Floating dry docks are much less capable than a proper graving dock. A dry dock is a lot more than just a dock, it's the whole supporting infrastructure of cranes, railways etc. that let you rapidly take a battle damaged ship, turn her around and get her back into the fight. In an ideal world every RN Fleet would have one or two graving docks for the heavy work plus a floating dry dock or two for smaller jobs (e.g. hull cleaning) that could be forward deployed. But in a would of limited budgets I'd choose the graving dock over the floating.

It is budget and as you say infrastructure thing

OTL the British deployed Floating docks to both Malta and Singapore - not sure of the capacity of the one at Singapore but the one at Malta was as I understand it capable of servicing KGV sized vessels and its loss (it should have been towed to Alex!) meant that KGVs could not operate in the Med.

I do not think that the infrastructure or budget existed to allow graving docks of such size to be created at either locations.

Large AFDs built in British ship yards however!
 
It is budget and as you say infrastructure thing

OTL the British deployed Floating docks to both Malta and Singapore - not sure of the capacity of the one at Singapore but the one at Malta was as I understand it capable of servicing KGV sized vessels and its loss (it should have been towed to Alex!) meant that KGVs could not operate in the Med.

I do not think that the infrastructure or budget existed to allow graving docks of such size to be created at either locations.

Large AFDs built in British ship yards however!

In OTL Britain found £60 million to build Singapore Naval Base from scratch, including a graving dock and associated infrastructure plus the Admiralty IX floating dock, with a larger British economy and less debt there is every reason to assume that Singapore is going to get built as in OTL complete with all it's infrastructure and possibly even landward facing guns. Though imho Britain should hedge its bets and put the Admiralty IX dock at Ceylon in order to a.) enhance their repair capacity in the Indian Ocean and b.) ensure the can't lose all the supporting infrastructure for the Far East Fleet at one stroke if Singapore is lost.
The floating dock at Malta was one captured from the Germans in WW1 so won't be available but with a healthier RN budget and a ten year rule there is a strong argument to spend the 20's building supporting infrastructure by building a big graving dock either at Malta or Gibraltar or even both though that might be asking a bit much of the budget. Considering the vulnerability of floating dry docks to air attack I don't think they are ever going to be viable in the Med unless it's a WW1 situation where the Med is basically secure and then you probably don't need forward repair capability.
 
So I noticed something last night, but that was last night and I was to tired to theorise on it.

But all of the 25° belts had deck armour that wasn't flat.
The 18° of the G3 and Nelson (and I presume the N3) all had flat decks...
I think that may have been the reason for the change especially once you consider diving shells at greater ranges...

That and british industry may not have been able to put angles any better than that?
...

And yes I realise the pictures have a whole boatload of extra information, I'm not sorry about the pun 😁, regarding the weight of everything.

The sloped outer decks were to do with increasing the armoured volume without greatly increasing weight.
They were saving a couple of feet of ~ 14" thick belt armour, by angling the deck down slightly at the edges and adding an inch to it's thickness to compensate for the less favorable angle.

Geometrically, they were 'cutting off the corner' - trading (say) 2' of belt steel for an extra foot of deck steel (because the sloped deck has to be slightly longer than a flat deck). The deck was also thinner than the belt, so overall it cut down the amount of armour, while retaining the same volume (i.e. buoyancy) behind the armour.

There was no real limit to how far the belt could be sloped, but the more it slopes 'in' at the bottom, the deeper it needs to be to prevent shells plunging under the belt.
Exaggerated diagram:
incline.png
Both belts are the same height, both shells come in at the same angle, but the sloped belt will need to be much deeper if it is to intercept the shell.
 
Interesting question, how much of the machinery and equipment could be salvaged for installation in a new hull designed to produce 25-28 knots? They might be able to finish Bearn as a carrier and use the engines and boilers for the other four to produce two better carriers later on, after they have had a few years to learn from Bearn.
Quite a lot was reused.
The boilers and guns were subsequently fitted to Bretagne-class ships in the '30s.
The engines aren't worth saving, as they're a mix of VTE and direct-drive turbines. By the time any new construction comes along, they'll have far better cruiser-type machinery available.
 
I a little disturbed by this fixation on 25 kt+ carriers. Is that really mandatory, BEFORE WWII ? I come to understand carriers had to follow battleships and cruisers only when they become capital ships, that is, after 1942.

Was 30 kt "follow the battleships / cruisers pace" mandatory before WWII and before carriers become capital ships ?

(Ah, I see where was my reasoning flawed. The RN / USN / IJA converted hulls were battlecruisers - 30 kt - when the Normandies were much slower battleships at 21 kt).
Others have made several other good points above, but one more:

From the very early days, there was the idea that carriers should be able to quickly enter strike range, hopefully without being detected, then launch/recover and get away before a counter-attack came.
(e.g. the idea of a surprise dawn attack, launched from multiple carriers on a fleet in harbour originated in 1916).

Given the ships that were converted, to some degree it's also self-fulfilling, as the commanders looked for more ways of using their fast carriers (e.g. several USN 'Fleet Problem' exercises involved ideas along these lines).
 

Deleted member 94680

From the very early days, there was the idea that carriers should be able to quickly enter strike range, hopefully without being detected, then launch/recover and get away before a counter-attack came.
(e.g. the idea of a surprise dawn attack, launched from multiple carriers on a fleet in harbour originated in 1916).

Not the earliest example of naval aviation attacking coastal emplacements, the RNAS kind of did it in 1914
 
In OTL Britain found £60 million to build Singapore Naval Base from scratch, including a graving dock and associated infrastructure plus the Admiralty IX floating dock, with a larger British economy and less debt there is every reason to assume that Singapore is going to get built as in OTL complete with all it's infrastructure and possibly even landward facing guns. Though imho Britain should hedge its bets and put the Admiralty IX dock at Ceylon in order to a.) enhance their repair capacity in the Indian Ocean and b.) ensure the can't lose all the supporting infrastructure for the Far East Fleet at one stroke if Singapore is lost.
The floating dock at Malta was one captured from the Germans in WW1 so won't be available but with a healthier RN budget and a ten year rule there is a strong argument to spend the 20's building supporting infrastructure by building a big graving dock either at Malta or Gibraltar or even both though that might be asking a bit much of the budget. Considering the vulnerability of floating dry docks to air attack I don't think they are ever going to be viable in the Med unless it's a WW1 situation where the Med is basically secure and then you probably don't need forward repair capability.

Fair enough point - I have been fixated on AFDs - maybe having more AFDs in more locations?

There I go again....
 
Fair enough point - I have been fixated on AFDs - maybe having more AFDs in more locations?

There I go again....

More AFD's is always nice, there is no conceivable conflict that the RN is going to be engaged in where you are going to have Admirals complaining about having too many of them. However budgets are finite. That said you can make a case that the RN should have define a "fleet minimum dock capacity" of say 1 extra large (BC/large BB/CVA), 1 large (BB/CA/CVL), 2 medium (CVE/CL) and 4 small (DD/SS) in every theatre and then have all the extra docks be mobile floating ones that can move to meet demand.
 
More AFD's is always nice, there is no conceivable conflict that the RN is going to be engaged in where you are going to have Admirals complaining about having too many of them. However budgets are finite. That said you can make a case that the RN should have define a "fleet minimum dock capacity" of say 1 extra large (BC/large BB/CVA), 1 large (BB/CA/CVL), 2 medium (CVE/CL) and 4 small (DD/SS) in every theatre and then have all the extra docks be mobile floating ones that can move to meet demand.

The trick being to actually move them - like the ex German one at Malta which should have gone to Alex but didn't and got bombed and the one at Singapore which was scuttled/Captured etc
 

Deleted member 94680

Fair enough point - I have been fixated on AFDs - maybe having more AFDs in more locations?

There I go again....

Spoken like a true admiral.

I know you say I shouldn't bang on about the docks, old boy, but I can’t help but think I need more docks.”
Worked like a dream in 1908 (we want eight...) maybe not so much in 1928.
 
Don't forget that pre War the UK was looking at three potential bases for the Pacific. Singers, Ceylon and Sydney. If the Anglo Japanese treaty remains for a few more years, that might move the focus away from say Singers which was a bit provocative, to either Sydney or Ceylon and turning Colombo into a full blown naval base. Both are still close to important colonies like Burma, Singapore and Hong Kong but not too close.

And if the RN is looking at building some seriously large ships, they'll need the infrastructure both at home and overseas, so a few large floating docks would be ideal.
 
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Not the earliest example of naval aviation attacking coastal emplacements, the RNAS kind of did it in 1914
Indeed not, and the first carrier airstrike on a vessel at sea was in 1915.

All of which illustrates the point well - that most of what can be done with carriers was thought of within a few years of there being aircraft aboard ships, even if in many cases they were well beyond the technology or resources of the day.
 
Modern infrastructure good, expensive infrastructure that turns out to be on the wrong ocean or vulnerable to enemy action maybe not so good.
Choosing whether to build your new docks in Singapore vs Malta vs Rosyth vs wherever is taking something of a view on where the next serious threat is going to be. Are people worrying about air attacks on ports yet (Singapore looks fairly safe, but Malta is in easy bomber range of Italy), or was that a 1930s thing?

Random-ish TL question because I don't think it's been covered - what's going on in Ireland at the moment? Did the war ending a year early give the British government a window to try and implement Home Rule before the shooting started and if so what came of it?
 
Spoken like a true admiral.

I know you say I shouldn't bang on about the docks, old boy, but I can’t help but think I need more docks.”
Worked like a dream in 1908 (we want eight...) maybe not so much in 1928.
Real admirals bang on about needing more frigates.
 
Alphabet Soup 4 – Small but Sensible
Alphabet Soup 4 – Small but Sensible

In the autumn of 1920, the ‘H-series’ battlecruisers were an attempt to take the best features of the ‘I-series’ and use them in a smaller ship. H-3a, b and c were all 860’ long with a 106’ beam, and so would fit in existing docks. They carried two triple 18" Mk.2 45-calibre turrets and would achieve speeds in excess of 33 knots.

The initial version, H-3a, mounted all guns forward of the bridge in super-firing turrets, while a powerful secondary armament of 16-6" guns in twin turrets would be mounted aft. Decks would be up to 9" thick, and the 18-degree inclined belt armour was 14" thick over the magazines and 12” elsewhere. Speed was 33½ knots, and all this was achieved on a displacement of 45,000 tons.
However, while all these new designs had very heavily armoured turrets, there was still an argument that a single lucky hit could knock out 50% of H-3a’s firepower, and a very unlucky hit might disable one turret and jam the other. H-3b and H-3c rectified this by mounting the turrets fore and aft of the bridge. Without the need for any long, heavy barbettes, H-3c came in at just 43,750 tons, with a speed of close to 34 knots.

An attempt was made to produce an H-4, with eight 18” guns in two quadruple turrets, but it resulted in a ship more than 880' in length. It still suffered from being a two-turret concept, and as it would not fit any existing docks, the outline design was never completed.

To some in the service, the H-3 designs represented a great deal of displacement and cost for a ship with only six main guns, while many more were not keen on any design with fewer than eight guns. However, if viewed as a ‘fully-armoured Furious’, the H-series showed that firepower, speed and armour could be achieved on reasonable displacements, if six guns were considered adequate.

Few details survive of the ‘G-series’, and indeed there may only have been a G-3, which was an attempt to cut the size of the ‘I-series’ by reducing the calibre of the guns rather than their number.
Outline details show her to be a ship of 46,000 tons with nine 16" Mk.2 guns, capable of 32½ knots. Deck armour was thinned over the machinery spaces to just 2”, although magazines were still heavily protected by a 14” belt and 8” deck.
Tantalisingly however, the design probably triggered the re-examination of the D-series and the sketching of D-33 as a way to compare the guns-forward design with a traditional one. The absence of plans may also be because G-3 was part of the inspiration for what was subsequently built, and drawings may have been re-used or kept secret when new ships were finally laid down in 1922.

The final pair of these smaller designs were neglected by most seagoing officers at the time, as they were seen as too small and limited. They did, however, have considerable appeal to a debt-laden government.

E-2 was an attempt to take the battlecruiser back to its roots, while saving money and weight in the process. It was a much smaller ‘I-series’, with six 16” Mk.2 guns in three turrets, while secondary armament was reduced to ten 4.7” guns in twin shielded mounts. The main turrets were heavily protected, but during the design process there were suggestions that a ship with four lightly armoured turrets might be preferable to one with three heavily armoured ones.
Torpedo protection was up to the latest standards, but the ship’s main armour was an 11” internal belt, inclined at 18-degrees, with 10” over the machinery, intended to keep 14” shells out of the machinery and 16” out of the magazines at longer ranges. Deck was 5” and 4”. Machinery was described as ‘modernised Hood’ which meant new boilers and 140,000shp, which would give 32 knots at a load displacement of 35,200 tons.

R-3 did much the same for battleships, with two triple 18” Mk.2 turrets, one at each end of a relatively stubby 590’ hull. Armour consisted of a full length 14” external belt and a 6-7” deck. Displacement fell to just 33,000 tons, and 60,000shp was expected to deliver 23¾ knots.

By the New Year of 1921, the Constructors and the Admirals were closer to agreeing what was needed. By that time it was clear that the existing 15” ships would form a major part of the fleet for many years to come, and so new ships would have to reinforce them. Other navies were known to be building 30 or 32-knot battlecruisers, and so very large 27 or 28-knot battleships seemed to be simultaneously too slow and too fast for the Navy’s needs.
A mix of powerful battleships and fast, but less heavily armed battlecruisers therefore seemed to be the way forward.

In the spring, the government announced a new construction programme of two battleships and two battlecruisers would be included in the 1921 Programme, and it was expected that a further ship of each type would follow in both 1922 and ’23. The exact designs were not specified at that time, but by the early summer, the RN had placed orders for two ‘fast battleships’, each very similar to N-3. Battlecruisers were still the subject of debate, with arguments raging between the merits of H-3c, or the more conventional D-33.
 
In the spring, the government announced a new construction programme of two battleships and two battlecruisers would be included in the 1921 Programme, and it was expected that a further ship of each type would follow in both 1922 and ’23. The exact designs were not specified at that time, but by the early summer, the RN had placed orders for two ‘fast battleships’, each very similar to N-3. Battlecruisers were still the subject of debate, with arguments raging between the merits of H-3c, or the more conventional D-33.

So the British are going ahead with new 18" battleships? I wonder if any naval treaty will now have each of the big three navies getting a couple of 18" ships each. On the other hand, will they start developing 19" or 20" guns to leapfrog the British?
 
This TL is awesome on many aspects, and now there is one more element in sheer coolness... that freakkin' OTL WNT is nowhere in sight, and soon there will be a race toward 18-inch and even 20-inch guns. :love::happyblush:happyblush:happyblush:love::love::love:😍
 
RN had placed orders for two ‘fast battleships’, each very similar to N-3

N-3 can't really be called a 'fast battleship'

M-3 would have nine guns in triple turrets on 46,000 tons, with 23½ knots being practical due to the lighter displacement...The ‘N-3’ of late 1920 was a development of ‘M’, with refinements based on new calculations regarding weights and stresses.

At 23½ knots it's just slow.

P-3 blended the two earlier design, using nine of the 18” Mk.2 45-calibre guns in the same hull as P-34. This allowed machinery power to be increased, with eight large boilers delivering steam for 80,000shp through two shafts. The relatively full hull wasn’t optimised for speed, but the combination would deliver 26 knots at a normal load of 51,000 tons.

Why didn't they go for the P-3 design it seems fantastic and when you are talking about a ship this size the financial saving from shaving off 2500 tons doesn't seem worth losing 3 knots of speed.

Battlecruisers were still the subject of debate, with arguments raging between the merits of H-3c, or the more conventional D-33

D-33 is probably the best bet. H-3c with it's 18" guns and extra 2" of armour is superficially attractive but just two turrets is too much of a risk.

In the spring, the government announced a new construction programme of two battleships and two battlecruisers would be included in the 1921 Programme, and it was expected that a further ship of each type would follow in both 1922 and ’23.

Whichever design they chose four of each any of these is a seriously powerful battlefleet, the SoDaks and Lexingtons look very inferior, but 400,000 tons of cutting edge capital ship over three years is an awful lot of money and Britain isn't in that great a condition.
 
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Scouting forces don't tool around at 30 knots. Cruising speed until you find your baddie then the cruisers go tally ho. As noted the aircraft won't need the airspeed over the flight deck until the late 30s. Even then. Remember the Light Fleet carriers were only good for about 24kt.

With the US it is interesting to remember that the the ships they learnt to carrier on were the Langley and Lexingtons. One slow and small to the point of uselessness and the other excessively fast and over sized. With hindsight the lessons learnt are pretty obvious.

Now I got 3 perspective intended for them: the conservative( you could say even retrograde), the moderate (mostly a pragmatic approach) and the radical one.

Give a few moments please...
 
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Sort of an odd question here. Does anyone in the RN *not* expect the USN to reach functional parity with the RN during the decade to come? (or at least for the US Government to be willing to spend as much money as the UK does)
 
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