Drag Nach Osten: Military Analysis of the East in a CP Victory

There was one man who advocated a "hearts and minds" approach - a certain Archduke Wilhelm - but he was powerless to make any significant changes.
He was actually tasked with promoting the Ukrainian national cause and was given his own occupation zone by the Austro-Hungarian command. Emperor Charles supported his efforts in full, it was rather that by that point the Germans were dictating policy to their allies (and they felt Wilhelm was a threat to the order they had set up thus far). So perhaps I should clarify/correct my earlier statement, in 1918 there was an attempt to move towards a hearts and minds campaign which they got veto'd on.
 
As for Prince Mirko of Montenegro, he was known to be a man of poor overall character, and known to be at least partially open to these schemes. And - in the event of his OTL death - his son would be just a kid, and not yet able to make decisions for himself.

Perhaps then, if Mirko does end up being chosen, it causes a divide within the Petrović-Njegoš family? Considering we're talking TTL, assuming Montenegro remained its own state and isn't absorbed by occupied Serbia, we'd still have King Nicholas I's heir and Mirko's elder brother, Danilo. I can't find any sources as to why Danilo chose to renounce his royal claims OTL, but Mirko's betrayal may convince him (alongside added encouragement from his aging father) to keep his royal claims for Montenegro. And even if Danilo does still renounce them, we'd have Petar, Mirko's younger brother.

So, we'd have the proper Petrović-Njegoš family, claiming Montenegro and initially led by Nicholas, later Danilo/Petar (and if neither has issue TTL, perhaps the claim jumps to Đorđe P. Karađorđević via his mother Zorka, or Roman Petrović Romanov via his mother Milica); and we have the CP-"approved" Petrović-Obrenović dynasty at the head of CP Serbia, initially led by Mirko, later his young son Mihailo.
 
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He was actually tasked with promoting the Ukrainian national cause and was given his own occupation zone by the Austro-Hungarian command. Emperor Charles supported his efforts in full, it was rather that by that point the Germans were dictating policy to their allies (and they felt Wilhelm was a threat to the order they had set up thus far). So perhaps I should clarify/correct my earlier statement, in 1918 there was an attempt to move towards a hearts and minds campaign which they got veto'd on.

The violence and repression in the Austrian occupation zone is certainly not Germany's fault (the Germans' own zone in Ukraine was actually much better than the Austrian zone, although it also had some severe problems). Archduke Wilhelm was one man with very limited authority; the A-H occupation machinery did not pay much heed to his wishes, and he failed to make any significant improvements to the overall Austro-Hungarian policy in Ukraine.
 
Perhaps then, if Mirko does end up being chosen, it causes a divide within the Petrović-Njegoš family? Considering we're talking TTL, assuming Montenegro remained its own state and isn't absorbed by occupied Serbia, we'd still have King Nicholas I's heir and Mirko's elder brother, Danilo. I can't find any sources as to why Danilo chose to renounce his royal claims OTL

His reasons are a mystery that was never fully cleared up (AFAIK). Though it seems that he was a hedonist who strongly preferred a stress-free life.
 
The violence and repression in the Austrian occupation zone is certainly not Germany's fault (the Germans' own zone in Ukraine was actually much better than the Austrian zone, although it also had some severe problems).
Sorry again my bad, didn't mean to imply that the Germans are to blame Austrian policy prior to Wilhelm, rather just that they were probably the main reason for his limited authority, as it was diplomatic pressure from Berlin that ultimately lead to him being withdrawn to Bukovina in September. The Germans didn't necessarily want Austrian authorities to be abusive, but they also didn't want anyone shaking the boat (especially with regards to potentially toppling their man in Kiev or creating a safe haven for wanted individuals).

Archduke Wilhelm was one man with very limited authority; the A-H occupation machinery did not pay much heed to his wishes, and he failed to make any significant improvements to the overall Austro-Hungarian policy in Ukraine.
He was only in a position to do anything at all for a few months, so I don't think too much can be made of his lack of success in changing established policies in such a short amount of time. The fact that he had the political support of the Emperor in his venture indicates that at least of the dual monarchy's state apparatus was interested in alternatives to just hanging anyone acting up.
 

Anchises

Banned
While I do not think the Germans are all sunshine and rainbows, they were disciplined and under a coherent leadership, the Red Army offered reform and not until you get Stalin's brutal policies does that promise appear nightmare, so we might extrapolate that Germany has a window to prove they are better than the Czar's incompetents or complete anarchy but in imposing unpopular rule they gain the distrust and dislike of the locals. But I do not see a victorious Germany moving to Stalin levels of brutality, or even staying in place long enough to become the bad guys, the locals left in play likely do that alone. While Germany might put in the usual suck up idiots and generally screw up who best to let run things, mostly Germany pulls back so long as any semblance of order returns and the place looks to be friendly enough. The vision of a Ludendorff or Hindenburg lasts long enough to sour things but not long enough to imprint more than distaste for German stupidity. Sadly the mediocre diplomacy in years future is likely what hands most of Eastern Europe to the USSR unless things are more clear that they merely promise a change in oppression by new acronym. Yet we certainly give a lot of peoples an open shot at independence.

Interesting take and I would partly agree.

The Germans are not going to be savage opressors. During the occupation we will likely see a mediocre performance by the arrogant Prussian Officer class. German demands will take their toll but discipline, a few remaining shreds of common sense and limited ressources will encourage cooperation eventually.

And just like you say: Whoever rules the place after the Germans leave will be picked for loyalty and not for popular support.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_State

The Ukraine is a prime example here.

However once the war is over, the paramount German interest is going to be stability and ending the occupation.

Apart from the Baltic States the Germans have no "ethnic stake" in the game. So the Germans, likely taking the path of least resistance, won't prop up nationalist strong men forever. They would probably start serious negotiations with opposition groups. As long as some basic German demands are fullfilled, I see no reason why the Germans (exhausted after a bloody war) wouldn't accept local autonomy. The Germans want a buffer against (Soviet-)Russia, unimpeded economic access and no German generals killed by anarchist/socialist/nationalist bomb throwers. Eventually most opposition groups would be ready to swallow these pills, especially if continued German occupation is the alternative.

So the short term result would be unhappy but somewhat stable Eastern European states. They enjoy considerable internal autonomy and the social and economic situation slowly improves because stability slowly returns. The economic and diplomatic subordination to Germany is a sore spot that poisions relations though.

Meanwhile the Soviets probably have crushed the Whites and now have to actually organize a viable bureaucracy and economy. We know how this went IOTL....

However I don't think that the Soviets would be strong enough to try expanding into Eastern Europe during or immediately after the Russian Civil War.

Even a weakened Germany could stop them easily and Lenin knows that. Sure, agitation and material support for local Socialists/Communists is going to happen. I really doubt that would suffice to topple the states in Germany's new Eastern European sphere though.

So prior to 1925-1927 I just don't think that the Soviets would have regenerated enough to challenge the Germans. By then Lenin is dead. His successor probably is even more authoritarian. The new Eastern European states on the other hand had some time to build their intstitutions.

Given their historical track record I believe that the Bolsheviks by then would have had ample opportunity to show that their rule would be merely a change of the opressor.

Every land-,shop-,factory- or bank owner would probably think twice about changing the German yoke for the Soviet one. The same is also true for religious people, clerics or national minorities.

Of course this assumes that the Bolsheviks roughly develop like OTL. If Lenin's successor is a moderate further pursuing the NEP instead of militarism, things might look very different.
 
Interesting take and I would partly agree.

The Germans are not going to be savage opressors. During the occupation we will likely see a mediocre performance by the arrogant Prussian Officer class. German demands will take their toll but discipline, a few remaining shreds of common sense and limited ressources will encourage cooperation eventually.

And just like you say: Whoever rules the place after the Germans leave will be picked for loyalty and not for popular support.

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_State

The Ukraine is a prime example here.

However once the war is over, the paramount German interest is going to be stability and ending the occupation.

Apart from the Baltic States the Germans have no "ethnic stake" in the game. So the Germans, likely taking the path of least resistance, won't prop up nationalist strong men forever. They would probably start serious negotiations with opposition groups. As long as some basic German demands are fullfilled, I see no reason why the Germans (exhausted after a bloody war) wouldn't accept local autonomy. The Germans want a buffer against (Soviet-)Russia, unimpeded economic access and no German generals killed by anarchist/socialist/nationalist bomb throwers. Eventually most opposition groups would be ready to swallow these pills, especially if continued German occupation is the alternative.

So the short term result would be unhappy but somewhat stable Eastern European states. They enjoy considerable internal autonomy and the social and economic situation slowly improves because stability slowly returns. The economic and diplomatic subordination to Germany is a sore spot that poisions relations though.

Meanwhile the Soviets probably have crushed the Whites and now have to actually organize a viable bureaucracy and economy. We know how this went IOTL....

However I don't think that the Soviets would be strong enough to try expanding into Eastern Europe during or immediately after the Russian Civil War.

Even a weakened Germany could stop them easily and Lenin knows that. Sure, agitation and material support for local Socialists/Communists is going to happen. I really doubt that would suffice to topple the states in Germany's new Eastern European sphere though.

So prior to 1925-1927 I just don't think that the Soviets would have regenerated enough to challenge the Germans. By then Lenin is dead. His successor probably is even more authoritarian. The new Eastern European states on the other hand had some time to build their intstitutions.

Given their historical track record I believe that the Bolsheviks by then would have had ample opportunity to show that their rule would be merely a change of the opressor.

Every land-,shop-,factory- or bank owner would probably think twice about changing the German yoke for the Soviet one. The same is also true for religious people, clerics or national minorities.

Of course this assumes that the Bolsheviks roughly develop like OTL. If Lenin's successor is a moderate further pursuing the NEP instead of militarism, things might look very different.

To be fair I do not think any occupation is actually fair or more importantly perceived as fair, and few army's actually buy into the "hearts and minds" approach until they have exhausted the usual tools they know better, so Germany is no worse than any other army in being wrongly suited to administer civilians. We can certainly look to behavior in Belgium and presume German generals will be heavy handed, but I will not assume that is a given. Overall I think the new governments are imposed by Germany and remain top-down affairs, thinly backed by those who prosper under them versus the idealists who likely hate anything. In some ways the thing looks a bit like the Warsaw Pact, but the Germans have no ideological claims or territorial ambitions, mere mercantile motives suffice. Once normal civilian government returns the army loses its grip and things should move to a much better footing. As you observe, stability and bringing home the army is priority, normal diplomacy will take over as will the bureaucracy.

As much as I think the Army and Kaiser might prefer to intervene, reality is that Germany must still win in the West, the whole point is to end fighting to the East. Assuming some peace develops to the West and assuming the Bolsheviks succeed, the real problem is Germany is close enough to exhaustion to be unable to intervene. And the reality is that Lenin is either their agent provocateur or far less an enemy of Germany than the ultra-nationalist Whites potentates. We could see the armistice in the West linked to Germany getting a free hand to quash the revolution, rather realpolitik of Britain, or stalemated enough that Germany cannot spare effort, or least likely they win enough to feel confident in returning to put out the fire.

Generally I can see Germany co-existing with the USSR, it is not a love affair, but it is workable, especially if Germany has a buffer zone and the all important economic recovery at hand. Whether it crumbles depends on who takes over, if it is Stalin then one might predict a far more cozy relationship as Stalin focuses internally. Long term the USSR becomes a serious threat, just as Russia always was.

My current mental exercise is to get a more Czarist aligned PG to seek a separate peace earlier, no special train or gold, Lenin makes his own way to Russia, the fledgling democracy faces a revolution, maybe it gets the Freikorps-esque White terror or the Reds plunge the country into anarchy, neither side is coherent enough to avoid the civil war but either can win it, scales tipped to the Reds. Here Germany, and A-H, will support whatever side offers them more or by default signed the peace and supports that. But here Germany and A-H possess less territory and are more dependent on getting food shipments from Russia rather from client states, so the stakes are different. Once peace in the West is secured, the RCW is more complex but less pressing.
 
Finland would be really firmly in German orbit.
https://histdoc.net/history/153_1C.html
+ the secret part where the Finnish representatives agree to all future German demands in advance.

I suspect Finland wiggles free and aligns with Sweden after Germany retreats back to a less belligerent posture. If Russia appears weak no one is really bothered, Finland will export to Germany rather than Russia, imports will realign to follow, but Germany has little need for more than a friendly nation in Finland. A secure Nordic shield is exactly what Germany needs, they make good trade partners and ideal members of the Customs Union, so Germany proceeds to secure them as favored nations.

If Germany holds Riga she can build an effective front line base to secure the Eastern Baltic, Finland merely needs to stay neutral with pro-German diplomacy. If Germany is in Estonia, Finland is far less necessary to German security, but still a good trade partner.
 
His reasons are a mystery that was never fully cleared up (AFAIK). Though it seems that he was a hedonist who strongly preferred a stress-free life.

Hm, if that were the case, then it would make sense. In that case, he ends up renouncing his claims while his father is still alive, due in part of the increased stress induced by Mirko's betrayal, leaving Petar Stefan as the heir presumptive and soon-to-be head of the royal house of Petrović-Njegoš. And with such a turn of events, we could assume Petar lives longer than he did TTL and actually has an heir (Valtazar?), though as I've mentioned, Đorđe P. Karađorđević and Roman Petrović Romanov are still around.

So, let's then summarize what we've figured out then!

Serbia and Montenegro initially remain under Austro-Hungarian occupation, with internal politics and Budapest's influence leading Vienna to decide against direct annexation. As it attempts to figure out whom to put in power as the head of state for Serbia, a government is established with those who are sympathetic to Vienna, headed by Stojan Ribarac's Narodna stranka and Živojin Perić's Konzervativna stranka, now formed together to be the Narodna konzervativna stranka (with figures such as Vukašin J. Petrović, Vojislav S. Veljković and others joining them) [though this is all assuming different occupational developments]. As Vienna considers its options, Berlin contacts whom they believe would work best, Prince Mirko Dimitri Petrović-Njegoš, second son of King Nikola I of Montenegro, previously planned to have been proclaimed Crown Prince of Serbia in the event of King Aleksandar Obrenović being without issue, prior to the May Overthrow. Offering him not only Serbia but also Montenegro if he were to collaborate with them, Mirko seems interested, but wishes Vienna's approval, which Berlin ends up obtaining after many long discussions, to the frustration of the Austrians.

Mirko's betrayal is uncovered by the remainder of the Montenegrin government-in-exile and the house of Petrović-Njegoš, fracturing it, with Nikola disowning his son in rage, as Mirko and whatever other sympathetic figures or allies within the government-in-exile departed for the region. Mirko arrives and is declared King Mirko I Petrović-Obrenović of Serbia, not even mentioning Montenegro despite it being part of his territory. Those of the government-in-exile that had joined him, the previously Austrian-established occupational government, anyone that Austria had asked to join the government, and whatever other sympathetic figures existed in the region establish a new government, one of an autocratic nature, suppressing all other political options with any popular support, and if worst came to worst, exiling them too; a dictatorship. Mirko could even get the Jakovljevići and Obren Hristić involved if he really wanted to, if he wanted to have close allies connected to him through his wife, especially since no one from his family would likely join him. Meanwhile, on the Njegoš side, Danilo manages to convince his father, with the help of his mother and sisters, to allow him to renounce his claims and allow Petar Stefan to become heir presumptive, for a multitude of reasons. Zorka and her son Đorđe P. Karađorđević, Milica's son Roman Petrović Romanov (assuming he leaves Crimea to help), Ksenija and Vera all try their damndest in these tough times, while Ana and her husband Franz Joseph of Battenberg would like to try, but are having their own tough times. Thank goodness Jelena was the Queen of Italy.

While initially the CP-supported government manages to keep hold, especially with the help of Berlin and Vienna, Austria eventually has to deal with its own internal developments (such as KR's 1927 Ausgleich), and as such, Serbia manages to de facto be independent. Unfortunately, they are completely surrounded on all sides by enemies, ready to pounce on them if they did even the slightest thing wrong. CP Serbia recognizes this, and tries to keep the status quo intact and lower unrest, as to avoid Austria's wrath for the time being, which would probably just delay the inevitable fact that the Serbian people are out for blood. The government tries its best to retain its more absolutist state, in some ways hellbent in keeping itself stable in face of those revolting against the government, and it's a powder keg ready to blow. There may be some attempts to reconcile with those pushing for a conflict, such as conducting some small-scale militarization and perhaps even relenting and allowing more democratic elements back into the government, but they can't keep going like this forever. You'd have folks clamoring for the return of the Karađorđevići (assuming King Peter didn't just die during the war, and honestly, he may just well have), wishing revenge against the state's neighbours, even greater reforms to the political system for greater representation, some even pushing for a republic, those with a more Montenegrin identity wishing for their independence, and more. An unstable, authoritarian and autocratic regime with absolutely no popularity and legitimacy among its citizens, dealing with problems that would overwhelm even the best possible government, a bed for extreme instability - an absolute political clusterfuck. Not even use of the church could help Mirko. And that's not even to mention what would happen if Mirko passed away at the same time as he did OTL because of the problems he had with his thyroid gland, leaving his underaged son Mihailo on the throne, along with a regency-turned-diarchal dictatorship that's still struggling to keep the region under check... assuming of course, he and his wife don't go through with their OTL divorce, allowing his eldest living son to join him in Serbia (and, if butterflies allow it, his other two sons).
 
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