Dutch navy submarines destroys Japanese invasion fleet 1942

I wonder the size of the resources the Japanese had, when they started their offensive in December 1941.
To me it looks the succes in Malaya and Indonesia had more do with, bad leadership (wrong tactic) and lack of persistence on the Allied side and luck.
If there was one or more delays, for instance one invasion fleet/army destroyed and a more determined defense of Malaya or even defence of Singapore the whole advance of the Japanese in Malaya and Indonesia would falter. It does not mean this will relieve the Allied forces but it would deny the Japanese of a base of desperatly needed resources, whihc could turn the tide much earlier in favour of the Allies.
 
Ah yes, Sulfur. Mentioned in a term paper I wrote in 1974. Applied correctly it makes a good high temp or high impact lubricant. Exposed to water Sulfuric Acid starts forming. Acidic Sulfur corrodes Iron and Steel rapidly.
 
In addition to doing better with their submarines, I think another small thing the Dutch could have done to better defend the DEI would have been to acquire from the US and British in 1940 and 1941 a few squadrons of attack aircraft that were being phased out. I'm thinking planes like the Vought Vindicator, the Blackburn Skua, the Fairey Battle, and even the SBC Helldiver. None of these planes were anything special but all would have been able to sink some transports if flown by trained pilots and help create additional situations like the OTL Battle of Balikpapan.
 
In addition to doing better with their submarines, I think another small thing the Dutch could have done to better defend the DEI would have been to acquire from the US and British in 1940 and 1941 a few squadrons of attack aircraft that were being phased out. I'm thinking planes like the Vought Vindicator, the Blackburn Skua, the Fairey Battle, and even the SBC Helldiver. None of these planes were anything special but all would have been able to sink some transports if flown by trained pilots and help create additional situations like the OTL Battle of Balikpapan.
The Dutch gouverment or Dutch East Indian gouverment does not spend money on obsolete types. Except when there is nothing else they purchased new but second rate type airplanes as they did in OTL. How ever the types you mentioned are from the 2nd halve of the thirties and at that time a head of their time. The Dutch East Indian Air branch of the colonial army was equiped with 120+ Martin B10 Bombers which were at time of purchase up to date. It is possible that in the thirties, there were funds made to purchase naval bombers next to the Do24 fly boats of the navy. I do have doubts that the Dutch navy would go for dive bombers. The Do24 could cary bombs as well. A better cooperation between the Army bombers and the Navy would be more economical.
 
Have the Netherlands not build anything larger than destroyers (think they can be build quicker than cruisers) and have more submarines.
 
The Dutch gouverment or Dutch East Indian gouverment does not spend money on obsolete types. Except when there is nothing else they purchased new but second rate type airplanes as they did in OTL. How ever the types you mentioned are from the 2nd halve of the thirties and at that time a head of their time. The Dutch East Indian Air branch of the colonial army was equiped with 120+ Martin B10 Bombers which were at time of purchase up to date. It is possible that in the thirties, there were funds made to purchase naval bombers next to the Do24 fly boats of the navy. I do have doubts that the Dutch navy would go for dive bombers. The Do24 could cary bombs as well. A better cooperation between the Army bombers and the Navy would be more economical.

But that's why we call it Alternate History, so we can explore plausible alternatives. When the Martin B-10 came out it was state of the art, by 1940 it was hopelessly obsolete, by 1942 it was an antique. The planes I rattled off were on the back end of the technology curve by 1942 but at least they all could put a bomb on a ship fairly accurately ife flown by a trained pilot. The POD here would be for somebody in Dutch leadership in the DEI to look at the success the British and Germans enjoyed with dive bombers early in the war (to include Skuas sinking a light cruiser) and deciding such planes could be valuable in defending the DEI. From there they will attempt to acquire what is available and everything I listed is potentially available.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
A better cooperation between the Army bombers and the Navy would be more economical.

This is the best option in addition to keeping the roedel tactics.

The addition of aircraft, even obsolescent aircraft is helpful. The Dutch should have acquired more subs in the late 30's.
 
I wonder the size of the resources the Japanese had, when they started their offensive in December 1941.
To me it looks the succes in Malaya and Indonesia had more do with, bad leadership (wrong tactic) and lack of persistence on the Allied side and luck.
I would suggest it has more to do with the situation in Europe.....

With most of the RN in europe and the size of the RNLN being totally inadequate the IJN was bound to win at least at first IMO even without wrong tactic and luck.
 

SwampTiger

Banned
...the IJN was bound to win at least at first IMO even without wrong tactic and luck.

The Japanese in OTL would be considered a huge wank in any ATL. A few sunk ships, a couple of delays in conquests, a few misses by the Japanese torpedoes could easily change the OTL outcome. Simply having a couple of packs of modern subs using roedel tactics positioned correctly could have crippled the Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies.
 

Marc

Donor
And what, pray tell are the Japanese planning to do while the Dutch adopt this strategy decades before WW2?
Point, and counter-point, ladies and gentlemen. Particularly when there is a lot of fore-running, as in this scenario...
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
And what, pray tell are the Japanese planning to do while the Dutch adopt this strategy decades before WW2?
Point, and counter-point, ladies and gentlemen. Particularly when there is a lot of fore-running, as in this scenario...

This was Dutch doctrine untill 1939. Didn't have any effect on the IJN.
 

Marc

Donor
This was Dutch doctrine untill 1939. Didn't have any effect on the IJN.

I am referencing this, from the original post:

Now..what if the Dutch remained with their well trained "roedel" tactic. and with some extra boats.

From what I gathered, the conceit is that the Dutch make a major modification of how they would defend their East Indies from what actually happened. Am I misreading this topic?
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
This post got eaten up by the Board shut down of this week :)

Some facts first:


The Koninklijke Marine indeed had trained in grouping its submarines in the East Indies in small packs of three boats normally to do just that. They had trained for that sort of use in the offensive roles, alongside the training with naval aviation to target them to the enemy. In the OTL WW2 the Dutch could not deploy the hunter killer packs mainly due to loosing the control in the air so soon to Japanese forces. For that reason the Submarineforce was left to more classical patrol duties of individual boats, though in close conjuction still with other forces. Later in the war, the USN copied the tactic of the small hunter killer pack for its own submarine force against Japan, basically combining the air and submarine cooperation simmilarly, though with more advanced more modern equipment.


Van Anten in Navalisme nekt onderzeeboot shows pretty convincingly that the RNLN had made the move from a submarine based to fleet to a lightcruiser based fleet in the second half of the '30s. Helfrich had no intention of using the submarines in divisions of three. He (and Furstner) were all about a risk-strategy.


HMS Warspite said:
More important still, The original tactic included a heavy cooperation between the Naval Air arm and submarine force, which in the end did not had the sufficient numbers in both aviation and capable submarines to be effective as such intended. The Dutch had hoped to have a force of 40+ submarines and at least 200 long range naval aircraft though never got these numbers due to budgetary restrictions on the whole defense department of the Netherlands. The dozen or so servicable boats and 50, or so aircraft would have to do in the OTL, which never was the number really needed to become an effective deterrent against an enemy with the strength of Japan.


At no point did the RNLN or the MLD have the numbers to defend the whole of the DEI. That's why after the defeat of the Vlootwet the RNLN decided to focus on the defense of Java only. Giving the geography factors that should have been doable for some time anyway. It was only after 1936 (or arguably 1939 when Helfrich became commander of the RNLN in Asia) that the fevered dream of defending the whole archipelago with a few light cruisers took over.


However, @Parma has in the OP said that the POD is the acceptance of the Vlootwet in 1924. This would not only have expanded the fleet but also have clearly made the submarine service dominant within the RNLN. It would also have made the RNLN less cutt-throat in interservice rivalry as they would be pretty safe. Ofcourse one can argue that after the Crisis hits the Vlootwet will be abandoned anyway but that could still mean that the shift to cruisers get's averted. If the HrMs De Ruyter does not get build that's worth at least 6 submarines (two divisions). If you give preference to the building of the subs instead of surface vessels that's three subs more.


Ofcourse the real change would be if not only the Vlootwet is accepted but also the Crisis is lessened. I've personally toyed with the idea of Troelstra's Foly (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Week_(Netherlands)) being averted. This way the SDAP is less of a parlaimentary pariah and keeps Colijn out of his second period of dominance. This cancels the Golden Standard and thus the Crisis is less severe leaving more money for defense. The submarines (and the Dorniers) could be sold as Keynsian measure since they were pretty much home-made.


The Dutch comanding admiral at the time handed all Dutch navy ship over to the command of the Brittish as soon as he landded in the UK after he caputilation of the Netherlands. Again in his believe of large surface ships. That last fact is the real reason why the Dutch did not used their trained submarine tactic the presonel believes of a few men at crucial positions in a crucial time. By the way the Dutch commander in question was later sacked due to complete misbehaviour, misconduct , lac of morale and a few other things.


I assume you mean Furstner? He wasn't really sacked though, in face he even became a member of the Raad van State after the war!


The scouting was Original performed by surface vessels, destroyers, later this was complemented by flyboats like the Dornier-J Wall and the modern Do24.

I do admit this was a chanlange but not impossible. As an example that air superiority of the Japanese was not ensured ; The sea battle of Balipapan was a reasult of a reconasance flight of a Dutch Do24.

The airsuperioty was lost when the Japanes could establish air bases on Ceylon and Borneo.


I assume you mean Celebes? :) You are right that one of the biggest problems for the Allied position in the DEI was that the Japanese could easily take of the various airfields. This was a problem in Malaya as well. However, even if the airfield would not have been build the IJN would simply send in the Kido Butai.


I do admit the offensive capabilities would be a one or two time shot, and due to battle losses the submarines and or the NAval air branch were not cabable to stage a third defence attack.

But is a landing amry was drowned for the coast of Borneo this would serious harm the Japanese war plans, due to a imidiate shortage of oil. As well all depends on the defence of Malaya and Singapore and as result of this th defense of Sumatra.


What I understood of my reading over the Battle for Malaya and Singapore the Japanese advancing army was very short on supplies.

Should it be possible even with a small force of 15 boats to stop at least one invasion? After this would it be disrupt the Japanese advance?

Better would be if the modernisation plan of 1930 would be excuted on time or ideal that the fleet plan of 1920 was executed in the next two decades.


One interesting POD might be when the Dutch submarines were send to Malaya to help the British. The Dutch submarine commander Bussemaker wrote in a letter that they were betrayed by the Dutch naval command as they were not allowed to use Roedel tactics but had to follow the British plan for a simple line. What if a Dutch division had found and attacked the Japanese invasion fleet?


First Battle of Balikpapan of 23–24 January 1942 illustrates the possibilities of the Roidel doctrine, even if not precisely following it. The Japanese amphibious force arrived at the landing site on the evening of 24 January and immediately executed landing operations. Previously on 24 January it had been observed and reported by air reconnaissance patrol, and had been attacked by Dutch bombers. One transport was damaged & the Nana Maru is credited as sunk. During the night of 23/24 Jan the Dutch submarine K XVIII attacked & was credited with sinking the Tsuruga Maru. During the night of the 24/25 Jan a US destroyer force of four old models attacked with torpedo and were credited with sinking four more transports, the Kuretake Maru, Tatsukami Maru, Nana Maru, and Sumanoura Maru.


Notes: The Japanese naval force was under defended as its primary escorts of destroyers had departed to pursue a submarine contact of the previous afternoon. The US surface force had lost strength when the light cruiser that was to accompany them was briefly grounded and damaged. The US destroyers made multiple attacks and expended all their torpedo, but only sank four transports. One strongly supported hypothesis is the Mk15 torpedo used were running well below the desired depth settings. It appears only one Dutch submarine was patrolling the area.


Observations: Had the Dutch doctrine referred to in this thread earlier, of having three subs patrolling together been in place, the opportunity to sink more than one transport could have presented itself.


Had the light cruiser been available to the US surface force the cannon likely would have sunk multiple transports. The ranges the destroyers engaged at were 'close' and multiple hits were made with their light guns.


Had the US torpedos performed better the transports sunk could have at least doubled, possibly tripled.


Modern bombers could have sunk more transports.


As many holes and failings the Allied air and naval attacks had, they did function however crudely as a combined force, overwhelming the defense, and causing substantial damage. This battle suggests what a properly trained and equipped light naval & air force could do vs the sort of amphibious forces the Japanese were deploying in early 1942.


Agreed.



Halting one invasion is possible. A more likely outcome is the several invasions are badly attrited leaving the landing forces undersupplied & some even isolated and vulnerable to counter attacks. The Japanese could still succeed with their initial landings at Balikpapan & elsewhere in January, but later are to badly attritioned they cannot effectively invade Java. Thus that portion of the campaign is postponed at length with severe negative consequences for the Japanese, or they leave it entirely in Allied control.


Unfortunatly for the Dutch Java is way to important to the Japanese. Don't forget that the rescources of Insulinde are the whole reason the Japanese attack on the Allies. Once the Kido Butai comes swooping in it's only a matter of time. It will have a lot of interesting knock on effects though.
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
I am referencing this, from the original post:

Now..what if the Dutch remained with their well trained "roedel" tactic. and with some extra boats.

From what I gathered, the conceit is that the Dutch make a major modification of how they would defend their East Indies from what actually happened. Am I misreading this topic?

A bit I'm afraid :)

The doctrine in the OP was in fact the doctrine of the Dutch navy until 1939. So for this to happen we just have to make that change not happen. If we look at the OTL Interbellum it is pretty clear that the IJN didn't care about the RNLN at all. They were focussed on the USN and to somewhat lesser extent the RN.

Depending on the POD the OOB of the RNLN will not be radically different from OTL. The submarine service could have 6-12 subs more but the biggest and most important change will be in the way they are employed.

Given the above I personally doubt that the IJN will behave more differently before the first shots are fired. :)
 
Thanks for the input
HJ Tulp, thanks to put it clear. The thread was based after reading " Van Anten in Navalisme nekt onderzeeboot "
I made several mistakes, correct I mean Celebes. And indeed I mean Mr Furstner and to my amazement he was not sacked, on the contrary as you mentioned. Never the less his behaviour and spending patern was not accepted by many Dutchmen in excile.
I do think Mr Furstner is the main isue of the bad performance of the Dutch navy in the DEI. Despite, in hintsight, inresponsible budget cuts on amry and navy by various Cabinets.
According the mentioned book the ''roedel'' tactics were exercised even in 1940.
I do think this tactic could result in a different out come of the Battle of Balikpapan or even the far more Northern Tarawak. I would even asume this could harm the transport fleet which landed on Malaya.
This all would be possible with the linited numbers the Dutch Navy had if the doctrine did not changed on the critical moment, around 1940 and had the Dutch Navy not be placed under British command. Or not in such way that the Dutch had to abandon their well trained tactic.
An other tragidy on the wrong time was the deadly air accident of the Luitenant-General G.J Berenschot. Not that his succesor was a bad commander, I can not find much about ths, but it disrupted the continuity of the cooperation within ABDACOM.

I have several POD's:
1) Fleetlaw proposal of 1920 is not torpedood by the secretary of war Mr.Pop, but handeled by a compentent secretary of war like Mr.van Dijk.
2) Fleetlaw of 1922, the halve of the proposal of 1920, which met fierce public opposition, is adapted by parliament in OTl it was rejected by 1 vote.
3) If first 2 options are disregard, the fleet plan of Mr. Deckers is earlier executed and not started late 2nd halve of the 30ties. This would needed a change in gouverment in orderr to change the view on deflation. I sugest a coalition of the Catholic Party with the Social Democratic party ( Ruijs de Beerenbrouck IV?1933- or Allberse I 1935-). This would require a change of interpretation of the doctrine of the Catholic party but not unreal. In both parties, Catholic and Socialist there were men with a more practial (devaluation of the guilder) and modern aproach (economic meaningfull labor support, not planting trees) of handeling the economic crisses and were not against gouverment support of the industry. This could benefit the shipbuilding industry and navy plans, despite strong pacifist sentiments within the Socialist party.
4) No change of events regarding building programes or navy plans but the Dutch Navy will not change at the critical moment their doctrine and remain command of their fleet, in cooperation with the other Allies.
5) A typical AH solution which need to be applied for all earlier mentioned options. Mr. Furstner need to
be removed of the stage, preferable before or not short after he become High Naval School.
 
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