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However, it is even more often used for salmon on bagels.
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Equally delicious in a submarine roll ...
Dread Nought but the Fury of the Seas
- Thread starter sts-200
- Start date
Equally delicious in a submarine roll ...
It does; a decent armament can never be overlooked.
It shows the advantage of designing for more moderate speeds - plenty of opportunity for guns and armour without a ridiculously big ship.
To a lesser degree 'Rodney' shows it too (in the background, I worked out the group and armour weights in reasonable detail). Essentially, we have Hood, but without the fixation on 31/32 knots. We still have the fine hull, but machinery is smaller, leading to positive feedback into armour and space for larger turrets & magazines without vast increases in weight.
‘Now we can get on with winning the war’
‘Now we can get on with winning the war’
In Germany, the Generals had taken effective control of the government.
In Austria, the new Emperor was persuaded, some say forcibly, that his exhausted nation must continue the struggle.
In Russia, the man who believed himself to be the most powerful in the world continued to demand ever greater efforts from his people.
In France, the energetic General Nivelle was now in charge of the Army, and had a plan for a swift, decisive victory.
In Italy, there was still an intense will to fight, even though the results of the war so far had been few and costly.
In Britain, Lloyd George was now Prime Minister, and he was determined to wage war with renewed determination and relentlessness. New committees and new laws attacked the problems of idleness and drunkenness in the factories. Forms of conscription were introduced to boost army recruitment. New quality controls on munitions were implemented, following complaints about the standards of British shells on battlefields from the Somme to Stavanger.
The old generation of pre-war commanders were giving way to younger men near the top of both the Army and the Navy, and with them came new ideas as to how the stalemate could be broken.
Meanwhile, in the North Atlantic and the Western Approaches, the Germans had unleashed a new wave of unrestricted submarine warfare. Since the limited, but successful campaign in 1915, the number of submarines had more than doubled, as had the reserves of torpedoes. On January 26th, the German government notified all neutral nations that it considered the waters around the British Isles to be a ‘war zone’, and that all ships carrying goods in that area were liable to be seized or sunk. The United States government was assured that every effort would be made to ensure the safety of civilians, but U-boat Captains were advised to exercise Cruiser Rules only when practical, with vessels known to be unarmed and unescorted.
Admiral Holtzendorff believed that 600,000 tons of merchant shipping would need to be sunk every month, for six months, in order to wreck British trade. The first months of the campaign produced good results, although sinkings fell slightly short of the goal.
However, that was before British countermeasures began to take effect. During the previous submarine campaign, Admiral Fisher had successfully argued for the introduction of convoys. Although his scheme was never fully put into effect (the German campaign ended before it could be), the number of sinkings did fall, and by enough to convince politicians and several key naval officers that convoying still had a place in modern warfare.
At government urging, the Admiralty acted relatively swiftly. On the 19th February, the first convoy of 11 ships left from Liverpool, escorted to the boundary of the ‘war zone’ by an armed sloop. The scheme was extended to the Western Approaches in March, although at first it was not compulsory for ships to wait for a convoy, providing they followed the ‘patrolled routes’. However, these routes soon became well known to the U-boat Captains as they provided them with easy targets. Word of the frequency of attacks soon spread among British seamen and shipowners, and by the end of April, most of the larger vessels were using the convoy system.
Off the North of Ireland and on the East coast, convoying was more widespread, and by the end of March there was a clear difference it the rates of loss between the Western Approaches and elsewhere (although this was undoubtedly also due to the number of U-boats seeking easy targets).
The Royal Navy had come up with other schemes in the 18 months since the last German campaign, and political pressure, including the direct intervention of the Prime Minister, ensured that these were swiftly put into practice.
The first two were very simple. Large numbers of merchant ships were armed, usually with either a 12-pdr or a 4” gun. Each gun came with a trained naval crew and the ships were provided with proper lookout stations, manned by experienced ratings. Naturally, most of these men had to come from the Fleet, as did many of the guns. In March and April, almost every Grand Fleet battleship and battlecruiser with 4” secondaries lost two guns, and all ships lost two guns’ crews.
These armed ships would form the core of ‘small convoys’; a group of three or four ships that would sail together. While not as effective as a proper full-size convoy, it reduced the loss rate, while keeping the shipowners happy that their vessels were not stuck waiting for large convoys to assemble. By the end of the war, these small convoys were acting as feeders for larger ones, but in the spring of 1917, that was still some way in the future.
In February, 535,000 tons of shipping was sunk.
In March, despite the northern convoys, the total rose to 580,000 tons.
In April, with destroyers taken from the Grand Fleet, wider use of small and large convoys and increasing numbers of coastal patrol craft, losses fell to 498,000 tons; and much more help was on the way.
In Germany, the Generals had taken effective control of the government.
In Austria, the new Emperor was persuaded, some say forcibly, that his exhausted nation must continue the struggle.
In Russia, the man who believed himself to be the most powerful in the world continued to demand ever greater efforts from his people.
In France, the energetic General Nivelle was now in charge of the Army, and had a plan for a swift, decisive victory.
In Italy, there was still an intense will to fight, even though the results of the war so far had been few and costly.
In Britain, Lloyd George was now Prime Minister, and he was determined to wage war with renewed determination and relentlessness. New committees and new laws attacked the problems of idleness and drunkenness in the factories. Forms of conscription were introduced to boost army recruitment. New quality controls on munitions were implemented, following complaints about the standards of British shells on battlefields from the Somme to Stavanger.
The old generation of pre-war commanders were giving way to younger men near the top of both the Army and the Navy, and with them came new ideas as to how the stalemate could be broken.
Meanwhile, in the North Atlantic and the Western Approaches, the Germans had unleashed a new wave of unrestricted submarine warfare. Since the limited, but successful campaign in 1915, the number of submarines had more than doubled, as had the reserves of torpedoes. On January 26th, the German government notified all neutral nations that it considered the waters around the British Isles to be a ‘war zone’, and that all ships carrying goods in that area were liable to be seized or sunk. The United States government was assured that every effort would be made to ensure the safety of civilians, but U-boat Captains were advised to exercise Cruiser Rules only when practical, with vessels known to be unarmed and unescorted.
Admiral Holtzendorff believed that 600,000 tons of merchant shipping would need to be sunk every month, for six months, in order to wreck British trade. The first months of the campaign produced good results, although sinkings fell slightly short of the goal.
However, that was before British countermeasures began to take effect. During the previous submarine campaign, Admiral Fisher had successfully argued for the introduction of convoys. Although his scheme was never fully put into effect (the German campaign ended before it could be), the number of sinkings did fall, and by enough to convince politicians and several key naval officers that convoying still had a place in modern warfare.
At government urging, the Admiralty acted relatively swiftly. On the 19th February, the first convoy of 11 ships left from Liverpool, escorted to the boundary of the ‘war zone’ by an armed sloop. The scheme was extended to the Western Approaches in March, although at first it was not compulsory for ships to wait for a convoy, providing they followed the ‘patrolled routes’. However, these routes soon became well known to the U-boat Captains as they provided them with easy targets. Word of the frequency of attacks soon spread among British seamen and shipowners, and by the end of April, most of the larger vessels were using the convoy system.
Off the North of Ireland and on the East coast, convoying was more widespread, and by the end of March there was a clear difference it the rates of loss between the Western Approaches and elsewhere (although this was undoubtedly also due to the number of U-boats seeking easy targets).
The Royal Navy had come up with other schemes in the 18 months since the last German campaign, and political pressure, including the direct intervention of the Prime Minister, ensured that these were swiftly put into practice.
The first two were very simple. Large numbers of merchant ships were armed, usually with either a 12-pdr or a 4” gun. Each gun came with a trained naval crew and the ships were provided with proper lookout stations, manned by experienced ratings. Naturally, most of these men had to come from the Fleet, as did many of the guns. In March and April, almost every Grand Fleet battleship and battlecruiser with 4” secondaries lost two guns, and all ships lost two guns’ crews.
These armed ships would form the core of ‘small convoys’; a group of three or four ships that would sail together. While not as effective as a proper full-size convoy, it reduced the loss rate, while keeping the shipowners happy that their vessels were not stuck waiting for large convoys to assemble. By the end of the war, these small convoys were acting as feeders for larger ones, but in the spring of 1917, that was still some way in the future.
In February, 535,000 tons of shipping was sunk.
In March, despite the northern convoys, the total rose to 580,000 tons.
In April, with destroyers taken from the Grand Fleet, wider use of small and large convoys and increasing numbers of coastal patrol craft, losses fell to 498,000 tons; and much more help was on the way.
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Fun fact the biggest reason why Battleship Divison 9 were such terrible shots when they joined the Grand Fleet was because literally over half of each of its ships gunnery departments had been stripped to crew the guns of armed merchant ships with their replacements not being nearly as experienced, the other major factor was the fact that the USN used less ammo in gunnery training than the RN what with it being at peace until 1917 and said practice usually occured either in near the Hampton Roads/Chesapeake Bay area or in the Caribbean where the weather was much more cooperative than in the North Sea.
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Yes, and for the same reasons as reality. Next update but one; among other things.
SsgtC
Banned
Will the USN be sending more modern ships this time than the old 12" ships? I know IOTL the British asked that the older ships be sent because they were coal burning while the Standards were all oil fired, but considering the damage sustained in the last fleet action, might the USN insist on sending their best protected and most heavily armed ships?
How about the UK's Standards...be nice to get these and the yards in use
Fighting the Great War at Sea: Strategy, Tactics and Technology – Norman Friedman
N class standard freighters were made by fabricating parts at inland bridge and engine builders and assembling them at a specially laid out yard. All frames were made straight and the ships sides vertical (bilges were cut off at a 45 degree angle). The hull had a hard chine and the stern was cut off flat. There was no shear between the masts. Turbine (rather than the usual reciprocating) power was planned, with watertube boilers, for easy transportation from distant plants. These ships were called N (National) ships. Eleven ships of N1 design and sixty-six of N design were ordered, most from conventional builders. The only special yard was an eight-berth plant at Haverton Hill (which built the N1 design) approved late in 1917.
Robins, Nick. Wartime Standard Ships (Kindle Locations 784-789). Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition.
The situation had become so bad that in the summer of 1916 the shipowners took it upon themselves to develop the capacity to build their own ships. Lord Inchcape, in charge of P&O and British India, Sir James Caird of the Scottish Shire Line, and others invested £600,000 in a site at Chepstow on the River Wye at which they proposed to build their own ships. A further £300,000 of shares quickly sold to the shipowning community, including Federal and Furness. The site was adjacent to Edward Finch & Company’s shipyard and this was incorporated into what became the Standard Shipbuilding & Engineering Company. Here it was planned to lay out eight large slipways; Lord Inchcape predicted that by autumn 1917 several 10,000dwt ships of standard design would be in frame. It was an attractive location, being close to the Welsh coal fields and the steel works in South Wales, and it was also out of range of attack by Zeppelin.
On 31 January 1917 Kaiser Wilhelm announced the reintroduction of unrestricted submarine warfare. All ships, British or neutral, became targets when entering the so called ‘danger zone’. It was a calculated threat, made with the knowledge that it might intimidate America to join forces against Germany. The campaign was initially successful, so that between April and June one in four merchant ships leaving Britain never came home. Bernard Leek wrote in Sea Breezes, July 1988:
The bitter experience of the Kaiser’s action finally prompted a positive and effective series of responses. Prime Minister Lloyd George persuaded the Sea Lords to adopt the convoy system as a matter of policy; the decision was taken to arm vessels throughout the merchant fleet; and merchant shipbuilding was belatedly placed upon a war footing. Skilled men were recalled from the colours and formed into Shipyard Brigades and a series of Standard Merchant Ship designs were adopted for construction by both traditional builders and upon purpose built slips in newly created yards in the Bristol Channel.
The latter included the newly laid-out yard at Chepstow, which was taken under the Defence of the Realm Act, without compensation for its owners until after the war had ended. Two other yards were to be laid out, one at Beachley and the other at Portbury. These were the so-called National Shipyards, which had a planned function to build, among others, the innovative ‘fabricated ship’. Government and military bureaucracy then took over and not one ship was completed before the end of the war.
Ultimately, six N-type (N for National) fabricated ships were completed, the first in April 1920, as well as three H-type ships: a poor record for £6.4 million of government investment. The existing shipyards fared much better than the new yards at Chepstow and on the Bristol Channel, largely because of their pool of skilled labour and existing slipways and facilities. These yards were easily able to turn to conventional ship construction to standard designs, as well as production of the N-type fabricated ship.
In July 1917 Geddes announced an ambitious shipbuilding programme of 3.1 million tons, some six times that achieved in 1916. At the same time, attention was turned to standard type ships, but the type and even size of ships was argued between Geddes and the Admiralty. The Admiralty wanted small 2,000-ton ships which would be small targets for submarines to attack and losses would occur only in small units. This argument was, of course, flawed, as it overlooked that the total cost of building five 2,000-ton ships would greatly exceed that of building one 10,000-ton vessel; the same argument also applied to manning the vessels. Friedman again:
The first standardised ships were ordered some time early in 1917 … British policy was … to accept a trial or design speed of 11.5 knots (sea speed of about 10 knots) for most ships but to seek a sea speed of about 13.5 knots if ships of 450 feet length could be quickly and economically built …
Impressive ships though the G class were, the most innovative class was the fabricated, or N-type, ships. The first N type, War Climax, was launched into the Tyne from Swan Hunter & Wigham Richardson’s yard on 8 August 1918; her keel had been laid on 25 February. On completion, she sailed on 7 October from Newcastle to take up duty for the Government Shipping Controller. The class was distinctive and easy to recognise as the ships had a shapeless hull and a triangular transom, both features designed for ease of construction. The last of the fabricated ships was laid down at Caird & Company’s shipyard at Greenock in 1920, but work was later suspended on the incomplete hull. The ship was eventually completed as Grantley Hall for the West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Company and commissioned only in August 1927. She was sold after just four years of service to Russia and given the name Angarstroi. The National Shipyards, however, were singularly unproductive, delivering only six N-type ships between April 1920 and August 1921, long after the war was over.
In other words the New Yorks,Nevadas and Pennsylvanias could possibly be sent. That's a lot of 14" guns
SsgtC
Banned
Yeah. 10x14"/45 on the New York and Nevada classes and 12x14"/45 on the Pennsylvania class. That's a lot of firepower. And the two Pennsylvanias actually fired a heavier broadside than any ship in the Royal Navy at that time (Excluding Furious with her 18" guns)
Mind you with the tight spacing of the guns the triple turrets won't be the most accurate gun mounts but quantity has a quality all its own.
SsgtC
Banned
IIRC, that had already been solved by this time by incorporating a half second delay in firing the center barrel
Yes, the British have their plans too, again likely to affect the postwar world more than the war itself.
More imagination here, more innovation there...
Well it had been solved as much as possible the tight spacing between the guns still slightly diminished accuracy
At the start, it will be the older six ships, for the same reason - limited oil supplies.
However, that's still a useful increase. The 'Floridas' are better than any of the Dreadnought-derived ships, while the 'Wyomings' are probably about equivalent to the 'Orions'.
More generally, it will be the USN who are able to make a contribution to the war in the short term, and there's the knowledge that powerful reinforcements/replacements are available.
Don't forget that the USN latter sent the Nevadas and Utah otl to Ireland to cover convoys from potential German battlecruiser raids on them,in this timeline due to fears of increased German naval strength maybe they join battleship division nine and form a full strength 6th battle squadron
SsgtC
Banned
IIRC, they also sent New York as fleet flagship. Perhaps they send both New York and Texas ITTL? Both were coal burning so no reason why both couldn't be sent
Texas was sent at the same time as her sister. As for why its rather simple they were the most powerful coal burning ships in the USN and thus alongside the reat of battleship division 9 were needed to help ensure the Grand Fleet's numerical superiority over the High Seas Fleet under any circumstance which in turn allowed for the ships of the Grand Fleet to undergo a more active refit cycle(moving the fleet to Rysoth also helped in this regard) and thus ensure each available capital ship was in the best possible material condition when the fleets once again clashed in battle, which never happened in large part due to the aforementioned numerical superiority of the Grand Fleet
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