Same arguments I offered in May.
You neglected to say that the tail group needed modification as well as everything else. The strut-braced configuration is very much like that used on the Whitley, and quite poor aerodynamically. I found the max range on internal fuel listed as 994 mi, and max internal bomb load at 1600 kg. Both these figures pale in comparison to the Whitley with twin Merlins. Since most of the aircraft would have to be redesigned, wouldn't it have been better to build it correctly in the first place, and doesn't it mean that the resulting aircraft will bear little resemblance to the original except for the fuselage tube, the same fuselage tube which cannot accommodate more than 1600 kg of bombs internally?
The Jumo 211 engines were in much demand early in the war, and the BMW323 engines had similar power at 10,000 ft altitude.
Goering made the decision to cancel based on industrial capacity and fuel availability. The cancellation of other aircraft which you don't favor, and which did serve various roles, against a possibly viable bomber which could never have been manufactured in quantities required to make a difference, doesn't seem a likely option, even with hindsight.
Just to address a trend, the Do-19 would not compare in performance to the B-17 because it did not use turbo-supercharging. The airplane being discussed is totally mythical, being an extrapolation of something built in a quantity of one. Presuming long range, large bombload, and invincibility to British fighters is ill-founded. German bombers grouped crews closely together and armored the crew area. The Do-19 spread the crew throughout the aircraft, making protection much less effective.
The potential extra shipping losses for this are big numbers, meaning a decisive victory for Germany.
Britain will have to respond with drastic countermeasures, curtailing bombing of Germany and committing their fleet carriers to North Atlantic convoy duty meaning they can do less in the med/east africa etc..
A question would be what happens politicially in Germany as a result of this success. Because:
Germany is apparently winning in the North Atlantic, why not increase D019 production, throw these over the North Atlantic, put ME110s and JU88s over the bay of biscay as escorts, night bomb British ports and try to win, push in the med as hard as you can to stress British shipping further. Try to win it all in 1941/early 1942, Delay the attack on the Soviet Union until 1942, sure the Soviets are stronger, but if the British are out, you will be stronger too and will have more allies to help (Turkey?)
Quite a lot of planning went into this pre-war. Convoying was something which the British in general and the RN in particular were well prepared for. The main problem with convoys, it appears, wasn't so much that all cargo arrived pretty much at once, but rather having it all removed from docks and quays in a timely and orderly manner. Also, the fall of France and the consequent closure of many east and south coast ports had not been anticipated prior to the war.
Even so, congestion issues pertained mainly to evacuation of imported stores, not so much to the ability of ports to handle many ships arriving at once. Particularly the winter of 1940-1941 was something of a crisis period - the Clyde ports being the most congested of all - but many problems were solved administratively by employing port masters with wide-ranging powers.
A major culprit in pre-war planning was the privately-owned railroad companies who had simply operated with traffic averages for their traffic calculations, not realizing or anticipating that only part of their networks would be strained by greatly increased traffic. Again the Clyde ports serve as a good example because their hinterlands weren't as well developed as other west coast ports; stores had to be unloaded from ships, sometimes by lighter, then removed from quays and into storehouses and warehouses, then all the way across Scotland on frequently single-track rail lines, via Gretna and Carlisle down to England over a rail network which had the added burden of having to deal with coal traffic due to port closures and a general shortage of coastal shipping.
The books to get about this highly interesting subject are C. B. A. Behrens Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Martin Doughty's Merchant Shipping and War, and also C. I. Savage Inland Transport
Yes, Behrens has something about the May 1941 raids on Liverpool. She recaps a June 1941 Ministory of Home Security report tallying losses in GRT thusly:
Ships totally lost: 39,100 tons
Ships damaged: 40,400 tons
Ships diverted: 83,600 tons
Ships delayed while working: 185,000 tons
Ships needed to replace lost imports: 66,000 tons
For a total of 414,100 GRT of shipping temporarily or permanently lost, or a loss of 26,116,100 ton-days. For a while, Liverpool only had 12 out of 130 berths in operation. (Ammunition ship carrying 1,000 tons of explosives blew up and knocked out over half of Liverpools quays)
However, the Luftwaffe only really began bombing west coast ports in earnest by spring 1941, by which time the 'transport crisis' alluded to above had largely been overcome, and the raids weren't sustained - no doubt because Barbarossa was looming on the horizon.
Here is a question for you. Short of butterflying away Wever's death who could replace Wever that might push forward a 4 engine bomber type? Key about Wever I get isn't so much his vision, that was important, but also he was a good staff officer and he tried to balance the chaos of early expansion of the Luftwaffe.
Michael
Is just me, or do we have the exact same LW maritime aircraft discussion every two months?
theo osterkamp
Why? From his German wiki, he left the Imperial Navy after WW1 and was in private industry. He doesn't return to military service till 1933, his staff experience doesn't come about till well after the war starts. What makes him a better choice over Albert Kesselring who before being seconded to the Luftwaffe was a Lt. Col and had some staff experience even if no formal war college training. Osterkamp was a major, in 1936. It would be a massive out of zone promotion to move him up to general rank.
Sorry I don't see this choice making any sense.
Michael
Supposedly the Condors sank about 360,000 tons of shipping by themselves by picking off single ships that didn't want to convoy or fell behind. Of course those numbers have been challenged, so for the sake of argument, let's say about 150k tons of shipping to the Condors.
Plus until 1941 B-dienst had cracked the convoy codes, so knew when and where the convoys were supposed to be. Of course they zig-zagged, so the Uboats with their limited spotting range often missed them in this period, even though they posted up where the convoys were supposed to be. They also had a hard time assembling Wolf Packs, but when they did, the Uboats were brutally successful in this period. With 100 Do19s with less accidents and greater serviceability, they could easily double or triple interceptions and Wolf Packs. Especially in the early period with minimal escorts the Uboats could sink entire convoys with surface attacks at night. The Do19 could also target the escorting ships and help pick them off.
Kesselring didn't play nice with Milch which is why he was only COS for 10 minutes
Milch and Goering loved Osterkamp; he was picked to run the secret German fighter school in Lipetsk in Russia when the LW was still under wraps; it wouldn't be the first time in nazi germany that someone with no experience or limited experience was promoted to general officer rank
10 months, which is enough time to kill the Do-19.
So we go from the highly trained Wever to the liked but inexperienced Osterkamp? What is the upside?
Second I am having trouble seeing the jump from Major to General here. Who else did they jump so highly as you suggest?
Michael
Second I am having trouble seeing the jump from Major to General here. Who else did they jump so highly as you suggest?
Egypt can be supplied through the Indian Ocean which will not be effected much by your changes. Rommel is stopped. Good chance Torch is cancelled because the UK will be begging for escorts and carriers. I see it helping Italy a good bit, and they might even be able to own the Med Sea. Maybe even the UK falls back to the Suez as its defensive line.
Goering and Milch themselves were promoted in such a way
and LW COS at least then didn't require you to be FM... Wever did most things as a one and later two star general
inexperienced is relative... Wever was a trained staff officer but he wasn't in the airforce in WW1 where Osterkamp had flown hundreds of missions and by 35/36 had squadron and gruppen command experience as well as staff and organizational experience from the secret flight school in Lipetsk he was running
osterkamp is upside because Milch and Goering loved him which means limited conflict... he also had flown dozens of missions against the UK and knew the difficulties of projecting airpower against them; plus as a highly decorated combat veteran he would be heavily respected by all of his subordinates and fliers and squash any end around attempts to undermine his authority
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helmuth_WilbergAnother prominent figure in German air power construction this time was Helmuth Wilberg. Wilberg was to play a large role in the development of German air doctrine. Having headed the Reichswehr air staff for eight years in the 1920s, Wilberg had considerable experience and was ideal for a senior staff position.[5] Göring considered making Wilberg Chief of Staff (CS). However, it was revealed Wilberg had a Jewish mother. For that reason Göring could not have him as CS. Not wishing his talent to go to waste, Göring ensured the racial laws of the Third Reich did not apply to him. Wilberg remained in the air staff and helped draw up the principle doctrine The Conduct of the Aerial War and its Regulation 16 under Walther Wever.[6][7]
Goering and Milch themselves were promoted in such a way
and LW COS at least then didn't require you to be FM... Wever did most things as a one and later two star general
inexperienced is relative... Wever was a trained staff officer but he wasn't in the airforce in WW1 where Osterkamp had flown hundreds of missions and by 35/36 had squadron and gruppen command experience as well as staff and organizational experience from the secret flight school in Lipetsk he was running
osterkamp is upside because Milch and Goering loved him which means limited conflict... he also had flown dozens of missions against the UK and knew the difficulties of projecting airpower against them; plus as a highly decorated combat veteran he would be heavily respected by all of his subordinates and fliers and squash any end around attempts to undermine his authority