion fleet. The surface units, destroyers and light cruisers were assigned as scouts were the light cruisers acted as protectors of the destroyers against enemy destroyers. Mr. Gooszen based the required number of submarines, destroyers, light cruisers and other vessels on three locations, divided in several patrol zones, in the Archipelago who could be entering point to Java and a 100% reserve. Due to incapability of a minster of war and later political turmoil the Fleetplan did not materialize. An other version, half the number of units in the original plan was voted away in 1923 with one vote differed in parliament, after large public protest.
Never the less a fleet with 18 submarines,2 light cruisers and 8 destroyers (8 from 1910/1913 and replaced during by 8 1928/1931)was sailing in the twenties.
With this small fleet, the navy men developed over the next two decades a submarine tactic which fit the strategy envisioned in the early 20ties.
During the twenties and thirties there was many progress made in technological developments,like wireless communication, shipbuilding techniques, and aviation. Above all the Dutch Navy had the ability and willingness to use and incorporate this technical improvements.
The Dutch submarine officers developed gradually a scout and attack technique by first concentrating the submarines in divisions of 3 to 4 boats. Improve cooperation and communication with the scouts. Initially this were the destroyers and light cruisers but this was with the arrival of the Dornier Wall fly boat gradually taken over by airplanes. After two decades at the end of the 30ties the Dutch refined their aggressive use of submarines in a tactic they called ''Division-Roedel'' tactic.
It is basically the following:
Scouts detect the invasion fleet and inform the submarine squadron of the location of the enemy.
The submarine squadron approach the invasion fleet and position it self for attack, which can be submerged or at the surface, and finally attack the enemy. All this is decided by the squadron commander, all boats communicate whit each other until the order of attack is given.
Dutch East Indie, on the same scale as Europe.