Does the Entente win if the USA doesn't enter WW1?

Who wins the war?


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Nice dodge petty insult...the difference however is very simple in the case of the Germans the troops and the sailors in most cases simply went home and never returned to the colours while the French remained with their regiments. The French will power to fight is not, going by the available evidence, any less than the Germans, a case could actually be made that it was higher.
Well when you talk down to people you tend to get it back and again if it happened in 1918 it's a non start because the Americans are in the war at that point and this discussion revolves around the Americans not joining at all, this changes the entire dynamic of that year.
 
Well when you talk down to people you tend to get it back and again if it happened in 1918 it's a non start because the Americans are in the war at that point and this discussion revolves around the Americans not joining at all, this changes the entire dynamic of that year.

No, I do not talk down to you any more than you talk down to me, only I try and check actual sources. The argument is actually as to how much the Americans not being in the war actually changes the dynamic and those arguing for a complete cessation of American trade for example have been remarkably coy about how that actually comes about. I have pointed out the US were very aware of the value of Entente trade to their economy and are unlikely to simply cut it off when to do would be to damage themselves in order to allow Germany to create a larger protected market for German goods that excludes US goods or even simply to no gain for the US.

Further but people need to show that the level of dependence as compared to the level of advantage gained by the Entente's use of American goods. I am firmly of the opinion that a successful strategic offensive against a competent foe requires overwhelming resources, something the CP will not enjoy over the Entente even with the cessation of US trade beyond cash exchange. Now since I also believe the US would not allow itself to drop into depression just to help out the CP, I can see the US not entering the war but think that the cessation of trade and commercial lending unlikely in the extreme.

Stalemate as pointed out by Admiral Holtzendorf would be disastrous...though it might be argued he meant merely for his fellow ruling class members rather than Germany as a whole.
 
Also, at the time of the Armistice, nearly a million French and British troops on their way back from Salonika to the Western Front. Additionally, there were large numbers of troops in Britain that had been held back by Lloyd-George in order to spite Haig. If Haig is seen to be defeating the Germans left, right and centre (as he was) it'll be difficult for Lloyd-George to deny him reinforcements. I think a couple of British offensives in 1919 would see the Germans forced back to the Rhine, given their plummeting morale and shortage of supplies.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Now since I also believe the US would not allow itself to drop into depression just to help out the CP, I can see the US not entering the war but think that the cessation of trade and commercial lending unlikely in the extreme.
So, what would be the commercial lending rate for a borrower with no colateral and an ever diminishing likelihood of repayment?

The British were burning through approximately $75 million per week on US purchases and as at January 1917, the British had total reserves/ collateral (including gold reserves) enough for approximately 2 further months of procurement.
 
So, what would be the commercial lending rate for a borrower with no colateral and an ever diminishing likelihood of repayment?

The British were burning through approximately $75 million per week on US purchases and as at January 1917, the British had total reserves/ collateral (including gold reserves) enough for approximately 2 further months of procurement.

I might humbly suggest 5.5%
 
No, I do not talk down to you any more than you talk down to me, only I try and check actual sources. The argument is actually as to how much the Americans not being in the war actually changes the dynamic and those arguing for a complete cessation of American trade for example have been remarkably coy about how that actually comes about. I have pointed out the US were very aware of the value of Entente trade to their economy and are unlikely to simply cut it off when to do would be to damage themselves in order to allow Germany to create a larger protected market for German goods that excludes US goods or even simply to no gain for the US.

Further but people need to show that the level of dependence as compared to the level of advantage gained by the Entente's use of American goods. I am firmly of the opinion that a successful strategic offensive against a competent foe requires overwhelming resources, something the CP will not enjoy over the Entente even with the cessation of US trade beyond cash exchange. Now since I also believe the US would not allow itself to drop into depression just to help out the CP, I can see the US not entering the war but think that the cessation of trade and commercial lending unlikely in the extreme.

Stalemate as pointed out by Admiral Holtzendorf would be disastrous...though it might be argued he meant merely for his fellow ruling class members rather than Germany as a whole.
Right out of the gate the Germans won't feel as pressured to go on one last big offensive as soon as possible without an American entry.
Ehh complete trade cutoff seems dubious to me but the entente are running low on collateral and I don't see why they would be getting unsecured loans.
the Americans have already set themselves up for disaster, they are over producing and that is going to lead to a crash whether that's because the war ends or because the amount of trade with the entente greatly decreases, what do you suppose the Americans do? I don't think the Americans really have any choice but a depression at this point.

The Germans thought of many things as disastrous that turned out to be not terribly bad in fact, like when Romania joined the entente.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
OTL indeed so. But can you think of anything better calculated to explode it than trying to conscript men there?
Perhaps not, but that doesn't mean it'll happen. If nothing else, if it did look like chaos would take place then they could easily pass Home Rule as a quid pro quo, citing the national emergency as a reason.

But, then, the Entente has other manpower resources to tap. OTL pre-Michael the British government was deliberately starving Haig of manpower; in an ATL with no US involvement there's no reason to think that would have to continue.

The Germans thought of many things as disastrous that turned out to be not terribly bad in fact, like when Romania joined the entente.
That was a matter of timing, though. IIRC, a few months earlier and the CPs wouldn't have had any reserves to divert there.
 
Right out of the gate the Germans won't feel as pressured to go on one last big offensive as soon as possible without an American entry.
Ehh complete trade cutoff seems dubious to me but the entente are running low on collateral and I don't see why they would be getting unsecured loans.
the Americans have already set themselves up for disaster, they are over producing and that is going to lead to a crash whether that's because the war ends or because the amount of trade with the entente greatly decreases, what do you suppose the Americans do? I don't think the Americans really have any choice but a depression at this point.

The Germans thought of many things as disastrous that turned out to be not terribly bad in fact, like when Romania joined the entente.

The first part I agree with and were it not for the troubles in the AH and the dependency of Germany on supplies of food and raw materials from that source my expectation would be for Germany to make it into 1919 with ease. However they were reliant on the Dual-Monarchy to make up the deficit in both food and supplies of key minerals and so when the AH go down Germany will shortly follow.

As to the US, once the war ends they will face a transition but that is...and was....less painful that cutting off supplies to the Entente would have been. There is a big difference between a crash and a correction, both can be painful but the former is a magnitude more so. As the Entente exit the war they and the regions reopened by the end of the war will want US civil goods and a non-victorious Germany is less able to enforce a mitteleuropa protection block.

So I would contend the options other than depression are and were very palatable.
 
Guys take a step down from argueing and look at the question from a distance and include all facts.

1. no US entry - all the same up to this point of time except Zimmerman (the premise itself is abit asb, but...)

I tend to look at this in three ways

A - the military situation
B - the economic situation
C - the political situation


A is easiest.

During April - that is after OTLS US entry - the Entente attacked (Arras, Nivelle) the latter led to the mutinies. I tend to lean to the Mutinies being a "no offensive, but full defense" thing. With no hope of US troops reliefing the french the military situation of the French will be (slightly) worse comapred to OTL in 1917. But overall the military situation won't change (much) in 1917, so I assume all goes (roughly) as OTL.

B - well - most of the discussion so far has been about this topic.

I tend to disagree with most said so far.

loans - they won't dry up immediately,

As some have noticed correctly the US economy is dependent (sort of) on exports. So US firms will continue to sell to the Entente nations. But without the US being in the war the CONDITIONS of those sales (and loans) will be worse than those of OTL, so in the mid to long run the supply situation will deteriorate over time. Much equipment of otls AEF was French made, so one source on US dollars could be the selling of French made equipment to an US that is arming its army (seeing maybe that its army is too small).

What happens after the war is something different. Will the Entente nation be able to repay their loans, or will they default? Will a default drag down the US economy? IF yes - how far?...

C - I see two potential developments

A - the US manages to broker a (near white) peace
B - nothing happens and the war drags on into 1918

THE interesting question will be - do the reds stall the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk as they did OTL - I think the furthjer development depends on this.

DID the Reds stall because they knew the US would come, if so Brets Litovsk might be a treaty shaped before OTL Faustschlag took place. That is the CPs gain a few weeks compared to OTL, or do the Reds stall even if the US does NOT come?
 
Additional political question: does Kerensky change his plans at all without American belligerence? Probably not, given his dependence on Entente aid, but he'd have even more reason to be pessimistic, and seeking terms in the fall would hedge the Bolsheviks out almost entirely.
 
how was the Entente set for food in general? I've read in a couple of places that when the US entered the war and first sat down to talk to the other Allied leaders, they were told that the Entente needed a lot of food rather badly, which caught Wilson by surprise, and the US had to drastically increase it's spring planting to get there. Any truth to this?
It wasn't so much running out of food as running out of money to pay for it. In OTL neutral Argentina ended up being a defacto Entente non-belligerent as it provided at least two years worth of wheat and beef exports to Britain and France on almost interest-free loans, becoming a net creditor nation for the first time in its history. So did Canada.

In a timeline on which the US remains neutral, and/or the war lasts longer with no clear victor in sight, those loans might not be forecoming, at least not in such generous terms. In OTL US pressure did help convince Argentina to basically give away its grain almost interest-free to the Entente, otherwise by 1918 the food situation in Europe was indeed becoming critical.
 
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The first part I agree with and were it not for the troubles in the AH and the dependency of Germany on supplies of food and raw materials from that source my expectation would be for Germany to make it into 1919 with ease. However they were reliant on the Dual-Monarchy to make up the deficit in both food and supplies of key minerals and so when the AH go down Germany will shortly follow.


AH only went down when Germany was no longer able to prop her (and Bulgaria) up.

If they haven't gambled everything on an "all or nothing" offensive in 1918, they have the forces available to shore up the Macedocian and Italian fronts.
 
But, then, the Entente has other manpower resources to tap. OTL pre-Michael the British government was deliberately starving Haig of manpower; in an ATL with no US involvement there's no reason to think that would have to continue.

Which, paradoxically, might have benefited the Germans. Had Haig been stronger in early 1918, then Michael would have looked far less promising, while absent the US, there's no urgent need to do it anyway. So they might not have launched the offensives which broke their morale in that year.
 
AH only went down when Germany was no longer able to prop her (and Bulgaria) up.

If they haven't gambled everything on an "all or nothing" offensive in 1918, they have the forces available to shore up the Macedocian and Italian fronts.

Well I think here my analysis is more based on the food riots in Vienna which is not surprising seeing as supplies of meat had fallen to 23g per person per day in Austria and 10g per person per day in Hungary and the supply of potatoes was just 70g per person per day or 1/5th the German ration by the beginning of 1918 Herwig, The First World War p361 and it is hard to blame any of that on the Americans.

Edit: when Hungary goes hungry it is no reason to forget it
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Which, paradoxically, might have benefited the Germans. Had Haig been stronger in early 1918, then Michael would have looked far less promising, while absent the US, there's no urgent need to do it anyway. So they might not have launched the offensives which broke their morale in that year.
But that just means that Germany fails later on - you have to attack to win, unless you can win by blockade, and the blockade of Germany was not going to go away.
 
https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/1264735/126093_samuel_kruizinga_paper.pdf

This article makes a rather clear point about how harshly the combined unrestricted submarine warfare and American joining of the British blockade curbed Dutch (and indirectly German) trade. Coal imports, ships docking at Rotterdam/Amsterdam, all of it halved or worse.

From that, it seems reasonable to assume that both of those factors being avoided will make the shipping situation of Europe (and thus Germany) a whole lot better. Britain alone may be able to somewhat strengthen its hand in the blockade, but nothing like what it could do with American aid - and it won't have the existential fear to back it that unrestricted submarine warfare induced. So I'd expect that 1917 and 1918 will see a much looser blockade of Europe, while also allowing somewhat safer supply lines to Britain (but without direct American support, that may not be so massive a boost compared to OTL).


In general, I believe the lack of Americans to offset the morale effect of Russia collapsing (boost for CP, hit for the Entente, and if anything sooner rather than later than OTL) will be the larger factor. When Russia drops out, Britain and France (and Italy/hangers on) will not see the slow strangulation of the blockade as a solution, they'll want to hit Germany/A-H hard before the Russian front is entirely wrapped up and the Germans come west. This will provoke either a hasty failed offensive, or they'll be so slow that they see it's useless and instead try to win a decent bargaining position some other way (naval victory? Major push on the Ottomans/Macedonia?). But barring a major offensive being succesful at dislodging the Germans from (parts of) France/Belgium or A-H from the Alps, they'll probably imagine the war unwinnable and act accordingly.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Two little aspects I've heard of recently.

In 1919 Britain & France looked for manpower from the USA and from French colonial troops. Absent the former but I've not read much at all about plans to massively expand the Algerian and (especially) the Senegalese (a term used for all natives of French West Africa) armies. Sounds similar to the oft mooted but usually ephemeral huge Indian Army the British would produce out of a hat.

Also attended the "Jutland: 36 Hours That Won the War?" Big Debate at Pompey a few weeks ago (the answer was probably not...) Dr. Laura Rowe mentioned that her latest research indicated that the blockade was not the main player in the collapse of the German home front, but (as some here have already mentioned) the truly appalling economic mis-management. Not just the Hindenburg programme but the refusal of German states to work with instead of against each other, very similar to the factors that brought Russia to her knees. So, if there is a better Federal programme in Germany, less states rights. we may not have a Fort Sumner, but we could see Germany better able to stave off the collapse and less willing to push USW. Mind you, don't think anything could save Austria-Hungary whose economic planning rivals some from one of her citizens 20-odd years later.
 
The first part I agree with and were it not for the troubles in the AH and the dependency of Germany on supplies of food and raw materials from that source my expectation would be for Germany to make it into 1919 with ease. However they were reliant on the Dual-Monarchy to make up the deficit in both food and supplies of key minerals and so when the AH go down Germany will shortly follow.

As to the US, once the war ends they will face a transition but that is...and was....less painful that cutting off supplies to the Entente would have been. There is a big difference between a crash and a correction, both can be painful but the former is a magnitude more so. As the Entente exit the war they and the regions reopened by the end of the war will want US civil goods and a non-victorious Germany is less able to enforce a mitteleuropa protection block.

So I would contend the options other than depression are and were very palatable.
Is it not possible that the Germans could continue to prop up AH without the pressure of having to launch one last attempt at a death blow to the entente? At the very least that should keep AH in a little longer, that could be enough to see Italy cut its losses, depending of course on what happens on that front. If CP knock out Italy and don't show any signs of folding in the balkans now that Russia is out its going to be a heavy hit to Entente morale.
Personally I think it will be Entente perception of German strength more than anything else that causes them to throw in the towel.
 
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