Dutch involved with Market Garden planning?

...is Monty really considered to be horribly overrated?
I would say that Montgomery is both overrated and underrated at the same time. Montgommery was a competent general. Not great, but not terrible. The thing is, after WWII he got the reputation that he was a great general (a reputation he partly created). Since these days most people started to realise he wasn't as great as he (and many others) claimed he was and he is now suffering from a backlash from people calling him a terrible general (which he wasn't either). In short Monty was a competent general, but people are calling him either great or terrible.
 

hipper

Banned
Relatively stronger, but the British had nowhere near the 3-1 advantage they had at El Alamein, not to mention that the German supply lines at Gazala were much shorter.

To have botched El Alamein the British leadership would have needed to be a special kind of special, but you're correct not anybody could have won.

At Galaza the British had the slight disadvantage of having their future intentions signalled direct to Rommel who did not scruple to make tactical use of it. Granted slow order processes and a somewhat decentralised command structure did not help. Montgomery restored Grip as he put it and more importantly used artillery properly - he was helped by the appearance of 6 lber anti-tank guns in adequate numbers though.
 
My view of Monty is that he was an excellent set-piece commander. As evidence, I present El Alamein and Overlord, along with the Rhine crossing. On the other hand, he didn't have the hell-for-leather cavalry dash that Patton had. Given that his prior military experience was in France during WWI, I can't find it in me to blame him.

The thing about Monty is that he saw just how much bad preparation and bad training can screw you over in WWI, so he put the emphasis on training and operational planning. Another thing you have to understand about Monty is that by 1944, Britain no longer really had manpower to gamble with, not after five years of industrial warfare on top of the demographical hit from WWI. This was one of the main reasons why Monty tried to use machines instead of men where he could.
 
One phone call - to a Dutch farmer, on the south bank of the Rhine -would have revealed that the polder immediately south of the Arnhem Bridge was dry enough to land gliders and firm enough to drive Jeeps.
This would have vastly improved the Red Devils' situation.
Too bad that Polish paratroopers only discovered this key DZ late in the battle, too late to affect the outcome.
 
On the other hand, he didn't have the hell-for-leather cavalry dash that Patton had. .

Up to a point...

Apart from the fact that under him 8th Army went westwards faster than Rommel went eastwards - distance El Alamein to Tunis is over 1500 miles, covered in less than 6 months.

And the 'Great Swan' from the Seine to Brussels by Guards Armoured with the last day's advance of 75 miles (a record until the Gulf War).

And getting a B-17 from Bedell Smith on a bet on how quickly he could move...
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
One phone call - to a Dutch farmer, on the south bank of the Rhine -would have revealed that the polder immediately south of the Arnhem Bridge was dry enough to land gliders and firm enough to drive Jeeps.
This would have vastly improved the Red Devils' situation.
Too bad that Polish paratroopers only discovered this key DZ late in the battle, too late to affect the outcome.

I'm not sure there were many farmers with phones back in those days ;)
 
Up to a point...

Apart from the fact that under him 8th Army went westwards faster than Rommel went eastwards - distance El Alamein to Tunis is over 1500 miles, covered in less than 6 months.

And the 'Great Swan' from the Seine to Brussels by Guards Armoured with the last day's advance of 75 miles (a record until the Gulf War).

And getting a B-17 from Bedell Smith on a bet on how quickly he could move...

And don't forget the subsequant dash to Antwerp whre the Port and facilities were captured intact!

Apart from all that - yeah no dash whats so ever
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It's something I've often thought about that - any general who pushes and pushes until things don't work is condemned for that.
But any general who doesn't push until things shut down is condemned for not pushing far enough.
(Or is if the aim is to portray him as a poor general.)

The evidence suggests that Monty usually pushed only when he felt he could get away with it - Market Garden is the main place where he pushed and it fell apart.

The cure to that... staff work.

So - here's one possibility to get Market Garden working.
The Allies doing a planning study in late June/early July for another large-scale drop, and getting some of the issues worked out. e.g. the limit of two-drops-per-day radius, the frequencies for the radios, things like that.
In the course of this, they also lay out a set of possible paths to have this "royal road" drop concept be done on. During this, they investigate most of the Low Countries for possible drop zones.

This fixes some of the OTL issues, and it also gives more time to spare during the run-up to the actual Market Garden to let them spot the SS.
 
It's something I've often thought about that - any general who pushes and pushes until things don't work is condemned for that.
But any general who doesn't push until things shut down is condemned for not pushing far enough.
(Or is if the aim is to portray him as a poor general.)

The evidence suggests that Monty usually pushed only when he felt he could get away with it - Market Garden is the main place where he pushed and it fell apart.

The cure to that... staff work.

So - here's one possibility to get Market Garden working.
The Allies doing a planning study in late June/early July for another large-scale drop, and getting some of the issues worked out. e.g. the limit of two-drops-per-day radius, the frequencies for the radios, things like that.
In the course of this, they also lay out a set of possible paths to have this "royal road" drop concept be done on. During this, they investigate most of the Low Countries for possible drop zones.

This fixes some of the OTL issues, and it also gives more time to spare during the run-up to the actual Market Garden to let them spot the SS.

Agree with you on the first part. Look at how Grant was condemned for the casualty lists from the Overland Campaign.

As for the second part, did the WAllies have the time to conduct that sort of planning? I got the impression that one of the reasons that the planning for MARKET GARDEN was so rushed was that there was an expiration date on the whole affair. Was there a hard and fast go/no go date by which the operation had to be completed, or was it just a rush job because of how the generals and army intelligence perceived the situation?
 
Was there a hard and fast go/no go date by which the operation had to be completed, or was it just a rush job because of how the generals and army intelligence perceived the situation?

It was the spur-of-the-moment decision. Seemingly German front is crumbling, the Heer is on a headlong rush to get back to Germany and one bold action might get the war over by Christmas.
 
It was the spur-of-the-moment decision. Seemingly German front is crumbling, the Heer is on a headlong rush to get back to Germany and one bold action might get the war over by Christmas.

There was a lot of it about - the same thing happened to the south during the Battle of Hürtgen Forest - in which the US Army Suffered 33K Casaulties - which many historians and indeed veterens of the battle considered needless.

This attack was also launched on the understanding that the German Soldat was finished.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It was the spur-of-the-moment decision. Seemingly German front is crumbling, the Heer is on a headlong rush to get back to Germany and one bold action might get the war over by Christmas.
My understanding is that there were several airborne ops cancelled during the autumn period because by the time they were ready to go the army had already overrun the drop site.

I'm kind of drawing from that idea - they prepare for "airborne ops" in general, and as such they're ready for this one.
 
So - here's one possibility to get Market Garden working.
The Allies doing a planning study in late June/early July for another large-scale drop, and getting some of the issues worked out. e.g. the limit of two-drops-per-day radius, the frequencies for the radios, things like that.
In the course of this, they also lay out a set of possible paths to have this "royal road" drop concept be done on. During this, they investigate most of the Low Countries for possible drop zones.

This fixes some of the OTL issues, and it also gives more time to spare during the run-up to the actual Market Garden to let them spot the SS.

Probably too early in June/July, as it was not clear at that stage that the Germans would be vulnerable to a Cobra type breakthrough.

Sometime in August, after FAAA was activated on 2 August and Eisenhower announced that he would be taking command in France, SHAEF should have been setting priorities and working on plans for breaching potential defensive lines eg Seine, Somme, Westwall, Rhine and how airborne forces could help. Instead it all went a bit free-form.
 
The port was useless since the Germans still controlled the approaches to the port.

Yes but they would eventually be removed - and emphasis on "Port captured intact" - a port that could handle 1000 ships a day as opposed to a port that has been heavily damaged - and emphasis on Dash - Brussels was captured on the 4th Sept - Antwerp on the 5th Sept (To put into context - the Falaise Pocket battle had ended on the 21st Aug)

Consider if you will that the original invasion plan called for Allied forces to be crossing the 'Seine River' at D-Day + 90 (About Sept 20th) - and here they are going about clearing Belgium -and moving up to the German Border - and in the case of Op Market Garden - trying to Cross into Germany

Op Market Garden was not directly responsible for clearing the estuary but it did make it difficult for units of 15th Army (Heer) to exist in the area between the Market Garden Salient and the Scheldt Estuary.

As it was it took some hard fighting to clear the land around Antwerp and Walcheren Island was always going to require a proper Sea-born assault with all the trimmings and I have no idea if that could have happened before it did?

So I would be surprised if the First Can and Second Br Armies could have cleared the area much faster than they did in order to open the Port

Note that XXX Corp and the Airborne Army was not operating in a vacuum - other 21st Army units were advancing across its frontage as well as Hodges with 1st US Army to the south. Note the Relative positions on the 15th Sept and then positions on 15th Dec on this map - the entire Allied line has hardly moved in that time - Allies outrunning their supplies and Stiffening German resistance.

map (URL for original as you can zoom in)

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/45/Ww2_map68.jpg

Ww2_map68.jpg
 
An interesting POD might be if 21st AG included Patton's 3rd rather than Hodges 1st US Army. Provided there was room for their egos you would have both Montgomery & Patton arguing for the same narrow front.
 
An interesting POD might be if 21st AG included Patton's 3rd rather than Hodges 1st US Army. Provided there was room for their egos you would have both Montgomery & Patton arguing for the same narrow front.

I thought 1st Army under Hodges was part of Bradley's 12th US Army Group

It might have become part of Montys 21st Br Army Group after the Battle of the Bulge Kicked off in mid Dec where Patch was separated from Bradley by the German Counter offensive?
 
On the other hand, he didn't have the hell-for-leather cavalry dash that Patton had.
Which given how Patton handled the Battle of Metz and surrounding campaign is not necessarily a bad thing. It's also worth pointing out that IIRC after the breakout the Allies advanced faster eastwards to Paris and onwards in northern France than the Germans had advanced westwards in 1940.


Another thing you have to understand about Monty is that by 1944, Britain no longer really had manpower to gamble with, not after five years of industrial warfare on top of the demographical hit from WWI. This was one of the main reasons why Monty tried to use machines instead of men where he could.
Machines and firepower over manpower had been pretty much the army's strategy since the 1920s, scuppered however by lack of resources and disagreements over how best to organise things and disagreements over centralised versus de-centralised command. In North-West Europe however they were getting really low on manpower and having to disband units to fully man others so it's hardly any wonder he was careful.


There was a lot of it about - the same thing happened to the south during the Battle of Hürtgen Forest - in which the US Army Suffered 33K casualties - which many historians and indeed veterans of the battle considered needless.
Hürtgen Forest is an odd situation. IIRC on the one hand the reasoning for it being that it was vital to make sure that the Germans didn't have a large body of troops concealed within, but then sending what was way too small a unit to carry out the task and deploying it in a less than great manner with the whole affair then growing and sucking in ever increasing troop numbers.
 
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