Does Narvik still fall to the Nazis if France doesn't fall in 1940 (or later)?

CaliGuy

Banned
Does Narvik still fall to the Nazis if France doesn't fall in 1940 (or later)?

Any thoughts on this?

Also, separate question: How much would a Narvik in Allied hands combined with a lack of a Fall of France have hurt Nazi Germany?
 
Does Narvik still fall to the Nazis if France doesn't fall in 1940 (or later)?

Any thoughts on this?

Also, separate question: How much would a Narvik in Allied hands combined with a lack of a Fall of France have hurt Nazi Germany?
There's probably a few thoughts on it.

If you have time to read look at PDF27s timeline. Narvik remains in allied hands and France doesn't fall.
 

Driftless

Donor
The Norwegians and French (Poles too?) recaptured Narvik on May 28, but it it became moot with the extraction of allied support for Norway and the subsequent capitulation of the Norwegians in early June. If the Battle of France goes better for the allies, maybe they re-evaluate their support for the Northern Norway campaign? FWIW, I believe Churchill described the abandonment of the Norwegians as mistake. As naraic, notes above, pdf27's (Blunted Sickle) timeline lays out a very plausible sequence of events for that theater.
 
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Driftless

Donor
Well worth reading in full, very good timeline.

Indeed. There are also myriad and detailed sidebar conversations that explore related topics. Depending on your level of interest in those particular subsets, the sidebars are also well worth the read.
 
A blunted sickle type scenario aside, let's assume France falls as per OTL, is it still possible for the Allies to sustain a foothold in Northern Norway?

I assume the lines of communication are too long but maybe if you combine with an earlier occupation of Iceland.
 

Driftless

Donor
You would need a combined services approach (land, air, sea); plus some cooperation from the Swedes on sealing the border to prevent raiding parties from slipping around the flanks. At some points the distance from the border to the nearest fjord is just a few kilometers - overland supply lines would be at risk.

While the Germans would have access to closer good ports and airfields for attacking the North, it would still be a very high maintenance operation. The 1940 mid-year Kriegsmarine was pretty beat up after the initial invasion, so there's that. The Luftwaffe's first priority was the Battle of Britain, so Norway would be a side-show for both sides.

If the Allies knew the cost of the Arctic convoys in 1940, they might have had second thoughts about trying to retain Northern Norway. But then, they'd need to know the military and diplomatic outcome of Barbarossa in advance.
 
You would need a combined services approach (land, air, sea); plus some cooperation from the Swedes on sealing the border to prevent raiding parties from slipping around the flanks. At some points the distance from the border to the nearest fjord is just a few kilometers - overland supply lines would be at risk.

While the Germans would have access to closer good ports and airfields for attacking the North, it would still be a very high maintenance operation. The 1940 mid-year Kriegsmarine was pretty beat up after the initial invasion, so there's that. The Luftwaffe's first priority was the Battle of Britain, so Norway would be a side-show for both sides.

If the Allies knew the cost of the Arctic convoys in 1940, they might have had second thoughts about trying to retain Northern Norway. But then, they'd need to know the military and diplomatic outcome of Barbarossa in advance.

Interesting thoughts. I understand why they pulled out like they did OTL but I can imagine a conversation along these lines:
  • "It will cost us a lot to try and sustain our hold on northern Norway"
  • "True, but think of how much it will cost the Huns to try and kick us out."
I can see a couple of PODs. First one is that the Allies make Norway a bloodier affair for the Germans creating an opinion among some that the cause is not yet lost. Second one is that after the debacle in France, Mr. Churchill, desperate for success somewhere/anywhere decides to try and hold Narvik. Maybe Churchill also feels that it is necessary to do something like that to impress upon Mr. Roosevelt just how serious he is about continuing the war.

I guess another way to think of this is would sustaining a presence in northern Norway be any harder or costly than sustaining Malta? I'm not so sure it would be.
 
BTW, I don't have time to write it but I would love to see a TL on this and I would be happy to help contribute if someone else writes it.
 
You would need a combined services approach (land, air, sea); plus some cooperation from the Swedes on sealing the border to prevent raiding parties from slipping around the flanks. At some points the distance from the border to the nearest fjord is just a few kilometers - overland supply lines would be at risk.

While the Germans would have access to closer good ports and airfields for attacking the North, it would still be a very high maintenance operation. The 1940 mid-year Kriegsmarine was pretty beat up after the initial invasion, so there's that. The Luftwaffe's first priority was the Battle of Britain, so Norway would be a side-show for both sides.

If the Allies knew the cost of the Arctic convoys in 1940, they might have had second thoughts about trying to retain Northern Norway. But then, they'd need to know the military and diplomatic outcome of Barbarossa in advance.

If the Swedes see North Norway controlled by the Allies ther'e probably not going to let the Germans take a detour through Sweden for raids on that; no way to define these as transports of wounded or foodstuffs supplies.
The establishing of an airdefence would be a premium - a few fighter squadrons with ground elements among these radar to guide intercepters onto incoming raids. Luftwaffe flew mainly unescorted bomber missions so that would be effective in limiting that. Untill the Germans get a droptank to fit under a Bf-109 to increase range which would be less of a problem for the defenders. However Luftwaffe releasing fighters for Norway with an upcoming and running campaign in the west is well night not happening.

You need the RN to remain active in Norwegian waters and approaches to keep pressure on the Germans regarding logistics; ofc the Swedes may still be allowing train movement of supplies to southern Norway though that would depend on the success of the Allies. This however would mean mining the Danish waters as heavily as OTL and then more to stop the Germans from using these for moving logistics which perhaps may trigger earlier Danish active resistance by sabotage of ferries.
 

Redbeard

Banned
If the allies maintain a presence in N. Norway they will of course have a logistic challenge across the North Sea/North Atlantic, but IMHO the German logistic challenge will be even greater.

The allies have the seapower and ports in N. Norway to keep supplies flowing but the Germans will have to creep cautiously through mine-infested Danish waters and up along the Norwegian coast or stick to inland Nowegian railroad lines. Both routes will have limited capacity and be quite vulnerable (see Arctic Warrior's post above).

If the Germans are not in control of Narvik S. Norway is of no use to them, and I doubt they will keep their presence. But that of course precondition a certain level of rationality in the German leadership.
 
It has always puzzled me why the Allies abandoned Narvik. That they didn't know that there would be Artic convoys is one reason, but what about the early reason for the Norwegian intervention (which was planned on the Allied side earlier than on the Axis side), to deny the Germans use of the port to whip Swedish iron ore? Granted that reasoning never made that much sense and they may have just been looking for something for the British and French armies to do during the Phony War.

I suspect that abandoning Narvik didn't make much sense, and it was just one of those things that slips through the cracks when a new government was formed. IIRC, Dill was new to the job as well as Churchill. The navy was never that enthusiastic about operations in and around Norway.

Having decided to stay in Narvik, could the British have really held this, or are we looking at an early version of Crete? Someone earlier commented that the Germans would be too busy for preparations for Sealion. I don't think this is accurate. Because only a limited number of troops and equipment could have been gotten across the Channel in even the most optimistic Sealion scenario, only two German armies were earmarked for the operation. The Battle of Britain involved two and a half luftflottes, the half being the Norwegian based one which played a small role that could have easily been curtailed. They had four at the time. The army and airforce assets were available.

Did the Allies have enough Free French forces at the time to send to Narvik, or were these just getting organized?
 

Driftless

Donor
Did the Allies have enough Free French forces at the time to send to Narvik, or were these just getting organized?

By the accounts I've read, the French forces arrived on scene better organized for the fight. The start-stop-start nature of the British operational plans led to a fair amount chaotic loading-unloading-reloading of men and material.

Churchill's later assessment ran:
The whole of northern Norway was covered with snow to depths which none of our soldiers had ever seen, felt, or imagined. There were neither snow-shoes nor skis - still less skiers. We must do our best. Thus began this ramshackle campaign.
Interesting observation, in that he was the prime political architect of the Norwegian campaign on the Allied side.

Another post-Norway Churchill assessment:
From all this wreckage and confusion there emerged one fact of major importance potentially affecting the whole future of the war. In their desperate grapple with the British Navy, the Germans ruined their own, such as it was, for the impending climax. The Allied losses in all the sea-fighting off Norway amounted to one aircraft carrier, two cruisers, one sloop, and nine destroyers. Six cruisers, two sloops, and eight destroyers were disabled, but could be repaired within our margin of sea power. On the other hand, at the end of June 1940, a momentous date, the effective German Fleet consisted of no more than one eight-inch cruiser, two light cruisers, and four destroyers. Although many of their damaged ships, like ours could be repaired, the German Navy was no factor in the supreme issue of the invasion of Britain.
 

Driftless

Donor
As long as I'm on a Churchill quotation cycle....

In his role as First Lord of the Admiralty - an internal note to the First Sea Lord and others from April 14, 1940:
On the assumption that Narvik falls into our hands in the near future we must consider the uses to which we intend to put it. First we want to make it a convenient oiling base, where our flotillas acting on the Norwegian coast can refuel at the highest economy. Secondly, we require to ship the masses of ore there to this country in a very active manner.

For these purposes we must have a moderate garrison, say about a thousand Territorial troops. A few efficient AA batteries, both high and low ceiling: a well netted, boomed and perhaps partially mined barrier: and a good supply of oil in tankers.

There's more operational recommendations in the note, but I think the key take away, is that regardless of any merit to these plans, Churchill was actively considering the ongoing use of Narvik. By the time this note was written, events were already spinning sideways for the allies in southern Norway.
 
In a couple of other threads we have talked about the Japanese taking Darwin, and one of the problems that presents for the Allies is that Darwin is basically an island due to a lack of developed ground lines of communication and the fact that it is far from a lot of other places.

Can the same be said about Narvik? I know Norway's terrain is pretty rough but how well developed were the ground lines of communication linking Narvik to areas further south? If the g-locs are well developed then the Germans can probably get up there and dig the Allies out, even if it takes awhile. However, if Narvik like Darwin is effectively an island, the my thinking is the Allies probably could have held on to it. It would have been rough on the guys stationed up there and Narvik is 900 miles from Scapa Flow but that is closer than Malta is to Gibraltar or Alexandria.

Thoughts?
 
I would also like to point out that running convoys from the British Isles up to Narvik would be a heck of a lot less deadly than running convoys through the Mediterranean to Malta.
 
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