The Right Armament
The Right Armament
The Battle of Stavanger produced many lessons that would be learned and re-interpreted over many years. For the Royal Navy, foremost among those was that torpedoes were of little use to capital ships in a fleet action, and that British gunfire didn't do as much damage as was expected. Both of those seemed to have a common cause – extreme range. Most of the action at Stavanger took place beyond 15,000 yards, and even the closest ranges were 11-12,000.
Slow running torpedoes were of little use at such ranges (if they could reach them at all), and while pictures in the American papers showed ‘wrecked’ German ships that limped into Kiel or Wilhelmshaven, the fact remained that they had made it home. Most of their ships continued to run and fight until the end of the battle; suggesting that their vitals, armament and propulsion were not as heavily damage by British gunnery as they should have been. At the very long ranges that now seemed to be the norm (ranges of 6,000-10,000 yards were expected before the war), it was clear that only a few hits could be expected. Therefore, when they occurred, they must do as much damage as possible.
That thought led to the question of gun calibre; all British capital ships designed since 1912 had been equipped with 15" guns (apart from Fisher’s ‘large light cruisers’). The 15" Mk.1 was considered a very successful weapon, but both Japan and the USA were known to be working on ships with 16" guns. In Britain, there had been studies into 16", 16.5" and 18" guns, but the 16.5” had been given a lower priority than the 18”, and there was only one manufacturer capable of delivering such large guns.
Long-term, new guns, torpedoes and ships might need to be designed, but the urgencies of war meant that for now, it was essential to use could be available in the near future. A further pair of ‘Admiral’ class battlecruisers had been authorised, but both were suspended only days after Stavanger while consideration was given into whether their design should be changed.
Fitting them with eight 18" guns would amount to a complete redesign, and it was found that only nine or ten guns could be ready in time for the ships’ expected completion in 1919. A follow-on proposal to fit just four 18" guns in single turrets was quickly rejected. Admiral Jellicoe had long criticised the ‘large light cruisers’ which had just four or six main guns, and his successor, Admiral Beatty, was not prepared to endorse a design with fewer than eight main guns.
The Royal Ordinance Factory was working on a 16.5" design, but there were other British alternatives, in the form of Vickers 16" guns originally designed for the Imperial Russian Navy. Although the ships for which they were intended had been suspended at the start of the war, Vickers had continued development of two guns on their own initiative and expected to test-fire the first example early in 1917. Naturally, there were grave concerns over the proposed use of a ‘foreign gun’ on a British ship, but Vickers had pursued two subtly different versions.
The original design was based on sound principles and featuring a series of interlocking tubes in place of the usual wire-wound barrels. However, the DNO’s office already had experience with a similar design; a set of 14” guns delivered by the Americans in 1915. At that time, it had proposed to fit these to Fisher’s ‘large light cruisers’, but following their delivery to the UK, it was found that their construction was so poor that ex-Chilean (Armstrong-built) 14” wire-wound guns and turrets had to be substituted instead.
The American guns were fitted to monitors instead, and although the inspections of one of the spare guns had revealed faults in the way the tubes were locked together, it was found that they performed adequately; service reports showed that some guns were worse than others, but the best were as good as any British gun.
However, seeing that tubular built-up guns were entirely out of favour, Vickers had started work on a part-wire-wound version of their 16” gun. This benefitted from the lightweight tubular construction near the muzzle but used the trusted wire technique near the breach where the gun needed to be strongest. Most importantly, this second prototype was built to use British propellants and meet accepted British margins of safety.
The tubular ‘Mark I’ gun was more advanced, but it was designed for use with Russian propellants, which were quite different to British Cordite. The nitrocellulose used by the Russians burned more slowly and at a lower temperature than the British charges, and while it would be possible to fire the gun using Cordite, using the same charge would probably destroy it. Vickers estimated the gun could use only about 2/3 as much Cordite as the Russian powder, resulting in a muzzle velocity of no more than 2,200 ft/sec. At such low speeds, the gun would be little better than the existing British 15”.
However, the newer part-wire ‘Mark II’ design included a strengthened and enlarged chamber, allowing more propellant to be used. This, together with a British-style shell in place of the version Vickers had built for the Russians allowed muzzle velocity to be restored.
The Mark II would be able to fire a 2,340lb shell at 2,450ft/sec. At 110 tons, the gun itself was slightly heavier than the British 15", but the new turrets being designed for the ‘Admirals’ could be adapted to carry these more powerful weapons. The tubular Mark I gun could be used as a prototype, so the 16” could complete its firing trials and be in production in time for the ships' expected completion in 1919.
HMS Rodney and HMS Hardy were only just being laid down as Stavanger was fought, and their design had already diverged from the first pair of ‘Admirals’. It included a single, large funnel, which was supposed to make range and inclination more difficult to measure, and the armour scheme had been improved. In December 1916, construction was resumed, and the legend was approved in mid-January. The pair could be called the first true fast battleship design; eight of Vickers’ 16" Mk.II guns would be fitted into the same 850’ hull of the earlier ‘Admirals’.
Internally, they would be very different. To make room for the larger turrets and magazines, three boilers would be removed (leaving 18 in three rooms), and the reduction in power allowed a novel rearrangement of the engine rooms. The forward room was identical to Hood and would power the wing shafts, but the two after rooms were amalgamated into one, to supply just 41% of the total power to the two inner shafts. This design saved a great deal of length, and despite the larger guns, the main armoured citadel could be just 493’ long, instead of 550’ in Hood.
This meant the armour was more concentrated, and it could therefore be thickened. A uniform 12" belt ran between end barbettes to the upper deck, with Howe-style layered deck armour. The main deck was a uniform 3”, with an additional 1.5” splinter deck above the magazines. Partly to compensate for the extra topweight of turrets, armour, rangefinders and searchlights, the torpedo bulkhead was thickened to 1.75”, and strengthening plates were added in key areas of the keel.
The design came out at 39,755 tons (normal), with full load expected to be about 44,000 tons.
With an installed power of 118,000shp, it was hoped to achieve 30 knots on trials, although at a more realistic fighting load and a few months out of dock, 28 knots would be more realistic.
HMS Rodney as approved, January 1917
The Battle of Stavanger produced many lessons that would be learned and re-interpreted over many years. For the Royal Navy, foremost among those was that torpedoes were of little use to capital ships in a fleet action, and that British gunfire didn't do as much damage as was expected. Both of those seemed to have a common cause – extreme range. Most of the action at Stavanger took place beyond 15,000 yards, and even the closest ranges were 11-12,000.
Slow running torpedoes were of little use at such ranges (if they could reach them at all), and while pictures in the American papers showed ‘wrecked’ German ships that limped into Kiel or Wilhelmshaven, the fact remained that they had made it home. Most of their ships continued to run and fight until the end of the battle; suggesting that their vitals, armament and propulsion were not as heavily damage by British gunnery as they should have been. At the very long ranges that now seemed to be the norm (ranges of 6,000-10,000 yards were expected before the war), it was clear that only a few hits could be expected. Therefore, when they occurred, they must do as much damage as possible.
That thought led to the question of gun calibre; all British capital ships designed since 1912 had been equipped with 15" guns (apart from Fisher’s ‘large light cruisers’). The 15" Mk.1 was considered a very successful weapon, but both Japan and the USA were known to be working on ships with 16" guns. In Britain, there had been studies into 16", 16.5" and 18" guns, but the 16.5” had been given a lower priority than the 18”, and there was only one manufacturer capable of delivering such large guns.
Long-term, new guns, torpedoes and ships might need to be designed, but the urgencies of war meant that for now, it was essential to use could be available in the near future. A further pair of ‘Admiral’ class battlecruisers had been authorised, but both were suspended only days after Stavanger while consideration was given into whether their design should be changed.
Fitting them with eight 18" guns would amount to a complete redesign, and it was found that only nine or ten guns could be ready in time for the ships’ expected completion in 1919. A follow-on proposal to fit just four 18" guns in single turrets was quickly rejected. Admiral Jellicoe had long criticised the ‘large light cruisers’ which had just four or six main guns, and his successor, Admiral Beatty, was not prepared to endorse a design with fewer than eight main guns.
The Royal Ordinance Factory was working on a 16.5" design, but there were other British alternatives, in the form of Vickers 16" guns originally designed for the Imperial Russian Navy. Although the ships for which they were intended had been suspended at the start of the war, Vickers had continued development of two guns on their own initiative and expected to test-fire the first example early in 1917. Naturally, there were grave concerns over the proposed use of a ‘foreign gun’ on a British ship, but Vickers had pursued two subtly different versions.
The original design was based on sound principles and featuring a series of interlocking tubes in place of the usual wire-wound barrels. However, the DNO’s office already had experience with a similar design; a set of 14” guns delivered by the Americans in 1915. At that time, it had proposed to fit these to Fisher’s ‘large light cruisers’, but following their delivery to the UK, it was found that their construction was so poor that ex-Chilean (Armstrong-built) 14” wire-wound guns and turrets had to be substituted instead.
The American guns were fitted to monitors instead, and although the inspections of one of the spare guns had revealed faults in the way the tubes were locked together, it was found that they performed adequately; service reports showed that some guns were worse than others, but the best were as good as any British gun.
However, seeing that tubular built-up guns were entirely out of favour, Vickers had started work on a part-wire-wound version of their 16” gun. This benefitted from the lightweight tubular construction near the muzzle but used the trusted wire technique near the breach where the gun needed to be strongest. Most importantly, this second prototype was built to use British propellants and meet accepted British margins of safety.
The tubular ‘Mark I’ gun was more advanced, but it was designed for use with Russian propellants, which were quite different to British Cordite. The nitrocellulose used by the Russians burned more slowly and at a lower temperature than the British charges, and while it would be possible to fire the gun using Cordite, using the same charge would probably destroy it. Vickers estimated the gun could use only about 2/3 as much Cordite as the Russian powder, resulting in a muzzle velocity of no more than 2,200 ft/sec. At such low speeds, the gun would be little better than the existing British 15”.
However, the newer part-wire ‘Mark II’ design included a strengthened and enlarged chamber, allowing more propellant to be used. This, together with a British-style shell in place of the version Vickers had built for the Russians allowed muzzle velocity to be restored.
The Mark II would be able to fire a 2,340lb shell at 2,450ft/sec. At 110 tons, the gun itself was slightly heavier than the British 15", but the new turrets being designed for the ‘Admirals’ could be adapted to carry these more powerful weapons. The tubular Mark I gun could be used as a prototype, so the 16” could complete its firing trials and be in production in time for the ships' expected completion in 1919.
HMS Rodney and HMS Hardy were only just being laid down as Stavanger was fought, and their design had already diverged from the first pair of ‘Admirals’. It included a single, large funnel, which was supposed to make range and inclination more difficult to measure, and the armour scheme had been improved. In December 1916, construction was resumed, and the legend was approved in mid-January. The pair could be called the first true fast battleship design; eight of Vickers’ 16" Mk.II guns would be fitted into the same 850’ hull of the earlier ‘Admirals’.
Internally, they would be very different. To make room for the larger turrets and magazines, three boilers would be removed (leaving 18 in three rooms), and the reduction in power allowed a novel rearrangement of the engine rooms. The forward room was identical to Hood and would power the wing shafts, but the two after rooms were amalgamated into one, to supply just 41% of the total power to the two inner shafts. This design saved a great deal of length, and despite the larger guns, the main armoured citadel could be just 493’ long, instead of 550’ in Hood.
This meant the armour was more concentrated, and it could therefore be thickened. A uniform 12" belt ran between end barbettes to the upper deck, with Howe-style layered deck armour. The main deck was a uniform 3”, with an additional 1.5” splinter deck above the magazines. Partly to compensate for the extra topweight of turrets, armour, rangefinders and searchlights, the torpedo bulkhead was thickened to 1.75”, and strengthening plates were added in key areas of the keel.
The design came out at 39,755 tons (normal), with full load expected to be about 44,000 tons.
With an installed power of 118,000shp, it was hoped to achieve 30 knots on trials, although at a more realistic fighting load and a few months out of dock, 28 knots would be more realistic.
HMS Rodney as approved, January 1917
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