Dreadnought expert?

What's this "trade protection" thing I keep hearing about? What exactly are the cruisers of His Majesty's Royal Navy protecting people from? Pirates? Sharks? I can understand the niche of cruisers for flag showing and strong-arming the locals into line, but why did the RN need the swarms they built?

The British didn't use the convoy system during peace, but your pretty much answered your own question. Trade protection was about showing the flag and police operations against pirates, rescue, etc.

The interwar cruisers that were built filled a gap that had developed during the Great War. There was, for much of the war, no 'workhorse' type of warships between the light cruisers and the battlecruisers - particularly any thing with the range and endurance to operate at oversea stations.
 
Just as a matter of interest the 'Washington' cruiser didn't just materialise out of thin air, it was virtually internationally standardising the RN's Hawkins class cruiser.
 
Da Pwnzlordd

As Riain points out both trade and military movements were very important and also vulnerable. Convoys were used in WWII, but caused problems themselves and also you got singificant use of single ship sailings, especially the Queens [liners not the BBs] in their role as troop carriers. However even them would have been vulnerable to merchant raiders let alone enemy cruisers. Battleships, especially in the numbers needed with other commitments couldn't be everywhere and the smaller trade protection cruiser was important in providing ships with more punch and range than destroyers for operations in distant waters especially.

In WWII Britain put a lot of effort in seeking to keep the Germans locked up in the North sea but as in WWI we couldn't prevent all the raiders getting out and some of the German ships had repeated crusies, with marked success at times. It was important to have heavier ships that could provide some protection to convoys and trade in distant waters.

Furthermore they also provided important roles in more active areas. Cruisers as much as destroyers were the eyes of the fleet until air power became a lot more extensive and reliable. The capital ships were only able to kill Bismarck and Sharnhorst because they could be located and tracked by other units. Smaller crusiers also proved important in AA operations and later in the war the ships could often be used for gunfire support for landings.

All in all balanced fleets were needed to perform all the tasks that the navy of a major state, with world-wide interests and activities required.

steve

What's this "trade protection" thing I keep hearing about? What exactly are the cruisers of His Majesty's Royal Navy protecting people from? Pirates? Sharks? I can understand the niche of cruisers for flag showing and strong-arming the locals into line, but why did the RN need the swarms they built?

Britain kept trade routes open by using the convoy system. Lots of merchant ships, a handful of destroyers/frigates for ASW, and a rusty second-rate battleship to scare off raiders. (Later there were escort carriers, but I doubt this figured into the plans of the inter-war RN) Cruisers didn't really fit into any of these roles. There was the Graf Spee, but what really did the Graf Spee in was the looming threat of a battlecruiser. Aside from that, cruisers never did much for the RN in WWII (as far as I know). The Bismark and Scharnhorst were stalked by cruisers, but battleships did the dirty work and sank them.


What's more, that's basically what they learned in WWII. Coronel saw a lonely cruiser squadren crushed. The RN called in a couple battlecruisers to take care of the problem. They also learned the hard way you need lots of destroyers for ASW, and took this to heart in the Second World War by starting the convoy system pretty much immediately. And then there's the main battlefleet, which locked down its opponents and kept them from doing direct harm to merchant ships. Any naval war after WWI would probably have followed the same pattern. The battlelines engage in a "decisive battle" or act as a fleet in being as seen fit. Convoys keep ships safe from submarines and battlecruisers/fast battleships hunt down opposing cruisers (which aren't likely to catch very much anyway because their prey is in a convoy). Armed merchantmen maintain the blockade. That's pretty much how it went in both world wars. Where do cruisers fit into this? Unless the British Empire was held together by the constant threat of a handful of cruisers offshore of each of its colonies, the numbers of British cruisers built in the inter-war period seem redundant.
 
f1b0nacc1

To some extend of course resources were the limiting factor. However the treaty was also a limit, especially before the 35 treaty. Because of the differing needs of the two powers the 1930 London Conference caused a lot of tension between Britain and the US. [We wanted numbers of smaller cruisers for trade protection, they wanted smaller numbers of larger cruisers for fleet operations, especially in their expected sphere in the Pacific where the distances involved demanded long range and hence larger size].

If Britain had built the G3's say it would have reduced the resources available for building and manning cruisers. However probably not by much as the big problems were how to met Britain's needs with the elderly fleet the treaty limited us to and the fact that those who wanted to avoid spending on defence could always hide behind the treaty - 'we can't build them because the treaty doesn't allow it'

I think that Britain might have had a few less cruisers if the treaty hadn't been in effect but not many and they would have had a more modern and balanced fleet, almost certainly more so than any of their major rivals.

Steve

Steve,

I think that we may be talking at cross-purposes. I completely agree that the Brits built more cruisers during the 20s than other navies. Warspite points out, however, that they needed far more than they produced, and to some extent, their capital ship construction priorities contributed to this. More to the point, however, my original comments regarding priorities were related to your comment that the Washington treaty might have been a mistake for the Brits. I tend to believe that it was a good movie, even a clever one, for precisely this reason. The limits on capital ship construction left some resources free for cruisers that might have otherwise been absorbed in a larger capital ship construction boom.
 

Da Pwnzlord

Banned
The British didn't use the convoy system during peace, but your pretty much answered your own question. Trade protection was about showing the flag and police operations against pirates, rescue, etc.

The interwar cruisers that were built filled a gap that had developed during the Great War. There was, for much of the war, no 'workhorse' type of warships between the light cruisers and the battlecruisers - particularly any thing with the range and endurance to operate at oversea stations.

But how often were they needed? As far as I know, pirates simply didn't exist in the early 20th century because warships have so much more firepower than anything a potential pirate could buy. Even if there was a situation analagous to the current situation in Somalia, what was the urgency? In peacetime, you could shift cruisers to trouble spots as neccessary. Same deal with wartime.

Here's how it goes in my mind:

Britain is in hypothetical war with continental Power X. Germany historically, but the same strategy works if its France, Russia, whatever. Britain has blockade mostly maintained by auxilliary cruisers, mines, submarines, and light (cheap) forces. There's 3 basic options when it comes to surface forces:

1.) Send armed merchantmen out. These have the best probabilty of making it past the blockade but can't effectively tackle anything thats escorted to any measure. Britain counters this by keeping an eye out for reports of missing merchants, then dispatches its cruiser squadrens to trouble spots.

2.) Send out cruisers. (Includes pocket battleships) Cruisers are much less likely to escape notice, but are capable of attacking convoys escorted by only destroyers. The RN dispatches battlecruisers, and attaches 2nd rate BBs to convoys until the threat passes.

3.) Send out capital ships. They will NOT escape notice. The Bismark might be able to take on a fully escorted convoy, but the RN will send its entire battlefleet after an isolated unit.



Why would the RN need the dozens of cruisers it built? Armed merchantmen are the only thing that cruisers are really concerned with, and they're fairly rare. If there's a region threatened by one, you organize a basic convoy system. Even without escort, a convoy removes the basic advantages of a merchant cruiser. Stick a couple guns on a few of these ships or attatch a destroyer and you're practically invincble.



Sorry if I seem confrontational, I'm just curious. Maybe I just don't understand the numbers involved, like how many ships sailed in a given reason, or how fast a cruiser could reach a given spot.
 
Part of "showing the flag" is having a ship that might do some damage to whoever it is being shown to.
Fer instance in the S Atlantic. The RN would always have a squadron of cruisers just hanging out, showin the flag. Makin sure the Brazilians and Argentinians and Uraguayans didnt get too cozy with the Germans or Italians and let them have basing rights. Ya never knew when a Graf Spee might show up and fill her tanks, the day before War was declared.
Similar in the Far East. Keep a few cruisers in Hong Kong, a few more in Singapore, some in Ceylon. You control all your trade routes from anything short of the Japanese Battle Line coming out.
All the Navies of the world spent inordinate effort balancing the numbers.
If the Italians built one more cruiser, the French had to move one from the Atlantic to the Med, and so did the British. The USA had half its ships in the Pacific, so the UK didnt worry as much about balancing them, but there was a LOT of idle chatter about a US-UK Naval War. Lord knows why. Either fishing fo added budget or the old dog watching the young dog taking over.
 
But how often were they needed? As far as I know, pirates simply didn't exist in the early 20th century because warships have so much more firepower than anything a potential pirate could buy. Even if there was a situation analagous to the current situation in Somalia, what was the urgency? In peacetime, you could shift cruisers to trouble spots as neccessary. Same deal with wartime.

Here's how it goes in my mind:

Britain is in hypothetical war with continental Power X. Germany historically, but the same strategy works if its France, Russia, whatever. Britain has blockade mostly maintained by auxilliary cruisers, mines, submarines, and light (cheap) forces. There's 3 basic options when it comes to surface forces:

1.) Send armed merchantmen out. These have the best probabilty of making it past the blockade but can't effectively tackle anything thats escorted to any measure. Britain counters this by keeping an eye out for reports of missing merchants, then dispatches its cruiser squadrens to trouble spots.

2.) Send out cruisers. (Includes pocket battleships) Cruisers are much less likely to escape notice, but are capable of attacking convoys escorted by only destroyers. The RN dispatches battlecruisers, and attaches 2nd rate BBs to convoys until the threat passes.

3.) Send out capital ships. They will NOT escape notice. The Bismark might be able to take on a fully escorted convoy, but the RN will send its entire battlefleet after an isolated unit.



Why would the RN need the dozens of cruisers it built? Armed merchantmen are the only thing that cruisers are really concerned with, and they're fairly rare. If there's a region threatened by one, you organize a basic convoy system. Even without escort, a convoy removes the basic advantages of a merchant cruiser. Stick a couple guns on a few of these ships or attatch a destroyer and you're practically invincble.

Sorry if I seem confrontational, I'm just curious. Maybe I just don't understand the numbers involved, like how many ships sailed in a given reason, or how fast a cruiser could reach a given spot.

After the Great War gunboat diplomacy was basically taken over by the cruiser. The cruiser, both light and heavy, took over all the jobs that the former second class battleships, protected and armoured cruisers, gunboats did before. All of the older classes - ie. older ships - which paid off and scrapped.

Cruisers, usually asked for by some local consul, make a greater impact upon the local population than a destroyer. The cruisers also have a larger crew which and be armed and sent ashore in case there is trouble. Destroyers have shorter ranges and are usually kept close to major ports. I'm still talking interwar years.

Off the top of my head I would believe that the sea areas in the Dutch East Indies probably did see piracy to a degree continue well into the 20th century. The Dutch probably kept a fairly tight rein on the area, but small incidences most likely still occurred.

The reason why you need so many cruisers is that the ocean is huge. Armed merchant ships aren't going to cut it. One sticks to the major shipping lanes and that serves a purpose similar to being in a convoy in case of emergency.
 
Cruisers and commerce protection

Da Pwnzlordd,

Keep in mind that during post-WWI and pre-WWII, the idea that subs would be the primary anti-commerce weapon was not taken seriously by the RN, or for that matter any other navy. Subs were too short-ranged, too limited in terms of attack options, and far too vulnerable to aggressive counter-attack by even light escorts. The convoy system was considered to be an excellent response to the submarine menace, and the development of ASDIC (we in the US call it SONAR) was thought to have 'solved' the u-boat problem.

With this in mind, the threats that naval planners were looking at (remember, they had the WWI experience fresh in their minds at the time) were primarily armed merchants and 'commerce raider' cruisers. These vessels could be prepositioned (prior to a declaration of war), and could cause significant disruption of commerce operations in time of war. This was certainly the 1914/early 1915 experience, particularly in the Pacific with Spee's squadron. The biggest problem was the lack of cruisers, vessels with enough armor and big guns to take on the raiders and sufficient range to patrol the vast spaces of the ocean trade routes. Absent radar and long range air patrols (both of which were still far in the future at the end of WWI), only cruisers could find, fix, and destroy enemy commerce raiders, or at least deter them.

Since the raiders themselves could choose the time and place that they would strike, a defending force would have to defend pretty much everywhere while the attacker would strike in only one location. Hence any defender would have to have a large number of cruisers to protect the commerce lanes. For the Brits (who had a world-wide empire that they were absolutely dependent upon for basic resources), this meant a large and power cruiser force was essential. Remember again that any British naval planner looking at the WWI experience would conclude that a future enemy would almost certainly decide to use commerce raiders against Britains large and exposed trade routes. Given that these potential enemies were NOT limited to Germany (Italy, for instance, had a very large cruiser force that would be well-suited to such activities, and the Japanese though not immediately a threat, certainly had the potential to become one), dispensing with a significant cruiser force would be an extremely poor choice.

Convoys, while useful, still would require significant naval assets for support beyond light escorts, as a under-armed convoy would simply make the attacker's job easier by gathering the targets into a easily attacked mass without sufficient defensive capacity (given the limited durability of subs, this was far less of a problem for ASW operations, but some under-armed convoys were successfully attacked in WWII). A well-armed, well-prepared convoy could stand off or even destory an attacker, but in order to generate these, a large cruiser force was necessary.

As a final point, note that at the beginning of WWII, the Germans did in fact do precisely what the Brits expected, i.e. use several cruisers and light capital vessels as commerce raiders. These foces were defeated primarily by the cruisers that the Brits had on station, backed-up by capital ships sent to hot-spots identified by the cruiser patrols. An excellent example of this was the Graf Spee (possibly the most ironic of ship names, considering her fate)....

I hope that this provides some perspective for the British need for a cruiser force.
 
From Steve:

To some extend of course resources were the limiting factor. However the treaty was also a limit, especially before the 35 treaty. Because of the differing needs of the two powers the 1930 London Conference caused a lot of tension between Britain and the US. [We wanted numbers of smaller cruisers for trade protection, they wanted smaller numbers of larger cruisers for fleet operations, especially in their expected sphere in the Pacific where the distances involved demanded long range and hence larger size].

If Britain had built the G3's say it would have reduced the resources available for building and manning cruisers. However probably not by much as the big problems were how to met Britain's needs with the elderly fleet the treaty limited us to and the fact that those who wanted to avoid spending on defence could always hide behind the treaty - 'we can't build them because the treaty doesn't allow it'

I think that Britain might have had a few less cruisers if the treaty hadn't been in effect but not many and they would have had a more modern and balanced fleet, almost certainly more so than any of their major rivals.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your argument is an interesting one, but since the Washington treaty was negotiated in 1922, and the Brits had implemented the notorious "Ten Year Rule" in 1919, it seems a bit of a stretch to suggest that the treaty, not the underlying British policy (and the lack of resources that it engendered) was responsible for the choices in shipbuilding policies. The fact that the London naval accords came into effect in 1930, and the Ten Year rule wasn't abrogated until 1932 (and in truth it stayed in effect, albeit unofficially) till the 1935-36 naval agreements, by which time it was far too late, I would suggest that absent the treaty, the RN (which clearly believed that its capital ships were more important) might well have starved cruiser construction further in order to support modernization of their capital ships.

Please note that I don't disagree with you that a smaller, more modern, more balanced, British fleet might have been a better choice (eliminating the Hood, for instance would have been a superb idea), and I suspect that we might find much to agree on in terms of the composition of such a fleet. Certainly there were numerous arguments made by those that wanted to spend nothing on defense that their parsimony was forced upon them by the treaty, but these are essentially dishonest arguments as demonstrated by the timing I cited above...
 
f1b0nacc1

I'm not sure we're disagreeing about anything much if at all. A lot would depend on the butterflies, which could well be huge.

As you say the 10 year rule was chiefly an attempt to undercut military spending and win the support of those pacifists who saw armed forces as more likely to lead to war - a big factor after WWI. However don't forget it's definition:- " Ten Year Rule, a principle that allows the Treasury to dominate and control strategic, foreign and financial policies under the assumption that "there would be no great European war for the next five or ten years". This was mainly influential on the army and airforce and despite it the RN saw extensive new construction during the 20's which in cruisers was only curtailed when the treaty limit was reached.

Without the treaties I could see a similar number of cruisers being constructed as OTL, possibly even more, as well as some new BBs. The navy didn't have the same stigma as the army and given its important role in protecting trade and shores it still have substantial support in the British public, coupled with the economic advantages a naval programme could have brought. You might well have seen a swing back to the old idea of a 'British way of war' emphesising naval rather than military power. Also without treaties you would very likely have seen more construction in both the US and Japan which would have given some incentive for continued RN production. [I'm not too greatly worried by this as war with the US is highly unlikely and pretty unlikely with Japan without the treaties ending the alliance. Also the evidence is that they would both have gone for a BB heavy construction programme].

I am interested by you're idea of scrapping the Hood? Know that the Chief of Naval Construction at the time suggested it ~1918 to clear the stocks for better designs. However, once constructed, for all her flaws she was still more useful than a lot of the older ships. Also, presuming say the 4G3s are constructed at least she's no longer the newest and largest ship so it would be easier for her to get a reconstruction. Given her size this would be far more practical than for some of the older ships that received them in the 30's and would have made her a pretty powerful unit.

Steve


From Steve:

To some extend of course resources were the limiting factor. However the treaty was also a limit, especially before the 35 treaty. Because of the differing needs of the two powers the 1930 London Conference caused a lot of tension between Britain and the US. [We wanted numbers of smaller cruisers for trade protection, they wanted smaller numbers of larger cruisers for fleet operations, especially in their expected sphere in the Pacific where the distances involved demanded long range and hence larger size].

If Britain had built the G3's say it would have reduced the resources available for building and manning cruisers. However probably not by much as the big problems were how to met Britain's needs with the elderly fleet the treaty limited us to and the fact that those who wanted to avoid spending on defence could always hide behind the treaty - 'we can't build them because the treaty doesn't allow it'

I think that Britain might have had a few less cruisers if the treaty hadn't been in effect but not many and they would have had a more modern and balanced fleet, almost certainly more so than any of their major rivals.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Your argument is an interesting one, but since the Washington treaty was negotiated in 1922, and the Brits had implemented the notorious "Ten Year Rule" in 1919, it seems a bit of a stretch to suggest that the treaty, not the underlying British policy (and the lack of resources that it engendered) was responsible for the choices in shipbuilding policies. The fact that the London naval accords came into effect in 1930, and the Ten Year rule wasn't abrogated until 1932 (and in truth it stayed in effect, albeit unofficially) till the 1935-36 naval agreements, by which time it was far too late, I would suggest that absent the treaty, the RN (which clearly believed that its capital ships were more important) might well have starved cruiser construction further in order to support modernization of their capital ships.

Please note that I don't disagree with you that a smaller, more modern, more balanced, British fleet might have been a better choice (eliminating the Hood, for instance would have been a superb idea), and I suspect that we might find much to agree on in terms of the composition of such a fleet. Certainly there were numerous arguments made by those that wanted to spend nothing on defense that their parsimony was forced upon them by the treaty, but these are essentially dishonest arguments as demonstrated by the timing I cited above...
 
The Hood

Steve,

I suspect we agree more than we disagree...which always makes for the best debates! (grin)....

Regarding the Hood, the original design was flawed on so many levels (beautiful ship though...utterly useless...a lot like a girl I once dated...), that scrapping her and replacing her with one of the newer designs always struck me as a better way to go. With that said, your point that a serious overhaul/rebuild would have helped is in fact a good one, though the costs of doing so seem a bit high. Her internal protection is the biggest problem, and that isn't very easy (though it is possible) to correct in an overhaul...
 
Are there any good reference materials for costs associated with operating and building different ships?

There is only one text that I am aware of that actually mentioned the cost of building a dreadnought, that would be, IIRC, Siegfried Breyer's Battleship and Battlecruisers 1905-1970. Breyer's is the most likely book I think most of us have access to which is why I'm mentioning it.

Undoubtedly, there are countless articles that will mention the cost, but I doubt that any outside an official government publication will have the operating expenses since those would vary.
 
There is only one text that I am aware of that actually mentioned the cost of building a dreadnought, that would be, IIRC, Siegfried Breyer's Battleship and Battlecruisers 1905-1970. Breyer's is the most likely book I think most of us have access to which is why I'm mentioning it.

Undoubtedly, there are countless articles that will mention the cost, but I doubt that any outside an official government publication will have the operating expenses since those would vary.

I don't have it handy, but one of the posters at Navweaps has posted a table with some 1930s RN estimates of construction and operating costs over an assumed lifetime that was prepared when Chatfield was 1SL; the subject of construction costs has also been the subject of several debates there, so a search through the forums there might provide some info on costs.
 
Are there any good reference materials for costs associated with operating and building different ships?


Guys

The attached is feedback from when I asked on a naval board due to an earlier thread on this sort of issue. Had heard earlier than generally Britain was cheaper and the US dearer in construction costs during the period ~1900-1940. The later generally referenced as due to the protectionism and pork-barrel elements of US politics. Also remembering a quote a few years back that Britain was constructing the KGV’s at about the same cost as the US were constructing their wartime CAs. [No doubt some wartime inflation may well have played a part in this while it ignores the operating costs of the designs.

Part of the problem may be that it’s not often clearly defined what is meant by the construction costs. Some figures may include little more than the main hull and superstructure.

Steve

+++
From New Golconda:-
The KGV price was roughly 7 million a copy in peacetime.

However, the RN stuffed up the estimating and they managed to claw back about 20% of that as "excess profits".

2.9 million is way too low.

RN are routinely quoted in multiple sources Brown, Parkes I believe - half a dozen books.

The general trend was pretty flat in terms of pounds per ton from 1900-1914 - and a sudden doubling from 1914-1919 (reflected in the prices of Hood (5 million from memory) and the Nelsons (7,000,000). Brown breaks down the Nelson costs into categories.

It seems that the actual raw costs of British shipbuilding fell 20+% mid 20's to 1936 - the effect of the depression no doubt. There was some cartel activity in the shipyards at this time (particularly destroyers - again see Brown I believe) and profit margins went up substantially for some builders. By the late 1930's British warships were well cheaper than anybodies - half for less the USN cost for comparable ships. This largely flows from wages IMHO - shipbuilding has always been about labor costs. British wages in the industrial north were low and bleak. People would work long days riveting steel ships in the rain while eating bread, porridge and dripping.


+++
From Creeping Death:-
From various posts over the years:


Iowa - 100 mln $
Missouri - 125 mln $
SD - 77mln $
NC - 76.9mln $
Alaska - 74mln $
Richelieu -1 277 billion frank = 28.5mln $
JB - 1400 billion frank = 28.5mln $
Bismarck 196.7mln Reich mark = 78.6mln $
Tirpitz - 181mln reichsmarck = 72.4mln $
Scharnhorst 143mln reichsmarck = 57mln $
Gneisenau - 146 reichsmarck = 58.3mln $
Dunkerque and Strabourg - 700mln frank = 15mln$
KGV - 7.5 mln pounds, Howe - 8.5mln pounds = 30-34mln $
Yamato - 64.9mln yen =15.6mln $ 283 million Yen – 73 million dollars
Musashi 52.7 mln Yen = 12.9 mln $
I have no data for Littorio.
Here's data for other ships:
Soryu and Hiryu: 40,200,000 Yen
Akagi + Kaga: 53,000,000 Yen
Agano class: 26.4 million Yen
Oyodo: 31.16 million Yen
Katori class: 6.6 to 7.2 million Yen
Tone Class: 31.265 million Yen
Mogami Class: 24,833,950 Yen
Takao class: 28,370,000 Yen
Myoko class: 21.9 million Yen
Furutaka + Aoba class: 15 million Yen
Sendai class: 8.1 million Yen
Kuma + Nagara Class: 6 million Yen
Tenryu class: 4.55 million Yen

Taiho: 105,318,000 yen – 27,213,953 dollars

Battleships

KGV 1937 = £7.5..North Carolina $77(£15.6 )…Bismarck RM196.0(£15.9)…Richelieu FF2000 AFC (£16.3) Yamato(1937) - 64.9mln yen =15.6mln $ 283 million Yen – 73 million dollars Lion (est.) 1939 = £8.85….Iowa $100(£22.6)…….H39 (est.) RM240.0(£21.6)


Aircraft carriers

Illustrious 1937 £4.5…….Graf Zeppelin RM92.7 (£7.5)
Implacable 1939 £5.4……Essex AFC $68.9 (£15.5)


Cruisers

Dorsetshire 1927 AFC £1.96…….Suffren AFC FF153.0 (£1.23)
Leander 1931 AFC £1.6……..Köln RM37.0 (£1.92)
Belfast 1937 AFC £ 2.15……..Cleveland AFC $31.1 (£6.3)
Dido 1937AFC £1.57……..Atlanta $23.3 AFC (£4.7)……. ‘M’ class RM56.0 (£4.55)
12,500 ton 9X8in design 1940 £3.5 (est.)……Baltimore $39.3 AFC (£10.26)…….Prinz Eugen RM104 (£10.
clip_image001.gif
… Houston 1929 $17 m.


Destroyers

J/K class £0.52 (ex guns)….Benson AFC $8.8 (£1.7 )….Z1type AFC RM13.4 (£1.2)…Le Hardi FF84.0 (£0.68)

Submarines

U class AFC £0.3……..Gato AFC $6.3 (£1.56)……..Type VIIC RM4.3 (£0.42)


Kaga and Akagi(1920): 24.5 million (5.64 mil. pounds)
Soryu (1934): 11.68 million dollars(2.69 mil. pounds)
Hiryu(1936): 11.26 million dollars(2.59 mil.)
Agano class(1940): 6.18 million dollars(1.42 mil.)
Oyodo(1941): 7.3 million dollars(1.679 mil)
Katori class(1938): 1.7 to 1.86 million dollars(.39 mil to .43 mil.)
Tone class(1934): 9.06 million dollars(2.08 mil.)
Mogami class (1931): 7.59 million dollars(1.75 mil.)
Takao class (1927): 13.5 million dollars(3.11 mil.)
Myoko class (1924): 9.79 million dollars(2.25 mil.)
Furutaka + Aoba class(1922): 6.58 million dollars(1.51 mil.)
Sendai class(1922): 3.7 million dollars(.85 mil.)
Nagara class(1920): 2.9 million(.67 mil)
Kuma class(1917): 3.05 million dollars(.7 mil)
Tenryu class (1917): 2.37 million dollars(.55 mil)

+++

From me replying:-
Creeping Death1929

Many thanks for the information.
clip_image002.gif
Amazing how much cheaper the RN was in that time period. Not sure how they compare in performance but the difference between the U class subs [£0.3M] and the Gato [£1.56M] is dramatic. From a quick glance it seems that the US [higher wages/pork barrel?] and Germany [Nazi corruption?] are generally significantly higher than the others Europeans Seems like Japanese prices are also very low, except for the Yamato, which could have been too leading edge. Dramatic drop for the production of the Musashi at only a 1/5th of the costs so suspect at least one of those values is off somewhat.


I was thinking more of the WWI period, although some details for the Japanese designs there but gives a good range of value. Also notice that compared to pre-WWI when their largely crippled by frequent government changes, the French compare very well even with Britain for production costs.

Thanks again

Steve


+++
From me:-
NG

Just a thought. You mention the depression as cutting wages and hence costs in Britain but the slump was world-wide. Presumably there would have been a similar effect in other nations? Possibly more so in the Anglo-Saxon nations as laisse faire gave less protection to the ordinary working population. However I doubt it would have been a solely British impact.

Steve


+++

From New Golconda:-

Presumably there would have been a similar effect in other nations?

No doubt, but the cold hard fact is that both British industrial wages and British shipbuilding costs were much lower in comparison by the end of the 30's.

Some thoughts on why the Depression might have been felt differently?

* Very low labour mobility - in Britains industrial north vs pretty good mobility in the US.

* Lower wages growth in the 20's - missing the US consumer boom.

* US having a more virbrant and flexible consumer driven economy in the 30's - even post depression.


+++

From CA30ist:-
Hello,
US "1200 ton" flushdeckers (WICKES / CLEMSON class) ordered in 1916 Budget, built ca. 1918-1920, cost about 1.5M USD ea, hull & fittings, as I recall.
+++

CA30

Thanks. That's a lot cheaper than the quote above for the WWII US DDs. Wonder what happened to put the prices up so much consider as quoted there would have been some downward pressure from the depression. [Possibly purely wartime inflation? Don't know what if anything the US did to control wartime inflation in WWII].

Steve

 
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