Dornier 19 instead of FW 200

[miketr]

Rommel. It take connections, but he went from Major in 1932 to Major General in 1939. Donitz went from Commander in 1933 to Rear Admiral in 1939. Himmler went from unemployed and living with his parents (1925) to Reichfuhrer in five years (1929).

The heer was intended from the get go to do rapid expansion into a mass army. Rommel served from end of WW1 on up, he punched his clock like other officers. What Hitlers connection got him was a division command and later a Corps Command. In your list of names is there someone that was jumped from squadron / division command to Chief of Staff or even close to it?

A lot of the logistical issues in Russia relate to the tendency of the officers to have skipped staff work. They often had company level experience in WW1. Then a military gap, then battalion level experience in mid 1930's. to corp/army/army group commanders by mid 1942. Today the USA takes 25 years to get a Division commander. A lot of the Nazi commanders had less than 12 years by mid 1942 (4 or so WW1, 5 prewar, 3 in war), and it showed. The jobs as staff officers at the regimental, then division, then corp level was simply missing. And these are the commanders I am looking up. The true staff officers had even less experience.

Some of which you say is no doubt true still had more experience than US commanders in WW2. Also you ignore the general trend of German officers from back to Fredric the Great to be willing to ignore logistics all together in the interest of short term gains. The Prussian - German military tradition was one of extreme aggression in combat, risk taking and independent thinking.

Back to the issue at hand, I haven't see any evidence for this guy being a better choice.

Michael

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Was he offering a better choice or just an alternate choice? The problem with Wever's death is that all of the strategic bomber crowd were weeded out with Wever's death by Goering. Goering wanted pliable people he could control after Wever. Goering was fearing the rise of his subordinates who were independent minded; that's why in 1936 he broke up the Luftwaffe from the RLM and tried to set Milch and Wever at each other in a divide and conquer move, because Milch was getting too 'uppity' and claiming he was the real Aviation Minister, not Goering. So when Wever died he was looking for someone young and pliable. Osterkamp was probably too independent and experienced for Goering to want to have to deal with, which is why he wasn't a choice IOTL.

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Knauss
http://www.geocities.com/~orion47/WEHRMACHT/LUFTWAFFE/General/KNAUSS_ROBERT.html
Assuming Goering wasn't going for more personal control over the Luftwaffe Knauss is someone interesting. He penned the 'Risk Air Force' strategy that helped Hitler bully his way around Europe for years, getting concessions that seem out of proportion to Germany's actual power in the mid-late 1930's.
He was deeply interested in strategic air power.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA396938
http://books.google.com/books?id=j8...WA&hl=en#v=onepage&q=risiko luftwaffe&f=false

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Luftwaffe_(1933–1945)

With an effective tactical-operational concept,[10] the German air power theorists needed a strategic doctrine and organisation. Robert Knauss, a serviceman (not pilot) in the Luftstreitkräfte during the First World War, and later an experienced pilot with Luft Hansa,[11] was prominent theorist of air power. Knauss promoted the Giulio Douhet theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry and morale by "terrorizing the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on civilians.[12] The General Staff blocked the entry of Douhet's theory into doctrine, fearing revenge strikes against German civilians and cities.[13]

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Himmeroder_Denkschrift
It appears he was also involved in planning German rearmament in West Germany postwar.

 

[miketr]

Robert Knauss is another Major in 36 with no staff experience it seams.

Wiking who were these pro-bomber people that were sacked by Goering?

Michael

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Let's talk production a bit.
Assuming Dornier's contract to build the Do17 (the He111 gets some of those resources too) is not made so as to free up resources for the Do19, plus the resources used for the Fw200 perhaps as well as some of the flying boats that aren't needed now that there is a land-based reconnaissance aircraft, which was superior to the flying boats, production of the Do19 would be higher than the FW200, especially as it would be lighter than the Fw200 even with further development.

I think we agreed that the Do19 would be viable for production by early-mid 1939. That gives time to change the cockpit and tail assembly, as well as modify the fuselage to expand the bomb bay, add more fuel tanks, and adapt the turrets to the smaller, more efficient ones that were available by 1939. The modifications reduce the crew to 6 or 7 depending on whether they want a dedicated nose gunner or not.

With the resources available in the early months of production I think 10 aircraft a month to start is viable and would increase as experience is gained producing the aircraft. Perhaps 15-20 a month is possible by September 1939. The first Geschwader would of course be a naval recon group that would be operational in time for Weserübung, the invasion of Norway. OTL the FW200 took stiff losses there, so perhaps 10 or so of 90 authorized aircraft are lost/written off.

I think once the war starts Wever, if he is still alive, would want a strategic bomber Geschwader and would start to form one once war is imminent. Once war is declared the Do19 project would likely got a lot of resources that IOTL the FW200 didn't get, because the Do19 was adaptable to strategic bombing. So by 1940 perhaps 50 or so a month is possible if multiple shifts are worked on existing lines, while new lines are opened up, as the He177 won't be available for years, so 'use what you've got' would be the mentality.
Plus by 1940 I think a further modified Do19 would be available, as testing and development would continue after production is authorized. The new version would probably be optimized for strategic bombing, so would have a deepened bomb bay allowing for larger payloads. These would appear in mid-1940 on the front line.

Production in 1940 should be high enough to have 1 dedicated naval squadron of 90-120 Do19s and 1 dedicated strategic bombing squadron of 90-120 aircraft. As production is increased by adding new production lines at the cost of not producing the Do217 in 1940-1 and phasing out any other Dornier product whose role can be taken on by another aircraft, plus the resources saved by not producing/tooling up for the Me210 in 1939 before it was deemed ready for production (OTL not until 1943 as the Me410). That means quite a bit of resources would be available for the Do19 without hurting the He111, Ju88, or any fighters (except for the Bf110 maybe).

So I think it is viable to say that by 1941 monthly production can be around or over 100 aircraft per month. That should be enough to cover training, replacement/attrition, and expansion to 4-5 or more Geschwader of 90 aircraft each. Let's say two naval squadrons of 90-120 each and 2-3 strategic bomber squadrons of 90 each.

Through 1940 there would be one oversized naval Geschwader and two normal sized strategic Geschwader by October. The first strategic Geschwader is active, if formed around August-September, by May-July. It takes part in either the Battle of Britain and/or the Blitz. The second is active by October, so only takes part in the Blitz. Perhaps the third strategic Geschwader if ready in February 1941?
The second naval Geschwader is probably ready by October-November.

The Naval version would probably have the less demanded Bramo 323 while the strategic version has either the DB 601 or Jumo 211. Eventually as Jumo production ramps up the naval version gets the Jumo 211 too.

As far as the payload goes, I think the first production variant could carry 4,000kg, with the bomb bay also being able to carry fuel tanks instead of bombs for long range missions that the naval unit would be on.
The second modified version IMHO could carry 5,000kg with a deepened fuselage like Dornier was able to do with its Do217.
This second version the Do19B would then be able to carry two 2,500kg bombs as a max internal payload or have even more slots for fuel tanks than the Do19A.

Further modifications would improve the wings, which were drag heavy, but carried fuel tanks; I think they fuel tanks would be moved out of the wings to make they less bulky. Perhaps this would be with the Do19B, as from October 1936-May 1940 would be enough to for major redesigns and development testing. That would all improve the range and speed.
The Do19 could end up looking more and more like a 4 engine Do217 with further modifications, though with some important differences.

So what do you all think, is this feasible?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Robert Knauss is another Major in 36 with no staff experience it seams.

Wiking who were these pro-bomber people that were sacked by Goering?

Michael

Sacked was perhaps too strong a word, but the were moved out of positions of influence.
Walter Wimmer, Wolfram Richthofen (was sort of sidelined in the technical department, so left for a combat command), Robert Knauss, who ended up getting command roles instead of staff ones, and Helmuth Wilberg, who ended up at a training school.

Knauss did end up at the Air War Academy in 1940 after serving as CoS of the forces in Norway, so he was regarded as an important enough air power thinker.

My source on this is James Corum in "Creating the Operational Air War", where he states that Wever was supported by the majority of the air staff by 1936 and gives these names. It is implied that there were more supporters, but he doesn't name them. I wouldn't be surprises if Fritz Loeb in production planning supported this, but Goering transfered him to the 4 Year Plan office by the end up 1936. Milch seems to have supported this too, as did other in the staff that came out against it later, like Kesselring, who, like Milch, turned against the idea because of the major resources that would be needed for strategic bomber development and production. The resource/foreign exchange crisis really dug into production around Wever's death, which made the remaining members of Wever's staff who supported the idea to turn against it and wait for the future He177 because they didn't have the resources to produce large numbers of strategic bombers in 1936. They thought the crisis would pass and in the future they could develop the technology and production base, as they thought they had until at least 1941-2 until war would come.

Of course the Do19 wasn't ready for production in 1936 and needed further development before it would be viable for production, which seems to have been Wever's plan, develop the technology for future production to gain experience with the complex technologies in development and production before the next, improved generation of bombers was ready. Wever wanted to hit the ground running when the He177 was ready and was supported by his technical and production staff, which was in contrast to the people that replaced him, who were more interested in focusing on existing technology and production to maximize it, rather than developing experience with future technologies, as they understood neither.

Of course Goering's replacements ended up handling existing production and technologies very badly. Udet is the classic example of incompetence in all areas of his responsibility, though Jeschonnek was pretty bad as well, and Goering's influence screwed things up even worse when he arbitrarily intervened. The sidelining of Milch was really the death blow to production, as without him production stagnating and declined in combat aircraft (not total aircraft though). Finally with Udet's death was some semblance of order restored, but by then technical matters were so out of sorts that there was no correcting things by the end of the war. The He177 for instance was eventually supported by Udet, even though he cancelled it initially when the design was ready, then ordered it as a dive bomber, and then approved it over a year later than it should have been ready to enter testing. Of course then it had a welded together engine...

 

[BlondieBC]

The heer was intended from the get go to do rapid expansion into a mass army. Rommel served from end of WW1 on up, he punched his clock like other officers. What Hitlers connection got him was a division command and later a Corps Command. In your list of names is there someone that was jumped from squadron / division command to Chief of Staff or even close to it?

You asked for officers with rapid promotion from Major to General, which I took to be a two star general. People regularly jumped several levels of command in both the German Army and the USA Army. For example, Patton went from commander of 700 men to commander of 16,000 men in under a year. In about two he went from 700 to 50,000. Eisenhower had a similar rapid rise. Monty jumped quite a few people. I am not as familiar with the German high command, but when I looked at individuals then have the rapid rise pattern seen in the USA. Going from LT Colonel to LT General in a few years was fairly common. Add a little patronage by Hitler, and going from a simple Major to Colonel General seems quite doable for a TL over a 5 year or so period.

If you want rapid German rise, just look at Himmler. Unemployed basement dweller to the head of the SS in five years. Roughly speaking, any poster of this thread receiving a five star USA commission and becoming life-time commander of the US Air Force would be a slower promotion path. Speer rose to power quite quickly.

Some of which you say is no doubt true still had more experience than US commanders in WW2. Also you ignore the general trend of German officers from back to Fredric the Great to be willing to ignore logistics all together in the interest of short term gains. The Prussian - German military tradition was one of extreme aggression in combat, risk taking and independent thinking.

Back to the issue at hand, I haven't see any evidence for this guy being a better choice.

Michael

I don't have a strong opinion on Weaver/Goering. Lots of mistakes were made and I am sure parts of it was who was chosen. But a lot of the blame resulted from Hitler's divided command pattern and his tendency to try to create a regime defense force that was also an Army. IMO, it was only the strong Prussian (Heer) command tradition that allowed Hitler to avoid fielding some pathetic force like many dictators do.

And how good the German army was at logistics depends at who it is compared with. You are looking at WW2 comparisons. The Germans often looked good compared to the USA in the early days or the purge depleted Soviet Army. I tend to look at WW1, and the Nazi logistical planning is terrible, as is a lot of the WW2 armies. The deep budget cuts and reduced forces in the interwar years had left a legacy of logistics by amateurs and the inexperienced. A merely competent Red Army in 1941 makes for a short war for Germany.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

You asked for officers with rapid promotion from Major to General, which I took to be a two star general. People regularly jumped several levels of command in both the German Army and the USA Army. For example, Patton went from commander of 700 men to commander of 16,000 men in under a year. In about two he went from 700 to 50,000. Eisenhower had a similar rapid rise. Monty jumped quite a few people. I am not as familiar with the German high command, but when I looked at individuals then have the rapid rise pattern seen in the USA. Going from LT Colonel to LT General in a few years was fairly common. Add a little patronage by Hitler, and going from a simple Major to Colonel General seems quite doable for a TL over a 5 year or so period.

If you want rapid German rise, just look at Himmler. Unemployed basement dweller to the head of the SS in five years. Roughly speaking, any poster of this thread receiving a five star USA commission and becoming life-time commander of the US Air Force would be a slower promotion path. Speer rose to power quite quickly.



I don't have a strong opinion on Weaver/Goering. Lots of mistakes were made and I am sure parts of it was who was chosen. But a lot of the blame resulted from Hitler's divided command pattern and his tendency to try to create a regime defense force that was also an Army. IMO, it was only the strong Prussian (Heer) command tradition that allowed Hitler to avoid fielding some pathetic force like many dictators do.

And how good the German army was at logistics depends at who it is compared with. You are looking at WW2 comparisons. The Germans often looked good compared to the USA in the early days or the purge depleted Soviet Army. I tend to look at WW1, and the Nazi logistical planning is terrible, as is a lot of the WW2 armies. The deep budget cuts and reduced forces in the interwar years had left a legacy of logistics by amateurs and the inexperienced. A merely competent Red Army in 1941 makes for a short war for Germany.

All of your examples are with the army though. How many examples can you find of that pre-war with air forces? If anything the Luftwaffe resisted jumping men up in command that rapidly pre-war. Wever was a prospect for CoS of the Heer before being transfered to the secret Luftwaffe and as far as I know was not promoted rapidly or above a staff level he was trained/groomed for. He as a staff officer that was trained and experienced in command at the general staff level having been Ludendorff's adjunct and involved in WW1 planning of the whole German strategy in 1917-1918. Apart from Helmuth Wilberg, who really should have been CoS of the Luftwaffe, Wever was the next most experienced/able/trained man in the Reichswehr.

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walther_Wever
Wever was promoted from full colonel to generalmajor when transfered to the Luftwaffe, not jumping rank. A year later when the decision was made to separate the Luftwaffe from the RLM he was promoted to generalleutnant, again not rank jump, but a normal progression.

Plus the Himmler example was a political appointment; the SS was not originally supposed to be a military organization, it was a ideological bodyguard of a party leader in the 1920's, not the praetorian guard it turned into once Hitler assumed power.

 

[Kome]

Rommel. It take connections, but he went from Major in 1932 to Major General in 1939. Donitz went from Commander in 1933 to Rear Admiral in 1939. Himmler went from unemployed and living with his parents (1925) to Reichfuhrer in five years (1929).

Rapid promotion isnt the issue here. The Luftwaffe had a few officers with similar feats. Richthofen (the less famous one) went from Major to Major General in 4 years (so, faster than even Rommel apparently).

The problem is Osterkamp wouldnt have 4 years for his promotion unless you change his starting rank or his time in service. For Osterkamp to become Luftwaffe CoS upon Wever's death in 1936 he would have to have a promotion from Major to Major General in less than a year. While also bypassing several officers with seniority and experience over him.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Rapid promotion isnt the issue here. The Luftwaffe had a few officers with similar feats. Richthofen (the less famous one) went from Major to Major General in 4 years (so, faster than even Rommel apparently).

The problem is Osterkamp wouldnt have 4 years for his promotion unless you change his rank or his time in service. For Osterkamp to become Luftwaffe CoS upon Wever's death in 1936 he would have to have a promotion from Major to Major General in less than a year. While also bypassing several officers with seniority and experience over him.

Not only that, but Goering didn't want someone as outspoken as Osterkamp or any of the WW1 vets that would challenge him. Goering was trying to reassert control over the Luftwaffe and RLM, so he wanted an anti-Milch candidate that would follow Goering and listen to him whenever he decided to interfere. You're right promotion wasn't the issue at all, it was politics. Osterkamp talked back and was friendly with Milch two very black marks against him.

 

[BlairWitch749]

All of your examples are with the army though. How many examples can you find of that pre-war with air forces? If anything the Luftwaffe resisted jumping men up in command that rapidly pre-war. Wever was a prospect for CoS of the Heer before being transfered to the secret Luftwaffe and as far as I know was not promoted rapidly or above a staff level he was trained/groomed for. He as a staff officer that was trained and experienced in command at the general staff level having been Ludendorff's adjunct and involved in WW1 planning of the whole German strategy in 1917-1918. Apart from Helmuth Wilberg, who really should have been CoS of the Luftwaffe, Wever was the next most experienced/able/trained man in the Reichswehr.
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walther_Wever
Wever was promoted from full colonel to major general when transfered to the Luftwaffe, not a major jump. A year later when the decision was made to separate the Luftwaffe from the RLM he was promoted to Lieutenant General, again not a major jump.

Plus the Himmler example was a political appointment; the SS was not originally supposed to be a military organization, it was a ideological bodyguard of a party leader in the 1920's, not the praetorian guard it turned into once Hitler assumed power.

wiking you are mixing up the german and american ranking systems

wevers top rank upon death was generalleutant which is 2 star general as opposed to the american rank of leutenant general which has 3 stars

wever going from colonel (oberst) to generalmajor is a single progression as general major in the german nomenclature is one star or the equivilent of the us brigadear general

if wever had three stars he would be general der flieger; the equivilent of the heers general der infantrie/cavalrie/artillerie/panzertruppen or us leutenant general

 

[BlairWitch749]

Rapid promotion isnt the issue here. The Luftwaffe had a few officers with similar feats. Richthofen (the less famous one) went from Major to Major General in 4 years (so, faster than even Rommel apparently).

The problem is Osterkamp wouldnt have 4 years for his promotion unless you change his starting rank or his time in service. For Osterkamp to become Luftwaffe CoS upon Wever's death in 1936 he would have to have a promotion from Major to Major General in less than a year. While also bypassing several officers with seniority and experience over him.

changing his starting rank isn't hard; have him brought back as an oberst when the LW picks him up; his record would certainly not make that controversial

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Interesting information about the Do19 I've not seen elsewhere, such as the order being given in July 1936 to cancel development and the basic design could carry over 2,000kg of bombs.

 

[Kome]

changing his starting rank isn't hard; have him brought back as an oberst when the LW picks him up; his record would certainly not make that controversial

Yeah that would be the easy solution. IIRC Udet took the same path and was commissioned as an oberst. Dont think anyone would object if Theo Osterkamp was given the same treatment.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

wiking you are mixing up the german and american ranking systems

wevers top rank upon death was generalleutant which is 2 star general as opposed to the american rank of leutenant general which has 3 stars

wever going from colonel (oberst) to generalmajor is a single progression as general major in the german nomenclature is one star or the equivilent of the us brigadear general

if wever had three stars he would be general der flieger; the equivilent of the heers general der infantrie/cavalrie/artillerie/panzertruppen or us leutenant general

Yes, my mistake.

 

[BlondieBC]

All of your examples are with the army though. How many examples can you find of that pre-war with air forces? If anything the Luftwaffe resisted jumping men up in command that rapidly pre-war.

I am not terribly familiar with the Luftwaffe leaders, but Jimmy Stewart (actor) made it from private to full colonel in the USA air force in about 5 years, so rapid promotion is not limited to armies of the world. Now their may be something related specifically to the Luftwaffe that makes it less likely for people to jump ranks than the German Army, USA Army or USA air force.

Ritter made if from Major to Lt. General in 6 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Ritter_von_Greim

Milch from Colonel to 3 star in 2.5 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erhard_Milch

Hans Jurgen from LTC to LT General in 5 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Jürgen_Stumpff

I admit it helps a lot coming back as a full Colonel rather than a major helps the odds a lot, but looking at these jumps, it looks like a man holding the rank of Major can make 2 or 3 star general in the Luftwaffe in under 5 years, and with patronage, it is probably under 3. It is not likely for any given major, but if Hitler took care of Rommel's career so well, what prevents Hitler from finding some major in the Luftwaffe (say his personal pilot in 1936) and having him as a 3 star by the time the war starts in an ATL.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I am not terribly familiar with the Luftwaffe leaders, but Jimmy Stewart (actor) made it from private to full colonel in the USA air force in about 5 years, so rapid promotion is not limited to armies of the world. Now their may be something related specifically to the Luftwaffe that makes it less likely for people to jump ranks than the German Army, USA Army or USA air force.

Ritter made if from Major to Lt. General in 6 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Ritter_von_Greim

Milch from Colonel to 3 star in 2.5 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erhard_Milch

Hans Jurgen from LTC to LT General in 5 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-Jürgen_Stumpff

I admit it helps a lot coming back as a full Colonel rather than a major helps the odds a lot, but looking at these jumps, it looks like a man holding the rank of Major can make 2 or 3 star general in the Luftwaffe in under 5 years, and with patronage, it is probably under 3. It is not likely for any given major, but if Hitler took care of Rommel's career so well, what prevents Hitler from finding some major in the Luftwaffe (say his personal pilot in 1936) and having him as a 3 star by the time the war starts in an ATL.

During or pre-war? During the war the military expanded even more rapidly and people gained combat experience quickly, meaning they can move up when unfit leaders are removed, which happened a lot on all sides during the war. 1936 is a different story for command of an entire arm of the military like the Luftwaffe. But again, rank is meaningless as Goering was looking for a young, inexperienced, but talented yes-man, which Osterkamp was not. Change what Goering was looking for and Osterkamp is possible, but not with OTL Goering, who was terrified of Milch's growing power and took the opportunity reassert his power.

 

[Kome]

(say his personal pilot in 1936) and having him as a 3 star by the time the war starts in an ATL.

Oh thats because Hans Baur was SS, not Luftwaffe.

Hans Jurgen from LTC to LT General in 5 years.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hans-J%C3%BCrgen_Stumpff

Stumpff was Wever's replacement, although he was a general by then. He pretty much fits wiking's description of what Goering was looking for. Relatively young for generals (Udet was a bit too young), inexperienced (unlike many in the Luftwaffe he lacked flight service in WW1. He was a cavalry then staff officer) and... well, competent but not exactly spectacular like Wever was. Also not a Milch man.

 

[BlondieBC]

During or pre-war? During the war the military expanded even more rapidly and people gained combat experience quickly, meaning they can move up when unfit leaders are removed, which happened a lot on all sides during the war. 1936 is a different story for command of an entire arm of the military like the Luftwaffe. But again, rank is meaningless as Goering was looking for a young, inexperienced, but talented yes-man, which Osterkamp was not. Change what Goering was looking for and Osterkamp is possible, but not with OTL Goering, who was terrified of Milch's growing power and took the opportunity reassert his power.

Both Prewar and Wartime

Well, I thought you were planning on sidelining Goering in your conceptual ATL. If he is out of the way, they different talent rise to the top. Milch made Oberst in October 1933 and made General der Flieger in January 1936. So clearly the Luftwaffe allowed for fast promotion if the stars aligned correctly for the officer. The others had wartime promotions.

Now as to the politics of one being promoted in the Luftwaffe, I am not familiar. I just have not read the source material on the subject, but it is clear to me the rapid promotions did happen and can happen in an ATL. With as mercurial a personality as Hitler has, it is not even a hard ATL to write. Take a random Luftwaffe officer and have him catch Hitler's eye. Task completed.

With Ostercamp, he came in 5th in a 1934 FIA contest. Have Hitler take note and send a note to have him given the rank of Colonel or even 1 star general in whichever is the desired year. He has 32 victories in WW1, won the Pour le Merite, and brought honor to Germany in international aviation competitions. Goering had only 22 victories and the Pour le Merite, so he actually had a better war record than Goering minus the drug issues. If you wanted to in a TL, you could just have him find Hitlers favor and bring him in straight as a 3 star General. It is a pretty short list of people with better war records than Ostercamp. I looked at the ones above 35 kills, most were not in the Luftwaffe in WW2. One was Udet, the second ended the war as 3 star, but did not start his rapid promotion until the war started. Another ended as a major.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Oh thats because Hans Baur was SS, not Luftwaffe.
Stumpff was Wever's replacement, although he was a general by then. He pretty much fits wiking's description of what Goering was looking for. Relatively young for generals (Udet was a bit too young), inexperienced (unlike many in the Luftwaffe he lacked flight service in WW1. He was a cavalry then staff officer) and... well, competent but not exactly spectacular like Wever was. Also not a Milch man.

He lasted less than a year, being pushed around by Milch and really only intended as an interm replacement.

Both Prewar and Wartime

Well, I thought you were planning on sidelining Goering in your conceptual ATL. If he is out of the way, they different talent rise to the top.

In one version of it yes I am. In this particular POD to get a Do19 as a FW200 replacement its not necessary, just Wever living.

Milch made Oberst in October 1933 and made General der Flieger in January 1936. So clearly the Luftwaffe allowed for fast promotion if the stars aligned correctly for the officer. The others had wartime promotions.

He was a civilian appointment and had almost no military role, despite what he styled himself. Like Goering it was ego driven and cosmetic.

Now as to the politics of one being promoted in the Luftwaffe, I am not familiar. I just have not read the source material on the subject, but it is clear to me the rapid promotions did happen and can happen in an ATL. With as mercurial a personality as Hitler has, it is not even a hard ATL to write. Take a random Luftwaffe officer and have him catch Hitler's eye. Task completed.

Goering IIRC was the source of most of those promotions, with Hitler promoting at the top levels. Still, Hitler didn't make staffing decisions like CoS in the Luftwaffe, that was Goering's department until 1944 or so.

With Ostercamp, he came in 5th in a 1934 FIA contest. Have Hitler take note and send a note to have him given the rank of Colonel or even 1 star general in whichever is the desired year. He has 32 victories in WW1, won the Pour le Merite, and brought honor to Germany in international aviation competitions. Goering had only 22 victories and the Pour le Merite, so he actually had a better war record than Goering minus the drug issues. If you wanted to in a TL, you could just have him find Hitlers favor and bring him in straight as a 3 star General. It is a pretty short list of people with better war records than Ostercamp. I looked at the ones above 35 kills, most were not in the Luftwaffe in WW2. One was Udet, the second ended the war as 3 star, but did not start his rapid promotion until the war started. Another ended as a major.

I think Osterkamp was too junior for Hitler to really get involved. Goering was really given control over promotions; I cannot think of a single case IOTL that Hitler ordered a promotion for anyone in the Luftwaffe that wasn't Goering or Milch; that could be my ignorance, but to my knowledge only Goering and Milch were promoted by or through Hitler. Even Udet got his job because of Goering, not Hitler. Goering wasn't using during the war, he was just taking sugar pills his doctor told him were painkillers (According to Richard Overy's Bio). No one really cared about WW1 records, it was about politics and relationships.

Goering was the leader of Richthofen's staffel during WW1 after his death and had lots of publicity and developed connections as a result in postwar Germany, which helped get Hitler get funding and audiences with industrialists and other influential people. Hitler didn't give Goering the Luftwaffe because of his war experience, it was a reward for his help during Hitler's rise to power, to take that office from the military to make sure a politically reliable ally ran that force it case the army revolted and make it a politically 'safe' branch. The 'old eagles' that got influence in the Luftwaffe did so because of Goering, not because of Hitler or any other Nazis. Goering was the one that cared about having the publicity from having his old comrades around, as it gave 'his' service luster and public favor by having recognizable faces around. Hitler didn't care one way or another.

 

[Kome]

He lasted less than a year, being pushed around by Milch and really only intended as an interm replacement.

But his replacement was Jeschonnek, who WAS an ally of Milch and had frequent arguments with Goering.

As an aside Jeschonnek apparently did manage to go from Major to major general (and chief of staff) as well, although he took the post in 1939.